



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 28, 1989

Docket Nos.: 50-369  
and 50-370

Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President  
Nuclear Production Department  
Duke Power Company  
422 South Church Street  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Tucker:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 94 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-9 AND  
AMENDMENT NO. 76 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-17 - MCGUIRE  
NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TACS 61510/61511)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 94 to Facility Operating License NPF-9 and Amendment No. 76 to Facility Operating License NPF-17 for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated May 14, 1986 as supplemented November 21, 1986 and revised April 25, 1988 and April 5, 1989.

The amendments change the Technical Specifications by deleting tables of containment penetration and isolation valves which have been incorporated into the FSAR. Other changes requested in your May 14, 1986 letter were addressed by previous Amendments 63 (Unit 1) and 44 (Unit 2).

By letter of January 4, 1989, you requested certain changes to the tables (now deleted by these amendments) which you state would be unnecessary once these amendments are issued. Thus, we consider your January request to have been negated and our actions completed on McGuire.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 94 to Facility Operating License NPF-9 and Amendment No. 76 to Facility Operating License NPF-17 is enclosed.

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
Mr. H. B. Tucker

-2-

April 28, 1989

Notice of issuance of amendments will be included in the Commission's next bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink that reads "DARL HOOD". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping "D" at the beginning.

Darl Hood, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 94 to NPF-9
2. Amendment No. 76 to NPF-17
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

Mr. H. B. Tucker

-2-

April 28, 1989

Notice of issuance of amendments will be included in the Commission's next bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,



Darl Hood, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 94 to NPF-9
2. Amendment No. 76 to NPF-17
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

PDII-3  
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DATED: April 28, 1989

AMENDMENT NO. 94 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-9 - McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1  
AMENDMENT NO. 76 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-17 - McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2

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D. Hood 14-H-25

OGC-WF 15-B-18

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E. Jordan MNBB-3302

W. Jones P-130A

T. Meek (8) P1-137

ACRS (10) P-135

GPA/PA 17-F-2

ARM/LFMB AR-2015

E. Butcher 11-F-23

J. Craig 8-D-1

D. Hagan MNBB-3302

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Duke Power Company

McGuire Nuclear Station

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-369

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 94  
License No. NPF-9

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated May 14, 1986, as supplemented November 21, 1986 and revised April 25, 1988 and April 5, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 94, are hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1989

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. <sup>94</sup>, are hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1989

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EButcher  
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-370

McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 76  
License No. NPF-17

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 filed by the Duke Power Company (the licensee) dated May 14, 1986, as supplemented November 21, 1986 and revised April 25, 1988, and April 5, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 76, are hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1989

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-17 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 76, are hereby incorporated into the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

*151*

David B. Matthews, Director  
Project Directorate II-3  
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: April 28, 1989

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LA:PDII-3  
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PM:PDII-3  
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4/20/89

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EButcher  
4/20/89

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 94

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-9

DOCKET NO. 50-369

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 76

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-17

DOCKET NO. 50-370

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The related overleaf page is provided to maintain document completeness.

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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## DEFINITIONS

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### CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
  - 1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves may be opened under administrative controls pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.1.a; or
  - 2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions.
- b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,
- c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3,
- d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2, and
- e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

### CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

### CORE ALTERATION

1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

### DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

### $\bar{E}$ - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.11  $\bar{E}$  shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the sample) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV/d) for the radionuclides in the sample.

## 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

#### CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations\* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves are open under administrative control,\*\* and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions;
- b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with Specification 3.6.1.3; and
- c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at  $P_a$ , 14.8 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for<sup>a</sup> these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than  $0.60 L_a$ .

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\* Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and the annulus and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

\*\*The following valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control: NC-141, NC-142, WE-13, WE-23, VX-34, VX-40, FW-11, FW-13, FW-4.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

- a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:
  - 1) Less than or equal to  $L_t$ , 0.30% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at  $P_a$ , 14.8 psig, or
  - 2) Less than or equal to  $L_t$ , 0.14% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at a reduced pressure of  $P_t$ , 7.4 psig.
- b. A combined leakage rate of less than  $0.60 L_a$  for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to  $P_a$ , and
- c. A combined bypass leakage rate of less than  $0.07 L_a$  for all penetrations identified as secondary containment bypass leakage paths when pressurized to  $P_a$ .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

#### ACTION:

With (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding  $0.75 L_a$  or  $0.75 L_t$ , as applicable, or (b) the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding  $0.60 L_a$ , or (c) the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding  $0.07 L_a$ , restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than  $0.75 L_a$  or less than or equal to  $0.75 L_t$ , as applicable, and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests to less than  $0.60 L_a$ , and the combined bypass leakage rate to less than  $0.07 L_a$  prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above  $200^\circ\text{F}$ .

