## Official Transcript of Proceedings ACRST-3174

### **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

ORIGINAL

Title:

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Thermal-Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee

> PROCESS USING ADAMS TEMPLATE: ACRS/ACNW-005

**Docket Number:** 

(not applicable)

Location:

Rockville, Maryland

Date:

Friday, October 26, 2001

Work Order No.:

NRC-082

Pages 225-356

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# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

October 26, 2001

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
5	THERMAL-HYDRAULIC PHENOMENA SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
6	(ACRS)
7	+ + + +
8	FRIDAY
9	OCTOBER 26, 2001
10	+ + + +
11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
12	+ + + +
13	The ACRS Thermal Phenomena Subcommittee
14	met at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White
15	Flint North, Room T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30
16	p.m., Dr. Graham Wallis, Chairman, presiding.
17	COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
18	DR. GRAHAM WALLIS, Chairman
19	DR. F. PETER FORD, Member
20	DR. THOMAS S. KRESS, Member
21	DR. WILLIAM SHACK, Member
22	DR. VIRGIL SCHROCK, ACRS Consultant
23	DR. JOHN D. SIEBER, Member
24	ACRS STAFF PRESENT:
25	PAUL A. BOEHNERT, ACRS Staff Engineer

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	AGENDA ITEM  Introduction by Chairman Graham  Dresden/Quad Cities Uprate  NRR Presentations

#### P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

(8:30 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The meeting will now please come to order. This is a continuation of the meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Thermal-Hydraulic Phenomena, at which we discussed the proposed extended power uprates for Dresden and Quad Cities.

And we heard yesterday from Exelon, and the licensees, and today we are going to hear from the staff. I would call on John Zalenski to get us started.

MR. ZALENSKI: Thank you so very much. I guess I am a little bit of a bump in the road, in that I wanted to take a couple of minutes to talk to the letter you sent with respect to the Duane Arnold facility, and its marriage or association to Quad Cities and Dresden.

Our staff is fully prepared to get into the details of the review on Dresden and Quad Cities, but I thought it would be worth a couple of minutes to highlight that your letter has made quite an impact on me personally and on the office.

And one of the issues that I thought I had addressed before the full committee had been my keen desire to ensure that we were going to indeed have a

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first-rate product before we ever approved that license amendment.

The status of that particular safety evaluation is that it is not ready to be served, and using a phrase that I have used many times in the past, we will serve no wine before its time.

The technical basis will be robust for each of those given sections, and I would submit that it would be our intent to provide some sort of a highlighted version for your easy review for information purposes once we get to the point where that is rating the issue.

In a small way to show what I believe to be a substantive difference between an early draft and the product that actually goes out the door, and hopefully that may be a little bit closer to some of the expectations of some of the members.

So to the product itself, I don't want to forecast or say that we are going to have it done next week, or the week after, but we are putting our shoulder down to ensure that the first one out of the shoot is done correctly, and it meets management's expectations, and is indeed robust.

As we go forward the staff sometimes relies on previous work and that will be kind of an

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example the staff will rely on. So it has got a high mental, and you have helped us in an interesting way to ensure that the mental is put at the right height. There were a couple of other issues in the letter that -- oh, by the way, we will be responding to the letter formally, but, I really wanted to

scratch an itch a little bit and if there was

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discussion, I would be more than happy to take some

questions. 9

> The staff should develop and improve guidance on the detail in the safety evaluation. Ι read this as a generic comment to how the staff does licensing work, and we will probably respond in that manner.

> And some of this is driven by our internal processes. We do have a quality initiative that has been germinating for the past year. It is funded for this fiscal year with a senior management leaving that particular activity, John Hannon in our activities branch.

> I think we will have a lot to say about this issue over the next year, and the criteria on independent assessments, and things of that sort, I think we will probably be talking to you considerably about a lot of the guidance that currently exists, and

a lot of the expectations that currently exist, and probably do a little bit better job in assuring how 3 our reviews are performed. I am struck by the young lady that rose at 4 the full committee and said I reviewed this document, 5 and I reviewed that, and I did a lot of these. 6 7 none of that ever made it to the safety evaluation. In so many words, we are going to go back 8 and ask ourselves should we be a little bit more 9 candid to here are the actual things that were done, 10 and so I think in short this has certainly got my 11 attention, and as we go through Duane Arnold, the bar 12 height will be established for what we see for other 13

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But yet I would not anticipate it having not gone through any management reviews. So if there are any questions, I would be more than happy to take Otherwise, I would begin turning the meeting over to Mr. Bajwa.

licensees, and the draft that you received from us on

Ouad Cities and Dresden is not at that level.

I will say that I have asked that a number responsible senior management team oversight of the reviews attend this particular subcommittee meeting.

Mr. Hannon is here, and Dr. Barrett and

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Mr. Vermeil, and a number of our senior management 1 team out of the two principal divisions in support of 2 this particular meeting. 3 So by elevating our attendance to some of 4 our managers and section chiefs, I am trying to 5 overtly indicate that we have heard what you have 6 7 said, and we are trying to be responsive. If there are no questions, I would be more 8 than happy to get into the subject at hand at this 9 time. 10 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, no, I just wanted 11 to thank you for what you have said. 12 helpful. 13 MR. ZALENSKI: Okay. Good. Mr. Bajwa was 14 the project director for Region 3 plants. He is also 15 our lead senior SES responsible for power uprates. 16 And I have asked him to provide some 17 opening comments on the work that the staff has done, 18 and then our project management team and our technical 19 review team stand prepared to address a variety of 20 review areas. 21 There is one topic area that we will touch 22 on that we have not come to resolution with Quad 23 Cities and Dresden, and that has to do with integrated 24 25 testing.

And should these plants be expected to perform testing of the MSIVs, should they be expected to perform other tests, such as suggested in their generic topical report -- and one that comes to mind is the load reject test, today we are simply not in a position to say that we think that those tests are necessary to confirm all the work that has been done by the staff.

My own sense of this is that the decision on whether to test or not is independent of can we

My own sense of this is that the decision on whether to test or not is independent of can we approve this license amendment. In other words, I don't believe that any of us feel that conducting the test if necessary to move forward with the technical work or not performing the tests.

So we have more work to do and we will have that issue resolved before we issue the amendment. We just did not have enough time to take it through the various levels of management to ensure we are aligned within our organization.

So with that as kind of an opening comment, why don't you go ahead and get started, Singh.

MR. BAJWA: My name is Singh Bajwa, and moving on to Quad Cities and Dresden, I would like to say that we have conducted a thorough review of the

areas

in all

potentially affected by the power uprate. 2 We conducted our review from existing 3 practices, including the lessons learned from the 4 Yankee experience, although we 5 information in many areas of the licensing basis of 6 Dresden and Quad Cities units. 7 And beyond that, we have used this 8 information, and we will focus our representation 9 today on the areas that we believe to be most of 10 interest for our power uprate. 11 We will also address areas that the ACRS 12 has expressed an interest in. So as John mentioned, 13 we have one open issue which we will not be able to 14 speak to it because it is a pre-decisional at this 15 16 point. But as John indicated, we will inform ACRS 17 at the time we issue the safety evaluation in its 18 final form. With that, I will now turn this to Larry 19 Rossbach, the lead project manager for the Dresden and 20 Quad Cities power uprate reviews. 21 Larry is also the NRR project manager for 22 the Dresden plant. Also at the table is Mr. Stu 23 Bailey, the NRR project manager for the Quad Cities 24 25 plant.

and Quad Cities plants

Dresden

Larry will give an overview of the review 1 process used for this application and agenda for the 2 meeting. He will also introduce the other presenters 3 at the table. 4 MR. ROSSBACH: Thank you, Singh. My name 5 is Larry Rossbach, and I am a project manager for the 6 7 NRR, and I am the project manager for Dresden, and also for the power uprate project for Dresden and Quad 8 9 Cities. 10 Briefly, to go over our review process, the guidelines we use, we use the generic G.E. 11 quidelines, and generic evaluations topicals, ELTR-1 12 and ELTR-2. 13 licensing topical reports 14 15 previously been accepted by the NRC as an acceptable quideline for power uprate applications. And the 16 staff uses these topicals as quidelines in our review. 17 In addition, we use the existing NRC 18 standard review plan and we rely on previous power 19 uprates. Specifically, the safety evaluation for the 2.0 Monticello Nuclear Generating Station was used as a 21 quide for the scope and the depth of the review. 22 In addition, Dresden and Quad Cities 23 24 reviews were really done in parallel with the Duane Arnold review, and in some areas even used the same 25

reviewers. So it should look familiar to you being done in the same format as the G-topicals, and being reviewed in the same manner in-house. As John Zalenski had said, we are on the Dresden-Quad Cities project of the comments on the Duane Arnold safety evaluation, and we have taken those into account to the extent that we could, although most of the reports that you have was written prior to receiving those comments, and we continuing to work to improve that safety evaluation. 11 identify the need for sometimes 12 13

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As we progress in our review, we do additional information, and so there was substantial additional information submitted by the licensee in response to our request.

The staff also performed three audits during the conduct of this amendment review. The Reactor Systems Branch audited global nuclear fuels analysis at the G.E. facility in Wilmington, North Carolina.

the probablistic safety assessment branch staff audited the licensee's risk assessment process at Exelon's midwest offices, and the plant systems reviewer audited analysis at the Dresden site.

The principal areas of our review -- and

again, very similar, and the same as in Duane Arnold, but the staff reviewed the results of the licensee's evaluations in reactor core and fuel performance, and reactor coolant systems, and containment analyses, and emergency core cooling system performance evaluation, and instrumentation and controls.

And the suitability of existing ones and the proposed modifications. The electrical power and power conversion systems, and auxiliary systems, and radiological consequences, special events and limiting operational transients.

And probablistic risk assessment review, and we reviewed human performance aspects of the submittal, and there was an environmental assessment done. The environmental assessment will be published separately in the Federal Register.

I would like to go over briefly the order of our presentation. The reactor systems review will be gone over by Ralph Caruso just to my left, and the plant systems review will be summarized by Ralph Architzel.

Following that, we will respond to ACRS questions in other areas where we had not prepared a full presentation. As time allows, we may get into more detail in those areas.

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And they include -- and this is partly in response to questions that we received from the ACRS dealing with material degradation issues, pipe support, pipe and support modifications, the need for electrical modifications, and the PRA analysis and evaluation which we did.

With that, I would like to turn it over to Ralph Caruso.

MR. ZALENSKI: If I might just jump in for a second. As our staff goes through the presentation, it would strike me that it would certainly be fair to query which code standards, which reg guides, standard review plans, acceptance criteria, specific regulatory requirements, the staff is working against.

And the staff should be able to clearly explain what we did to independently determine that something was acceptable. And so seeding your thought a little bit, that would be my expectation to find that kind of information in the final report.

MR. CARUSO: Good morning. My name is Ralph Caruso, and I am chief of the BWR nuclear performance section and reactor systems in NRR, and I am going to talk about the nuclear reactor and fuel systems review that was done as part of the Dresden/Quad EPU review.

