

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
President, TVA Nuclear and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

September 13, 1995

SUBJECT: CORRECTION TO AMENDMENT NOS. 203 AND 193 FOR SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
UNITS 1 AND 2 RESPECTIVELY (TAC NOS. M91977 AND M91978) (TS 95-05)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

By letter dated June 13, 1995, the Commission issued Amendment No. 203 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 193 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments were in response to your application dated April 6, 1995. The amendments deleted Tables 3.6-1, 3.6-2 and 3.8-2, and incorporated other related changes, in accordance with Generic Letter 91-08.

When these amendments were issued, changes to page B3/4 6-3a inadvertently failed to incorporate changes to the pages that were issued on April 28, 1995 in Amendment Nos. 197 and 188 for Units 1 and 2, respectively. Enclosed are the corrected pages. We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

David E. LaBarge, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosures: 1. Corrected page B3/4 6-3a for
Amendment No. 203 to License No. DPR-77
2. Corrected page B3/4 6-3a for
Amendment No. 193 to License No. DPR-79

cc w/enclosure: See next page

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Docket File

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OGC 0-15-B-18

G. Hill T-5-C-3 (2 per docket)

C. Grimes w/Amendment 0-11-E-22

ACRS (4)

E. Merschoff RII

M. Lesser RII

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

The opening of penetration flow path(s) on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing the operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that the environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. For valves with controls located in the control room, these conditions can be satisfied by including a specific reference to closing the particular valves in the emergency procedures, since communication and environmental factors are not affected because of the location of the valve controls.

Note that due to competing requirements and dual functions associated with the containment vacuum relief isolation valves (FCV-30-46, -47, and -48), the air supply and solenoid arrangement is designed such that upon the unavailability of Train A essential control air, the containment vacuum relief isolation valves are incapable of automatic closure and are therefore considered inoperable for the containment isolation function without operator action.

The containment vacuum relief valves (30-571, -572, and -573) are qualified to perform a containment isolation function. These valves are not powered from any electrical source and no spurious signal or operator action could initiate opening. The valves are spring loaded, swing disk (check) valves with an elastomer seat. The valves are normally closed and are equipped with limit switches that provide fully open and fully closed indication in the main control room (MCR). Based upon the above information, a 72 hour allowed action time is appropriate while actions are taken to return the containment vacuum relief isolation valves to service.

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

BASES

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Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

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