Docket Nos. 50-327
and 50-328

November 1, 1989

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
Manager of Nuclear Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

SUBJECT: THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION AND BYPASS DEVICE TESTING (TAC NOS. 73753, 73754) (TS 89-04) - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 128 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 115 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated May 25, 1989.

The amendments modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications. The changes revise Section 4.8.3.2 and Table 3.8-2 to add a surveillance requirement for a channel functional test of the bypass circuitry for the thermal overload devices of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip and throttle valve for each unit. These valves, 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51, will be identified in Table 3.8-2 as being bypassed under certain accident conditions. The changes also identify valves 1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207 in Table 3.8-2 as common to both units.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Bi-Weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 128 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 115 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 128
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated May 25, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 128, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Suzanne Black

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 1, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 128

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 8-17	3/4 8-17
3/4 8-18	3/4 8-18
3/4 8-19	3/4 8-19
3/4 8-20	3/4 8-20*

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 The thermal overload protection devices, integral with the motor starter, of each valve listed in Table 3.8-2 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more of the thermal overload protection devices inoperable, declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the ACTION Statement to the affected valve(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 The above required thermal overload protection devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of a representative sample of at least 25% of all thermal overload devices which are not bypassed, such that each non-bypassed device is calibrated at least once per 6 years.

b. At least once per 18 months, by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overload devices which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions.

TABLE 3.8-2

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

Valve No.	Function
1-FCV-1-15	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
1-FCV-1-16	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
1-FCV-1-17	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
1-FCV-1-18	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
1-FCV-1-51	TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve**
1-FCV-62-138	Safe Shutdown Redundancy (CVCS)
1-FCV-63-1	ECCS Operation
1-FCV-63-3	SI Pump Mini-flow
1-FCV-63-4	SI Pump Mini-flow
1-FCV-63-5	ECCS Flow Path
1-FCV-63-6	ECCS Operation
1-FCV-63-7	ECCS Operation
1-FCV-63-8	ECCS Flow Path
1-FCV-63-11	ECCS Flow Path
1-FCV-63-22	ECCS Flow Path
1-FCV-63-47	Train Isolation
1-FCV-63-48	Train Isolation
1-FCV-63-72	ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump
1-FCV-63-73	ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump
1-FCV-63-93	ECCS Cooldown Flow Path
1-FCV-63-94	ECCS Cooldown Flow Path
1-FCV-63-152	ECCS Recirc
1-FCV-63-153	ECCS Recirc
1-FCV-63-156	ECCS Flow Path
1-FCV-63-157	ECCS Flow Path
1-FCV-63-172	ECCS Flow Path
1-FCV-63-175	SI Pump Mini-flow
1-FCV-67-123	CSS Ht Ex Supply
1-FCV-67-124	CSS Ht Ex Discharge
1-FCV-67-125	CSS Ht Ex Supply
1-FCV-67-126	CSS Ht Ex Discharge
1-FCV-67-146	CCW Ht Ex Throttling
0-FCV-67-205*	Turb Bldg Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-67-208*	Turb Bldg Hdr Isolation
1-FCV-68-332	Pressurizer PORV Block Valve
1-FCV-68-333	Pressurizer PORV Block Valve
0-FCV-70-1*	SFPCS Hx Throttle
0-FCV-70-11*	SFPCS Hx Throttle
1-FCV-70-153	RHR Hx Outlet Isolation
1-FCV-70-156	RHR Hx Outlet Isolation
0-FCV-70-193*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-194*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-197*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-198*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-206*	CDWE Isolation

*Common for Units 1 and 2
**Bypassed under accident conditions

TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

Valve No.	Function
1-FCV-70-207*	CDWE Throttle
2-FCV-70-207*	CDWE Throttle
0-FCV-70-208*	CDWE Isolation
1-FCV-72-20	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
1-FCV-72-21	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
1-FCV-72-22	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
1-FCV-72-23	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
1-FCV-72-40	RHR Cont. Spray Isol.
1-FCV-72-41	RHR Cont. Spray Isol.
1-FCV-74-1	Open for Normal Plant Cooldown
1-FCV-74-2	Open for Normal Plant Cooldown
1-FCV-74-3	ECCS Operation
1-FCV-74-21	ECCS Operation
1-FCV-74-33	ECCS Operation
1-FCV-74-35	ECCS Operation