I am going this with the slides being a 1 little bit out of order, the package that you have, 2 and so I am going to do my presentation the old 3 fashioned way here, and I think I have a crib sheet 4 here that tells me where you should be turning as I go 5 along, and I will call out the slide numbers that you 6 7 have got. The first one is slide 10, and that has 8 The second slide is slide 11, and got my name on it. 9 this is the background. This is a power uprate of 10 approximately 18 percent from the original rated 11 normal power level. 12 It involved implementation of MELLLA and 13 It also involved the ARTS, reactor trip system. 14 introduction of GE14 fuel into a core 15 currently supplied by Siemens. 16 The staff, as part of its review, in 17 addition to the review in-house that we normally do, 18 performed an on-site audit at GNF-Wilmington. 19 looked at compliance with the analytical methods that 20 we have approved and that are being applied by GE to 21 analyze this reactor's behavior. 22 And this includes something called G-STAR 23

Amendment 22, which is the process that they used to develop and approve the GE-14 fuel design. We

24

performed audits of the Dresden and Quad Cities EPU system performance, and a design basis safety analysis. And we reviewed as it says here the safety analysis reports.

DR. SCHROCK: Ralph, before you leave that, I have a question on the first item. One of the problems that I mentioned yesterday in connection with

that, I have a question on the first item. One of the problems that I mentioned yesterday in connection with the review of this large quantity of paper that was received is the fact that we essentially had two sets of things that were verbatim to a major extent.

And it was very difficult to sort out the things that were different for the different plants, and I pointed out in the beginning that as I tried to do that, I found that in the SARs that the MELLLA graphs are not the same for the two plants.

And the response to that was initially that, yes, they thought that they were the same and they should not be different. But subsequently I got the two reports side-by-side, and indeed they are different.

So what is then confusing is why are they different? What is the explanation for why the MELLLA is different for the different plants, and why is the response from the plant owners that, yes, they should be the same, when in fact they are not the same?

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1	MR. CARUSO: It is not clear to me. What
2	do you mean by they are different, and in what sense?
3	DR. SCHROCK: They are different in the
4	sense that different points have different valves.
5	The slope of the main MELLLA line is different on the
6	different graphs.
7	The full power, full flow point, is the
8	same. Everywhere else on the graph, the lines are not
9	the same.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And on the left-hand
11	side the boundaries are very different I think.
12	MR. CARUSO: Well, I can't speak to the
13	specifics of exactly where the points are. I am not
14	surprised that they are different, because the plants
15	are different, because the fuel designs are different,
16	and because the fuel management schemes will be
17	different, because they are implementing different
18	fuels at different points in life, and there is a lot
19	of core design that gets done, which will change those
20	curves.
21	So I am not surprised, and so are you
22	looking for an explanation of exactly why the points
23	are slightly different?
24	DR. SCHROCK: Well, there are two parts to
25	the point that I am trying to make and the guestion

that I am trying to raise; and the first one is the 1 detail of what is correct about the SARs. 2 those things be different, and should they be the 3 4 same. I am confident that I heard pretty clearly 5 vesterday from representatives of the industry that 6 7 they ought to be the same. Now, you are saying that they ought to be different, and I am not surprised 8 that they are different. 9 MR. CARUSO: I am not surprised that they 10 are different. 11 So there is a point to be DR. SCHROCK: 12 But the overall point that I am 13 resolved there. trying to get across is that it makes for a very 14 inefficient process to be put in the position of 15 having to sort out differences between two plants that 16 resolved simultaneously when these 17 are being differences are not highlighted in the documentation 18 that is presented. 19 And where you get two stacks of paper 20 which you ought to expect to have to digest in some 21 detail, and what you find is that they are essentially 22 verbatim, like 95 percent plus. 23 And then you have to discover what is the 24

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reason for numbers to be different in the two plants

1	when there is no explanation in the documentation,
2	either in the SARs or in the SERs. That is the problem
3	that I am trying to get across to you.
4	DR. KRESS: Your MELLLA line is not a
5	fixed thing. It ought to vary throughout the whole
6	life of the core actually.
7	MR. CARUSO: I would expect it to vary
8	from reload to reload.
9	DR. KRESS: Yes, and from reload to
10	reload, and so I guess it depends on what they choose
11	to analyze when they put the thing together.
12	MR. CARUSO: Right. That's why I am
13	saying that I am not surprised that they are
14	different, and I can't speak to the particular details
15	of each curve. Let me ask my staff if they have any
16	insights as to why they might be different?
17	MR. KENDRICK: This is Edward Kendrick,
18	reactor systems branch. First of all, the Quad and
19	Dresden plants, the pre-EPU are different power
20	levels. The post-EPU is the same thermal power.
21	So the post-EPU MELLLA lines I believe
22	should be virtually identical. And since they started
23	from a different one and they used in many cases a
24	bounding Unit 5, there could be some differences.
25	The staff, in preparation for the audit,

looked first at Dresden, and then specifically at 1 Dresden-2, which is the lead unit. And we identified 2 the differences, first of all, between Dresden and 3 Quad, and then the differences between Dresden-2 and 4 Dresden-3. 5 Now, we did not include a table in the 6 SER. We could do that because for our information we 7 had to go through and look at Dresden, and then go 8 through and look at Quad. So I think in the SER we 9 can tabulate the differences, and why there are 10 differences. 11 And a great deal of our MR. CARUSO: 12 review did not necessarily look at and verify each 13 individual point on those curves, because the way we 14 do the reviews is to do a sampling to ensure that the 15 methodologies that are being applied are being applied 16 17 correctly. So we don't necessarily review every 1.8 individual number and verify each and every individual 19 2.0 number. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, I was going to ask 21 the question that my colleague asked in a different 22 way. I was going to ask did the staff realize that 23 these figures, which are key, the power versus flow 24 maps, are different for the two plants? 25

1	And did they then ask why.
2	MR. CARUSO: I don't believe that question
3	was explicitly asked, because as I said, I am not
4	surprised at all that they are different.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I know, and you can say
6	that, but the thing is were you aware until my
7	colleague mentioned that they were different that they
8	were different, and that is the thing that
9	MR. CARUSO: I don't think that I
.0	explicitly had that it crossed well, I don't
L1	know. Ed, did that cross your mind? He is nodding
.2	yes. He did notice that.
.3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think the natural
.4	circulation line is significantly different, for
L5	instance, and I don't know why it is different.
16	Anyway, we should probably get off of this point. We
L7	have now started asking questions.
L8	MR. CARUSO: Okay. Review Scope, and this
L9	is Slide 12. As part of the review, as I said, we
20	have looked at fuel design and operation, and this was
21	Amendment 22, and something that we audited at the GE-
22	Wilmington facility.
23	Thermal limits, and reactor coolant
24	system, and connected systems, ECCS performance, the
,	ganability of the standby liquid control system and

design basis and safety analysis, and ATWS and ATWS 1 instability. This is the scope. 2 And Slide 14 will be next. As Larry 3 Rossbach said, we followed the scope of the ELTR-1 and 4 ELTR-2, and the Supplement-1 to ELTR-2, to guide us in 5 And once again in the reactor systems our review. 6 area -- and that's what I am here to focus on -- all 7 of these analyses were done in accordance with NRC 8 approved methodologies, analytical codes, and they are 9 all met NRC approved analytical limits. 10 And those limits would range from the 11 numbers in the regulations, such as 2200 degrees and 12 17 percent oxidation in 50-46, to the general design 13 criteria requirements that 99.9 percent of fuel rods 14 not experience boiling transition during a transient 15 16 event. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I'm sorry, but I am 17 going to go back to the previous question. You said 18 that specific points weren't calculated or checked on 19 the power versus flow map. I'm sorry, but my mind is 20 following a train of thought here. 21 MR. CARUSO: Okay. 22 How did you satisfy CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 23 yourselves that the MELLLA upper boundary was in fact 24 in the right place? 25

MR. CARUSO: Well, as part of the audits 1 that were done, the staff reviewed the calculations 2 that were done for linear heat generation rate for the 3 LOCA analyses, and for the transients. 4 And the MELLLA line will be developed as 5 part of that process. So we reviewed particular 6 points in the process to ensure that the process was 7 being followed, and the MELLLA line was therefore 8 9 appropriate. DR. KRESS: You reviewed the process 10 instead of the product. 11 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Did you make any 12 independent calculational checks or anything? 13 MR. CARUSO: No, we did not. 14 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you checked off that 15 they went through the right process? 16 MR. CARUSO: No, we didn't check it off. 17 What we did was that we sent people to the GE-18 Wilmington facility to look at detailed calculations, 19 to look at the inputs and to look at the outputs. 20 And to determine whether the assumptions 21 that were made were appropriate and within the stated 22 limits and the approved methodologies. And that the 23 outputs were in accordance with the acceptance 24 25 criteria.

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CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, the reason for asking the question is because this is a very key point, because you are saying that they are arguing that it is now possible to go up to this limit, this boundary.

It is now possible to operate in a region where we have not operated in before, and this is the boundary of the new region. So you have to be really sure that you are on good ground if you approve that boundary or the methods that led to that boundary.

MR. CARUSO: In the reactor systems area, we are -- I don't want to say we are unique, but I think we are probably ahead of other organizations, other parts of NRR, other disciplines, in that we have a well-founded base of analytical methods that have been reviewed and approved, and that we have a lot of experience with.

These methodologies have been reviewed and we have -- we do have our own analytical tools that have been used to verify these methodologies, and we feel that as long as licensees and vendors use those methodologies within the acceptance criteria, and within the limits of application, we do not feel a need to do additional independent assessment unless we have specific credible information which would cause us to

doubt those codes are being applied inappropriately. 1 And in the case of these power uprates, 2 because the peak bundles are not changing, and because 3 the flow rates are all within current methodological 4 limits, we didn't feel that there was any need to do 5 any independent assessment. 6 7 DR. KRESS: If you did want to do an independent assessment would you use RELAP and NAMONA, 8 9 or is --MR. CARUSO: It would depend entirely upon 10 If it were a LOCA case, we could use TRAC-11 B, and we could use RELAP. In the area of stability, 12 we could use ROMANA. Well, ROMANA is the one that 13 comes to mind. I think there may be some other codes. 14 But we have contractors available to us, 15 and Jose Marsh Luba, the expert on instability, and we 16 would call on him if we felt that there was something 17 about the operation of this plant that placed it 18 outside the appropriate methodology. 19 But because of the way that they did this 20 power uprate, everything stayed within the appropriate 21 limits, and therefore there was no credible reason for 22 us to doubt that the methodologies were not being 23 applied correctly. 24

We do occasionally -- I mean, the reason

that we do these audits is because these power uprates called into question whether the methods were being applied correctly.

That was a prima facie case for doing an audit, and that's why we started doing the audits at Duane Arnold, and that's why we continued doing them for Dresden and Quad Cities.

And that's why we continued for Clinton, and that was done, I believe, in September, and I believe that we are planning going out and doing a Brunswick audit sometime later on this winter.

