

October 10, 1991

Mr. Dan A. Nauman
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Nauman:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. M81844 AND M81845) (TS 91-17)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 154 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 144 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated October 11, 1991 that requested that the proposed license amendment be reviewed on an emergency basis.

This amendment revises Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 related to the voltage overshoot limits resulting from a full load reject test of the emergency diesel generators from 114 percent and 8276 volts to 120 percent and 8712 volts, respectively.

By letter dated October 10, 1991, the Tennessee Valley Authority requested that a Temporary Waiver of Compliance (TWC) be issued to waive the criteria until such time as the NRC acts on the proposed license amendment. The TWC was issued on October 11, 1991.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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PDR ADDCK 05000327
P PDR

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 154 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 144 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

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NAME	: MSanders	: DLaBarge:as	:	: FHebbon	: FRosa
DATE	: 10/17/91	: 10/17/91	: 10/17/91	: 10/17/91	: 10/17/91

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

October 18, 1991

Docket Nos. 50-327
and 50-328

Mr. Dan A. Nauman
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Nauman:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. 81844 AND 81845) (TS 91-17)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.154 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No.144 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated October 11, 1991 that requested that the proposed license amendment be reviewed on an emergency basis.

This amendment revises Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 related to the voltage overshoot limits resulting from a full load reject test of the emergency diesel generators from 114 percent and 8276 volts to 120 percent and 8712 volts, respectively.

By letter dated October 10, 1991, the Tennessee Valley Authority requested that a Temporary Waiver of Compliance (TWC) be issued to waive the criteria until such time as the NRC acts on the proposed license amendment. The TWC was issued on October 11, 1991.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David E. LaBarge".

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.154 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No.144 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

AMENDMENT NO.154 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 and
AMENDMENT NO.144 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328
DATED: October 18, 1991

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Mr. Dan A. Nauman

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
DOCKET NO. 50-327
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 154
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated October 11, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 154, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director
for Region II Reactors
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 18, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 154

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 8-4

INSERT

3/4 8-4

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service,
 2. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 600 kw while maintaining voltage within ± 10 percent of the initial pretest voltage and frequency at 60 ± 1.2 Hz. At no time shall the transient voltage exceed 8276V.
 3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4400 kw without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 120 percent of the initial pretest voltage or 8712V, whichever is less during and following the load rejection.
 4. Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:
 - a) Verifying de-energization of the shutdown boards and load shedding from the shutdown boards.
 - b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the shutdown boards with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencers and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady state voltage and frequency of the shutdown boards shall be maintained at 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz during this test.
 5. Verifying that on a ESF actuation test signal (without loss of offsite power) the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the steady state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test.
 6. Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal, and
 - a) Verifying de-energization of the shutdown boards and load shedding from the shutdown boards.
 - b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the shutdown boards with permanently connected emergency (accident) loads through the load sequencers and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads. After energization, the steady state voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz during this test.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
DOCKET NO. 50-328
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 144
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated October 11, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 144, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director
for Region II Reactors
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 18, 1991

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 144

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 8-4

INSERT

3/4 8-4

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
 1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service,
 2. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 600 kw while maintaining voltage at within ± 10 percent of the initial pretest voltage and frequency at 60 ± 1.2 Hz. At no time shall the transient voltage exceed 8276V.
 3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4400 kw without tripping. The generator voltage shall not exceed 120 percent of the initial pretest voltage or 8712V, whichever is less during and following the load rejection.
 4. Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:
 - a) Verifying de-energization of the shutdown boards and load shedding from the shutdown boards.
 - b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the shutdown boards with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencers and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady state voltage and frequency of the shutdown boards shall be maintained at 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz during this test.
 5. Verifying that on a ESF actuation test signal, without loss of offsite power, the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the steady state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this test.
 6. Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal, and
 - a) Verifying de-energization of the shutdown boards and load shedding from the shutdown boards.
 - b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the shutdown boards with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through the load sequencers and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads. After energization, the steady state voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz during this test.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ENCLOSURE 3

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.154 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77
AND AMENDMENT NO.144 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 11, 1991, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested amendment would change the diesel generator full load reject overshoot limits specified in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.3. This specification currently requires that tests be performed every 18 months to verify the capability of the diesel generators (DGs) to reject a load of 4400 kw (i.e., full load) without tripping, and that the voltage not exceed 114 percent of the initial pretest voltage or 8276 volts, whichever is less, during and following the load rejection test. Specifically, the licensee has requested that the voltage overshoot limits of 114 percent and 8276 volts be changed to 120 percent and 8712 volts, respectively.

2.0 DISCUSSION

As a result of a full load reject test of the 1A-A DG performed on October 7, 1991, the licensee determined that the voltage overshoot was 115 percent above the pretest voltage and, therefore, declared the DG inoperable. Following discussions with the licensee, the NRC staff granted a verbal TWC on October 9, 1991, to raise the acceptance value to 115 percent, the value specified in the Standard Technical Specifications. This allowed the DG to be declared operable.

A similar test of the 1B-B DG was then performed on October 9, 1991, which resulted in an overshoot of approximately 119 percent. The 1B-B DG was, therefore, declared inoperable. Following further discussions with the licensee, the NRC staff granted a verbal TWC of compliance on October 10, 1991, which raised the limit to 120 percent. The licensee determined that the slightly higher overshoot resulting from the 1B-B full load reject test was primarily due to additional adjustments of the generator voltage that were necessary to obtain the desired pretest conditions. There are four diesel generators associated with the two units, and all four must be operable to satisfy the technical specification requirements for each unit's operation.

