September 22, 1988

Docket Nos. 50-327/328

Mr. S. A. White
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

Dear Mr. White:

SUBJECT: REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS REQUIRED FOR MODE 3 (TAC R00106/R00107) (TS 82) SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 84 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 75 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments are in response to your application dated February 27, 1987.

These amendments revise Specification 3/4.4.1.2, Reactor Coolant System, Hot Standby, in the Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Technical Specificiations (TS). The changes are to increase the number of reactor coolant system loops required to be in operation during Mode 3, Hot Standby, to two loops. The TS limiting conditon for operation, action statement and surveillance requirement are being revised. The Bases for the Specification 3/4.4.1.2 are also being changed.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Bi-Weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Special Projects

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 84 to License No. DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 75 to License No. DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 84
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated February 27, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 84 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Suzanne Black

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Special Projects

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 20, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.84

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 4-1a	3/4 4-1a
B 3/4 4-1	B 3/4 4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

HOT STANDBY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 At least two of the reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE with at least two reactor coolant loops in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed and at least one reactor coolant loop in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are open:*

a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

b. Reactor coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

d. Reactor Coolant Loop D and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With only one reactor coolant loop in operation and the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, within 1 hour open the Reactor Trip System breakers.

c. With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required reactor coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 The required steam generators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 21 percent at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.2.3 The required Reactor Coolant loops shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*All reactor coolant pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, a single reactor coolant loop or residual heat removal (RHR) loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5, single failure considerations require that two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single fety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no

UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 75
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated February 27, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 75 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Suzanne Black

Suzanne Black, Assistant Director
for Projects
TVA Projects Division
Office of Special Projects

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 20, 1988

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 75

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Revise the Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages* are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE	INSERT
3/4 4-1	3/4 4-1*
3/4 4-2	3/4 4-2
B 3/4 4-1	B 3/4 4-1
B 3/4 4-2	B 3/4 4-2*

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.1 All reactor coolant loops shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.*

ACTION:

With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

SUREVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.4.1.1 The above required reactor coolant loops shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

HOT STANDBY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 At least two of the reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE with at least two reactor coolant loops in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed and at least one reactor coolant loop in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are open:*

a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump,

b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump,

c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump,

d. Reactor Coolant Loop D and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required Reactor Coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With only one reactor coolant loop in operation and the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, within one hour open the Reactor Trip System breakers.

c. With no Reactor Coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required Reactor Coolant loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required Reactor Coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 The required steam generators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 21 percent at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.2.3 The required Reactor Coolant loops shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*All Reactor Coolant pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

BASES

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, a single reactor coolant loop or residual heat removal (RHR) loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 single failure considerations require that two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

The power operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12 hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that 150 kw of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that the plant will be able to control reactor coolant pressure and establish natural circulation conditions.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 84 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

AND AMENDMENT NO. 75 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 27, 1987, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) proposed changes to the Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The changes would revise Specification 3/4.4.1.2, Reactor Coolant System, Hot Standby. The changes are to increase the number of reactor coolant system loops required to be in operation during Mode 3, Hot Standby, to two loops. The TS limiting condition for operation, action statement and surveillance requirement are being revised. The Bases for the Specification 3/4.4.1.2 are also being changed.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The Westinghouse Safety Review Committee determined in June 1984 that a potential unreviewed safety question existed due to an inconsistency in assumptions between the accident analysis in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the TS. The issue concerns the number of operating reactor coolant pumps when the plant is between residual heat removal (RHR) operation and hot zero power. This stage of operation is known as Mode 3 in the TS and the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (WSTS).

The FSAR analysis of the rod bank withdrawal from subcritical event assumed that all four reactor coolant pumps were operating at hot zero power. The Westinghouse reanalysis of the event showed that two reactor coolant pumps in operation are adequate to meet reactor coolant system (RCS) design limits. Open reactor trip system breakers preclude rod bank withdrawal. Therefore, the proposed changes to TS 3/4.4.1.2 require two reactor coolant loops to be in operation during Mode 3 when the trip system breakers are closed and operation of one reactor coolant loop with the trip system breakers open.

3.0 EVALUATION

TVA did not include the Westinghouse reanalysis in its submittal. The staff has, however, confirmed that methods approved by the NRC were conservatively used in the reanalysis, that the results are compatible with those found for similar plants and that the proposed changes bring the TS into full conformance with Rev. 5a of the Standard Technical Specification (STS) for Westinghouse PWRs. As the proposed changes were submitted prior to the release of ~~Rev. 5~~ to the STS, there are differences in the Bases. TVA may choose to update the Bases to agree with the STS, but the differences are not relevant to this SER. The proposed revision to the bases for TS 3/4.4.1.2 is correct and is acceptable.

The staff finds that with the change, the minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) may be expected to remain above the limiting value at all times during the postulated uncontrolled bank withdrawal transient, even if a failure reducing the flow in one of the two reactor coolant loops is assumed. As may be noted from the "Action" statements, the Mode 3 rod withdrawal event is very slow. With only one Reactor Coolant Pump operational, the operator has an hour to open the breakers or 72 hours to restore the required loops to operable status.

The staff concludes that TVA's proposed changes to TS 3/4.4.1.2 for Unit 1 and for Unit 2 eliminate the postulated unresolved safety question by requiring that a minimum of two reactor coolant loops be in operation during Mode 3 when there is a possibility for an uncontrolled bank withdrawal event.

No other postulated events were found to be adversely affected by this change. TVA stated that administrative controls implemented August 10, 1984, required two reactor coolant loops to be in operation or one reactor coolant loop if the control rods are on the bottom and the control rod drive system is tagged to prevent rod withdrawal. The TS change goes a step further, replacing the tag with the requirement that the reactor trip system breakers be open during single loop operation.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: J. Watt

Dated: September 22, 1988

cc:
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