So we are looking at these things to check to make sure that the methodologies are being applied appropriately, but without some credible specific issue. We don't believe that we have the resources to go do an independent assessment.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, an issue might arise -- and I haven't done this yet, as my colleagues have been looking at these curves in more detail, but if we started to compare them and we found that there were really big differences between this MELLLA boundary in one reference than another, then I think we might ask at the full committee meeting again why this is so -- and it might indicate that someone perhaps needed to check into it.

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And you are saying that you didn't have a 1 good reason to want to make an independent assessment 2 of the guestion, and that may well be true. 3 We began to question it because we noticed 4 that there were these differences, that's all. 5 I understand that, but as I MR. CARUSO: 6 said, realize that these changes occur from cycle to 7 cycle, and the staff normally doesn't even do reload 8 They can make changes to these parameters 9 without our knowledge when they change fuel designs, 10 and when they change core designs. 11 And we would not even see them except as 12 a report after they start off. That could cause --13 DR. KRESS: They basically develop a new 14 MELLLA line for every reload don't they? 15 MR. CARUSO: That's correct. That has to 16 be reevaluated every reload. All of these analyses 17 have to be done every reload. And they are done in 18 accordance with these approved methods, and we feel 19 comfortable enough with those methods that we didn't 20 think that we needed to do independent assessments. 21 Did your audit go to the DR. KRESS: 22 extent of checking the input to the codes to these 23 methods? 24

MR. CARUSO:

Yes.

DR. KRESS: So you really did look at the 1 2 inputs? As I described I think to MR. CARUSO: 3 this committee, or maybe it was to the full committee, 4 we had four people that went to the plant, and they 5 asked for what are called the design record files, and 6 these are the detailed calculations that support 7 operation. 8 And they sat down in a room and they read 9 them. They went through them page by page looking at 10 the inputs, and looking at the outputs, and looking at 11 the assumptions. 12 And then they asked questions, and they 13 sat down with people like Jason Post, who is standing 14 15 up and he wants to say something. This is Jason Post. Yes. 16 MR. POST: have a couple of things. One is that the differences 17 that you see in the power flow maps between the two 18 units are mostly in the natural circulation line, and 19 20 the minimum pump speed line. And those were not -- those are historical 21 differences between the two sites, and we did not try 22 to reconcile those differences for this, because that 23 really was not pertinent to the change that was being 24 25 made.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I don't understand the
2	term historical. I mean are they meaningfully
3	different, or is it some mysterious history?
4	MR. POST: It has to do with the
5	instrumentation and the analysis that was done at the
6	time that those plants were first built. And the
7	difference is not as great as it is shown.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, if they are
9	similar plants, you would expect natural circulation
10	characteristics to be pretty well the same wouldn't
11	you?
12	MR. POST: Yes, you would.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So why are they so
14	different on a map?
15	MR. POST: As a result of the improved
16	methodology over the years, some of the plants have
17	gone back and redefined their natural circulation
18	lines. My guess is that one of the units has done
19	that a little more accurately than the other unit.
20	But again that wasn't something that was
21	pertinent to this design change to MELLLA and EPU. So
22	that was not addressed in this license amendment that
23	historical difference was maintained.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, maybe if we asked
25	the question again at the next meeting, you will have

1	an explanation other than history?
2	MR. POST: Certainly.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Can you have an
4	explanation other than that?
5	MR. POST: Certainly. The other statement
6	that I wanted to make was that while the actual power
7	flow relationship can change from a cycle to cycle
8	basis, the MELLLA line itself is a licensed limit, and
9	that as a licensed boundary does not change.
10	And that licensed boundary is drawn to be
11	bounding over the actual power flow relationship that
12	can change slightly from cycle to cycle. And Israel
13	is just coaching me here. It is also common to both
14	plants, and so the MELLLA boundary itself is identical
15	between the two sites.
16	It's just extended to a lower core flow in
17	one to match the natural circulation line, which is
18	lower.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you.
20	DR. KRESS: So Virgil's observation that
21	the slope is different is not true? The slope is
22	actually the same?
23	MR. POST: That is correct.
24	MR. CARUSO: It is not the same on the
25	graphs.
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1	MR. POST: Excuse me. I believe the slope
2	is the same on the two SARs. It's just that the lower
3	point, the lower left-hand point, is different. So it
4	might appear that the slope is different.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is something that
6	we can easily verify since we have two different
7	points of view, and we can do a test at the break and
8	see who is right.
9	MR. CARUSO: My next slide is actually
10	Slide 21 in your package. And it is the reactor core
11	and fuel performance slide. And one of the questions
12	that often comes up is a question about margin, and
13	who owns the margin.
14	And as I stated earlier, we have a number
15	of different cycles specific, and licensing thermal
16	limits. And the licensing limits, like the 2200
17	degrees, and the 86 gallons per minute for the
18	standpoint liquid control system, and the 99.9 percent
19	limit for the transient, those are the fixed limits.
20	And licensees are free to work within that
21	boundary as much as they want. They own that margin.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And they did in this
23	case.
24	MR. CARUSO: And they do.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And 1600 became 1600

1	exactly, for instance.
2	MR. CARUSO: That's acceptable.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And 1500 psi became
4	1499.
5	MR. CARUSO: And I will be honest, as the
6	first question that I asked when I saw the number was
7	how many times did you have to run it to get results.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We asked the same thing.
9	We asked about do loops and things.
10	MR. CARUSO: And I got a very indignant
11	response. He said that the first time that we ran it,
12	it was 1499 and that is what it was.
13	DR. SHACK: I wouldn't run it again
14	either.
15	DR. KRESS: Your statement that the
16	margins are available to the licensee, does that have
17	qualifications to it? Like it is available if they
18	are using the same approved codes that they used
19	before?
20	MR. CARUSO: Absolutely. They have to use
21	the methodologies within the limits that are defined
22	in the SER, and they have to meet the appropriate
23	acceptance criteria.
24	DR. KRESS: So if I go in and change my
25	code, and improve the code, do I still

We could spend all CARUSO: 1 talking about changes to the codes. 2 Yes, I understand. DR. KRESS: 3 There are rules about this, MR. CARUSO: 4 some of which are better defined than others, about 5 when changes have to be re-reviewed, and it depends on 6 whether it is a LOCA code, or a transient code, or a 7 stability code. 8 And we have disagreements about that now 9 and again. But generally as long as they stay within 10 the acceptance limits, then they can wander within the 11 box. And occasionally we see people do very creative 12 things, and we try to convince them of the error of 13 their ways when they do that. 14 Once again, as I said here, this is an 15 unusual power uprate because it was based not on any 16 one particular plant. Most of the analyses were done 17 for what was called Unit 5, and it was a bounding 18 analysis of some plant that doesn't actually exist and 19 that had parameters that bounded all of the four 20 Dresden and Quad Cities units. 21 our determination was 22 equilibrium bounding unit -- the analysis of this 23 equilibrium bounding unit demonstrated that the 24 thermal limits are acceptable, and that the cores that 25

1	will be designed eventually in the future to be used
2	in these plants can be appropriately designed, and can
3	be appropriately operated.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Could you say what the
5	thermal limits are again, and what you mean by it?
6	MR. CARUSO: Up here on top, we have a
7	safety limit minimum, minimum critical power ratio,
8	MCPR.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Those are things like
10	the 2200 degrees and things like that?
11	MR. CARUSO: Some of these are 2200, like
12	the LOCA limit to the right is there, and the safety
13	limit, MCPR, and its derivative, the operating limit
14	MCPR, are there to show that you meet the 99.9 percent
15	boiling transition.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Were these evaluated
17	for I don't quite understand, but for some typical
18	cores, which is a bounding some typical bounding
19	unit?
20	MR. CARUSO: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, then you are sure
22	that this is somehow outside all the possibilities of
23	the various limitations of cause or whatever?
24	MR. CARUSO: For the purposes of doing the
25	power uprate, they did a bounding calculation, but

1	then for each individual plant, for each actual core
2	design, they will verify that that core design meets
3	those limits.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The numbers that we were
5	presented with, the 1600 degrees, and things like
6	that, are the actual specific calculations for
7	specific plants aren't they?
8	MR. CARUSO: I think it depends on the
9	analysis. In some cases, they were plant specific,
10	but in some cases they were bounding. I seem to
11	remember some were plant specific, but some were also
12	bounding.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It would seem that
14	eventually they all have to be plant specific.
15	MR. CARUSO: That's correct.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And one would expect the
17	number to go down when it becomes plant specific if
18	the previous one were bounding.
19	MR. CARUSO: Yes, that's correct.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is that always the case?
21	MR. CARUSO: I believe so.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Does it go down by much?
23	Is it exactly 1600 in the bounding case, and 1599 for
24	the plant, or something like that?
25	MR. CARUSO: I don't think that they are

1	going to go down to something like 700.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I guess if we saw 1600
3	for the plant, then the bounding unit must have been
4	somewhere above the limit.
5	MR. CARUSO: Let's see if I can get
6	someone from the licensee to answer that.
7	MR. FREEMAN: This is John Freeman with
8	Exelon. The 1600 degree was for the upper bound
9	calculation on the LOCA analysis.
LO	MR. CARUSO: Oh, you are talking about the
L1	LOCA number. Okay.
L2	MR. FREEMAN: I think that is what you
L3	were driving at, and that was a bounding number based
L4	on the Unit 5 approach, which covered all of the fuel
L5	types which were going to be in the reactor.
16	As far as whether some of them are cycle
17	specific, or bounding, LOCA well, actually, all the
18	thermal limits get reevaluated on a cycle specific
19	basis. However, most of them don't change. The ones
20	that we expect to change are the safety limit MCPR,
21	the operating limit MCPR. To a lesser extent, the
22	LHGR, depending on how the center line melt and
23	plastic strain limits are met.
24	So that is all done on a cycle specific
25	basis. However, I think the big issue was the LOCA

1	analysis, and that is bounding. The ATWS analysis was
2	bounding.
3	So we don't expect to see any changes in
4	those results without changes to the reactor system
5	design.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So this 1600 degree
7	example that we have here is specific to each cycle.
8	So it is a variable. It changes all the time?
9	MR. CARUSO: Well, in this case, I think
10	as the GE I think Dan Pappone did that presentation
11	yesterday. And he explained that they have a 1600
12	degree limit in the GE methodology. So they may
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But the 1600 is the
14	actual as well.
15	MR. CARUSO: And they calculate 1600 as
16	the actual number, but they may vary the MAPLHGR
17	limit, the linear regeneration rate, to stay below
18	that number.
19	So they will use 1600 as the limit, and
20	they will vary the heat generation rate to make sure
21	that they stay within it. The number may stay the
22	same, and
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And part of your
24	licensing procedure is not just to say they have
25	calculated a number which you approved of, but to say

1	that you trust them to keep calculating it and to keep
2	it below your limit?
3	MR. CARUSO: Yes, that's very important.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And you trust them to
5	keep calculating it all the time because it is cycle
6	specific?
7	MR. CARUSO: That's a very important
8	point.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And not to let it go
10	over the limit.
11	MR. CARUSO: That is a very important
12	point, yes. We trust them to do these calculations
13	appropriately. But we also verify from time to time
14	that they are.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So when they show us a
16	number which is exactly on the border, 1600 calculated
17	equals 1600 allowable, then this is for a particular
18	calculation at a particular time that is implied with
19	sort of our approval of that if we approve it, and
20	they are going to keep doing this, and they are not
21	going to allow themselves to go over that?
22	MR. CARUSO: That's correct.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And that they didn't
24	understand at the time?
25	MR. CARUSO: That's correct.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And presumably they
2	found that they were going over it? What would they
3	do, shut down the plant until they corrected something
4	or what?
5	MR. CARUSO: No, they have to revise some
6	aspect of either plant operation or core design to
7	make sure they stay below it.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So they might then
9	operate at a reduced power?
10	MR. CARUSO: Exactly.
11	DR. KRESS: They can only go over it on a
12	hypothetical basis.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Of course, it is a
14	calculation.
15	DR. KRESS: It is a calculation.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay. Thank you.
17	MR. CARUSO: Let's see. My next slide is
18	Slide 28. Let's see. I have a general discussion
19	here about system performance. We looked at the
20	systems.
21	For example, the RCI system, the high
22	pressure injection systems, and the low pressure
23	injection systems, to see whether they would perform
24	their design functions at the higher power, higher
25	rated power.

