



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

June 25, 1985

Docket Nos: 50-327  
and 50-328

Mr. H. G. Parris  
Manager of Power  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
500A Chestnut Street, Tower II  
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Dear Mr. Parris:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 40 to Facility Operating License  
No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 32 to Facility Operating  
License No. DPR-79 - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2


The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 40 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 and Amendment No. 32 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-79. These amendments are in response to your requests dated August 19 and October 24, 1983, December 10, 1981, and February 22, 1984.

The amendments change the Technical Specifications related to subcooling margin monitors, fire hose hydrostatic testing requirements, and Bases statements for operational limits associated with the pressurizer spray nozzles. The amendments are effective as of their date of issuance.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 40 to Facility Operating License DPR-77 and Amendment No. 32 to Facility Operating License DPR-79 is enclosed.

Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,


  
Elinor G. Adensam, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 4  
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 40 to DPR-77
2. Amendment No. 32 to DPR-79
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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P PDR

SEQUOYAH

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June 5, 1985


AMENDMENT NO. 40 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77 - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
AMENDMENT NO. 32 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79 - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 40  
License No. DPR-77

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The applications for amendment to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 filed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (licensee), dated August 19 and October 24, 1983, and February 22, 1984, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the license, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Appendix A Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-77 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications


The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 40, are hereby incorporated into the license.

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The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
for Elinor G. Adensam, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 4  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Appendix A Technical  
Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: June 25, 1985

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.40

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-77

DOCKET NO. 50-327

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Amended  
Page

3/4 3-55  
B3/4 4-6

## INSTRUMENTATION

### ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.7 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels, except for the RCS subcooling margin monitor, less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- c. With the subcooling margin monitor inoperable for more than 48 hours, the minimum shift crew (per Table 6.2-1) will be increased by one member who shall be dedicated to and capable of determining the subcooling margin during an accident using existing instrumentation.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.3.7 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

The temperature and pressure changes during heatup and cooldown are limited to be consistent with the requirements given in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G.

- 1) The reactor coolant temperature and pressure and system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 for the first full-power service period.
  - a) Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown. Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation.
  - b) Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 define limits to assure prevention of non-ductile failure only. For normal operation, other inherent plant characteristics, e.g., pump heat addition and pressurizer heater capacity, may limit the heatup and cooldown rates that can be achieved over certain pressure-temperature ranges.
- 2) These limit lines shall be calculated periodically using methods provided below.
- 3) The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator is below 70°F.
- 4) The pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates shall not exceed 100°F/hr and 200°F/hr respectively. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 560°F.
- 5) System preservice hydrotests and in-service leak and hydrotests shall be performed at pressures in accordance with the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

The fracture toughness properties of the ferritic materials in the reactor vessel are determined in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan, and ASTM E185-73, and in accordance with additional reactor vessel requirements. These properties are then evaluated in accordance with Appendix G of the 1976 Summer Addenda to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the calculation methods described in WCAP-7924-A, "Basis for Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves, April 1975."





UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 32  
License No. DPR-79

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The applications for amendment to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 filed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (licensee), dated August 19 and October 24, 1983, December 10, 1981, and February 22, 1984, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the license, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Appendix A Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-79 is hereby amended to read as follows:


(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 32, are hereby incorporated into the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

  
for Elinor G. Adensam, Chief  
Licensing Branch No. 4  
Division of Licensing

Attachment:  
Appendix A Technical  
Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: June 25, 1985

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 32

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-79

DOCKET NO. 50-328

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Amended</u>	<u>Page</u>
3/4	3-56
3/4	3-66
3/4	3-67
3/4	6-23
3/4	7-48
B3/4	4-6

## INSTRUMENTATION

### ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.3.7 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

#### ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels, except for the RCS subcooling margin monitor, less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- c. With the subcooling margin monitor inoperable for more than 48 hours, the minimum shift crew (per Table 6.2-1) will be increased by one member who shall be dedicated to and capable of determining the subcooling margin during an accident using existing instrumentation.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.3.3.7 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