*Common for Units 1 and 2

ISOLATION DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.3 All circuit breakers actuated by fault currents that are used as isolation devices protecting IE busses from non qualified loads shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the above required circuit breakers inoperable either:

a. Restore the inoperable circuit breaker(s) to OPERABLE status within 8 hours, or

b. Trip the inoperable circuit breaker(s), rack-out the circuit breaker(s) within 8 hours and verify the circuit breaker(s) to be racked out at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to racked-out circuit breakers, or

c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.3 Each of the above required circuit breakers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months by selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of circuit breaker. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. The functional test shall consist of injecting a current input at the specified setpoint to each selected circuit breaker or relay and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed. For each device found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of each over current protection device of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all devices of that type have been functionally tested.

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 115
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated May 25, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 115, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Suzanne Black

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 1, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 115

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 8-18	3/4 8-18
3/4 8-19	3/4 8-19
3/4 8-20	3/4 8-20*

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 The thermal overload protection devices, integral with the motor starter, of each valve listed in Table 3.8-2 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more of the thermal overload protection devices inoperable, declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the ACTION Statement to the affected valve(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 The above required thermal overload protection devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of a representative sample of at least 25% of all thermal overload devices which are not bypassed, such that each non-bypassed device is calibrated at least once per 6 years.

b. At least once per 18 months, by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overload devices which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions.

TABLE 3.8-2

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

Valve No.	Function
2-FCV-1-15	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
2-FCV-1-16	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
2-FCV-1-17	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
2-FCV-1-18	Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine
2-FCV-1-51	TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve**
2-FCV-62-138	Safe Shutdown Redundancy (CVCS)
2-FCV-63-1	ECCS Operation
2-FCV-63-3	SI Pump Mini-flow
2-FCV-63-4	SI Pump Mini-flow
2-FCV-63-5	ECCS Flow Path
2-FCV-63-6	ECCS Operation
2-FCV-63-7	ECCS Operation
2-FCV-63-8	ECCS Flow Path
2-FCV-63-11	ECCS Flow Path
2-FCV-63-22	ECCS Flow Path
2-FCV-63-47	Train Isolation
2-FCV-63-48	Train Isolation
2-FCV-63-72	ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump
2-FCV-63-73	ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump
2-FCV-63-93	ECCS Cooldown Flow Path
2-FCV-63-94	ECCS Cooldown Flow Path
2-FCV-63-152	ECCS Recirc
2-FCV-63-153	ECCS Recirc
2-FCV-63-156	ECCS Flow Path
2-FCV-63-157	ECCS Flow Path
2-FCV-63-172	ECCS Flow Path
2-FCV-63-175	SI Pump Mini-flow
2-FCV-67-123	CSS Ht Ex Supply
2-FCV-67-124	CSS Ht Ex Discharge
2-FCV-67-125	CSS Ht Ex Supply
2-FCV-67-126	CSS Ht Ex Discharge
2-FCV-67-146	CCW Ht Ex Throttling
0-FCV-67-205*	Turb Bldg Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-67-208*	Turb Bldg Hdr Isolation
2-FCV-68-332	Pressurizer PORV Block Valve
2-FCV-68-333	Pressurizer PORV Block Valve
0-FCV-70-1*	SFPCS Hx Throttle
0-FCV-70-11*	SFPCS Hx Throttle
2-FCV-70-153	RHR Hx Outlet Isolation
2-FCV-70-156	RHR Hx Outlet Isolation
0-FCV-70-193*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-194*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-197*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-198*	SFPCS Hdr Isolation
0-FCV-70-206*	CDWE Isolation
1-FCV-70-207*	CDWE Throttle
2-FCV-70-207*	CDWE Throttle

*Common for Units 1 and 2
**Bypassed under accident conditions

TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

Valve No.	Function
0-FCV-70-208*	CDWE Isolation
2-FCV-72-20	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
2-FCV-72-21	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
2-FCV-72-22	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
2-FCV-72-23	Cont. Spray Pump Suction
2-FCV-72-40	RHR Cont. Spray Isol.
2-FCV-72-41	RHR Cont. Spray Isol.
2-FCV-74-1	Open for Normal Plant Cooldown
2-FCV-74-2	Open for Normal Plant Cooldown
2-FCV-74-3	ECCS Operation
2-FCV-74-21	ECCS Operation
2-FCV-74-33	ECCS Operation
2-FCV-74-35	ECCS Operation

*Common for Units 1 and 2

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ENCLOSURE

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 128 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

AND AMENDMENT NO. 115 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 25, 1989, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposed to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed changes are to revise Section 4.8.3.2 and Table 3.8-2 to add a surveillance requirement for a channel functional test of the bypass circuitry for the thermal overload devices of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump trip and throttle valve for each unit. These valves, 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51, will be identified in Table 3.8-2 as being bypassed under accident conditions. The overload devices for these motor-operated valves (MOVs) are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions. The proposed changes also identify valves 1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207 in Table 3.8-2 as common to both units. This is TVA change request 89-04.