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1	And because this was a constant pressure
2	uprate, those reviews were not very difficult to
3	determine that those components would operate
4	appropriately, because they see the same steam
5	pressure, and they see the same reactor pressure. Most
6	of the bounding parameters remain the same for these
7	systems.
8	DR. KRESS: How did you decide that the
9	isolation valves would perform their function just as
10	well at the new uprate?
11	MR. CARUSO: The isolation valves.
12	Actually, they have to be able to close on critical
13	flow. If you have a pipe break outside the MSIV
14	DR. KRESS: I understand, and the heat
15	didn't change?
16	MR. CARUSO: The pressure didn't change.
17	DR. KRESS: Yes, but T did.
18	MR. CARUSO: T? Temperature?
19	DR. KRESS: Critical flow is squared over
20	KGRT. It is steam. It is close enough.
21	MR. CARUSO: I don't think it matters.
22	Why did the heat change?
23	DR. KRESS: Well, I thought you changed
24	the outlet temperature.
25	MR. CARUSO: No.

1	
1	DR. KRESS: Just the amount of steam flow?
2	MR. CARUSO: The steam flow rate changed,
3	but the steam pressure stays the same.
4	DR. KRESS: So your blow down rates are
5	about the same.
6	MR. CARUSO: They would be about the same.
7	DR. KRESS: And your pressure is about the
8	same.
9	MR. CARUSO: Right.
10	DR. KRESS: So the loads on the valves, if
11	they could close before, they can close now is what
12	you are saying?
13	MR. CARUSO: Exactly.
14	DR. KRESS: Okay.
15	MR. CARUSO: Let's see. My next slide is
16	Slide 29. As I said, they performed the LOCA analyses
17	for the bounding unit using an equilibrium GE-core.
18	This is the core that they eventually
19	expect to get to once they replace all the Siemens'
20	fuel in about 2, 3, or 4 cycles with GE-14 fuel.
21	And we looked at the as part of our audit, we
22	looked at the pre-EPU and the EPU analyses for LOCA.
23	These were done with the SAFER/GESTR
24	methodology that was described yesterday, and as we
25	have discussed in the past, the peak limiting bundle

1	for these analyses doesn't really change.
2	So there was not much to look at in terms
3	of changes to the methodology, and changes to the
4	inputs to reflect the fact that it was a mixed core,
5	Siemens fuel and GE-14 fuel, and it changes because it
6	is GE-14 fuel which is going in for the first time.
7	But other than that, the methodology was
8	applied appropriately, and the LOCA analyses
9	demonstrated compliance with 50.46.
10	DR. KRESS: This particular ECCS, to deal
11	with LOCA, is it a head spray, or where does that come
12	in at?
13	MR. CARUSO: I need assistance. This says
14	well, Dresden has high pressure coolant injection.
15	How many high coolant injection pumps? One high
16	pressure coolant injection pump.
17	DR. KRESS: And that is in the head coming
18	down on top?
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It is a ring spray, a
20	ring with a lot of nozzles on it.
21	MR. CARUSO: It is a low pressure core
22	spray.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We are asking the staff
24	if they know or if they understand the system, I
25	guess.

MR. CARUSO: Well, you are asking me off 1 the top of my head, and I don't have all 37 BWRs in my 2 3 head. I understand CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I know. 4 5 that. DR. KRESS: Well, part of my question is 6 to see what you guys looked at, and the other part is 7 if you flatten out the core profile, and you have got 8 more steam coming up around the edges, and less in the 9 10 middle. And you are basing your validation of your 11 code for these ECCS based on something like the old 12 tests in Germany and Japan, which didn't have a core 13 profile. It had a different one. 14 And does this put into question the 15 validation of the codes that are used to calculate 16 these peak clad temperatures? 17 MR. CARUSO: Interestingly enough, this is 18 one thing that we did actually talk to them about, 19 20 spray distribution. DR. KRESS: Yeah, carry over and the spray 21 Right. distribution. 22 in And it came up CARUSO: MR. 23 relationship to an issue involving license renewal of 24 concerned about 25 and were the BWR, we

distribution over extended -- of a plant at the end of 1 60 years, and would it still have the same spray 2 3 distribution. And in talking to G.E. about it, we 4 learned that spray distribution is not important for 5 the early part of the LOCA because of the assumptions 6 7 that are made as part of the analysis. They don't assume a particular distribution, but for the long 8 term cooling portion of the LOCA analysis, spray 9 10 distribution does become important. And let me see if I remember the logic 11 here, because this gets very convoluted. Late in the 12 LOCA sequence, the distribution is acceptable. 13 trying to remember the reason why we discussed this 14 15 with them. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Early in the sequence, 16 you have got a pool don't you? 17 MR. CARUSO: Exactly, and that's why --18 DR. KRESS: The pool is up on the top. 19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But then how the pool 20 drains will depend upon the amount of steam coming out 21 of all of these channels, which is now different 22 because you have gotten more heat source on the 23 outside from the decay heat. 24 DR. KRESS: And the question was how much 25

1	of that drained and how much got carried out.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, there is a
3	different pattern of drainage, too, because of the
4	flux distribution.
5	MR. CARUSO: This was discussed. We had
6	a real long discussion with them about this.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It was discussed, and so
8	you are really sure that you are on good technical
9	grounds?
10	MR. CARUSO: Yes.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And you looked at the
12	effect of the new distribution of heat source across
13	the core on the draining of that pool during a LOCA?
14	MR. CARUSO: Yes. The explanations are
15	very reasonable. I was going to suggest at some point
16	that it might be a good idea well, I won't talk
17	about that now.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, you didn't find it
19	necessary to do any independent verification
20	calculations or anything on those phenomena?
21	MR. CARUSO: No.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Because I guess one of
23	the generic questions that ACRS raised before was when
24	do you decide to do your independent verification
25	calculations, and when do you accept what you see from

1	the applicant.
2	MR. CARUSO: And as I said earlier, if we
3	when we are using these approved methods within
4	their acceptance criteria, we would do independent
5	calculations if we had some specific and credible
6	reason to believe that they were not appropriately
7	being applied.
8	If we had some issue that had been raised
9	by staff members, by the Office of Research, by the
.0	ACRS, by outside interested parties, that said they
1	didn't consider this particular aspect.
.2	And there is no way you can tell that from
.3	their analysis, and then we might do an independent
L4	analysis in that case. But realize that the
L5	methodologies have been validated in many instances
L6	against the NRC codes already.
L7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We have no way of
L8	independently checking this. We just have to ask you
L9	and sort of believe that you have done the job.
20	MR. CARUSO: You would have to dig through
21	piles, and piles, and piles of topical reports.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's correct.
23	MR. ZALENSKI: For closure on this issue
24	did I hear a comment or a question raised regarding
25	the validity of our codes based on new data becoming

1	available from Japan?
2	DR. KRESS: No, the comment was that the
3	codes that their validation was based on old data
4	mostly, I think, and those used actual flux
5	distributions that were not as flat as these.
6	And the question is does that put into
7	question the validity of them, because it is based on
8	old data with the wrong flux distribution.
9	MR. CARUSO: Our question really had to do
10	with the spray distribution, and to make sure that
11	there was the spray distribution that was assumed as
12	part of the analysis.
13	DR. KRESS: Yes, it is the same issue. Is
14	the flux distribution going to maybe affect the spray
15	distribution.
16	MR. BOEHNERT: And whether the tests are
17	still applicable.
18	DR. KRESS: So that was the nature of the
19	question.
20	DR. SCHROCK: I guess I wonder how
21	confident a particular analysis is bounding.
22	MR. CARUSO: Generally, you mean?
23	DR. SCHROCK: Yes, in general. Do you
24	scratch your head and say now why is this one bounding
2 =	when I am going to make some changes?

1	MR. CARUSO: Well, that is one of the
2	reasons that we did the audits. We sent people down
3	to actually look at the inputs that were used, and the
4	people that did the audits, like Ed Kendrick here, are
5	experienced in core design and analysis methods.
6	And they know which parameters are
7	sensitive, or which parameters can affect those
8	analyses, and they looked at the bounding analyses and
9	determined that G.E. had used the appropriate
10	conservative values as inputs. And they ran a number
11	of sensitivity cases to verify that.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Oh, G.E. ran them?
13	MR. CARUSO: G.E. ran them. That takes me
14	to my next slide, which is Number 30, which is what we
15	did as part of the audit reviews. Fuel thermal
16	limits, which is transients; and reactivity
17	characteristics, and stability.
18	And we looked at detailed calculations in
19	each of these areas to verify that they were done
20	appropriately.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is a check of
22	paperwork?
23	MR. CARUSO: It is a check of the
24	calculations.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It is not an interactive

thing, where you look over someone's shoulder and say, 1 well, how about trying this and that, and let's see if 2 3 it is really bounding. MR. CARUSO: No, but because it was done 4 at the vendor site, and when people had questions 5 paperwork, they the 6 about was in 7 immediately ask the people who did the work and get an They are interactive in that sense. 8 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And that wasn't actually 9 sort of together running the code to see what happened 10 under certain circumstances or that you were curious 11 about? 12 MR. CARUSO: No. 13 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It would be interesting 14 if you could do that sort of thing. 15 MR. CARUSO: We are about to do that for 16 one of the advanced reactor reviews. In this case, we 17 didn't feel that it was necessary. Are there any 18 questions about the audits? If not, my last slide is 19 Slide Number 33, Conclusions. 20 I guess it is hard to CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 21 know, and I guess what I am thinking about here is how 22 do we satisfy you did a good audit? Well, I guess an 23 example would be if you had a case history where you 24 found something, and if the audit found nothing, it is 25

a kind of evidence-free situation. 1 And we don't know if it is good or bad as 2 you didn't find anything, maybe because you didn't try 3 hard enough or maybe there is nothing there to find. 4 It is hard to know what to say. 5 But if you had a case history where you 6 7 were actually curious about something, wondered about it, and when you probed deeper, yes, 8 you indeed found that they really knew what they were 9 doing, and they convinced you that everything was 10 good. 11 That might be a little bit more harder to 12 convince some independent person that the audit was a 13 useful exercise. 14 I will go back to the Duane 15 MR. CARUSO: Arnold review and something that I said last time. 16 None of these audits should be looked at in isolation. 17 It is a series of audits, and we started with the 18 Duane Arnold review, looking at areas that we had the 19 most interest in. 20 And I am going to admit that we had an 21 anterior motives besides doing the power uprates. 22 wanted to understand how the vendors were doing their 23 24 reviews.