FIRE ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	Ionization	MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE		
			Photoelectric	Thermal	Infrared
241	480-V XFMR Rm. 1A, El. 749	3			
242	480-V XFMR Rm. 1A, El. 749	3			
243	480-V XFMR Rm. 1B, El. 749	3			
244	480-V XFMR Rm. 1B, El. 749	3			
245	480-V XFMR Rm. 2A, El. 749	3			
246	480-V XFMR Rm. 2A, El. 749	3			
247	480-V XFMR Rm. 2B, El. 749	3			
248	480-V XFMR Rm. 2B, El. 749	3			
249	125-V Batt. Rm. I, El. 749	1			
250	125-V Batt. Rm. I, El. 749	1			
251	125-V Batt. Rm. II, El. 749	1			
252	125-V Batt. Rm. II, El. 749	1			
253	125-V Batt. Rm. III, El. 749	1			
254	125-V Batt. Rm. III, El. 749	1			
255	125-V Batt. Rm. IV, El. 749	1			
256	125-V Batt. Rm. IV, El. 749	1			
257	480-V Bd. Rm. 1B, El. 749	4			
258	480-V Bd. Rm. 1B, El. 749	4			
259	480-V Bd. Rm. 1A, El. 749	4			
260	480-V Bd. Rm. 1A, El. 749	4			
261	480-V Bd. Rm. 2A, El. 749	4			
262	480-V Bd. Rm. 2A, El. 749	4			
263	480-V Bd. Rm. 2B, El. 749	4			
264	480-V Bd. Rm. 2B, El. 749	4			
269	Computer Rm. El. 685	4			
270	Computer Rm. El. 685			4	
271	Aux. Inst. Rm. El. 685	8			
272	Aux. Inst. Rm. El. 685			9	
273	Computer Rm. Corridor, El. 685	3			
276	Intake Pump Sta. El. 690 & 670.5	15			
277	ERCW Pump Sta. El. 704	21			
427	125-V Batt. Rm. V El. 749	2			
428	125-V Batt. Rm. V El. 749	2			

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2

3/4 3-66

Amendment No. 32

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

<u>FIRE ZONE</u>	<u>INSTRUMENT LOCATION</u>	<u>Ionization</u>	<u>MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE</u>		
			<u>Photoelectric</u>	<u>Thermal</u>	<u>Infrared</u>
296	Aux. CR Bds. L-4B, 4D, & 11B E1 732	6			
297	Main CR Bds. E1. 732	9			
298	Common MCR Bds. E1 732	9			
387	Turbine Cont. Bldg. Wall, E1. 706			18	
353	Lwr. Compt. Coolers, E1. 693		4		
355	Upr. Compt. Coolers, E1. 778		4		
374	Reactor Building Annulus		18		
375	Reactor Building Annulus		18		
362	RCP 1 E1. 693			2*	
363	RCP 1 E1. 693			2	
358	RCP 2 E1. 693			2*	
359	RCP 2 E1. 693			2	
366	RCP 3 E1. 693			2*	
367	RCP 3 E1. 693			2	
370	RCP 4 E1. 693			2*	
371	RCP 4 E1. 693			2	

\*This change is effective upon completion of the modification

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

<u>VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)</u>
C. PHASE "A" CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION (Cont.)		
13.	FCV-30-50 Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
14.	FCV-30-51 Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
15.	FCV-30-52 Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
16.	FCV-30-53 Upper Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
17.	FCV-30-56 Lower Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
18.	FCV-30-57 Lower Compt Purge Air Exh	4*
19.	FCV-30-58 Inst Room Purge Air Exh	4*
20.	FCV-30-59 Inst Room Purge Air Exh	4*
21.	FCV-90-107 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
22.	FCV-90-108 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
23.	FCV-90-109 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
24.	FCV-90-110 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
25.	FCV-90-111 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
26.	FCV-90-113 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
27.	FCV-90-114 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
28.	FCV-90-115 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
29.	FCV-90-116 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
30.	FCV-90-117 Cntmt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon	5*
D. OTHER		
1.	FCV-30-46 Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
2.	FCV-30-47 Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25
3.	FCV-30-48 Vacuum Relief Isolation Valve	25

\*Provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position with power removed and leakage limits of Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.4 are satisfied.

#Provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position with power removed and either FCV-62-73 or FCV-62-74 is maintained operable.

## PLANT SYSTEMS

### FIRE HOSE STATIONS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.7.11.4 The fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-5 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-5 inoperable, route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from an OPERABLE hose station within 1 hour if the inoperable fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise, route the additional hose within 24 hours. Restore the fire hose station to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.6.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the station to OPERABLE status.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.7.11.4 Each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.7-5 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by a visual inspection of the fire hose stations accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station.
- b. At least once per 18 months by:
  1. Visual inspection of all the stations not accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station.
  2. Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and
  3. Inspecting all gaskets and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings.
- c. At least once per 3 years by:
  1. Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve OPERABILITY and no flow blockage.
  2. Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.



## REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### BASES

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#### SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (Continued)

Reducing  $T_{avg}$  to less than 500°F prevents the release of activity should a steam generator tube rupture since the saturation pressure of the primary coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves. The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the primary coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action. Information obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomena. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

#### 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

The temperature and pressure changes during heatup and cooldown are limited to be consistent with the requirements given in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G.

- 1) The reactor coolant temperature and pressure and system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 for the first full-power service period.
  - a) Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown. Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation.
  - b) Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 define limits to assure prevention of non-ductile failure only. For normal operation, other inherent plant characteristics, e.g., pump heat addition and pressurizer heater capacity, may limit the heatup and cooldown rates that can be achieved over certain pressure-temperature ranges.
- 2) These limit lines shall be calculated periodically using methods provided below.
- 3) The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator is below 70°F.
- 4) The pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates shall not exceed 100°F/hr and 200°/hr respectively. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than 560°F.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 40 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 32 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79  
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

INTRODUCTION

These amendments address Technical Specification changes that were requested by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, which are as follows:

- (1) Section 3.3.3.7 of the Sequoyah Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications set forth the limiting conditions for operation for accident monitoring instrumentation. The ACTION statements limit continued plant operation in Modes 1, 2, or 3 to 7 days when one channel of accident monitoring instrumentation is inoperable and to 48 hours when redundant channels are inoperable. Since only one channel is provided for the reactor coolant system subcooling margin monitor, its out-of-service limit was specified as 7 days. By letters dated August 19 and October 24, 1983, the licensee requested a change in the limiting conditions for operation which are applicable to the subcooling margin monitor. The proposed change would limit the out-of-service time of the subcooling margin monitor to 48 hours instead of 7 days. Further, the proposed change would permit the licensee to increase the minimum shift crew by one member who would be dedicated to and capable of determining the subcooling margin during an accident using existing instrumentation if the subcooling monitor is not restored to operable status in 48 hours.
- (2) On December 10, 1981, the licensee proposed changes for Units 1 and 2 on fire hose hydrostatic test pressure requirements that would make them consistent with NRC requirements.
- (3) On February 22, 1984, the licensee stated that changes to the BASES to make them consistent with the requested changes on operational limits associated with the pressurizer nozzle were omitted from their letter of July 21, 1983. Amendments 25 and 36 on pressurizer spray nozzle were not affected by the omission since the BASES statements are not part of the Technical Specifications, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36.

EVALUATION

- (1) The licensee's proposal to limit the out-of-service limit on the single channel subcooling margin monitor from 7 days to 48 hours is consistent with the limitation established for redundant channels i.e., the out-of-service limit for a parameter of accident monitoring instrumentation. Therefore, the staff finds that this change is acceptable.

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In the event that the subcooling margin monitor is out-of-service and cannot be restored to operable status within the 48 hour limit, the proposed change would also permit the dedication of an individual to the task of determining the subcooling margin based on indications of reactor coolant system temperature and pressure. Since this individual would be in addition to the minimum shift crew requirements, this would not place an additional burden on the plant staff during an accident and is, therefore, an acceptable alternative.

- (2) The revision to the fire hose hydrostatic test pressure requirements was made on Unit 1 (Amendment No. 13) but inadvertently omitted for Unit 2. Fire hose hydrostatic testing for nuclear plants was changed by the NRC to be conducted at a pressure of 150 psig, instead of 300 psig, or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating, pressure, whichever is greater.
- (3) The Technical Specification changes for operational limits for the pressurizer spray nozzle were issued on November 23, 1983 (Amendments 28, 36). The proposed BASES changes are consistent with the operational limits identified in the technical specification. Therefore, the revision is acceptable.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve changes in the installation of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

#### CONCLUSION

The Commission made proposed determinations that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which were published in the Federal Register on January 26, 1984 (49 FR 3357), September 28, 1984 (49 FR 38410), and December 31, 1984 (49 FR 50826) and consulted with the state of Tennessee. No public comments were received, and the state of Tennessee did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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