2.0 EVALUATION

In its application, TVA stated that the Sequoyah TDAFW pump trip and throttle valve for each unit (MOVs 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51) have thermal overload devices that are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions. TVA proposes to ensure these MOVs will perform their function during accidents by conducting a channel functional test of the bypass circuitry of the thermal overload devices at least once every 18 months. The channel functional test at least once every 18 months will minimize the possibility of a malfunction of the bypass circuitry that will prevent these two motor-operated valves from performing their intended safety functions during an accident. The bypass circuitry conforms to the appropriate sections of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Standard 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." The performance of the bypass circuitry test conforms to the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Thermal Overload Protection For Electric Motors on Motor-operated Valves", and to the NRC standard Westinghouse Electric Corporation TSs (surveillance frequency and test) for thermal overload devices normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions.

The staff finds that the additional surveillance will improve the margin of safety for the plants and thus is acceptable.

In a phone call to TVA on October 6, 1989, the staff requested the following clarification on the proposed TS changes: (1) were there MOVs other than 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51 in Table 3.8-2 that had thermal overload devices bypassed under accident conditions and (2) were there MOVs with thermal overload devices normally bypassed except for periodic or maintenance testing. The NRC standard Westinghouse Electric Corporation TSs also require a channel functional test for the bypass circuitry for the MOVs in item (2) above. TVA stated that there were no MOVs at Sequoyah with thermal overload devices normally bypassed expect for testing and the only MOVs in Table 3.8-2 with thermal overload devices bypassed under accident conditions are valves 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51.

Regulatory Guide 1.106, Revision 1, dated March 1977 states that to ensure safety-related MOVs whose motors are equipped with thermal overload protection devices will perform their safety function during an accident the licensee should do one of the following: (1) have the thermal overload device continuously bypassed and only temporarily placed in service when the valve motors are undergoing periodic or maintenance testing, (2) have the thermal overload device that are normally in service during plant operations bypassed under accident conditions, and (3) have the trip setpoint of the thermal overload device established "with all uncertainties resolved in the favor of [the valve] completing the safety-related action." TVA stated in the conference call on October 6, 1989 that MOVs 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51 are the only MOVS in Table 3.8-2 which have the thermal overload devices bypassed during accident conditions. The remaining MOVs in Table 3.8-2 have the trip setpoint of the thermal overload device established "with all uncertainties resolved in favor of [the valve] completing the safety-related action." TVA explained that there are other MOVs at Sequoyah which have thermal overload devices which have been permanently bypassed. These MOVs were deleted from Table 3.8-2 in Amendments 61 and 53, dated October 22, 1987, for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

Based on this, the staff concludes that the proposed changes are acceptable. The valves 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51 will be identified in Table 3.8-2, "Motor-operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection", with the phrase "bypassed under accident conditions."

TVA also identified that the condensate demineralizer waste evaporator throttle valves (1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207) as common valves to both units. These valves are in unit lines that flow into a common supply line to the waste gas evaporator building. This common supply line is isolated by the condensate demineralizer waste evaporator isolation valve (0-FVC-70-208) when the water level in component cooling water surge tank A or B is low. Both throttle valves also close when either surge tank is low; therefore, both valves are common to both units. This proposed change is being submitted by TVA to provide consistency in identifying common valves in Table 3.8-2. The staff concludes that this proposed change is acceptable.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed changes in TVA application 89-04, dated May 25, 1989, are acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 32178) on August 9, 1989, and consulted with the State of Tennessee. No public comments were received and the State of Tennessee did not have any comments.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Donohew

Dated: November 1, 1989

AMENDMENT NO. 128 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 and
AMENDMENT NO. 115 FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT NO. 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328
DATED: November 1, 1989

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