

December 27, 1994

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
President, TVA Nuclear and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. M90359 AND M50360) (TS 94-04)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 192 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 184 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated September 9, 1994.

The amendments revise the technical specifications related to the cold leg injection accumulators.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY FREDERICK J. HEDDON
FOR:

David E. LaBarge, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/I
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

- Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 192 to License No. DPR-77
- 2. Amendment No. 184 to License No. DPR-79
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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AMENDMENT NO. 192 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 and
AMENDMENT NO. 184 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328
DATED: DECEMBER 27, 1994

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Docket Files

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SQN Reading File

S. Varga

0-14-E-4

J. Zwolinski

G. Hill

T-5-C-3(2 per docket)

C. Grimes

0-11-E-22

H. Abelson

ACRS(4)

OPA

0-2-G-5

OC/LFDCB

T9-E10

B. Boger

RII

M. Lesser

RII



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 192
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated September 9, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 192, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 45 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 27, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 192

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 5-1

3/4 5-2

B3/4 5-1

INSERT

3/4 5-1

3/4 5-2

B3/4 5-1

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

COLD LEG INJECTION ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The isolation valve open,
- b. A contained borated water volume of between 7615 and 8094 gallons of borated water,
- c. Between 2400 and 2700 ppm of boron,
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 600 and 683 psig, and
- e. Power removed from isolation valve when RCS pressure is above 2000 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

- a. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of boron concentration not within limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the boron concentration not within limits, restore boron concentration to within limits within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours.

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 12 hours by:
 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in each cold leg injection accumulator, and
 2. Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is fully open.
 - b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume, that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank,# by verifying the boron concentration of the cold leg injection accumulator solution.
 - c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is removed.

#Only required to be performed for affected accumulators that experienced volume increases.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each cold leg injection accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core in the event that the RCS pressure falls below the specified pressure of the accumulators. For the cold leg injection accumulators, this condition occurs in the event of a large or small rupture.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. The limits in the specification for accumulator volume and nitrogen cover pressure are analysis limits and do not include instrument uncertainty. The cover pressure limits were determined by Westinghouse to be 615 psia and 697.5 psia. Since the instrument read-outs in the control room are in psig, the TS valves have been converted to psig and rounded to the nearest whole numbers. The actual nitrogen cover pressure safety limits in SQN's design documents are 600.3 psig and 682.8 psig. The minimum boron concentration ensures that the reactor core will remain subcritical during the post-LOCA (loss of coolant accident) recirculation phase based upon the cold leg accumulators' contribution to the post-LOCA sump mixture concentration.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except boron concentration not within limits minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. Under these conditions, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required. For an accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits, the limits for operation allow 72 hours to return boron concentration to within limits. This is based on the availability of ECCS water not being affected and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality during reflood because boiling of ECCS water in the core concentrates boron in the saturated liquid.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 184
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated September 9, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 184, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 45 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 27, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 184

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

INSERT

3/4 5-1

3/4 5-1

3/4 5-2

3/4 5-2

B3/4 5-1

B3/4 5-1

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

COLD LEG INJECTION ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The isolation valve open,
- b. A contained borated water volume of between 7615 and 8094 gallons of borated water,
- c. Between 2400 and 2700 ppm of boron,
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 600 and 683 psig, and
- e. Power removed from isolation valve when RCS pressure is above 2000 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

- a. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of boron concentration not within limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the boron concentration not within limits, restore boron concentration to within limits within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours.

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by:
 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in each cold leg injection accumulator, and
 2. Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is fully open.
- b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume, that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank,# by verifying the boron concentration of the cold leg injection accumulator solution.
- c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is removed.

#Only required to be performed for affected accumulators that experienced volume increases.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each cold leg injection accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. For the cold leg injection accumulators this condition occurs in the event of a large or small rupture.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. The limits in the specification for accumulator volume and nitrogen cover pressure are analysis limits and do not include instrument uncertainty. The cover pressure limits were determined by Westinghouse to be 615 psia and 697.5 psia. Since the instrument read-outs in the control room are in psig, the TS values have been converted to psig and rounded to the nearest whole numbers. The actual nitrogen cover pressure safety limits in SQN's design documents are 600.3 psig and 682.8 psig. The minimum boron concentration ensures that the reactor core will remain subcritical during the post-LOCA (loss of coolant accident) recirculation phase based upon the cold leg accumulators' contribution to the post-LOCA sump mixture concentration.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except boron concentration not within limits minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. Under these conditions, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required. For an accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration not within limits, the limits for operation allow 72 hours to return boron concentration to within limits. This is based on the availability of ECCS water not being affected and an insignificant effect on core subcriticality during reflood because boiling of ECCS water in the core concentrates boron in the saturated liquid.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 192 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77
AND AMENDMENT NO. 184 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated September 9, 1994, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) proposed an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2. The requested changes would revise the limiting conditions for operation (LCO), action requirements, surveillance requirements (SR), and associated bases for the cold leg injection accumulators (CLA).

