



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

June 20, 1985

Docket Nos: 50-327
and 50-328

Mr. H. G. Parris
Manager of Power
Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street, Tower II
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 39 to Facility Operating License
No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 31 to Facility Operating
License No. DPR-79 - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2


The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 39 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 31 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79. These amendments are in response to your request dated October 24, 1983.

The amendments change the Technical Specifications to delete tables related to hydraulic snubbers. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 39 to Facility Operating License DPR-77 and Amendment No. 31 to Facility Operating License DPR-79 is enclosed.

Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next monthly Federal Register notice.


Sincerely,


Elinor G. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 39 to DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 31 to DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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Certified By 

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June 20, 1985

AMENDMENT NO. 39 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77 - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
AMENDMENT NO. 31 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79 - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

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SEQUOYAH

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 39
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 filed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (licensee), dated October 24, 1983, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the license, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Appendix A Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications


The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 39 are hereby incorporated into the license.

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The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


for Elinor G. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Appendix A Technical
Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: June 20, 1985

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 31

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Amended</u>	<u>Page</u>
3/4	4-15a
3/4	7-21
3/4	7-25
3/4	7-26
3/4	7-27
3/4	7-28
B3/4	7-6
B3/4	7-7
B3/4	7-8
	6-23

TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
63-560	Accumulator Discharge
63-561	Accumulator Discharge
63-562	Accumulator Discharge
63-563	Accumulator Discharge
63-622	Accumulator Discharge
63-623	Accumulator Discharge
63-624	Accumulator Discharge
63-625	Accumulator Discharge
63-551	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-553	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-557	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-555	Safety Injection (Cold Leg)
63-632	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-633	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-634	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-635	Residual Heat Removal (Cold Leg)
63-641	Residual Heat Removal/Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-644	Residual Heat Removal/Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-558	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-559	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-543	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-545	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-547	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-549	Safety Injection (Hot Leg)
63-640	Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg)
63-643	Residual Heat Removal (Hot Leg)
87-558	Upper Head Injection
87-559	Upper Head Injection
87-560	Upper Head Injection
87-561	Upper Head Injection
87-562	Upper Head Injection
87-563	Upper Head Injection
FCV-74-1*	Residual Heat Removal
FCV-74-2*	Residual Heat Removal

*These valves do not have to be leak tested following manual or automatic actuation or flow through the valve.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9. All safety-related snubbers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. (MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems or partial systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.)

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9. Each safety-related snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Inspection Groups

The snubbers may be categorized into two major groups based on whether the snubbers are accessible or inaccessible during reactor operation. These major groups may be further subdivided into subgroups based on design, environment, or other features which may be expected to affect the OPERABILITY of the snubbers within the subgroup. Each subgroup or group may be inspected independently in accordance with 4.7.9.b through 4.7.9.h.

b. Visual Inspection Schedule and Lot Size

The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be completed by October 31, 1981, and shall include all snubbers on safety-related systems. If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperable during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed 18 months \pm 25% from the date of the first inspection or during an outage of sufficient duration (at least 72 hours in Mode 5). Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

i. Snubber Service Life Program (Continued)

expire during a period when the snubber is required to be operable. The seal replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with 6.10.2.n. Mechanical snubber drag force increases greater than 50 percent of previously measured values shall be evaluated as an indication of impending failure of the snubber. These evaluations and any associated corrective action shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with 6.10.2.n.

j. Exemption From Visual Inspection or Functional Tests

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and if applicable snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

SNUBBERS (Continued)

that may be generically susceptible and operability verified by inservice functional testing, if applicable, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable. Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as temperature, radiation, and vibration. Inspection groups may be established based on design features and installed conditions which may be expected to be generic. Each of these inspection groups are inspected and tested separately unless an engineering analysis indicates the inspection group is improperly constituted. All suspect snubbers are subject to inspection and testing regardless of inspection groupings.

To further increase the assurance of snubber reliability, functional tests shall be performed during each refueling outage. These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper movement, activation, and bleed or release. The performance of hydraulic snubbers generally depends on a clean, deaerated fluid contained within variable pressure chambers, flowing at closely controlled rates. Since these characteristics are subject to change with exposure to the reactor environment, time, and other factors, their performance within the specified range should be verified. Mechanical snubbers which depend upon overcoming the inertia of a mass and the braking action of a capstan spring contained within the snubber for limiting the acceleration of the attached component (within the load rating of the snubber) are not subject to changes in performance in the same manner as hydraulic snubbers. Pending the development of information regarding the change during the service of the snubber of the acceleration/resistance relationship and the optimum method for detecting this change, these mechanical snubbers may be tested to verify that when subjected to a large change in velocity the resistance to movement increases greatly. The performance change information is to be developed in order to establish test methods to be used during and after the first refueling outage.

Ten percent of the total population of approximately 700 snubbers is an adequate sample for functional tests. The initial sample is to be proportioned among the groups in order to obtain a representative sample. Observed failures of more than two snubbers in the initial lot will require an engineering analysis and testing of additional snubbers selected from snubbers likely to have the same defect. A thorough inspection of the snubber threaded attachments to the pipe or components and the anchorage will be made in conjunction with all required functional tests.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere,

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

SNUBBERS (Continued)

location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, CO₂, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service. When the inoperable fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.

The surveillance requirements provide assurance that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the fire suppression systems are met.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for a twenty-four hour report to the Commission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the continued protection of the nuclear plant.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetrations ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

Fire barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and dampers are considered functional when the visually observed condition is the same as the as-designed condition. For those fire barrier penetrations that are not in the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be performed to show that the modification has not degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier penetration.

