Docket Nos. 50-327
and 50-328

February 16, 1990

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

SUBJECT: CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS (TAC 75053/75054) (TS 89-39) - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 130 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 117 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated October 5, 1989.

These amendments modify Sections 1.0, Definitions, and 3/4.6.1, Primary Containment, of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). These changes revise the definition of containment integrity and the Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 4.6.1.1.b and 4.6.1.2.f for containment air locks. The changes modify the requirements for containment air locks to be consistent with the NRC's NUREG-0452, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors." The containment air locks would be required to be "in compliance with the requirements of Specifications 3.6.1.3" instead of being required to be "operable per Specification 3.6.1.3."

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Bi-Weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 130 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 117 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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1/1

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AMENDMENT NO. 130 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 and
AMENDMENT NO. 117 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328
DATED: FEBRUARY 16, 1990

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 130
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated October 5, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 130, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Suzanne Black

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 16, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 130

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
1-1	1-1*
1-2	1-2
3/4 6-1	3/4 6-1
3/4 6-4	3/4 6-4

DEFINED TERMS

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

ACTION

1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

1.2 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.

BYPASS LEAKAGE PATH

1.3 A BYPASS LEAKAGE PATH is a potential path for leakage to escape from both the primary containment and annulus pressure boundary. Only one type of BYPASS LEAKAGE PATH is recognized:

a. BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING are those paths that would potentially allow leakage from the primary containment to circumvent the annulus secondary containment enclosure and escape directly to the Auxiliary Building secondary containment enclosure.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.5 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechansim associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATION

1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at P_a, 12 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 L_a.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the annulus or containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. The combined bypass leakage rate to the auxiliary building shall be determined to be less than or equal to 0.25 L_a by applicable Type B and C tests at least once per 24 months except for penetrations which are not individually testable; penetrations not individually testable shall be determined to have no detectable leakage when tested with soap bubbles while the containment is pressurized to P_a (12 psig) during each Type A test.

f. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

g. Leakage from isolation valves that are sealed with fluid from a seal system may be excluded, subject to the provisions of Appendix J, Section III.C.3, when determining the combined leakage rate provided the seal system and valves are pressurized to at least 1.10 P_a (13.2 psig) and the seal system capacity is adequate to maintain system pressure (or fluid head for the containment spray system and RHR spray system valves at penetrations 48A, 48B, 49A and 49B) for at least 30 days.

h. Type B tests for penetrations employing a continuous leakage monitoring system shall be conducted at P_a (12 psig) at intervals no greater than once per 3 years.

i. All test leakage rates shall be calculated using observed data converted to absolute values. Error analyses shall be performed to select a balanced integrated leakage measurement system.

j. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 117
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated October 5, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 117, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Suzanne Black

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 16, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 117

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
1-1	1-1*
1-2	1-2
3/4 6-1	3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2	3/4 6-2*
3/4 6-4	3/4 6-4

DEFINED TERMS

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

ACTION

1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

1.2 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.

BYPASS LEAKAGE PATH

1.3 A BYPASS LEAKAGE PATH is a potential path for leakage to escape from both the primary containment and annulus pressure boundary. Only one type of BYPASS LEAKAGE PATH is recognized:

a. BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING are those paths that would potentially allow leakage from the primary containment to circumvent the annulus secondary containment enclosure and escape directly to the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.5 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

1.6 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATION

1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-2 of Specification 3.6.3.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at P_a, 12 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 L_a.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the annulus or containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of less than or equal to L_a, 0.25 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, 12 psig.

b A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.60 L_a for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P_a.

c. A combined bypass leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.25 L_a for all penetrations identified in Table 3.6-1 as secondary containment BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING when pressurized to P_a.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

ACTION:

With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L_a, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L_a, or (c) with the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.25 L_a for BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than or equal to 0.75 L_a, and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests to less than or equal to 0.60 L_a, and the combined bypass leakage rate from BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING to less than or equal to 0.25 L_a, prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3. Valves pressurized with fluid from a seal system.

e. The combined bypass leakage rate to the auxiliary building shall be determined to be less than or equal to 0.25 L_a by applicable Type B and C tests at least once per 24 months except for penetrations which are not individually testable; penetrations not individually testable shall be determined to have no detectable leakage when tested with soap bubbles while the containment is pressurized to P_a, 12 psig, during each Type A test.

f. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

g. Leakage from isolation valves that are sealed with fluid from a seal system may be excluded, subject to the provisions of Appendix J, Section III.C.3, when determining the combined leakage rate provided the seal system and valves are pressurized to at least 1.10 P_a, 13.2 psig, and the seal system capacity is adequate to maintain system pressure (or fluid head for the containment spray system and RHR spray system valves at penetrations 48A, 48B, 49A and 49B) for at least 30 days.

