April 28, 1995

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
President, TVA Nuclear and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. M86077 AND M86078) (TS 93-04)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 197 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 188 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated March 19, 1993; which was superseded by letter dated May 16, 1994; which was superseded by letter dated February 10, 1995. Amplifying information was supplied by letter dated February 17, 1995.

The amendments clarify the Limiting Condition for Operation applicable to the dual function of the containment vacuum relief isolation lines by indicating the actions that would be required should one or more of the vacuum relief lines be incapable of performing its containment isolation function or incapable of performing its vacuum relief function.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
David E. LaBarge, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 197 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 188 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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AMENDMENT NO. 197 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 and
AMENDMENT NO. 188 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328
DATED: April 28, 1995

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 197
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 19, 1993; which was superseded by letter dated May 16, 1994; which was superseded by letter dated February 10, 1995, with amplifying information being supplied by letter dated February 17, 1995; complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 197, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 45 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Frederick J. Hebdon

Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 197

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
VIII	VIII
XIII	XIII
3/4 6-17	3/4 6-17
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3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Sections A, B, C and D.4 through D.7 of Table 3.6-2 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

   1. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

   2. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

   3. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

   4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one or more containment vacuum relief isolation valve(s) specified in Sections D.1 through D.3 of Table 3.6-2 inoperable, the valve(s) must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER		FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
A. PHASE "A" ISOLATION (Cont.)			
61.	FCV-77-19	RCDT and PRT to V H	10*
62.	FCV-77-20	N_2 to RCDT	10*
63	FCV-77-127	Floor Sump Pump Disch	10*
64.	FCV-77-128	Floor Sump Pump Disch	10*
65.	FCV-81-12	Primary Water Makeup	10*
B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION			
1.	FCV-32-80	Control Air Supply	10
2.	FCV-32-102	Control Air Supply	10
3.	FCV-32-110	Control Air Supply	10
4.	FCV-67-83	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
5.	FCV-67-87	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
6.	FCV-67-88	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
7.	FCV-67-89	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
8.	FCV-67-90	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
9.	FCV-67-91	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
10.	FCV-67-95	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
11.	FCV-67-96	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
12.	FCV-67-99	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
13.	FCV-67-103	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
14.	FCV-67-104	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
15.	FCV-67-105	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
16.	FCV-67-106	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
17.	FCV-67-107	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
18.	FCV-67-111	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
19.	FCV-67-112	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
20.	FCV-67-130	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
21.	FCV-67-131	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
22.	FCV-67-133	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
23.	FCV-67-134	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
24.	FCV-67-138	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER		FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION (Cont.)			
25.	FCV-67-139	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
26.	FCV-67-141	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
27.	FCV-67-142	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
28.	FCV-67-295	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
29.	FCV-67-296	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
30.	FCV-67-297	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
31.	FCV-67-298	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
32.	FCV-70-87	RCP Thermal Barrier Ret	60
33.	FCV-70-89	CCS from RCP Oil Coolers	60
34.	FCV-70-90	RCP Thermal Barrier Ret	60
35.	FCV-70-92	CCS from RCP Oil Coolers	60
36.	FCV-70-134	To RCP Thermal Barriers	60
37.	FCV-70-140	CCS to RCP Oil Coolers	60
38.	FCV-70-141	CCS to RCP Oil Coolers	65
C. PHASE "A" CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION			
1.	FCV-30-7	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
2.	FCV-30-8	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
3.	FCV-30-9	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
4.	FCV-30-10	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
5.	FCV-30-14	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
6.	FCV-30-15	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
7.	FCV-30-16	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
8.	FCV-30-17	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
9.	FCV-30-19	Inst Room Purge Air Supply	4*
10.	FCV-30-20	Inst Room Purge Air Supply	4*
11.	FCV-30-37	Lower Compt Pressure Relief	4*
12.	FCV-30-40	Lower Compt Pressure Relief	4*

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER		FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
C. PHASE "A" CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION (Cont.)			
13.	FCV-30-50	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
14.	FCV-30-51	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
15.	FCV-30-52	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
16.	FCV-30-53	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
17.	FCV-30-56	Lower Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
18.	FCV-30-57	Lower Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
19.	FCV-30-58	Inst Room Purge Air Exh	4*
20.	FCV-30-59	Inst Room Purge Air Exh	4*
21.	FCV-90-107	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
22.	FCV-90-108	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
23.	FCV-90-109	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
24.	FCV-90-110	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
25.	FCV-90-111	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
26.	FCV-90-113	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
27.	FCV-90-114	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
28.	FCV-90-115	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
29.	FCV-90-116	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
30.	FCV-90-117	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
D. OTHER			
1.	FCV-30-46	Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
2.	FCV-30-47	Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
3.	FCV-30-48	Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
4.	FCV-30-571	Vacuum Relief Valve	**
5.	FCV-30-572	Vacuum Relief Valve	**
6.	FCV-30-573	Vacuum Relief Valve	**
7.	FCV-62-90	Normal Charging Isolation Valve	12

*Provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position with power removed and leakage limits of Specification 4.6.1.1.c are satisfied. For purge valves, leakage limits under Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.9.3 must also be satisfied.

#Provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position with power removed and either FCV-62-73 or FCV-62-74 is maintained operable.

**Vacuum relief valves perform a containment isolation function. The maximum isolation time is not applicable to these normally closed self-acting valves.

3/4.6.6 VACUUM RELIEF LINES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.6 Three primary containment vacuum relief lines shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one primary containment vacuum relief line inoperable, restore the line to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6.1 No additional surveillance requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5

*Refer to LCO 3.6.3 if one or more containment vacuum relief isolation or containment vacuum relief valves are incapable of performing a containment isolation function.

Note that due to competing requirements and dual functions associated with the containment vacuum relief isolation valves (FCV-30-46, -47, and -48), the air supply and solenoid arrangement is designed such that upon the unavailability of Train A essential control air, the containment vacuum relief isolation valves are incapable of automatic closure and are therefore considered inoperable for the containment isolation function without operator action.

The containment vacuum relief valves (30-571, -572, and -573) are qualified to perform a containment isolation function. These valves are not powered from any electrical source and no spurious signal or operator action could initiate opening. The valves are spring loaded, swing disk (check) valves with an elastomer seat. The valves are normally closed and are equipped with limit switches that provide fully open and fully closed indication in the main control room (MCR). Based upon the above information, a 72 hour allowed action time is appropriate while actions are taken to return the containment vacuum relief isolation valves to service.

3/4.6.5.7 and 3/4.6.5.8 FLOOR AND REFUELING CANAL DRAINS

The OPERABILITY of the ice condenser floor and refueling canal drains ensures that following a LOCA, the water from the melted ice and containment spray system has access for drainage back to the containment lower compartment and subsequently to the sump. This condition ensures the availability of the water for long term cooling of the reactor during the post accident phase.

3/4.6.5.9 DIVIDER BARRIER SEAL

The requirement for the divider barrier seal to be OPERABLE ensures that a minimum bypass steam flow will occur from the lower to the upper containment compartments during a LOCA. This condition ensures a diversion of steam through the ice condenser bays that is consistent with the LOCA analyses.

3/4.6.6 VACUUM RELIEF LINES

The OPERABILITY of three primary containment vacuum relief lines ensures that the containment internal pressure does not become more negative than 0.1 psid. This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the containment design limit for internal vacuum of 0.5 psid. A vacuum relief line consists of a self-actuating vacuum relief valve, a pneumatically operated isolation valve, associated piping, and instrumentation and controls.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 188
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated March 19, 1993; which was superseded by letter dated May 16, 1994; which was superseded by letter dated February 10, 1995, with amplifying information being supplied by letter dated February 17, 1995; complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 188, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 45 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Frederick J. Hebdon

Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 188

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
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XIII	XIII
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3/4 6-22	3/4 6-22
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3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Sections A, B, C and D.4 through D.7 of Table 3.6-2 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:

