

September 7, 1999

Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2,
REGARDING SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION (TAC NOS. MA4625 AND MA4626)
(TS 98-09)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 245 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 236 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated January 15, 1999, which requested approval to remove the seismic instrumentation requirements and the associated Bases from the SQN Technical Specifications for Units 1 and 2. This approval enables the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to relocate the seismic instrumentation requirements to the SQN Technical Requirements Manual. The Commission has reviewed TVA's request and found it to be acceptable.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original signed by:

MRC FILE CENTER COPY

Ronald W. Hernan, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 245 to License No. DPR-77
- 2. Amendment No. 236 to License No. DPR-79
- 3. Safety Evaluation

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cc w/enclosures: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald W. Hernan".

Ronald W. Hernan, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 245 to
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2. Amendment No. 236 to
License No. DPR-79
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cc w/enclosures: See next page

Mr. J. A. Scalice
Tennessee Valley Authority

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 245
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated January 15, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 245 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented no later than 45 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Sheri R. Peterson, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 7, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 245

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

INSERT

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INSTRUMENTATION

SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.3 This specification is deleted.

(Pages 3/4 3-44 through 3/4 3-46 are deleted)

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

This specification is deleted.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility and the potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50.

BR

3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS

This specification deleted.

R66

3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980.

R153

The postaccident monitoring instrumentation limiting condition for operation provides the requirement of Type A and Category 1 monitors that provide information required by the control room operators to:

Permit the operator to take preplanned manual actions to accomplish safe plant shutdown.

R163

Determine whether systems important to safety are performing their intended functions.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 236
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

- A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated January 15, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
- B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
- C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
- D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
- E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 236 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented no later than 45 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Sheri R. Peterson, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 7, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 236

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

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R130

R54

R218

R134

INSTRUMENTATION

SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.3 This specification is deleted.

(Pages 3/4 3-45 through 3/4 3-47 are deleted)

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

This specification is deleted.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

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The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT STANDBY of the facility and the potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50.

BR

3/4.3.3.6 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS

This specification deleted.

R54

3/4.3.3.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980.

R135

The postaccident monitoring instrumentation limiting condition for operation provides the requirement of Type A and Category 1 monitors that provide information required by the control room operators to:

R149

Permit the operator to take preplanned manual action to accomplish safe plant shutdown



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 245 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

AND AMENDMENT NO. 236 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated January 15, 1999, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) proposed an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2. The requested changes would relocate the seismic instrumentation requirements from the SQN TS to the SQN Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). In addition, the appropriate TS Bases sections and index pages would be revised to reflect this change.

2.0 BACKGROUND

TVA requests the proposed change to remove requirements from the SQN TS that do not meet the criteria in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.36. TVA's proposed change is provided in accordance with the guidance in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter (GL) 95-10, "Relocation of Selected Technical Specifications Requirements Related to Instrumentation," dated December 15, 1995. NRC GL 95-10 refers to the Commission's "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," published in the Federal Register on July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132). The NRC Final Policy Statement states that TS requirements that do not meet any of the screening criteria for retention may be proposed for removal from the TS and relocated to licensee-controlled documents, such as the Final Safety Analysis Report or TRM. TVA's proposed change will allow revisions to the seismic instrumentation, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, without requiring a license amendment request and adds flexibility to processing necessary changes.

TVA is planning to upgrade SQN's seismic instrumentation system starting in August 1999. The proposed upgrade includes replacement of the current analog seismic recorders and central recording and playback units with a new digital system.

ENCLOSURE

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3.0 EVALUATION

SQN's seismic instrumentation is designed to record data on seismic ground motion and provide data on the frequency and amplitude relationship of the response of major structures and systems to seismic events (earthquakes). SQN's seismic instrumentation system is designed for compliance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 1, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes." Currently, SQN TS contain limiting conditions of operation (LCOs) and surveillance requirements (SRs) to verify the operability of seismic instrumentation. The operability of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluates the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 100. The current SRs include the conduct of periodic channel checks, channel calibrations, and channel functional tests. The TS Bases contains the basis for requiring seismic instrumentation.

TVA's proposed TS change is consistent with the guidance of NRC GL 95-10 and the Standard TS for Westinghouse-designed nuclear power plants (NUREG-1431). In NUREG-1431, there are no seismic instrumentation requirements because this instrumentation does not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36. NRC GL 95-10 provides guidance for relocating selected instrumentation requirements that do not meet the criteria from 10 CFR 50.36. In addition, TVA evaluated SQN's current seismic instrumentation TS requirements against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36. The following discussions address the applicability of the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria to SQN's TS for seismic instrumentation:

Criterion 1: Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Seismic instrumentation is used to record data for use in evaluating the effect of a seismic event. This instrumentation is not used to mitigate a design basis accident (DBA) or transient. SQN's seismic instrumentation is not used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Accordingly, the SQN seismic instrumentation does not satisfy Criterion 1.

Criterion 2: A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or Transient that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier.

SQN's seismic instrumentation is not a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier. Therefore, the SQN seismic instrumentation does not satisfy Criterion 2.

Criterion 3: A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

SQN's seismic instrumentation is not assumed to function in the safety analysis. The instrumentation is not a structure, system or component that is part of the primary success path for accident mitigation. In addition, seismic instrumentation does not function or actuate to mitigate a DBA or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Accordingly, seismic instrumentation does not satisfy Criterion 3.

Criterion 4: A structure, system or component, which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Neither operational experience nor probabilistic safety assessment has shown the SQN seismic instrumentation to be significant to the public health and safety. Therefore, the instrumentation does not satisfy Criterion 4.

The proposed relocation of the seismic instrumentation requirements to the SQN TRM is acceptable based on the above discussions. Therefore, the staff finds the amendments, as proposed by TVA to be acceptable. Following relocation of the seismic instrumentation requirements to the SQN TRM, TVA will ensure that changes are not implemented that would reduce the functionality or testing of this system without prior NRC review in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 6712). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Ronald W. Herman

Dated: September 7, 1999