With Unit 2 operating at full power in Mode 1, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1.1 was applicable. This LCO requires that the DG be returned to the operable status within 72 hours or that the plant be placed in at least the hot standby condition within the next six hours and in the cold shutdown condition within the next 30 hours. Also, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 for the Cycle 5 refueling outage, scheduled activities associated with the outage were immediately and severely impacted with the DG in the inoperable status.

By letter dated October 10, 1991, the licensee requested that the staff issue a Temporary Waiver of Compliance (TWC) to waive the criteria until such time as the NRC staff could act on the licensee's amendment application. This TWC was issued on October 11, 1991.

3.0 EVALUATION

Analysis of the voltage spikes resulting from the full load reject tests determined that failure to meet the overshoot acceptance criteria stated in the TS was primarily due to changes to the test procedure that implemented Information Notice 91-13 and due to modifications to the generator exciter control system that changed the excitation current transformer (CT) tap settings to provide a boost of the field current for a given DG kva load. The Information Notice indicated that the worst-case conditions of voltage, electrical power factor, frequency and environment, should be considered when DG tests are performed. Therefore, procedures had been revised to require that the generator loading be increased to rated electrical kw and kva (4400 kw and 5000 kva). This resulted in an increase in both the internal generator voltage setpoint (excitation) that is required to overexcite the generator to rated reactive load, and an increase in generator field current. These conditions tended to create a higher voltage overshoot when the load was suddenly removed.

In addition, a more accurate test instrument (high speed visicorder) was used to determine the magnitude and duration of the voltage overshoot. Previously, the voltage overshoot had been determined using the installed panel meter, which significantly reduced the accuracy of the transient data. Also, the TS value of 114 percent was based on past test results prior to the changes described above and when less accurate techniques were used to measure the voltage spike, not on criteria associated with equipment damage.

The effects of these changes on the full load reject test had not been recognized or analyzed by the licensee until the performance of the test.

As a result of discussions with the appropriate vendors, the licensee has determined that the proposed overshoot voltage limits have not and will not adversely affect DG equipment or the capability of the DG to perform its intended function. The overvoltage condition exists for such a very brief duration (measured at 13 cycles and 23 cycles for DG 1A-A and 1B-B respectively) and is of such a small magnitude, that the effects on the generator, the insulation, the DG controls, and the instrumentation is negligible.

In summary, the cause of the voltage overshoots being in excess of the TS limits and previously measured values is the combination of the revised procedural requirements to test at rated generator load, the CT modifications, and the use of more accurate test instrumentation. The individual contributions of each are not known and would require additional testing to determine. Additional testing is not desired due to potential reliability concerns. The effects of these changes was not quantified at the time of initial implementation and, therefore, was not identified until performance of the full load reject test.

The staff has evaluated the safety significance associated with failure to meet the voltage overshoot criteria presently specified in the TS related to the DG full load reject test, the proposed increase to the overshoot criteria, and the effects of the increase. We have determined that the proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.3, as it pertains to the DG overvoltage limit of 114 percent and 8276V (to 120 percent and 8712V respectively), is acceptable.

4.0 EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

The licensee, in its October 11, 1991 application, requested that the proposed TS change be approved on an emergency basis. The licensee stated that failure to satisfy the current TS requirement would require a forced outage of SON Unit 2, unnecessary additional testing of the DGs, and delays in critical path activities related to the Unit 1 Cycle 5 refueling outage. In addition, the situation could not have been avoided without additional (and undesirable) testing of the DGs, and was not recognized by the licensee as a consequence of the DG changes in procedure, components, and testing equipment prior to performance of the tests. Once the condition was identified by the licensee, an intensive investigation and evaluation was conducted with the determination that the intent of the TS requirement was satisfied by the test that was conducted, and the DGs were considered inoperable only because of the specific wording of the TS, not for technical reasons.

The licensee was granted a verbal TWC on October 9, 1991, based on the results of the analysis following testing of the 1A-A DG. Another verbal TWC was granted on October 10, 1991, following analysis of the additional information that was developed following tests of DG 1B-B. In granting the temporary waivers, the NRC staff recognized that emergency circumstances existed that warranted prompt approval, since failure to act would result in extending the Unit 1 refueling outage and could result in a forced shutdown of Unit 2, that the situation could not have been avoided, and that the licensee applied for the amendment in a timely fashion. Thus, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), the staff finds that an emergency situation exists which would result in shutdown of the operating plant (Unit 2).

5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that the license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the amendment, would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The request proposed a TS change for Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 to allow a voltage overshoot of 120 percent of pretest voltage or 8712 volts, whichever is less. It has been determined that these increased values would not result in damage to the DG and will continue to ensure operability. The revised limits will ensure that safety-related functions are adequately verified. Therefore, the DGs will continue to be verified to meet safety requirements and the subject changes will not increase the consequences of an accident. In addition, the DGs are not postulated to be the source of any design basis accident and, therefore, cannot increase the probability of an accident.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

The request only provides an increase in the allowable voltage overshoot on a total DG load rejection. The change does not create any new type of accident because alteration of test requirements for the DG or any other DG test or operation cannot create an accident. The DGs only provide accident mitigation functions.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The revised voltage values will not result in damage to any DG components and therefore the DG safety functions will be maintained. Since the DGs will continue to provide full accident mitigation capabilities, a margin of safety will not be reduced.

Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations.

6.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to a surveillance requirement. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: D. LaBarge

Date: October 18, 1991

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: F. Allenspach, LPEB, DLPO
K. Jabbour, PDII-3, DRPE
F. Rinaldi, PDII-3, DRPE

Date: October 15, 1991