h. Type B tests for penetrations employing a continuous leakage monitoring system shall be conducted at P_a, 12 psig, at intervals no greater than once per 3 years.

i. All test leakage rates shall be calculated using observed data converted to absolute values. Error analyses shall be performed to select a balanced integrated leakage measurement system.

j. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ENCLOSURE 3

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 130 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

AND AMENDMENT NO. 117 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 5, 1989, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposed to modify Sections 1.0, Definitions, and 3/4.6.1, Primary Containment, of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). These proposed changes are to revise the definition of containment integrity and the Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 4.6.1.1.b and 4.6.1.2.f for the containment air locks. The proposed changes would modify the requirements for containment air locks to be consistent with the NRC's NUREG-0452, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors" (WPWR STS). The containment air locks would be required to be "in compliance with the requirements of Specifications 3.6.1.3" instead of being required to be "operable per Specification 3.6.1.3."

2.0 EVALUATION

The containment air locks are a penetration through the containment boundary to allow people to enter or leave containment. The locks are two doors to assure that at least one door is closed at all times when containment integrity is required. The requirements on the air locks are contained in the following sections of the TSs: (1) Definition 1.7 of containment integrity, (2) SR 4.6.1.1.b for containment integrity, (3) SR 4.6.1.2.f on containment leakage and (4) TS 3.6.1.3 on the containment air locks themselves. The first two requirements are to assure that the containment can be isolated. The third requirement assures that the containment leak rate during an accident will be less than that allowed. The fourth requirement assures that the air locks meet their design requirements in the Sequoyah Final Safety Analysis Report.

The current definition of containment integrity and the SRs 4.6.1.1.b and 4.6.1.2.f require that the air locks must be operable. If an air lock is not operable for any reason, the TSs state that the containment integrity (TS 3.6.1.1) and containment leakage (TS 3.6.1.2) requirements are not being met. The TSs would then require the unit to shutdown if the air lock can not be made operable. This would be required even if one of the doors of the air lock is closed maintaining containment integrity and the leakage through the air lock does not exceed containment air leakage criteria.

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The requirements on the containment air locks are in TS 3.6.1.3. If an air lock door is inoperable, the TSs require that the operable door must be closed. The unit may continue to operate until the next air lock leakage test, provided the air lock door is verified closed at least once a month. If the air lock is inoperable for any other reason, at least one air lock door is maintained closed and the inoperable air lock is made operable within 24 hours or the unit is shut down.

If the air lock meets the requirements of TS 3.6.1.3, containment integrity and containment leakage should be assured. Therefore, the requirements on containment integrity and containment leakage should state that the containment air locks meet the requirements of TS 3.6.1.3 and not that they are operable. Stating that the air locks must be operable for containment integrity and containment leakage is too restrictive because the air locks may be inoperable but containment integrity and containment leakage requirements may still be met.

TVA stated in its submittal that the current definition of containment integrity and the SRs 4.6.1.1.b and 4.6.1.2.f in the TSs contain the requirement that the containment air locks must be operable. The specific wording leads to an interpretation that precludes the use of the action provisions in TS 3.6.1.3 when an air lock is inoperable but an air lock door is closed and the air lock is still within the allowable leakage limits of TS 3.6.1.2.

TVA proposed to replace the requirement in Definitions 1.7, SR 4.6.1.1.b and SR 4.6.1.2.f which currently state that the air locks must be operable in accordance with TS 3.6.1.3 with the requirement that the air locks must be in compliance with the requirements of TS 3.6.1.3. TS 3.6.1.3 is the limiting condition for operation for containment air locks requiring that the doors are kept closed and the leak rate is acceptable for reactor modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. The proposed change requires that the air locks meet the requirements in TS 3.6.1.3 to assure containment integrity and containment leakage. Therefore, the unit will not be shut down if at least one door to the air lock is kept closed to maintain containment integrity and the air lock leakage is still considered acceptable to maintain an acceptable containment leakage.

The proposed changes were reviewed against the requirements in Revision 4a of the NRC Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors (WPWRSTS). These Technical Specifications are applicable to Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes are consistent with the specifications in the WPWRSTS. The proposed SR 4.6.1.2.f refers to the requirements of the LCO 3.6.1.3 whereas the current SR 4.6.1.2.f refers to the requirements of the SR 4.6.1.3. There is no difference in the requirements on the air locks between the proposed SR 4.6.1.2.f and the current SR 4.6.1.2.f. The wording in the proposed SR 4.6.1.2.f is consistent with the new wording in the proposed Definition 1.7 and SR 4.6.1.1.b.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to the TSs are acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 46159) on November 1, 1989 and consulted with the State of Tennessee. No public comments were received and the State of Tennessee did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Donohew

Dated: February 16, 1990