

September 29, 1997

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
President, TVA Nuclear and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF LICENSE AMENDMENTS FOR THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR
PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M96598 AND M96599) (TS 96-07)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 229 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 220 to the Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated August 28, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated March 17, March 27, April 3, and July 15, 1997.

The amendments revise the as-found setpoint tolerance band for the pressurizer Code safety relief valves and the main steam Code safety relief valves from $\pm 1\%$ to $\pm 3\%$.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald W. Hernan, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

- Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 229 to License No. DPR-77
 2. Amendment No. 220 to License No. DPR-79
 3. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ronald W. Herman".

Ronald W. Herman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 229 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 220 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 229
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

- A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated August 28, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated March 17, March 27, April 3, and July 15, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
- B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
- C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
- D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
- E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment. Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 229, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented no later than 45 days of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 29, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 229

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 4-3

3/4 4-4

3/4 7-1

3/4 7-3

INSERT

3/4 4-3

3/4 4-4

3/4 7-1

3/4 7-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE[#] with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG \pm 3%.*

| R108
|

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within \pm 1%.

|

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve of nominal operating temperature and pressure.

#A safety valve is not required OPERABLE provided at least one safety valve is removed from the pressurizer and the associated RCS breach is not covered by a pressure retaining membrane.

| R108

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING

SAFETY VALVES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG \pm 3%.*

|FP
|

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within \pm 1%.

|FP
|

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 Main steam safety valves (MSSVs) shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

R200

ACTION:

- a. With one or more MSSVs inoperable, operation may proceed provided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint trip is reduced per Table 3.7-1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the requirements of ACTION a., not met or with one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN in the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, list settings shall be within $\pm 1\%$.

With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position.

R200

TABLE 3.7-2

STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP

R200

<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>				<u>LIFT SETTING (+ 3%)*</u>	<u>NOZZLE SIZE</u>
<u>Loop 1</u>	<u>Loop 2</u>	<u>Loop 3</u>	<u>Loop 4</u>		
1-1-522	1-1-517	1-1-512	1-1-527	1064 psig	16 sq. in.
1-1-523	1-1-518	1-1-513	1-1-528	1077 psig	16 sq. in.
1-1-524	1-1-519	1-1-514	1-1-529	1090 psig	16 sq. in.
1-1-525	1-1-520	1-1-515	1-1-530	1103 psig	16 sq. in.
1-1-526	1-1-521	1-1-516	1-1-531	1117 psig	16 sq. in.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment. Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 220 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented no later than 45 days of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 29, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 220

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 4-6
3/4 4-7
3/4 7-1
3/4 7-3

INSERT

3/4 4-6
3/4 4-7
3/4 7-1
3/4 7-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE# with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG \pm 3%.*

| R93

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE residual heat removal loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within \pm 1%.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

#A safety valve is not required OPERABLE provided at least one safety valve is removed from the pressurizer and the associated RCS breach is not covered by a pressure retaining membrane.

| R93

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING

SAFETY VALVES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 PSIG \pm 3%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within \pm 1%.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 Main steam safety valves (MSSVs) shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-2.

R187

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more MSSVs inoperable, operation may proceed provided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint trip is reduced per Table 3.7-1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the requirements of Action a., not met or with one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN in the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. Following testing, lift settings shall be within $\pm 1\%$.

With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position.

R187

TABLE 3.7-2

STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP

<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>				<u>LIFT SETTING (+3%*)</u>	<u>NOZZLE SIZE</u>
<u>Loop 1</u>	<u>Loop 2</u>	<u>Loop 3</u>	<u>Loop 4</u>		
2-1-522	2-1-517	2-1-512	2-1-527	1064 psig	16 sq. in.
2-1-523	2-1-518	2-1-513	2-1-528	1077 psig	16 sq. in.
2-1-524	2-1-519	2-1-514	2-1-529	1090 psig	16 sq. in.
2-1-525	2-1-520	2-1-515	2-1-530	1103 psig	16 sq. in.
2-1-526	2-1-521	2-1-516	2-1-531	1117 psig	16 sq. in.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 229 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

AND AMENDMENT NO. 220 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) requested amendments to Operating Licenses DPR-77 and DPR-79 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, respectively, in a letter dated September 28, 1996, as supplemented by letters dated March 17, March 27, April 3, and July 15, 1997. The requested changes were to modify the Technical Specifications (TS) to increase the setpoint tolerance for the pressurizer safety valves (PSVs) and main steam safety valves (MSSVs) from $\pm 1\%$ to $\pm 3\%$. These parameters are contained in TS 3.4.2, TS 3.4.3.1, and Table 3.7-2.

Additionally, the sentence "Following testing, lift settings shall be within $\pm 1\%$." will be added to Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.4.2, 4.4.3.1, and 4.7.1.1.

The March 17, March 27, and July 15, 1997 letters provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the August 28, 1996, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND

TVA is requesting a revision to TS 3.4.2, TS 3.4.3.1, and Table 3.7-2 to relax the setpoint tolerance for the PSVs and the MSSVs. TVA stated that based on industry and SQN experience, the $\pm 1\%$ tolerance is not sufficient to accommodate valve setpoint drift over an entire fuel cycle. Industry standards (American National Standards Institute/American Society of Mechanical Engineers OM-1) recognize that $\pm 3\%$ is an acceptable criteria. TVA wishes to take advantage of this industry supported relaxation.