2.0 EVALUATION

The proposed changes would affect Specifications 3.5.1.1, 4.5.1.1, and associated Bases for Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes are as follows:

1. A requirement that power be removed from the CLA isolation valves at reactor coolant system (RCS) pressures above 2000 psig would be added to LCO 3.5.1.1.
2. Currently TS 3.5.1.1.a Action Statement requires that either an inoperable CLA be restored to operable status within 1 hour or the plant be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours. This applies to all causes for inoperability except that resulting from a closed isolation valve (currently addressed in TS 3.5.1.1.b). The revision to TS 3.5.1.1.a would include the closed isolation valve as an applicable inoperability, and would exclude inoperability resulting from CLA boron concentration being out of limits. Additionally, instead of requiring that a hot shutdown condition be reached within 6 hours after hot standby, the revision would require that pressurizer pressure be reduced to 1000 psig or less within 6 hours after the plant reaches hot standby.
3. Currently TS 3.5.1.1.b Action Statement applies only to inoperability resulting from a closed isolation valve and requires that either the valve be opened immediately or the plant be in hot standby within 1 hour and in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. These requirements have been incorporated into the method used in the proposed change to TS 3.5.1.1.a Action Statement. As revised, TS 3.5.1.1.b would apply only to inoperability resulting from CLA boron concentration out of limits. It requires that either the concentration be restored to within limits within

72 hours or the plant be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and pressurizer pressure be reduced to 1000 psig or less within the following 6 hours.

4. Currently SR 4.5.1.1.1.a, Item 1, contains specific wording regarding how verification of contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure will be performed. The proposed revision to SR 4.5.1.1.1.a would delete the reference to any specific means of verification.
5. Currently SR 4.5.1.1.1.b specifies requirements for verification of CLA boron concentration and states that verification is required within 6 hours after any solution volume increase of 1 percent of tank volume or greater. The revision to SR 4.5.1.1.1.b would exclude from this requirement any volume additions originating from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). Furthermore, the revision would clarify that verification need only be performed for that CLA that experiences a solution volume increase.
6. Currently SR 4.5.1.1.1.c requires verification of power removal from isolation valve operators at RCS pressures above 2000 psig by verifying removal of the associated breakers from the circuit. The revision to SR 4.5.1.1.1.c would delete reference to specific means of verification.
7. Currently SR 4.5.1.1.1.d verifies automatic opening of the CLA isolation valves when an actual or simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) setpoint or upon receipt of a safety injection test signal. The proposed revision deletes this requirement.
8. Current SR 4.5.1.1.2 and the associated footnote verify operability of each CLA water level and pressure channel by performance of a channel functional test and a channel calibration. This SR would be deleted in the proposed revisions.

2.0 EVALUATION

1. The addition to LCO 3.5.1.1 was proposed to provide consistency with SR 4.5.1.1.1.c and does not represent a new requirement. The SR already requires verification of power removal at RCS pressures above 2000 psig.
2. The revisions to the TS 3.5.1.1.a Action Statement provide consistency with the Westinghouse STS. If an inoperable CLA cannot be restored to operable status within the completion time specified in LCO 3.5.1.1, the plant must be brought to an operating condition where the LCO does not apply. As the revised TS indicates, this corresponds to Mode 3 (hot standby) with pressurizer pressure reduced below 1000 psig.
3. The revisions to the TS 3.5.1.1.b Action Statement provide consistency with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Replacing the current one hour completion time for restoring boron concentration to within limits with a completion time of 72 hours reflects the relative safety significance of the boron-related inoperability compared with other

CLA inoperabilities. Minimum CLA boron concentration is intended to ensure post-LOCA subcriticality. However, with one CLA out of limits, there is no appreciable effect on subcriticality during the reflood phase because of the increase in boron concentration in the core resulting from boiling, and no effect on the availability of ECCS cooling water.

4. The revisions to SR 4.5.1.1.1.a (Item 1) and SR 4.5.1.1.1.c provide consistency with the Westinghouse STS by removing specific details regarding how the surveillance will be implemented. These details need not be controlled by TS and deletion of this information does not relax the requirement of the SR.
5. The revisions to SR 4.5.1.1.1.b reduce unnecessary surveillance activities by performing surveillance only on that CLA which experiences a volume addition of greater than 1 percent of tank volume, and by excluding from applicability any volume addition originating from the RWST. Since RWST boron limits are within CLA boron limits, any addition from the RWST to the CLA could not cause CLA boron concentration to deviate from these limits.
6. Item d of SR 4.5.1.1.1 verifies operability of design features which provide automatic opening of the CLA isolation valves. Since LCO 3.5.1.1, SR 4.5.1.1.1.a.2, and SR 4.5.1.1.1.c already ensure that the CLA isolation valves will open and remain open under those plant conditions where availability of the CLAs is assumed in the accident analysis, Item d represents a redundancy in the TS. Deletion of Item d provides consistency with the Westinghouse STS in that specific design features of the isolation valves need not be controlled by TS.
7. Deletion of SR 4.5.1.1.2 also provides consistency with the Westinghouse STS. TS control of the calibration and functional testing of CLA level and pressure instrumentation is not necessary. Availability of this instrumentation is not assumed in the safety analyses and SR 4.5.1.1.1.a.1 already ensures verification of the proper CLA level and nitrogen cover-pressure.
8. The remainder of the proposed TS revisions are administrative in nature and were proposed for purposes of clarification. These revisions appear in LCO 3.5.1.1.c (footnote), SR 4.5.1.1.1.a.1, and SR 4.5.1.1.1.a.2.

Based on this evaluation, the staff has determined that the TS revisions proposed by the licensee are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and in surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 51629). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Harvey I. Abelson

Dated: December 27, 1994

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
Tennessee Valley Authority

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

cc:

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