   1. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

   2. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

   3. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

   4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one or more containment vacuum relief isolation valve(s) specified in Sections D.1 through D.3 of Table 3.6-2 inoperable, the valve(s) must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
A. PHASE "A" ISOLATION (Cont.)		
61. FCV-77-19	RCDT and PRT to V H	10*
62. FCV-77-20	N_2 to RCDT	10*
63 FCV-77-127	Floor Sump Pump Disch	10*
64. FCV-77-128	Floor Sump Pump Disch	10*
65. FCV-81-12	Primary Water Makeup	10*
B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION		
1. FCV-32-80	Control Air Supply	10
2. FCV-32-103	Control Air Supply	10
3. FCV-32-111	Control Air Supply	10
4. FCV-67-83	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
5. FCV-67-87	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
6. FCV-67-88	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
7. FCV-67-89	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
8. FCV-67-90	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
9. FCV-67-91	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
10. FCV-67-95	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
11. FCV-67-96	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
12. FCV-67-99	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
13. FCV-67-103	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
14. FCV-67-104	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
15. FCV-67-105	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
16. FCV-67-106	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	70*
17. FCV-67-107	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
18. FCV-67-111	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
19. FCV-67-112	ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs	60*
20. FCV-67-130	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
21. FCV-67-131	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
22. FCV-67-133	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
23. FCV-67-134	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
24. FCV-67-138	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION (Cont.)		
25. FCV-67-139	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
26. FCV-67-141	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
27. FCV-67-142	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
28. FCV-67-295	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
29. FCV-67-296	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
30. FCV-67-297	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
31. FCV-67-298	ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs	60*
32. FCV-70-87	RCP Thermal Barrier Ret	60
33. FCV-70-89	CCS from RCP Oil Coolers	60
34. FCV-70-90	RCP Thermal Barrier Ret	60
35. FCV-70-92	CCS from RCP Oil Coolers	60
36. FCV-70-134	To RCP Thermal Barriers	60
37. FCV-70-140	CCS to RCP Oil Coolers	60
38. FCV-70-141	CCS to RCP Oil Coolers	65
C. PHASE "A" CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION		
1. FCV-30-7	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
2. FCV-30-8	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
3. FCV-30-9	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
4. FCV-30-10	Upper Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
5. FCV-30-14	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
6. FCV-30-15	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
7. FCV-30-16	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
8. FCV-30-17	Lower Compt Purge Air Supply	4*
9. FCV-30-19	Inst Room Purge Air Supply	4*
10. FCV-30-20	Inst Room Purge Air Supply	4*
11. FCV-30-37	Lower Compt Pressure Relief	4*
12. FCV-30-40	Lower Compt Pressure Relief	4*

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
C. PHASE "A" CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION (Cont.)		
13. FCV-30-50	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
14. FCV-30-51	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
15. FCV-30-52	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
16. FCV-30-53	Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
17. FCV-30-56	Lower Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
18. FCV-30-57	Lower Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
19. FCV-30-58	Inst Room Purge Air Exh	4*
20. FCV-30-59	Inst Room Purge Air Exh	4*
21. FCV-90-107	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
22. FCV-90-108	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
23. FCV-90-109	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
24. FCV-90-110	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
25. FCV-90-111	Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
26. FCV-90-113	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
27. FCV-90-114	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
28. FCV-90-115	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
29. FCV-90-116	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
30. FCV-90-117	Cntmt Bldg UPR Compt Air Mon	5*
D. OTHER		
1. FCV-30-46	Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
2. FCV-30-47	Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
3. FCV-30-48	Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
4. 30-571	Vacuum Relief Valve	**
5. 30-572	Vacuum Relief Valve	**
6. 30-573	Vacuum Relief Valve	**
7. FCV-62-90	Normal Charging Isolation Valve	12

*Provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position with power removed and leakage limits of Specification 4.6.1.1.c are satisfied. For purge valves, leakage limits under surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.9.3 must also be satisfied.

#Provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position with power removed and either FCV-62-73 or FCV-62-74 is maintained operable.

**Vacuum relief values perform a containment isolation function. The maximum isolation time is not applicable to these normally closed self-acting valves.

3/4.6.6 VACUUM RELIEF LINES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.6 Three primary containment vacuum relief lines shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one primary containment vacuum relief line inoperable, restore the line to OPERATE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.6.1 No additional surveillance requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

*Refer to LCO 3.6.3 if one or more containment vacuum relief isolation or containment vacuum relief valves are incapable of performing a containment isolation function.

Note that due to competing requirements and dual functions associated with the containment vacuum relief isolation valves (FCV-30-46, -47, and -48), the air supply and solenoid arrangement is designed such that upon the unavailability of Train A essential control air, the containment vacuum relief isolation vales are incapable of automatic closure and are therefore considered inoperable for the containment isolation function without operator action.

The containment vacuum relief valves (30-571, -572, and -573) are qualified to perform a containment isolation function. These valves are not powered from any electrical source and no spurious signal or operator action could initiate opening. The valves are spring loaded, swing disk (check) valves with an elastomer seat. The valves are normally closed and are equipped with limit switches that provide fully open and fully closed indication in the main control room (MCR). Based upon the above information, a 72 hour allowed action time is appropriate while actions are taken to return the containment vacuum relief isolation valves to service.

3/4.6.5.7 and 3/4.6.5.8 FLOOR AND REFUELING CANAL DRAINS

The OPERABILITY of the ice condenser floor and refueling canal drains ensures that following a LOCA, the water from the melted ice and containment spray system has access for drainage back to the containment lower compartment and subsequently to the sump. This condition ensures the availability of the water for long term cooling of the reactor during the post accident phase.