So we were looking in places that we

really didn't think we would find anything related to 1 power uprates, but we wanted to just check how they 2 had done the calculations. 3 And during the Duane Arnold review, we 4 found a couple of significant issues. We found one 5 that led to a Part 21 report, and the next audit that 6 we did, we decided that we would look at something 7 different, because we only have a certain limited 8 amount of time. 9 So we focused on things where we think we 10 will find something, and in this case we came up with 11 a dry hole so to speak. But that's not bad. The next 12 time we did the Clinton audit. I don't know what to 13 say about the Clinton audit. I think 14 That is pre-15 -- well, I don't want to talk about it. decisional. 16 But then we will do another one for 17 Brunswick, and we will do another one for the plant 18 after that, and at some point we will get tired, and 19 20 we will stop. From the reactor safety KRESS: 21 evaluations, your previous slide, I sort of have a 22 two-part question. For the site calculations, 10 CFR 23 100, did they redo an origin calculation to get a new 24 inventory, or did they just scale up the previous 25

1	inventory in some way, like using the power ratio
2	MR. BAILEY: What the did this is
3	Stewart Bailey, and I am the project manager for Quad
4	Cities. They did run origin for the new core loadings
5	and for the 24 cycle, and they used that to develop
6	scaling factors on the critical isotopes.
7	And they combined that with some of their
8	previous analysis to evaluate the changes in the off-
9	site dose.
10	DR. KRESS: And I have a question to ask
11	G.E. or that I asked the applicant people yesterday
12	about the PRA, and the use of LERF. With a different
13	core inventory, with different power and a different
14	amount of products in the core, should the definition
15	of what constitutes an acceptable LERF be the same or
16	should it change?
17	MR. BAILEY: I am not going to touch that.
18	Mark Rubin will.
19	MR. RUBIN: Good morning. I am Mark Rubin
20	from the PRA branch. I think we have kicked this
21	around with the committee a couple of times. It is
22	certainly a very valid point as we have mentioned
23	before.
24	Generally, we see a large variety of power
25	levels in currently operating plants, and when we are

developing the guidance for Reg Guide 1.174, it was 1 thought that we should try to be design independent, 2 and site independent, and go with a LERF that would 3 certainly be confirmatory on the Commission safety 4 qoals. 5 We have plants at higher power levels 6 7 operating now, and clearly have higher inventory, given a LERF. We are sticking with the 1.174 criteria 8 I believe if we were to start the at this time. 9 licensing plants at significantly higher power levels 10 than currently operating, we certainly would want to 11 reconfirm the LERF definitions, but at this time we 12 think that this is appropriate. 13 Because the power levels are DR. KRESS: 14 generally within the mean of the distribution? 15 MR. RUBIN: Yes, sir. 16 DR. KRESS: I think that is a good answer. 17 DR. SCHROCK: How about the way in which 18 origin is used? And one of the difficulties that I 19 done with everything is hearing that 2.0 have in previously approved codes, the codes can be used in a 21 variety of ways, and Origin is an example, as it is 22 designed it is a point reactor. 23 And so it doesn't do for you any spacial 24 evaluation of different compositions in different 25

parts of the core. If you are going to use it to do 1 that, then you have got to apply it in a particular 2 3 way. Another limitation that it has is that the 4 composition of the core is constant during a time 5 step, and so the limitation that you may place on the 6 time step will have an impact on the accuracy of 7 results that you get from the application of the code. 8 So what I am asking is do you look at how 9 Origin is employed in different parts of the analyses 10 that are necessary on these evaluations? It comes up 11 in a number of ways; for the radiological consequence, 12 for the activities, for a wide range of things. 13 In a sense, it is a more general question. 14 It is how do you assure yourself that what you regard 15 as an adequate previously approved code, which you 16 then have confidence in the results for a new 17 application, is being applied in a way that you should 18 still have that confidence. 19 Well, for the -- I can't 20 MR. CARUSO: speak to Origin, because I was not involved in 21 We don't have the reviewing the origin code. 22 individual here. 23 But I think the question is probably also 24 applicable to the other codes that we deal with, and 25

I guess you could say, well, how do we know that they
are not doing and creating a notalization, for
example, or creative time steps control.

And the answer is that we when we do the
review of the LOCA codes, for example, we approve
explicit notalizations, and they are required to do

There are lots of criteria that go into approving a method to make sure that people don't use it too creatively. And if you go look at the way the vendors have set up their calculational systems, they are very rigid because they can't afford to have to defend lots of creative solutions.

time step studies to verify that the time steps that

are used demonstrate convergence.

And so they do things in rather rigid ways, and we found this of all the vendors. They all proceed this way. So it is our experience that with codes like the LOCA codes, they are rather set in their ways.

So they don't do things very creatively with those codes, because it is not worth it to them from an economic basis, and we try in approving the methodologies to define the box so that they can't be too creative.

I can't answer with regard to the origin

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1	calculation, but I understand the question that you
2	are asking.
3	DR. SCHROCK: And another question
4	regarding the approved codes. According to the SAR
5	and I believe also your draft SER, one of the ECCS
6	LOCA codes that is in the table of approved codes is
7	said not to have been previously approved, but to be
8	currently under review and that is TASK.
9	MR. CARUSO: Yes.
10	DR. SCHROCK: Can you tell us the status
11	of that?
12	MR. CARUSO: I can give you some history
13	behind this. This is actually this is one of those
14	examples of something of a change that might not be
15	considered to be a change.
16	G.E. had previously been using a code
17	called SKAT. The same four letters rearranged
18	slightly different. That was the code that was
19	explicitly approved in the methodology for I
20	believe it is a LOCA methodology.
21	And along the line they are allowed to
22	make changes to the LOCA methods to a certain extent
23	without our approval. And in this case, they made a
24	change that involved a change in the name of the code,
25	and they didn't think it was a change that required

our review.

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During an industry audit of their methodologies, the industry found this change and said we think you should send this to the NRC for review. And the staff, when they found out about it, said, yes, we agree.

So G.E. submitted the code to us for review, and I just go the draft SER from Tony Ulyses this morning, and he believes that it is acceptable. He thinks it is a relatively minor change, and we will be approving that.

So the change from SCAT to TASC is one of these changes that they are allowed to do, but we always do have disagreements about when is a change significant and when is it not. And those are things that we can work out with them.

DR. SCHROCK: I guess if my experience is relevant to what the committee knows about these codes, there is a large question mark as to what really the codes contain.

So what you have just described as a process of approval of a new code, which isn't going to come to the committee for review, it is one of about six things that are indicated as being a part of the ECCS LOCA evaluation, I don't know what they do.

And so I don't know how I can say yes, I think the ACRS ought to agree that NRR has a sound basis for saying that they have reviewed all of this, and it is in fact well accepted. There is something missing in here as I see it, and I may not be seeing it the way as members of the committee.

I don't see how you can expect to have

I don't see how you can expect to have people look at what you have said and accept what you have said if you don't show them what it is that you are talking about.

MR. CARUSO: Well, the LOCA codes are an unusual case, in the sense that 50.46 explicitly allows licensees and vendors to make changes to LOCA codes without approval of the staff. It is written in the regulation.

They are required to report to us periodically, at least on an annual basis, when they do make those changes. And the effect of those changes on PCT limits. But this is in the regulation.

And so it gets -- well, the difficulty is that it is not spelled out very well in the regulation what exactly is -- well, I shouldn't say that, because the regulation does have a criteria. It has a 50 degree criteria when the accumulation of temperature changes reaches 50 degrees, licensees are required to

make a report to us, and they are required to redo 1 their analyses. 2 But when you talk about whether those 3 changes have to be approved by the staff, the staff 4 has an opportunity to discuss them with the vendors, 5 and decide whether they should be reviewed. 6 approve minor changes to 7 But we do methodologies all the time without coming in to ACRS. 8 I am not sure though that you wouldn't want to see 9 every one of them. 10 So we make a judgment as to whether 11 something is major or significant, and we consult with 12 the ACRS staff to see whether you would like to review 13 it, and most of the time the answer is no. 14 In fact, there is another MR. ZALENSKI: 15 provision in there, in 50.46, when the licensee trips 16 50 degrees, that is a 30 day report. When they trip 17 20 degrees, that goes into their annual report as to 18 changes that they have looked at and anticipated, and 19 maybe adopted, or maybe not adopted. 20 DR. SCHROCK: But these are the results of 21 calculations and the ability to judge that 22 calculation is an adequate calculation that I am 23 really questioning. 24 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: What you are saying is 25

1	that they could put complete nonsense into the physics
2	and get 10 degrees.
3	DR. SCHROCK: Yes.
4	MR. CARUSO: And that's why I said we
5	tried to write the acceptance of the methodologies in
6	such a way that they can't be too creative. And we
7	try to do that, and that's why we like to do these
8	audits, because these audits give us an opportunity to
9	go see how creative they are. That's why we thought
10	that this was a nice opportunity for us.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are we breaking this up
12	and trying to do
13	MR. CARUSO: No, I'm done.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You're done?
15	MR. CARUSO: I'm done.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So how many of these
17	have you covered? I have lost track.
18	MR. CARUSO: The last one was number
19	well, page 30.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And all these other
21	numbers before that you have covered in some other
22	sort of order?
23	MR. CARUSO: Actually, a lot of those were
24	backup slides. I was going to offer those up if you
25	had questions about particular issues, such as

1	stability of thermal limits, or fuel design, and I
2	could give you details.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So your bottom line one
4	of all these numbers here is?
5	MR. CARUSO: Is Number 33, which says that
6	they used appropriate methods.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And they got appropriate
8	answers?
9	MR. CARUSO: And they got appropriate
10	answers. And we looked at them, and we looked at how
11	they did it specifically as part of the audit, and we
12	didn't find anything unusual.
13	And we have not heard any credible
14	specific evidence raised that the methods are not
15	appropriate.
16	DR. SHACK: Just following up on Virgil's
17	question. What kind of changes are they making when
18	they are making these changes all the time? I mean,
19	can you think of some examples? Are they changing
20	correlations, or they are not changing numerical
21	methods?
22	MR. CARUSO: Well, no, they don't change
23	numerical methods. They might change a correlation.
24	I mean, very frequently, they will well, for
25	example, they will come up with a new fuel design.

