

August 10, 1992

(M)

Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Dr. Mark O. Medford, Vice President
Nuclear Assurance, Licensing & Fuels
3B Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Dr. Medford:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. M83541 AND M83542) (TS 92-04)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.161 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No.151 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated May 26, 1992.

The amendments add an additional Limiting Condition for Operation, Surveillance Requirement, and Bases information related to the operability requirements for the containment ice condenser inlet doors.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 161 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 151 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC:	PDII-4/LA <i>ms</i>	PDII-4/PM <i>DL</i>	SPLB*	OGC*	PD-II-4/D
NAME:	MSanders	DLaBarge	CMcCracken	BNB	FHebbon
DATE:	8/4/92	8/10/92	7/22/92	7/23/92	8/10/92

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PDR ADDCK 05000327
P PDR

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AMENDMENT NO. 161 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 and
AMENDMENT NO. 151 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328
DATED: August 10, 1992

Distribution

Docket File

NRC PDR

Local PDR

SQL Reading File

S. Varga 14-E-4

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M. Sanders

D. LaBarge

B. Wilson RII

W. Little RII

OGC 15-B-13

D. Hagan MNBB-3302

E. Jordan MNBB-3302

G. Hill P1-130 (4 per docket)

Wanda Jones MNBB-7103

J. Calvo 14-E-4

ACRS(10)

OPA 2-G-5

OC/LFMB MNBB-9112

C. McCracken 8-D-1



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

August 10, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-327
and 50-328

Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Dr. Mark O. Medford, Vice President
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. LaBarge", written over a horizontal line.

David E. LaBarge, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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DATE:	8/4/92	8/10/92	7/22/92	7/23/92	8/10/92

Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Dr. Mark O. Medford

cc:

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Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

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Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

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Regional Administrator
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Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. William E. Holland
Senior Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
U.S.N.R.C.
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Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 161
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated May 26, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 161, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Frederick J. Heddon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 10, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 161

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE

3/4 6-29
B3/4 6-5

INSERT

3/4 6-29
B3/4 6-5

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

ICE CONDENSER DOORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.3 The ice condenser inlet doors, intermediate deck doors, and top deck doors shall be closed and OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more ice condenser inlet doors inoperable due to being physically restrained from opening, restore all inlet doors to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one or more ice condenser doors open or otherwise inoperable for reasons other than action a., POWER OPERATION may continue for up to 14 days provided the ice bed temperature is monitored at least once per 4 hours and the maximum ice bed temperature is maintained less than or equal to 27°F; otherwise, restore the doors to their closed positions or OPERABLE status (as applicable) within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.3.1 Inlet Doors - Ice condenser inlet doors shall be:

- a. Continuously monitored and determined closed by the inlet door position monitoring system, and
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:
 1. Verifying that the torque required to initially open each door is less than or equal to 675 inch pounds.
 2. Verifying that opening of each door is not impaired by ice, frost, debris, or obstruction.
 3. Verifying that the torque required to open each door is less than 195 inch-pounds when the door is 40 degrees open. This torque is defined as the "door opening torque" and is equal to the nominal door torque plus a frictional torque component.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

event that observed sublimation rates are equal to or lower than design predictions after three years of operation, the minimum ice baskets weight may be adjusted downward. In addition, the number of ice baskets required to be weighed each 9 months may be reduced after 3 years of operation if such a reduction is supported by observed sublimation data.

3/4.6.5.2 ICE BED TEMPERATURE MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the ice bed temperature monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the ice temperature. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

3/4.6.5.3 ICE CONDENSER DOORS

The OPERABILITY of the ice condenser doors ensures that these doors will open because of the differential pressure between upper and lower containment resulting from the blowdown of reactor coolant during a LOCA and that the blowdown will be diverted through the ice condenser bays for heat removal and thus containment pressure control. The requirement that the doors be maintained closed during normal operation ensures that excessive sublimation of the ice will not occur because of warm air intrusion from the lower containment.

If an ice condenser inlet door is physically restrained from opening, the system function is degraded, and immediate action must be taken to restore the opening capability of the inlet door. Being physically restrained from opening is defined as those conditions in which an inlet door is physically blocked from opening by installation of a blocking device or by an obstruction from temporary or permanently installed equipment or is otherwise inhibited from opening such as may result from ice, frost, debris, or increased inlet door opening torque beyond the values specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.3.1.

3/4.6.5.4 INLET DOOR POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the inlet door position monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the individual inlet door position. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

3/4.6.5.5 DIVIDER BARRIER PERSONNEL ACCESS DOORS AND EQUIPMENT HATCHES

The requirements for the divider barrier personnel access doors and equipment hatches being closed and OPERABLE ensure that a minimum bypass steam flow will occur from the lower to the upper containment compartments during a LOCA. This condition ensures a diversion of the steam through the ice condenser bays that is consistent with the LOCA analyses.