3.0 EVALUATION

Sequoyah has three PSVs with nominal setpoints of 2485 psig and a total of 20 MSSVs (5 per steam line) which have nominal setpoints of 1064 psig, 1077 psig, 1090 psig, 1103 psig, and 1117 psig. The function of the PSVs and MSSVs is to provide overpressure protection for the primary and secondary systems by limiting the pressures to within 110% of the system design.

TVA evaluated each event in Chapter 15 of the SQN Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to assess the effects of the proposed changes in the valve lift tolerances. For overpressurization of the primary and secondary systems, the licensee determined that the Loss of Electric Load (LOEL) event, described in UFSAR Section 15.2.7, is the bounding event. Therefore, to demonstrate acceptability of the proposed changes, the licensee reanalyzed the LOEL transient with assumptions that are conservative from a peak pressure perspective.

The LOEL event is initiated by a loss of external load or turbine trip. Electrical power to plant components continues to be available during the event and the reactor coolant pumps continue to operate. The turbine valve closure interrupts the heat sink for the plant, resulting in an overheating transient in the primary system. Primary system heat removal is impaired until the MSSVs open. The secondary steam dump valves are assumed not available. This event results in pressurization of both the primary as well as the secondary systems. The PSVs and MSSVs will open to maintain the pressures of the primary and secondary systems within acceptable limits.

The licensee performed separate analyses for the primary peak pressure and secondary peak pressure cases. This was necessary because assumptions related to availability of the primary pressure control system, specifically the pressurizer relief valves and pressurizer spray, affect the outcomes of the two cases differently. For the peak primary pressure case, it was conservative to assume no primary pressure control. This prevented the pressure control system from aiding the PSVs in limiting the peak pressure. For the peak secondary pressure case, it was conservative to assume that the primary pressure control was available. This effectively delayed the reactor trip and allowed the secondary side pressure to peak at a higher value. The new analyses utilized the RELAP5/MOD2-B&W computer code and included the following additional assumptions in order to maximize primary and secondary system pressures:

- Initial power was assumed to be at 102% of rated thermal power.
- A positive moderator temperature coefficient of +7 pcm/°F was assumed.
- Initial reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature was assumed to be nominal minus 4°F for control and measurement uncertainties.
- Initial RCS pressure was assumed to be nominal consistent with steady-state full power operation. Uncertainty associated with the initial pressure was accounted for in the reactor trip signal setpoint by the square root sum of the squares method.
- The tolerances assumed for the MSSVs and PSVs were +6% and +5% respectively for the peak pressure analyses. These assumptions were conservative with respect to the requested tolerances of +3%. The additional margin in tolerances between the requested and assumed (i.e., 3% for MSSVs and 2% for PSVs) is sufficient to bound the actual valve performance including valve characteristics effects (accumulation).
- Initial pressurizer level was conservatively assumed to be at 69% of span which is greater than the nominal plus instrument uncertainty level of 65%.
- No credit was taken for direct reactor trip on turbine trip.

In addition to the above considerations, the licensee confirmed that the proposed tolerances will not result in the PSVs actuating prior to the high pressurizer pressure reactor trip. The licensee applied the square root, sum of the squares method to account for safety valve setpoint drift and instrumentation uncertainties in this evaluation.

The licensee's new analyses have shown that the overpressurization acceptance criterion of 110% of system design pressure continue to be met for both the primary and secondary systems with the positive increase from 1% to 3% for setpoint tolerances. Peak pressures achieved in the analyses were 2740 psia for the primary system and 1201 psia for the secondary system and were below the limits of 2748 psia and 1208 psia, respectively.

The licensee provided an assessment of the environmental consequences of the increased setpoint tolerance for the MSSVs. The licensee provided evaluations for the environmental consequences of the Postulated Loss of AC Power to Plant Auxiliaries, Postulated Steam Line Break, Postulated Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and Postulated Rod Ejection Accident. The negative tolerance change (i.e., -3%) was also evaluated from the standpoint of increased mass release from the MSSVs to the atmosphere. The licensee indicated that their evaluation confirmed that radiological consequences remain well within the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100 with the increased steam release rates although the thyroid and whole-body gamma doses from a steam generator tube rupture accident could be as much as 37% and 5% higher, respectively. The staff found the licensee's conclusion regarding the radiologic consequences of this change to be acceptable.

The inclusion of the statement to return the PSVs and the MSSVs to $\pm 1\%$ after testing to allow for setpoint drift provides reasonable assurance that the valves will remain within the specified setpoint tolerance and is therefore acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change the requirements with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 52968). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has reviewed the proposed revision to TS to increase the setpoint tolerance for the PSVs and MSSVs from $\pm 1\%$ to $\pm 3\%$ and has found these changes to be acceptable as evaluated in Section 3.0.

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Mohammed A. Shuibi

Dated: September 29, 1997