3/4.6.5.9 DIVIDER BARRIER SEAL

The requirement for the divider barrier seal to be OPERABLE ensures that a minimum bypass steam flow will occur from the lower to the upper containment compartments during a LOCA. This condition ensures a diversion of steam through the ice condenser bays that is consistent with the LOCA analyses.

3/4.6.6 VACUUM RELIEF LINES

The OPERABILITY of three primary containment vacuum relief lines ensures that the containment internal pressure does not become more negative than 0.1 psid. This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the containment design limit for internal vacuum of 0.5 psid. A vacuum relief line consists of a self-actuating vacuum relief valve, a pneumatically operated isolation valve, associated piping, and instrumentation and controls.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 197 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

AND AMENDMENT NO. 188 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated March 19, 1993; which was superseded by letter dated May 16, 1994; which was superseded by letter dated February 10, 1995; and amplified by information supplied by letter dated February 17, 1995; the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) proposed amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2. The requested changes would clarify the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requirements applicable to the dual function of the containment vacuum relief (VR) isolation lines by indicating the actions that would be required should one or more of the VR lines be incapable of performing its containment isolation function or incapable of performing its VR function.

The proposed changes would revise TS 3/4.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," and TS 3/4.6.6, "Vacuum Relief Valves" action statements to separate the containment isolation requirements from the vacuum relief requirements. A change to Table 3.6-2 would add the containment vacuum relief valves. The proposed change to TS 3/4.6.6 would clarify that the specification is applicable to the primary containment vacuum relief lines (rather than valves) and a note as a reminder to refer to LCO 3.6.3 if the valves cannot perform their containment isolation function. Other proposed changes affect Bases 3/4.6.3, Bases 3/4.6.6, and index pages to reflect these changes.

2.0 EVALUATION

The VR system consists of three identical flow paths, each comprised of a self-actuating VR valve in series with a pneumatically operated isolation valve, associated piping, instrumentation, and controls.

Each self-actuating VR valve is a 24-inch, spring-loaded, swing-disc check valve that is normally closed and will start to open if containment internal pressure is 0.1 psi below atmospheric pressure. The purpose of the valves is to protect the primary containment vessel from excessive external forces in excess of its design pressure of negative (-) 0.5 psig. This excessive pressure could result from excessive cooling in the containment as a result of

ENCLOSURE 3

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inadvertent actuation of the containment spray system, inadvertent operation of the containment air return fan, or both events occurring simultaneously. Two of the three VR lines are required to mitigate the limiting external differential pressure event (inadvertent spray actuation). The check valves are also designed as containment isolation valves to provide a containment boundary against leakage of airborne fission products from the containment atmosphere under normal and accident conditions. They are tested for seat leakage in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J (Type C test) to ensure that they are capable of providing a qualified containment boundary. Open and closed position indication is provided in the main control room (MCR).

In contrast, each VR isolation valve is an air-operated butterfly valve that is normally open, and fails open on loss of control air pressure. Air is supplied to the three isolation valves from two separate trains of control air (designated Train A and Train B) through two separate solenoid valves. The solenoid valves are designed to automatically close the isolation valves if pressure inside the containment increases to 1.5 psig in response to an isolation signal developed from either of two independent sets of three pressure sensors. Open and closed position indication is provided in the MCR and an alarm will sound if the isolation valve is not in the fully open position.

The vacuum relief system is designed to mitigate the following abnormal operational occurrences: inadvertent containment spray actuation, inadvertent containment air return fan operation, and simultaneous occurrence of inadvertent spray and air return fan operation. Two of the three lines are required to met the design requirements.

The VR system is not required to actively mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident or any other accident scenario that might result in the release of radioactivity inside the containment. As an extension of the primary containment boundary, the VR system provides a barrier against leakage of airborne fission products from the containment atmosphere under normal and accident conditions. To accomplish this, the isolation valves shut automatically to isolate the containment should internal pressure reach 1.5 psig. They will also shut if control power is lost.

As explained in LER 50-327/92015, the licensee discovered that the configuration of air supplies and solenoid valves for the isolation valves would result in loss of the guaranteed automatic closure capability if Train A control air pressure is lost, causing the isolation valves to remain in their fail-open position. This would render them inoperable as the result of a single failure, since they would then be incapable of shutting in response to an isolation signal. Under this condition, the normally-shut self-actuating check valves would seat more tightly with increasing containment pressure and would provide the containment barrier. Therefore, containment integrity is not lost.