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972 or the mass-plot method:

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## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.6.3 The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to the required isolation times.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

- a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or
- d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.6.3.1 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Verifying that on a Phase A Containment Isolation test signal, each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position,
- b. Verifying that on a Phase B Containment Isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, and
- c. Verifying that on a Containment Radioactivity-High test signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

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## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.1.7 REACTOR BUILDING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment reactor building will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to provide: (1) protection for the steel vessel from external missiles, (2) radiation shielding in the event of a LOCA, and (3) an annulus surrounding the steel vessel that can be maintained at a negative pressure during accident conditions. A visual inspection is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

#### 3/4.6.1.8 ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Annulus Ventilation System ensures that during LOCA conditions, containment vessel leakage into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours over a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the accident analyses and limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during LOCA conditions. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

#### 3/4.6.1.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves for the lower compartment (24-inch) and instrument room (12-inch and 24-inch) are required to be sealed closed during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA. Maintaining these valves sealed closed during plant operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive material will not be released via the Containment Purge System. To provide assurance that these containment valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevents power from being supplied to the valve operator.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the purge supply and exhaust isolation valves in the upper compartment (24-inch) since, unlike the valves in the lower compartment and instrument room, the upper compartment valves will close during a LOCA. Therefore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment purging operation. Operation with these valves open will be limited to 250 hours during a calendar year.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge supply and exhaust supply valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before gross leakage failures could develop. The 0.60 L leakage limit of Specification 3.6.1.2b. shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

## CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

### BASES

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#### 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

##### CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

#### 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 thru 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

Containment isolation valves are listed in FSAR Table 6.2.4-1. Those valves with a required isolation time have a value given in the "MAX ISOLATION TIME (SEC)" column. Penetration test type (type B, type C, or None) is listed in the "TEST TYPE" column of the table for each containment penetration. Changes to the FSAR are made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

#### 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

The OPERABILITY of at least 64 of 66 igniters ensures that the Distributed Ignition System will maintain an effective coverage throughout the containment. This system of igniters will initiate combustion of any significant amount of hydrogen released after a degraded core accident. This system is to ensure burning in a controlled manner as the hydrogen is released instead of allowing it to be ignited at high concentrations by a random ignition source.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 94 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-9  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 76 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-17

DUKE POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NOS. 50-369 AND 50-370

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 14, 1986, as supplemented November 21, 1986, and revised April 25, 1988, and April 5, 1989, Duke Power Company (the licensee) proposed amendments to delete Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.6-1, "Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage Paths," and TS Table 3.6-2, "Containment Isolation Valves." TS Bases 3/4 6.3 would be supplemented to note that "Containment isolation valves are listed in FSAR Table 6.2.4-1. Those valves with a required isolation time have a value given in the 'MAX ISOLATION TIME (SEC)' column. Penetration test type (type B, type C, or none) is listed in the 'TEST TYPE' column of the table for each containment penetration. Changes to the FSAR are made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59." References to these tables within TSs 1.7, 4.6.1.1, 3.6.1.2c, 3.6.3 and 4.6.3 would be similarly deleted. TS 1.7 and 4.6.1.1 would be changed to permit the operation of certain manual penetration valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control. The valves are NC-141, NC-142, WE-13, WE-23, VX-34, VX-40, FW-11, FW-13, and FW-4.

Other changes requested by the May 14, 1986 letter were addressed by previous Amendments 63 (Unit 1) and 44 (Unit 2).

2.0 EVALUATION

TS Table 3.6-1 lists containment penetrations and identifies their service, location and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J test types. TS Table 3.6-2 lists containment isolation valves and identifies their function and maximum allowed isolation time. The contents of existing TS Tables 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 have been added to the McGuire FSAR as Table 6.2.4-1. Hence, deletion of the tables from the TS and changes to reference the corresponding FSAR table do not change the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) or surveillance requirements (SRs).

In the event future changes are needed to this information in the FSAR, the proposed changes would be evaluated in accordance with the process described in 10 CFR 50.59. Under 10 CFR 50.59, proposed changes determined by the licensee not to involve an unreviewed safety question, may be made without prior Commission approval. A report of such changes, including a summary of the safety evaluation

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of each, will be submitted annually to the Commission. The Commission has determined as part of its implementation policy for TS improvements that the subject penetrations and valves are appropriate for this process and corresponding changes have been previously approved by the Commission on other nuclear power plants (e.g., Millstone Unit 3, Amendment 28).

Certain manual valves are permitted to be opened during operation as long as they are administratively controlled. Operation of these valves currently allows testing, maintenance and other activities on the following systems: reactor coolant pump motor oil drain, equipment decontamination, containment hydrogen sampling and refueling water. The specific valves are NC-141, NC-142, WE-13, WE-23, VX-34, VX-40, FW-11, FW-13, and FW-4. Prior to these amendments, the footnote "may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control" was in TS Table 3.6-2. Upon deletion of the entire table, this provision is retained within the TS by adding it to TS 1.7 and 4.6.1.1a. Thus, no change in existing requirements is made.

Accordingly, the changes made by these amendments are of an administrative nature as no change in limiting conditions for operation or surveillance requirements are made. The changes have no adverse impact on safety and are, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

### 4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 7631) on February 22, 1989. The licensee's subsequent submittal of April 5, 1989 makes minor changes to the request to be consistent with corresponding changes approved by the Commission on another power plant. These subsequent changes do not change the intent of the earlier requests, nor the Commission's conclusion that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. The Commission consulted with the state of North Carolina. No public comments were received, and the state of North Carolina did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: April 28, 1989