

January 22, 1989

Docket Nos. 50-327/328

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

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Dear Mr. Kingsley:

SUBJECT: CORRECTIONS TO AMENDMENT NO. 80 (TS 88-18) TAC R00457, AMENDMENT NOS.92 AND 82 (TS 87-27) TAC R00203/R00204

1. In Amendment No. 80 to Facility Operating License DPR-79 for Sequoyah, Unit 2, the footnote change was incorrectly stated. It should read as follows:

*One time extension to be performed no later than Unit 2, Cycle 3 refueling outage or January 22, 1989, whichever occurs first.

A corrected page is enclosed.

2. In Amendment Nos. 92 and 82 to Facility Operating License DPR-77 and DPR-79, for Sequoyah, Units 1 and 2, respectively, the licensee submittal page with pen and ink changes were inadvertently transmitted as actual TS pages. A revised TS page for each unit is enclosed.

We apologize for any inconvenience caused by these omissions. If you have any questions please contact Jack Donohew, Sequoyah Project Manager (301-492-0704).

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. TS pg. 3/4 6-27 (Unit 2)
2. TS pg. 3/4 5-6 (Units 1&2)

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

OFC	: ADSP/TVA/AA	: ADSP/TVA/PM	: ADSP/AD/TP	: ADSP/AD/TP	:	:	:
NAME	: MSimms	: JDonohew	: RPiehl	: SBlack	:	:	:
DATE	: 1/18/89	: 1/18/89	: 1/18/89	: 1/22/89	:	:	:

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CA
[Signature]

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.

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Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

cc:

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Regional Administrator, Region II
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Washington, D.C. 20515

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Rockville Office
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Suite 402
Rockville, Maryland 20852

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.5 ICE CONDENSER

ICE BED

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.1 The ice bed shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The stored ice having a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm boron as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5,
- b. Flow channels through the ice condenser,
- c. A maximum ice bed temperature of less than or equal to 27°F,
- d. A total ice weight of at least 2,333,100 pounds at a 95% level of confidence, and
- e. 1944 ice baskets.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the ice bed inoperable, restore the ice bed to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.1 The ice condenser shall be determined OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by using the ice bed temperature monitoring system to verify that the maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27°F.
- b. At least once per 6 months during the first 2 years following initial criticality and at least once per 12 months* thereafter by:
 1. Chemical analyses which verify that at least 9 representative samples of stored ice have a boron concentration of at least 1800 ppm as sodium tetraborate and a pH of 9.0 to 9.5 at 20°C.

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* One time extension to be performed no later than Unit 2, Cycle 3 refueling outage or January 22, 1989, whichever occurs first.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- | <u>Valve Number</u> | <u>Valve Function</u> | <u>Valve Position</u> |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
| a. FCV-63-1 | RHR Suction from RWST | open |
| b. FCV-63-22 | SIS Discharge to Common Piping | open |
- b. At least once per 31 days by:
1. Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points, and
 2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
 2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is above 700 psig.
 2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
- e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal and automatic switchover to containment sump test signal.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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