During periods of time when a barrier is not functional, either, 1) a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier, or 2) the fire detectors on at least one side of the affected barrier must be verified OPERABLE and a hourly fire watch patrol established, until the barrier is restored to functional status.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the Unit Operating License:

- a. Records and drawing changes reflecting unit design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
- b. Records of new and irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers and assembly burnup histories.
- c. Records of radiation exposure for all individuals entering radiation control areas.
- d. Records of gaseous and liquid radioactive material released to the environs.
- e. Records of transient or operational cycles for those unit components identified in Table 5.7-1.
- f. Records of reactor tests and experiments.
- g. Records of training and qualification for current members of the unit staff.
- h. Records of in-service inspections performed pursuant to these Technical Specifications.
- i. Records of Quality Assurance activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Manual.
- j. Records of reviews performed for changes made to procedures or equipment or reviews of tests and experiments pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
- k. Records of meetings of the PORC, RARC, and the NSRB.
- l. Records of analyses required by the radiological environmental monitoring program.
- m. Records of secondary water sampling and water quality.
- n. Records of the service life monitoring of all safety-related hydraulic and mechanical snubbers, required by T/S 3.7.9, including the maintenance performed to renew the service life.
- o. Records for Environmental Qualification which are covered under the provisions of Paragraph 2.c.(12)(6) of License No. DPR-77.

6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 31
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 filed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (licensee), dated October 24, 1983, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the license, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Appendix A Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:


(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 31 are hereby incorporated into the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


for Elinor G. Adensam, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 4
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Appendix A Technical
Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: June 20, 1985

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 39

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Amended
Page

3/4 7-21
3/4 7-25
3/4 7-26
3/4 7-27
3/4 7-28
B3/4 7-6a
6-29

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9 All safety-related snubbers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. (MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems or partial systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.)

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9 Each safety-related snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Inspection Groups

The snubbers may be categorized into two major groups based on whether the snubbers are accessible or inaccessible during reactor operation. These major groups may be further subdivided into subgroups based on design, environment, or other features which may be expected to affect the OPERABILITY of the snubbers within the subgroup. Each subgroup or group may be inspected independently in accordance with 4.7.9.b through 4.7.9.h.

b. Visual Inspection Schedule

The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers on safety-related systems. If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperable during the first inservice

PLANT SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

g. Functional Test Failure - Attached Component Analysis

For snubbers(s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components which are restrained by the snubber(s). The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components restrained by the snubber(s) were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubbers(s), and in order to ensure that the restrained component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

h. Functional Testing of Repaired and Spare Snubbers

Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. These snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the functional test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

i. Snubber Service Life Program

The seal service life of hydraulic snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the seals do not fail between surveillance inspections. The maximum expected service life for the various seals, seal materials, and applications shall be estimated based on engineering information, and the seals shall be replaced so that the maximum expected service life does not expire during a period when the snubber is required to be operable. The seal replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with 6.10.2.n.

Mechanical snubber drag force increases greater than 50 percent of previously measured values shall be evaluated as an indication of impending failure of the snubber. These evaluations and any associated corrective action, shall be documented, and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with 6.10.2.n.

j. Exemption From Visual Inspection or Functional Tests

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and if applicable snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

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BASES

3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS (cont'd)

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.10.2 (Continued)

- m. Records of secondary water sampling and water quality.
- n. Records of the service life monitoring of all safety-related hydraulic and mechanical snubbers, required by T/S 3.7.9, including the maintenance performed to renew the service life.

6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

6.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA

6.12.1 In lieu of the "control device" or "alarm signal" required by paragraph 20.203(c) (2) of 10 CFR 20, each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 100 mrem/hr but less than 1000 mrem/hr shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Special (Radiation) Work Permit*. Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following:

- a. A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area.
- b. A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate level in the area has been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them.
- c. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures who is equipped with a radiation dose rate monitoring device. This individual shall be responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the facility Health Physicist in the Special (Radiation) Work Permit.

6.12.2 The requirements of 6.12.1, above, shall also apply to each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1000 mrem/hr. In addition, locked doors shall be provided to prevent unauthorized entry into such areas and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Shift Engineer on duty and/or the Health Physicist.

*Health Physics personnel or personnel escorted by Health Physics personnel in accordance with approved emergency procedures, shall be exempt from the SWP issuance requirement during the performance of their assigned radiation protection duties, provided they comply with approved radiation protection procedures for entry into high radiation areas.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 39 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77
AND AMENDMENT NO. 31 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

I. INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION

On October 24, 1983, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) requested a revision to the Technical Specifications of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, on safety related hydraulic snubbers. Recognizing the general applicability of the proposed changes, Generic Letter 84-13 was issued on May 3, 1984, on this subject. This letter permitted the deletion of both Tables 3.7-4a (Safety Related Hydraulic Snubbers) and 3.7-4b (Safety Related Mechanical Snubbers) from present Technical Specifications of all Power Reactor Licenses (except SEP licenses) and all applicants for licenses to operate power reactors. Since the recordkeeping requirement of Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.7 has not been changed and the requirement that operability of safety related snubbers shall be maintained is clearly delineated by the proposed revision, the staff concludes that this proposal meets the guidelines of Generic Letter 84-13 and approves the change.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve changes in the installation of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

III. CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register on January 26, 1984 (49 FR 3357) and consulted with the state of Tennessee. No public comments were received, and the state of Tennessee did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and

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(2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: June 20, 1985