1	So they have got to put a new correlation
2	into the model to account for the new fuel design, and
3	I have had some people doing a bunch of those. A lot
4	of times they find errors.
5	DR. SHACK: Right.
6	MR. CARUSO: But they are usually minor.
7	They are minor errors, and a lot of what gets reported
8	to us is that we have identified that we made a non-
9	conservative assumption about the start of the ISI
10	pump, and instead of starting at 28 seconds, it starts
11	at 32 seconds. Something like that.
12	DR. SHACK: Okay. A lot of these affect
13	input assumptions?
14	MR. CARUSO: Right. A lot of them affect
15	input assumptions. I can't think of any off the top
16	of my head that affected internal workings of the
17	codes.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you said you were
19	done. What is the next move?
20	MR. CARUSO: Plant systems.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you very much,
22	Ralph.
23	MR. BAILEY: Starting on 35.
24	MR. CARUSO: Oh, let me ask one other
25	question. Is there anything that I need to take away
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from this session as a testing or a query, 1 something that you would like us to talk about 2 specifically at the next session in front of the full 3 committee that I have not covered? 4 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, it is hard to say 5 exactly what will happen at the full committee 6 It is a fresh game, you know, and then our 7 meeting. mines will be working between now and then. 8 But nothing that you can MR. CARUSO: 9 think of right now? 10 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think you ought to 11 read the transcript. Does any member have anything 12 that they wish to add at this time? If not, let's 13 move on then. 14 Ralph is 15 ARCHITZEL: My name Architzel, and I am the lead reviewer for the plant 16 systems branch review for the extended power uprates 17 for Dresden and Ouad Cities. There were additional 18 reviewers that looked at various areas during this 19 review, and they were Ron Young, and he is not with us 20 today, but other members are here that looked at the 21 HVAC control room features. 22 Steve Jones looked at some of the spent 23 fuel pool issues, and Rob Elliott looked at the 24 strainer delta-P calculation aspects of it, and it's 25

not really related to EPU, but it got resolved during 1 the course of the EPU. 2 And in addition, Rich LaBelle assisted 3 with the containment performance reviews, along with 4 Ben Gitnick, who is our ISL contractor, during the 5 Duane Arnold audit. 6 Basically, the plant systems branch -- if 7 you could go on to the next slide, and the slides are 8 a little bit changed from what I saw last night. 9 Basically, the plant systems branch has a 10 wide breadth of responsibilities. The way that we 11 performed our review is that it is somewhat different 12 than reactor systems, but I will go over it right now. 13 We reviewed the design operation 14 requirements for the systems, using the UFSAR. 1.5 examine application for conformance with the approved 16 topical report, and the statements in the topical 17 report safety evaluation, and that was quite an 18 extensive review just to get that information and 19 digest it, because I was not one of the original 20 reviewers for the EPU. 21 We assured Agency regulations and reg 22

guides are met under EPU conditions, and that is the reg guide standards, and in this context, you have to go back to the licensing basis for the plant as well.

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288 So it is not always a straight correlation 1 for a standard review plan, or for the regulatory 2 quides. We held telephone conferences, quite a few, 3 to clarify the applications, and to systems design and 4 operation, and the responses. 5 And in that context, these applications 6 7 8

aren't sometimes quite as extensive as what you see on So there is -- where we search for the FSAR. additional clarifications are in areas where there wasn't quite the detail that we felt was necessary to make the safety decision.

issued RAIs to resolve questions regarding the licensee's EPU evaluation results, and the supplement to documented information. review, we did coordinate with different branches because we do have a wide breadth of responsibility, and where others might have the lead.

This included working with the PRA branch on the impacts on our affected systems, and we worked with the inspection programs branch on start-up test issues, and station blackout input with the electrical branch.

And the radiological source term with Steve Levine when we are doing the control room HVAC Our conclusion was that the EPU did not reviews.

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basis of the adversely affect the operational 1 responsible areas that we had under our review. Go to 2 the next slide. 3 The next series of slides basically is a 4 tabulation of the areas where we provided input into 5 the EPU safety evaluation report. I assume you have 6 7 it and that you have read it. I don't know that I want to go over all 8 these unless you really had questions. There were 9 certain areas where we had significant review items, 10 and I have asked Rick for those, and they are on the 11 last page, but right now I will just flip through 12 these areas, unless the committee has any questions. 13 I have a question about the DR. KRESS: 14 containment performance, and it has to do with source 15 16 term. MR. ARCHITZEL: All right. 17 DR. KRESS: There is this alternate source 18 term that is in 10 CFR 100 to show compliance with the 19 thing, and there is one for BWRs and one for PWRs. 20 The question that I have is whether that 21 is the source term that they used to show that they 22 meet 10 CFR 100? And does the fact that you have a 23 different power, should it influence the design basis 24 source term from the standpoint of bypass around the 25

1	suppression pool, and the temperature and
2	effectiveness of the suppression pool in removing
3	source terms?
4	MR. BAILEY: This is Stewart Bailey, the
5	PM for Quad Cities. The licensee did not go to the
6	alternate source term as a part of this update.
7	DR. KRESS: They used the old source term?
8	MR. BAILEY: They were originally a TAD
9	14844 source term, and they ran the origin runs to get
10	appropriate scaling factors, and usually just scaling
11	up the critical isotopes. They have not gone to
12	alternate source term yet.
13	DR. KRESS: Did they take credit for
14	sprays, containment sprays? I understand that this
15	particular
16	MR. BAILEY: My understanding is that they
17	did not. They would have to clarify that. Our
18	reviewer, or the person who reviewed all of the dose
19	analysis in detail is not here today. But my
20	understanding is that they did not credit the spray
21	for iodine scrubbing.
22	DR. KRESS: But do you know what they used
23	for a suppression pool decontamination factor?
24	MR. BAILEY: I don't know that offhand.
25	DR. KRESS: I guess I would have to ask

1 the people --MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes, as that was not 2 within my review. 3 DR. FORD: Could I ask a question of the 4 previous graph about radiological source terms? 5 that analysis that you did, you referred to Hydrogen 6 A case has been made that because you are using 7 Noble Chem that Hydrogen 16 would be reduced. 8 Was there any analysis that was done as to 9 how well the Noble Chem is going to stand up to the 10 high flow rates, in terms of this adherence? 11 MR. ARCHITZEL: Let me just explain that 12 my part of that review was basically asking or had 13 some questions about the use of Noble Chem, 14 whether they wanted to credit it for reduced hydrogen 15 usage, or excuse me, when they came to the limit on 16 17 the recombiners. So there are different aspects that have 18 been involved on whether they were going to use or 19 credit Noble Chem, and they stated in their response 20 to the RAI that that was not their licensing basis. 21 But they planned to use it. 22 As far as the aspect that you are talking 23 about, the degradation of Nobel Chem, I did not look 24 25 at that area, and I am not --

1	MR. BARRETT: This is Rich Barrett with
2	the NRR staff. A number of questions this morning do
3	seem to relate to the way in which the radiological
4	consequences the source term, et cetera were
5	calculated, and we do not have our reviewer here
6	today.
7	If the Committee would be interested in
8	having someone here, we could probably arrange to do
9	that this morning.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Maybe you could arrange
11	for someone to come after the break, since there have
12	been several questions, and that would be helpful.
13	Can you do that, Rich?
14	MR. BARRETT: Yes, we will look into that.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you.
16	MR. ARCHITZEL: At this point, I would
17	just like to return to the list of areas and quickly
18	go over them, and then if there are questions, I do
19	have backups for some of the areas of review.
20	Main steam isolation valves, residual heat
21	removal/LPCI/containment cooling and shutdown cooling
22	systems, are basically the modes that reflect on the
23	containment response, and not to the heat portion of
24	that.
25	DR. FORD: Will the discussion on the

1	steam separator performance, will that come in later
2	on in materials degradation?
3	MR. ARCHITZEL: The discussion is a
4	limited discussion, and the limited review that I did
5	on the steam separator performance is strictly to
6	verify that they were going to test the moisture
7	carryover and you heard a discussion yesterday, but
8	that was the response that they got in the REI.
9	As far as the structural part of the
10	separators, and what the staff reviewed, that would be
11	the mechanical engineer
12	MR. BAILEY: Dr. Ford, you are interested
13	in hearing from mechanical engineering on the
14	structural integrity of the dryer?
15	DR. FORD: Yes.
16	MR. BAILEY: I think we can arrange that.
17	DR. FORD: Well, it is really just the
18	process that you went through to assess their analysis
19	that there would not be a big impact of fluence use
20	vibration, for instance.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The loss of parts or
22	whatever.
23	DR. FORD: Loose parts analysis, and just
24	the process that you went through.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you will have

1	somebody on after the break then?
2	MR. BAILEY: Yes.
3	MR. ARCHITZEL: If there are no questions
4	on this slide, we will go on to the next slide. In
5	the containment systems performance area, we did
6	review the containment pressure temperature response,
7	and this is one of the areas where you may have
8	additional questions.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Did you do an
10	independent calculations of any of these things?
11	MR. ARCHITZEL: What we did in the
12	containment systems area is that we coordinated with
13	the Duane Arnold review, and the independent review
14	that was done for Duane Arnold.
15	I participated in that review and those
16	calculations, and it contained code that was used
17	there as the same containment code that was used for
18	Duane Arnold and Dresden.
19	We also had those reviewers, Rich LaBelle
20	and ISL, look over the containment response portions
21	of the application, and they participated in the
22	review of the additional questions and the details
23	that we searched for, in terms of being able to make
24	our safety decision.
25	We did not do independent calculations for

1	the containment response for Duane Arnold and Dresden,
2	but we relied on that containment response. We may in
3	the future do additional independent calculations, and
4	mass energy release is an area that we may look at,
5	but at the moment it was to compare it to the codes
6	that G.E. used for this evaluation.
7	MR. BAILEY: And I guess another part of
8	that is that we took a look at their inputs and
9	methodologies. We had done confirmatory analysis of
10	their containment response within the last 3 years.
11	So we have looked at what they are doing recently.
12	MR. ARCHITZEL: And that was more in the
13	MPSH area, which is a different slide. We did have
14	those calculations. This may go fairly quickly,
15	because if there aren't any questions, we can on
16	DR. KRESS: Well, the containment dynamic
17	loads, does that include the loads on the suppression
18	pool
19	MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes, it does, but
20	basically those loads were bounded as per the EPU, and
21	aspects like whether or not the you know, with the
22	same pressure as the driving source initially, EPU is
23	a second order effect sort of on the containment
24	response.
25	So there wasn't a tremendous amount of

difference impacted by the EPU except in the long term. Now, the TORUS temperature went up for two reasons. One, the analysis methods changed. They used a more realistic blow down.

That gets the energy into the suppression pool faster, and they also no assumed thermal equilibrium between the TORUS air space temperature and the water and the TORUS, and the higher suppression pool temperatures, and the MPSH needs were increased because of the EPU.

And those are the types of things that we looked at, and we asked for curbs, and we have curbs for the containment pressure response, and trying to understand what was happening at different points. But we did not do any analyses.

