

DOCKETED
USNRC

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DOCKET NUMBER
PETITION RULE PART 73-11
(66FR 55603)November 26, 2001 (12:03PM)
OFFICE OF SECRETARY
RULEMAKINGS AND
ADJUDICATIONS STAFF

TMI Alert

The following reference from TMI Alert shows how sloppy the NRC Commissioners have become in carrying out their responsibilities.

6. NRC Commissioner McGaffigan "...why do they go after nuclear plants as opposed to all the other soft targets where they can do even more damage, and why do you not bring the same absolutism to the chemical industry or to various other various soft targets that are available in the United States"? NRC briefing on safeguards performance assessment, Wednesday, May 5, 1999, p.118 The further reference below from TMI Alert certainly applies today in light of the above reference. The Commissioners are not competent administrators of safety of our nuclear power plants.

7. "To prevent accidents as serious as Three Mile Island, fundamental changes will be necessary in the organization, procedures, and practices -- above all -- in the attitudes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, to the extent that institutions we investigated are typical, of the nuclear industry. "Report of the President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island" Overall Conclusion, p.7

For several decades I have observed a lack of capability to resist a terrorist attack at one nuclear power plant in particular. Of course, there have been changes. But a guard at an entrance will not solve much.

Yes, the ten ton truck bomb (T3B) has substantial range. A ten ton barge bomb (T2B2) has substantial range. And a milk truck loaded with gasoline or diesel or a mix thereof can wipe out a site. By now, the Commissioners should be aware of even stronger sets of threats. For too long, the nuclear power lobbyists have been successful in deriding those who have these concerns. And the Commissioners apparently have not realized that an evacuation induced by a meltdown is different than escaping the fumes from a chemical plant disaster.

The November 19, 2001 issue of The New Yorker includes the following remarks by Leslie E. Robertson who helped design the World Trade Center: **"I'm sort of a methodical person, so I listed all of the bad things that could happen to a building and tried to design for them. I thought of the**

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B-25 bomber, lost in the fog, that hit the Empire State Building in 1945. The 707 was state-of-the art airplane then, and the Port Authority was quite amenable to considering the effect of an airplane as a design criterion. We studied it, and designed for the impact of such an aircraft. The next step would have been to think about the fuel load, and I've been searching my brain, but I don't know what happened there, whether in our testing we thought about it."

In testimony to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Insurance Department Hearings on Risk and Insurability at Nuclear Power Plant Operations, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 15, 1973, a supplier of nuclear power plant systems stated: *"Applied research in water reactor safety has included over 100 loss of coolant accident related research programs comprising thousands of individual tests since the mid 1960's, with expenditures of several hundred million dollars. Sound engineering practice does not require the kind of full scale test which the critics talk about in order to assure oneself that the system will operate properly. One does not need, for example, to duplicate the 64-story United States Steel Building in Pittsburgh and set it on fire in order to test whether its fire sprinkler system will perform its job."*

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