

November 17, 1994

Mr. T. C. McMeekin
Vice President, McGuire Site
Duke Power Company
12700 Hagers Ferry Road
Huntersville, NC 28078-8985

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SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
(TAC NOS. M90536 AND M90537)

Dear Mr. McMeekin:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 152 to Facility Operating License NPF-9 and Amendment No. 134 to Facility Operating License NPF-17 for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated October 4, 1994.

The amendments revise the TS to eliminate a compliance conflict that arises when swapping the Centrifugal Charging (NV) pumps in Modes 4, 5, and 6. In eliminating the conflict, this amendment will permit flexibility in the operation of the NV pumps during unit startup without a safety concern.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Victor Nerses, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 152 to NPF-9
2. Amendment No. 134 to NPF-17
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\McGuire\MCG90536.AMD

*See previous concurrence

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 17, 1994

Mr. T. C. McMeekin
Vice President, McGuire Site
Duke Power Company
12700 Hagers Ferry Road
Huntersville, NC 28078-8985

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
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The amendments revise the TS to eliminate a compliance conflict that arises when swapping the Centrifugal Charging (NV) pumps in Modes 4, 5, and 6. In eliminating the conflict, this amendment will permit flexibility in the operation of the NV pumps during unit startup without a safety concern.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Victor Nerses".

Victor Nerses, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 152 to NPF-9
2. Amendment No. 134 to NPF-17
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. T. C. McMeekin
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McGuire Nuclear Station

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-369

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 152
License No. NPF-9

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 filed by the Duke Power Company (licensee) dated [redacted] complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 152 , are hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Louis L. Wheeler, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: November 17, 1994



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-370

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 134
License No. NPF-17

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility), Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 filed by the Duke Power Company (licensee) dated [redacted] complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 134, are hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Louis L. Wheeler, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Technical Specification
Changes

Date of Issuance: November 17, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 152

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-9

DOCKET NO. 50-369

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 134

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-17

DOCKET NO. 50-370

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 1-9
3/4 1-10
3/4 5-9
B 3/4 1-3
B 3/4 1-4
B 3/4 5-2
B 3/4 5-3

Insert Pages

3/4 1-9
3/4 1/10
3/4 5-9
B 3/4 1-3
B 3/4 1-4*
B 3/4 5-2
B 3/4 5-3*

*No change - overflow page

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.3 One[#] charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying a differential pressure across the pump of greater than or equal to 2380 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All centrifugal charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position or by verifying the discharge of each charging pump has been isolated from the Reactor Coolant System by at least two isolation valves with power removed from the valve operators.

[#]Two charging pumps may be operable and operating for ≤ 15 minutes to allow swapping charging pumps.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.4 At least two# charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.4.1 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying a differential pressure across each pump of greater than or equal to 2380 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.4.2 All centrifugal charging pumps, except the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 300°F by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position or by verifying the discharge of each charging pump has been isolated from the Reactor Coolant System by at least two isolation valves with power removed from the valve operators.

#A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 300°F. Two charging pumps may be operable and operating for ≤15 minutes to allow swapping charging pumps.

3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg F 350°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

- a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,#
- b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,
- c. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and
- d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

- a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
- b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the RHR heat exchanger or RHR pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} less than 350°F by use of alternate heat removal methods.
- c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

#A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one Safety Injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 300°F. Two charging pumps may be operable and operating for ≤15 minutes to allow swapping charging pumps.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

Refueling Water Storage Tank Requirements for Maintaining SDM - Modes 1-4

Required volume for maintaining SDM	presented in the COLR
Unusable volume (below nozzle)	16,000 gallons
Additional margin	17,893 gallons

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one Boron Injection System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 300°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV. Allowing two Centrifugal Charging pumps to operate simultaneously for ≤15 minutes increases the margin of safety with respect to the Reactor Coolant pump seal failure resulting in a LOCA in that the Reactor Coolant pump seal injection flow is not interrupted during pump swap. For the 15 minute period during which simultaneous Centrifugal Charging pump operation is allowed, the safety margins as related to the mass addition analysis are not appreciably reduced. Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 requires two PORVs to be operable during this period of operation, thus a mass addition transient can be relieved as required assuming the two PORVs function properly.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. The minimum borated water volumes and concentrations required to maintain shutdown margin for the Boric Acid Storage System and the Refueling Water Storage Tank are presented in the Core Operating Limits Report.

