

November 22, 1994

Mr. T. C. McMeekin
Vice President, McGuire Site
Duke Power Company
12700 Hagers Ferry Road
Huntersville, NC 28078-8985

SUBJECT: MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - AMENDMENTS NOS. 150
AND 132 (TAC NOS. M77359, M77360, M77429, AND M77430)

Dear Mr. McMeekin:

Amendment Nos. 150 and 132 to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-9 and NPF-17, respectively, for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, were issued on October 27, 1994. Due to an administrative oversight, the Technical Specifications (TS) pages contained a few minor typographical errors. Please substitute the enclosed revised set of TS pages for the ones sent to you on October 27.

Sincerely,
Original signed by:
L. Wiens for:
Victor Nerses, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/encl: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Victor Nerses".

Victor Nerses, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/encl: See next page

Mr. T. C. McMeekin
Duke Power Company

McGuire Nuclear Station

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 All power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable because of excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) and maintain power to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With two PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORVs to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. If the block valves have been closed and power has been removed, restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With three PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive leakage, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV switch in the "close" position and remove power from its associated solenoid valve (do not enter action statement b for the resulting inoperable PORV); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES (continued)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- f. With two block valves inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valves to OPERABLE status or place their associated PORV switches in the "close" position (do not enter action statement c for the resulting inoperable PORVs); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. If the PORV switches have been placed in the "close" position, restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- g. With three block valves inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valves to OPERABLE status or place their associated PORV switches in the "close" position (do not enter action statement d for the resulting inoperable PORVs). Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- h. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and
- b. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel during MODE 3 or MODE 4 when the temperature of all RCS cold legs is greater than 300F with the block valve closed.

4.4.4.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION a., b., c., or d. in Specification 3.4.4.

4.4.4.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Manually transferring motive power from the normal (air) supply to the emergency (nitrogen) supply.
- b. Isolating and venting the normal (air) supply, and
- c. Operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 At least one of the following Overpressure Protection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig, or
- b. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 4.5 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 300°F, MODE 5, and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

- a. With one PORV inoperable in MODE 4, restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 4.5 square inch vent(s) within the next 8 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable in MODE 5, suspend all operations that could lead to water-solid RCS conditions. Restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 4.5 square inch vent(s) within the next 24 hours.
- c. With one PORV inoperable in MODE 6, restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 4.5 square inch vent(s) within the next 8 hours.
- d. With both PORVs inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 4.5 square inch vent(s) within 8 hours.
- e. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, at least once per 31 days;
- b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and
- c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

*Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS (Continued)

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the Reactor Coolant System and the Secondary Coolant System (reactor-to-secondary leakage = 500 gallons per day per steam generator). Cracks having a reactor-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that reactor-to-secondary leakage of 500 gallons per day per steam generator can readily be detected by radiation monitors of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with proper chemistry treatment of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Repair will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the repair limit of 40% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Installed sleeves with imperfections exceeding 40% of the sleeve nominal wall thickness will be plugged. Defective steam generator tubes can be repaired by the installation of sleeves which span the area of degradation, and serve as a replacement pressure boundary for the degraded portion of the tube, allowing the tube to remain in service. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect wastage type degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness. For tubes with degradation below the F* distance, and not degraded within the F* distance, repair is not required. If a tube is sleeved due to degradation in the F* distance, then any defects in the tube below the sleeve will remain in service without repair.