3/4.6.5.6 CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS

The OPERABILITY of the containment air return fans ensures that following a LOCA 1) the containment atmosphere is circulated for cooling by the spray system and 2) the accumulation of hydrogen in localized portions of the containment structure is minimized.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 151
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated May 26, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.151, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Frederick J. Hebdon, Director
Project Directorate II-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 10, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 151

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

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REMOVE

3/4 6-30
B3/4 6-5

INSERT

3/4 6-30
B3/4 6-5

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

ICE CONDENSER DOORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.3 The ice condenser inlet doors, intermediate deck doors, and top deck doors shall be closed and OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more ice condenser inlet doors inoperable due to being physically restrained from opening, restore all inlet doors to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one or more ice condenser doors open or otherwise inoperable for reasons other than action a., POWER OPERATION may continue for up to 14 days provided the ice bed temperature is monitored at least once per 4 hours and the maximum ice bed temperature is maintained less than or equal to 27°F; otherwise, restore the doors to their closed positions or OPERABLE status (as applicable) within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.3.1 Inlet Doors - Ice condenser inlet doors shall be:

- a. Continuously monitored and determined closed by the inlet door position monitoring system, and
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:
 1. Verifying that the torque required to initially open each door is less than or equal to 675 inch pounds.
 2. Verifying that opening of each door is not impaired by ice, frost, debris, or obstruction.
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The OPERABILITY of the ice bed temperature monitoring system ensures that the capability is available for monitoring the ice temperature. In the event the monitoring system is inoperable, the ACTION requirements provide assurance that the ice bed heat removal capacity will be retained within the specified time limits.

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If an ice condenser inlet door is physically restrained from opening, the system function is degraded, and immediate action must be taken to restore the opening capability of the inlet door. Being physically restrained from opening is defined as those conditions in which an inlet door is physically blocked from opening by installation of a blocking device or by an obstruction from temporary or permanently installed equipment or is otherwise inhibited from opening such as may result from ice, frost, debris, or increased inlet door opening torque beyond the values specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.3.1.

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

ENCLOSURE 3

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77
AND AMENDMENT NO. 151 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated May 26, 1992, the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) proposed an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2. The requested changes would revise the TS to provide additional requirements designed to ensure operability of the ice condenser doors. The licensee has proposed re-labeling the existing Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.5.3 to 3.6.5.3.b and inserting a new LCO numbered 3.6.5.3.a.

In addition, a proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.3.1.b.2 would verify that opening of each door is not impaired by an "obstruction," in addition to the items that are presently verified (ice, frost, and debris) at 18-month intervals. The proposed change to Bases 3/4.6.5.3 would emphasize the importance of maintaining the inlet doors free to open and the need to take immediate corrective action.

2.0 EVALUATION

The ice condenser is a passive device located inside the primary containment. It contains borated ice that is used in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or high energy line break (HELB) to absorb the thermal energy that would be released by condensing the steam that would be released as a result of the accident. The resulting pressure reduction, along with the containment spray system, ensures the integrity of the containment during the early stages of the accident. It also reduces the fission product iodine concentration in the post-LOCA and/or post-HELB containment atmosphere.

The ice condenser is divided into 24 bays, with each bay having a pair of inlet doors in the lower compartment. These doors are designed to be opened by the differential pressure produced by the LOCA or HELB, which allows the

steam and air to flow through the condenser. The inlet doors are normally closed to form a barrier to the containment atmosphere during normal plant operation, and they are maintained closed by tension spring mechanisms that produce a small closing torque. This prevents excessive loss of ice during normal plant operation.

The present TS LCO 3.6.5.3 requires that if one or more of the ice condenser doors is open or otherwise inoperable, power operation can continue for 14 days provided that the ice bed temperature is monitored at least once per 4 hours and that the maximum ice bed temperature is maintained less than or equal to 27°F. Otherwise, the doors must be closed or made operable (as appropriate) within 48 hours or the plant placed in the Hot Standby condition within the next 6 hours and in the Cold Shutdown condition within the following 30 hours. This LCO would remain, but would be relabeled 3.6.5.3.b.

The new LCO proposed by the licensee would become 3.6.5.3.a and would require that if one or more of the ice condenser inlet doors are inoperable because they are physically restrained from opening, the inlet door(s) must be restored to the operable status within one hour or the plant placed in at least the Hot Standby condition within the next 6 hours and in the Cold Shutdown condition within the following 30 hours. The purpose of the new LCO is to provide actions that address the potential for the inlet doors to be physically restrained from opening and, therefore, not capable of automatically opening when required.

The present LCO is appropriate to address the required actions should one or more of the doors be open. However, it is nonconservative in that it does not provide appropriate actions should one or more (up to all) of the doors be blocked from opening. Allowing the doors to remain in this condition for the 14 days is not appropriate and is potentially more serious from a plant risk perspective since the ice condenser system may not be capable of performing its safety-related function of reducing the primary containment pressure following a LOCA or HELB. The new LCO addresses this concern by allowing plant operation for only one hour under this condition, and is consistent with Revision 4a of the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications dated September 1987.

In an effort to determine that opening of the doors is not impaired, the licensee proposed addition of a check to ensure that an obstruction does not exist, in addition to the present requirement to check for ice, frost and debris when the surveillance test is performed. This represents a more conservative approach to the surveillance test that is performed at 18-month intervals.

Since the proposed changes appropriately reflect the additional operability concerns of the ice condenser doors, represent an increase in the safety-related aspects of plant operation, a more conservative approach, and is consistent with staff guidance, the staff has determined that they are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and to the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 30262). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: D. LaBarge

Date: August 10, 1992