The Technical Specification LCO value for the Boric Acid Storage Tank and the Refueling Water Storage Tank minimum contained water volume during Modes 5 and 6 is based on the required volume to maintain shutdown margin, an allowance for unusable volume and additional margin as follows:

Boric Acid Storage Tank Requirements for Maintaining SDM - Modes 5 & 6

Required volume for maintaining SDM	presented in the COLR
Unusable volume (to maintain full suction pipe)	4,132 gallons
Additional margin	1,415 gallons

Refueling Water Storage Tank Requirements for Maintaining SDM - Modes 5 & 6

Required volume for maintaining SDM	presented in the COLR
Unusable volume (below nozzle)	16,000 gallons
Additional margin	6,500 gallons

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 9.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The control rod insertion limit and shutdown rod insertion limits are specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT per specification 6.9.1.9.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T_{avg} greater than or equal to 551°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.

For Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTIONS c. and d., it is incumbent upon the plant personnel to verify the trippability of the inoperable control rod(s). This may be by verification of a control system failure, usually electrical in nature, or that the failure is associated with the control rod stepping mechanism.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one Safety Injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and Safety Injection pumps except the required OPERABLE charging pump to be inoperable below 300°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV. Allowing two Centrifugal Charging pumps to operate simultaneously for ≤15 minutes increases the margin of safety with respect to the Reactor Coolant pump seal failure resulting in a LOCA in that the Reactor Coolant pump seal injection flow is not interrupted during pump swap. For the 15 minute period during which simultaneous Centrifugal Charging pump operation is allowed, the safety margins as related to the mass addition analysis are not appreciably reduced. Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 requires two PORVs to be operable during this period of operation, thus a mass addition transient can be relieved as required assuming the two PORVs function properly.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4

[Deleted]

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued)

3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 9.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 152 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-9
AND AMENDMENT NO. 134 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-17

DUKE POWER COMPANY

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-369 AND 50-370

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 4, 1994, Duke Power Company, the licensee for the McGuire Nuclear Station, requested technical specification (TS) changes regarding centrifugal charging pump operation in Modes 4, 5 and 6 (Ref. 1). TS 3.1.2.3, 3.1.2.4, and 3.5.3 allow only one centrifugal charging (NV) pump to be operable in Modes 4, 5 and 6. The charging pumps provide, as one of their functions, cooling water to the reactor coolant pump seals. The licensee foresees a potential violation of the above TS in case the operating charging pump needs maintenance or needs to be taken out of service for other reasons while in these modes. To switch charging pumps requires the non-operating pump to be started before shutting the operating pump. In essence, two pumps are operating at the same time. This overlapping condition lasts for less than or equal to 15 minutes. During this time, with two pumps operating, a violation of the above TS is created. On the other hand, the plant cannot operate, even for a short time, without an operating centrifugal charging pump, due to the need to maintain pump seal coolant water supply. The licensee requested removal of this potential cause of a non-compliant condition in the TS.

2.0 EVALUATION

The proposed resolution is to allow two centrifugal charging pumps to be in operation at the same time for less than or equal to 15 minutes in Modes 4, 5 and 6. The limitation of one centrifugal charging pump operating is imposed to avoid cold overpressurization of the reactor cooling system. TS 3.4.9.3 allows one power-operated relief valve (PORV) to be inoperable for 7 days during Modes 4, 5 and 6. However, during the pump changeovers in these modes, the licensee will maintain two of the three PORVs at McGuire operable. With two pumps operating, adequate depressurization capability is provided. The licensee has confirmed that two PORVs are capable of mitigating the effects of mass addition from two centrifugal charging pumps. Also, the probability of a pressurization event during these 15 minutes is judged to be small due to the short time period.

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Considering that the licensee has established the requirement to have two PORVs operable that provide adequate depressurization capability for two centrifugal charging pumps for the relatively short time interval of 15 minutes, we find the proposed technical specification changes acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the North Carolina State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 52003 dated October 13, 1994). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and, (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: L. Lois

Date: November 17, 1994