This fail-open design of the isolation valve was previously evaluated and the staff found it acceptable in NUREG 1232, Volume 2, "Safety Evaluation Report on Tennessee Valley Authority: Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Plan," as an exception to General Criterion 56 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. This NUREG

recognized that the fail-open position provides the greatest safety for the plant since it protects against containment collapse in the event of inadvertent actuation of containment sprays. It did, however, indicate that since the two solenoids were located in redundant air supplies, a single failure would not render the valves inoperable. Once this single-failure inconsistency was discovered for loss of Train A air as it applies to the high containment pressure protection function, the licensee initiated temporary instructions to remove fuses from the Train A solenoid valve circuit if Train A control air becomes unavailable, as indicated in the LER. This would establish a flow path for Train B control air to operate the butterfly isolation valves should it become necessary. For the long-term solution, the licensee proposed this amendment to clarify and strengthen the actions to be taken should one or more of the VR lines become inoperable.

Due to the configuration of the solenoid valves, the same problem does not occur for loss of Train B air.

Upon loss of Train A air the present TS 3.6.3.b Action Statement would require that the affected vacuum relief lines be isolated within four hours or a shutdown started. Isolation of the line would involve closing the affected air-operated butterfly isolation valve(s) and removing electrical power in order to fulfill the isolation requirement. Since this would conflict with TS 3/4.6.6 that requires the vacuum relief lines be open for operability of the vacuum relief system, the licensee has proposed amending the TS to clarify the requirements.

The change to TS 3.6.3 would add an action statement to allow one or more of the containment vacuum relief isolation valves listed in Sections D.1 through D.3 of Table 3.6-2 to be inoperable for 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. When the isolation valve is inoperable, the vacuum relief line isolation function and containment integrity function is being served by the self-actuating swing check valve that has been leak rate tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The valve is normally shut and would shut more tightly if containment pressure increased, with an alarm if it left its shut seat. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

The applicability of the present TS 3.6.3 action statement would be changed to indicate that the present requirements apply to Sections A, B, C and D.4 through D.7 of Table 3.6-2. These are the containment isolation valves, including the three vacuum relief valves. This change would, therefore, result in the present containment isolation valves' requirements becoming applicable to the vacuum relief valves and is acceptable.

A proposed change to Table 3.6-2, Section D, would add the three vacuum relief valves to the list of containment isolation valves. In addition, a note would be added, referenced to the vacuum relief valves, to indicate that the relief valves perform a containment isolation function and that the maximum isolation time is not applicable to them since they are normally closed, self-actuating valves. The staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

Another proposed change to Table 3.6-2 would remove double asterisks from Valves FCV-67-89, FCV-67-90, FCV-67-105, FCV-67-106, and FCV-70-141, and the referenced note that states that the valve is required after completion of the associated modification. Since the modification was completed in 1988-89 during the Cycle 3 refueling outage, the staff finds the change acceptable.

One change to TS 3/4.6.6 would change the applicability of the specification from vacuum relief "valves" to vacuum relief "lines." The SQN design assumes single failure of one line such that two of the three vacuum relief lines are required to mitigate the limiting event. Failure of a line can result from failure of any component in the line, not just the valve. Therefore, the change clarifies the applicability of the requirement and is more conservative. It also conforms with the Westinghouse Standard TS (STS). The staff finds the change acceptable.

Another proposed change to TS 3/4.6.6 would remove the words "with an actuation setpoint of less than or equal to 0.1 PSID" from the LCO. Testing of the vacuum relief valve setpoint is performed in accordance with the In-Service Test Program, which is required by Surveillance Requirement 4.6.6.1 by referencing Specification 4.0.5. This change also conforms to the STS and is acceptable.

Another proposed change to TS 3/4.6.6 would modify the allowed outage time (AOT) for an inoperable vacuum relief line(s) from 4 hours to 72 hours. This change is based on the Westinghouse STS AOT for vacuum relief valves and is consistent with the AOT change for the containment vacuum relief isolation valves. The staff finds it acceptable.

Another proposed change to TS 3/4.6.6 would add a footnote as a reminder to refer to LCO 3.6.3 if one or more containment vacuum relief isolation or containment vacuum relief valves are incapable of performing a containment isolation function. This will ensure that appropriate actions are taken if valves in a vacuum relief line cannot perform their isolation function. The staff finds this change acceptable.

Other proposed changes affect Bases 3/4.6.6 section and TS index pages to reflect the proposed changes indicated above. These changes are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation

exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 28060, 59 FR 32237, and 60 FR 16202). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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