The safety relief valve discharge loads and things like that were not affected, because there is a time when it affects the drain down, and we also looked at aspects like with the increased temperature, and with the squenchers, and the steam that was coming out of the squenchers intersect with the suction of the ECCS pumps.

And they provide discussions and envelopes for that would not be in the phenomena, and so therefore they didn't have a local pool temperature

effect addressed or limit addressed.

On the very last page, I happen to have a list of the ones that are on 46, are the areas where we had additional input, and one of them was the 4.2.5, and there is no more information there than the net positive suction head.

And I guess I would like to say on the net positive suction head that that was one of these cases where it was an existing open issue before the EPU started.

Most or a lot of our review items or aspects, the EPU has a negative effect on net positive suction head by raising that pressure, and therefore there was an increased demand, and it was addressed in the ELTR about the potential need for plants to take credit for net positive suction head, and there will be an additional need for net positive suction head.

And in this instance, that effect is there, and we have looked at it. I could show you the credit they have requested, versus the existing credit. There is no additional credit requested in the very beginning of the transient for either Dresden or Quad Cities.

But with time that credit does go up for periods of time and it hangs in there longer. So if

I could take a curve and show you how it is affected 1 if you are interested. 2 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is this still acceptable 3 to you, that we take this credit? 4 MR. ARCHITZEL: Right. We tried to 5 minimize the credit that we allow them to receive. So 6 7 the questions were along the lines of did you examine and replace the pumps, or some type of other mechanism 8 to reduce the pressure, and of course that was not 9 10 economically feasible was the answer that we got back. So in that instance would the EPU have any 11 approval for the potential additional over credit. We 12 looked at it, and it was not a major increase in over 13 credit over what has currently been granted. 14 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And there is no basis 15 for saying that the pump performance is likely to be 16 degraded? 17 MR. ARCHITZEL: Well, the cavitation, they 18 do have cavitation at Dresden and Quad Cities after 19 the peak as you heard yesterday. When I went to the 20 audit, I did see the testing that was done, and it was 21 like about an hour-and-a-half testing at cavitation 22 conditions. 23 And so there is cavitation, and even 24 though we have granted that credit, they still don't 25

have enough credit for 290 until about the 10 minute 1 point, where they take credit for operator action. 2 The procedures are in place to reduce the 3 flow for the operators, and so there is no reason to 4 really believe that it would necessarily go that long, 5 the cavitation route. 6 And part of the questions that I was 7 asking was also to make sure that the operators 8 actually weren't going to throttle back those flows 9 and leave the extra pumps running if they did have 10 sufficient MPSH. 11 So I quess if the question is if we are 12 comfortable with the net positive suction head credit 13 that we are granting, the open issue that existed did 14 deal with strainer differential pressure. 15 And it has taken a long time to get that 16 resolved, and there have been open issues. Actually, 17 Quad Cities did not have credit for containment over 18 19 pressure. They had an application in-house which we 20 had not approved. We rejected it because the methods 21 that they had used were not in accordance with the 22 URG. Very lately, we have gotten the submittal that 23 does follow the URG recommendations and SER. 24 We have looked at it, and we have not 25

1	written the SER yet, but that should not be a problem
2	for this uprate then. But as for the strainer and
3	differential pressure, and the unique strainers they
4	have got, they developed a head loss.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So the final SER will
6	explain why you feel comfortable in some detail?
7	MR. ARCHITZEL: Well, actually the
8	strainer differential pressure influence in this EPU
9	was in the conservative or the effect of raising the
10	temperature actually results in a lowered differential
11	pressure.
12	So in that aspect, it is not a concern,
13	but we will explain that in the SC.
14	MR. BOEHNERT: What was the issue with the
15	fuel pool cooling?
16	MR. ARCHITZEL: The issue for the fuel
17	pool cooling is strictly the increased decay heat and
18	how you handle increased decay heat. We are taking
19	new looks at fuel pool coolants these days, and what
20	single failure exists, and it turns out that with
21	Dresden there is a difference between Dresden and Quad
22	Cities.
23	And that they use and credit the RHR fuel
24	pool system, and they have a dedicated RHR well,
25	excuse me, a dedicated shut down cooling system at

Dresden, and Quad Cities has the residual heat removal 1 2 mode. But basically it is the single failure. 3 We examined the single failure that they are talking 4 about, and with the RHR pump, it is just identifying 5 the single failure, and we got into discussions about 6 7 do you really have an RHR backup or you don't you, administratively, and things like that. 8 And what temperature are you going to go 9 to, and what are your makeup rates, and do you exceed 10 the design of 150 degrees or not. You get a little 11 more detail, and there is very short sentences in the 12 13 application. So finding out all the details of how that 14 worked, and what administrative controls were in place 15 to assure that you had a backup, and assumed the right 16 17 single failure. The make-up rates were not really stated 18 correctly in the application, and so we got 19 understanding of it really has significantly more 20 makeup, and they provided us the boil off rate, and 21 those types of issues. 22 There is no ultimate CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 23 heat sink? 24 MR. ARCHITZEL: The ultimate heat sink 25

-- and if you are on to that page.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I am looking at the slide behind you there that says that was an area --

MR. ARCHITZEL: Well, you are one ahead of my slide, but okay. In the area of ultimate heat sink, the staff review is not complete on the ultimate heat site. This is another area -- well, the EPU effect just for Dresden.

At Quad Cities another fairly short discourse provided by the licensee, but the basic bottom line is that with dam failure at Quad Cities, the pool behind that dam separates from the plant after a defined amount of time, and that defined amount of time is what they currently need to provide portable pumps for their ultimate heat sink.

Dresden is the area where we have not completed our review at this point, and one of the principal reasons that I did go to the site to do an audit on their calculation of the situation.

This is another existing open issue. The licensee discovered problems with their design basis reconstitution several years ago, and after they discovered those problems -- they are dealing basically with which volumes are available in the seismic aspects of the system and the timing of the

operator actions.

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And we evaluated those conditions before the EPU, and we provided the region a TIAA response to what areas to look at, and basically the EPU effect is to shorten the time period for manual actions go get portable pumps, and make up into the canal, which they consider their seismic -- if you will, a seismic source.

There still is no seismic source from that point into the isolation condenser. So that is part of the staff approvals that is really part of the issue that is still open, but basically the new information came out fairly late, and the EPU effect is not significant from a safety standpoint.

We have looked at that, the 4.5 days to the 4 days is the latest information that we have received, there is other information, for example, that with EPU that you need 2.9 million gallons in the intake canal, versus 2.5 million before.

That is just boiling water, and it is not really what you really need, and so the 30 days is not -- and whether that was in their licensing basis is questionable. So it is not clear if there ever were a 30 day type of a plant.

And these are just discussions in the

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1	history that we are evaluating. And there are also
2	aspects that are currently under review, like proposed
3	modifications to add a seismic Class One capability
4	within several years for the IPEEE.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I was going to ask you
6	about seismic. Are you the right person to ask?
7	MR. ARCHITZEL: I can describe my
8	understanding of what is seismic and what is not
9	seismic with the Dresden plant.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, we were given this
11	IPEEE part of the draft on the SER, and it talks about
12	that it is an inadequate seismic margin at some point.
13	MR. ARCHITZEL: Well, I guess that is
14	where you consider, and Donnie maybe could talk a
15	little bit to those numbers that you heard some about
16	yesterday, and the impact is not tremendously safety
17	significant of those future modifications.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It may not be safety
19	significant, but are they meeting the regulations
20	then, in terms of
21	MR. ARCHITZEL: Well, let me just say that
22	for the current regulations and Donnie can talk
23	about the safety aspects of it, but for the current
24	regulations and with the seismic makeup that they
25	have, the isolation condenser, which would last now

and which would last before, 20 minutes approximately. 1 They are keeping that power level just 2 like the bypass valves, and they have got a set power 3 level, and it is a fraction of the existing power 4 level when it uprates, and so for 20 minutes they have 5 a make-up capacity that is seismic. 6 In addition to that, they have the 7 containment, and they have got the ability for a day 8 But the remainder of the seismic of containment. 9 capability to make up to the isolation condenser, they 10 have diverse sources. 11 And the diverse sources have some seismic 12 rigidity, but they are not safety related. 13 wouldn't credit them an existing plant today. And we 14 have looked at some of the seismic statements. 15 is one statement in the SEP that the far water system 16 17 was qualifiable. I think we are talking two MR. BAILEY: 18 different things here, in terms of the low rigidity 19 that is discussed in the safety evaluation, and I 20 don't believe that that applies here. Can you give an 21 22 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I am referring to this 23 24 .909G.24G. MR. BAILEY: That is not really the issue 25

we are talking about for the ultimate heat sink. 1 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: No, it's not. 2 MR. BAILEY: For the ultimate heat sink 3 that the staff review is still ongoing, we are trying 4 to make sure that we understand all of the scenarios, 5 and all of the available water, and --6 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And that is a different 7 issue. 8 This is Donnie Harrison MR. HARRISON: 9 from the PRA branch, and the reference you are making 10 to the .09G HCLPF value is a reference out of the 11 IPEEE for Quad Cities. 12 13 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right. MR. HARRISON: And it was recognizing that 14 that was, if you will, an unacceptably low seismic 15 capacity for a plant. At that time the licensee was 16 still in the process of making modifications, and most 17 of that was I believe Cable Tray and Anchorage. 18 And since that time I think at Quad 19 they are going to complete all 20 modifications by the next outage, the completion of 21 the next outage for each of those two plants. 22 At that time the concern that the staff 23 going 24 was raising was there is not reevaluation to see where the plant is. So the staff 25

1	used some numbers from Dresden, partly because the
2	Dresden well, we had the information on Dresden,
3	and the seismic hazard at Dresden is actually a little
4	higher than Quad.
5	So we felt comfortable as just being a
6	perspective of where the risk was for the .09G plant,
7	as opposed to going up to, let's say, your design
8	basis at 1202.4 from a HCLFP value.
9	And that was provided mainly to raise the
10	issue and to get a risk perspective of where the plant
11	was.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is there going to be a
13	presentation from the staff on the risk perspectives?
14	MR. HARRISON: We can at any time you
15	want, yeah.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And that is where we
17	could revisit this seismic margin issue then perhaps.
18	MR. HARRISON: Sure.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So we will have that
20	again later in the morning, or timing willing, I
21	guess.
22	MR. ARCHITZEL: We will do that after the
23	break. And we can work out the order of presentation
24	after the break.
, <sub>-</sub>	CHAIDMAN WALLE. And we are approaching

1	the break as we approach the end of this presentation.
2	MR. ARCHITZEL: Well, I think that is
3	about it for ultimate heat sink. Part of the issue
4	also is whether the calculations were conservative or
5	not, or formalized, and those issues are still being
6	considered.
7	DR. SCHROCK: And that issue is limited to
8	the Dresden?
9	MR. ARCHITZEL: That's correct.
10	DR. FORD: And the feed water issues and
11	corrosion, that will come in later?
12	MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes. There is something
13	there on feed water, and about flushing out and how
14	the system changed, which was not in the application.
15	And getting additional information on the logic behind
16	running the pumps and saving the plan, and the plant
17	availability on how you run it, and where the suction
18	trips come in.
19	And actually trying to maintain the plant
20	on line was the focus of my review in the feed water
21	area. And the next slide.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is the last one.
23	MR. ARCHITZEL: That's it. And the last
24	one was just going over the well, it is sort of an
25	open listing of areas that we reviewed, and if you had

questions, I could go into more. But if you don't 1 have questions, then -- you know. 2 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are we ready for a break 3 Are there any questions from members of the 4 now? committee? 5 MR. HANNON: Excuse me, but this is John 6 7 Hannon. I wanted to make sure that one of the points that Ralph made is clear, because it relates back to 8 one of your concerns on the Duane Arnold review, and 9 John Zalinski asked me to follow up on that. 10 One of your points was that the staff 11 independent should develop criteria for when 12 assessments should be performed to compliment our 13 reviews of the applicant's submittal. 14 And this is one case where we did it on an 15 We sent Ralph to the site to do some 16 ad hoc basis. independent verification of the calculations that they 17 had done for the ultimate heat sink. 18 And the point that I wanted to make is 19 that we do do that on an ad hoc basis when it appears 20 to be appropriate. And this is a case where we 21 thought it would be appropriate for us to do it. 22 MR. ARCHITZEL: And also when I went to 23 the site also, you looked at the calculations for the 24 25 net positive suction head that the licensee had done.

1	So it was two different areas where we examined,
2	including that.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you. So are we
4	ready for a break? So we will take a break until 25
5	until 11:00, a 15 minute break; and after the break my
6	colleague, Jack Sieber, is going to Chair, and I am
7	going to turn the Chair over to him.
8	I would ask my colleagues to send me
9	comments on this whole issue so I can prepare a letter
10	for the full committee.
11	(Whereupon, the meeting was recessed at
12	10:19 a.m., and resumed at 10:36 a.m.)
13	MR. SIEBER: I would like to call the
14	meeting to order. In looking at the agenda, we have
15	on the last page a response to ACRS questions, which
16	I think we should go through at this time.
17	And then we had some additional questions
18	on source term in the PRA, and so we can deal with
19	those at the staff's convenience. You can arrange
20	however you want to give the remaining presentations.
21	MR. BAILEY: We wanted to make a small
22	change in the agenda to address your request for a PRA
23	presentation.
24	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
25	MR. BAILEY: Donnie Harrison will present

1	his PRA analysis, and if this is all right with you,
2	then we would return to the responses to ACRS
3	questions portion.
4	MR. SIEBER: Okay. That's fine.
5	MR. BAILEY: And for clarification, we did
6	not get somebody or we were not able to get somebody
7	here to answer the questions related to the
8	radiological analysis.
9	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
10	MR. BAILEY: So if there are questions or
11	information you would like us to bring to the full
12	committee, we can offer you that.
13	DR. KRESS: I think those were mostly
14	clarification questions that I had, and I can dig in
15	to the stuff we have and get them out.
16	MR. BOEHNERT: So why don't you stand by
17	and we will let you know if we want something in
18	follow-up on that.
19	MR. BAILEY: All right. Very well.
20	MR. SIEBER: Okay. Why don't we begin.
21	MR. HARRISON: Good morning. My name is
22	Donnie Harrison, and I did the PRA portion of the
23	review of the power uprate. And these slides are just
24	back up information in response to your questions.
25	MR. BOEHNERT: We will need copies of

these.

MR. HARRISON: We will walk you through it. If we could just move on to the next slide. Basically, the information that we received from the licensee is provided on this slide, as well as what the staff used in its review.

We have the original submittal by the licensee, which was just a couple of paragraphs if I remember correctly. That was supplemented in about the February time frame to address the key areas of review that the staff typically looks at in the risk area.

We then had a series of -- one major round of RAIs with a series of clarifications and meetings and such, and conversations on, and again this covers the areas of internal events, external events, shutdown operations, and then also just an area of PRA quality, and does the plant reflect the as-built as operated facilities.

The staff review looked at the licensee provided information. We also looked at other areas. For example, much of the external events questions from the staff were derived from the Ses that were written on the IPEEEs. We also pursued areas that maybe the SE called out on the IPE.

DR. KRESS: And how exactly did you assess 1 the quality of the PRA? 2 MR. HARRISON: The quality of the PRA was 3 4 done in a couple of different ways. One is in July, at the end of July, we actually -- two members of the 5 staff took a trip down to the Exelon facility to look 6 at their maintenance procedures and processes, to see 7 how Exelon actually ensures for themselves that their 8 models are up to date to ensure that the models 9 actually reflect significant changes to the facilities 10 that go on throughout a period of time. 11 -- and I will They did return Dr. 12 13 Burchill's compliment. They did an excellent job of 14 providing us information, and providing us a whole series of their PRA materials, their procedures. 15 understand that it is an evolving process, and it is 16 17 getting better all the time. Has their PRA undergone the 18 DR. KRESS: industry peer review process? 19 MR. HARRISON: Both PRAs have undergone 20 that. Dresden went through it twice, and if you talk 21 to Dr. Burchill, he will say the first time was 22 probably premature for them to go through. 23 And they learned a lot of lessons and 24 25 reflected that in the Quad Cities and in the revision

1	to the Dresden PRA. So both events were both received
2	by March, and with their evaluation criteria, all of
3	them were all of the elements were at a high level
4	that could be used in a risk informed submittal
5	supporting deterministic information.
6	DR. SHACK: Was that the owners' group one
7	or the NEI? I mean, could we assign a Level-3 to this
8	thing? I mean, was there a number? I am not sure
9	whether the owner's group gives you that.
10	MR. SIEBER: The BWR owners group.
11	MR. HARRISON: They assign a number for
12	each of the 11 elements. For 10 of the elements, they
13	received a three; and for the 11th one they received
14	a four. So, higher is better than lower. So it was
15	a 3-4.
16	MR. BOEHNERT: Out of what?
17	MR. HARRISON: Out of four. That is a
18	good question. So, yes, the staff actually spent some
19	time, a few days, at the facility just to look at the
20	process. We looked at their they have a software
21	program that is kind of like an XL spreadsheet that
22	they track the modifications going on at the plant.
23	They evaluate those modifications to see
24	if they need to do an update immediately of the PRA,
25	or if it is something that they can wait until their

1 next periodic update.

Today, they have never had anything rise to the level that requires that immediate update. One of the things that the staff noted in its draft SE write-up was given all of the changes going on with the plant with this power uprate, and things in parallel with this power uprate, the staff would probably recommend doing an update on these PRAs just to make sure that everyone is reading from the same sheet of music.

But again that is more of a statement of what the staff would recommend, and it is not a required thing.

MR. SIEBER: If I look at the Section 10 of the safety evaluation, I see a lot of places -- and I guess I have both Dresden and Quad Cities here -- where a statement was made that the delta-risk was insignificant.

Does that mean that they actually modeled the changes in the PRA and then looked at the numbers, or does it mean that in the PRA the issue wasn't even modeled at all?

MR. HARRISON: What I would say is that there is a couple of things that the licensee did. There were places where they put something in the

model and recalculated, and reran the model. 1 thev used is places where 2 There simplified model, where they were making the design of 3 the -- let's say the recirc run back circuit, and that 4 was in design at the same time they were doing their 5 PRA evaluation. 6 So they put in a simple model and ran that 7 through and saw what the impact was. Other cases --8 and typically in response to the staff's RAIs, they 9 may provide us a calculation that says that the loss 10 of off-site power fast transfer is a new event that we 11 are going to evaluate. 12 And that we will just give you 13 calculation to show you that the number is 10 to the 14 loss of off-site power that the 15 10, or initiating event frequency would have been increased 16 by 2 times 10 to the minus 6, but it is a very simple 17 calculation. 18 So there is a smattering of different 19 approaches, depending on what the issue was, and how 20 we are dealing with it. 21 Is it possible to pick that MR. SIEBER: 22 out of the safety evaluation report on which method 23 they used when they were rerunning the model, or --24

MR. HARRISON:

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I think I pointed out in

1	the write-up where they used simplified models or
2	simplistic calculations. I tried to make it clear
3	and that is where after going into each of those
4	sections the staff made a conclusion that it was using
5	a simplistic model.
6	If it had been a risk-informed submittal,
7	we might have sought for the licensee to confirm that
8	the design and the simple model either match, or the
9	simple model actually bounds it for sure.
10	So I think that would come out. We don't
11	necessarily go through and say here is all the
12	modeling changes that they did.
13	MR. SIEBER: Right. Well, I think that
14	would be too extensive, and would make this too long.
1.5	MR. HARRISON: Right. As it is, for a
16	section that is supposed to be an insight section, it
17	is still 20 pages long.
18	MR. SIEBER: Right.
19	MR. HARRISON: I hope that there is a lot
20	of insights.
21	MR. SIEBER: Okay. Thank you.
22	MR. HARRISON: We can move on, and the
23	next few slides are just going to repeat really what
24	Dr. Burchill mentioned yesterday, with maybe a
25	different slant on it from the staff's perspective.

They evaluated the key areas, and in the 1 initiating events area, component reliability, success 2 criteria, and operator actions. They addressed all 3 those areas. 4 5 some impacts pretty There were identified either by the staff or by the licensee in 6 each area. Again, as you mentioned, each area seemed 7 to have -- we are talking a percent here or two 8 percent there change in CDF. 9 We weren't seeing any major changes. 10 next result is that there is -- and I think yesterday 11 that you saw Exelon had a CDF delta increase of 9 12 13 percent, and I listed 8 percent. Maybe we count different. I have probably got more of 14 an error in the way that I added them. 15 Quad Cities is looking at a five percent, 16 and those are very small risk increases. 17 The LERF numbers again are 10 percent at Dresden, and 4 percent 18 at Ouad Cities. 19 The difference between Dresden and Quad 20 21 Cities, I would probably arque, is mostly because the base CDF and base LERF numbers at Quad Cities are 22 about twice as high as they are at Dresden, and 23 24 therefore, the change in risk is half at Quad Cities.

DR. KRESS:

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So the actual deltas were

about the same?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, for the most part. The numerical number would be about the same. Again, we would just point out that there were simple models and simplistic calculations performed, as well as on the transformers, and there was some question on the switch gear and the breakers.

And there were some tests that the licensee stated that they were going to perform to show that they were acceptable, and they might have to make some field modifications to make that acceptable.

It wasn't clear to me that those tests had been completed and that the modifications had actually been implemented. So that was to recognize that there was some uncertainty there.

And then on the thermal hydraulic area, the staff recognizes that they did an analysis of what their typical thermal level will be, and not what their licensed thermal level would be, which means that they did the thermal hydraulics runs using MAP about two percent below what the licensed level is.

And the staff recognizes that puts us into a little bit of an uncertainty area as far as success criteria and operator action time. But again we are only talking about two percent in a 17 percent uprate,

1	and we don't see that as being something that would
2	trip us into a concern.
3	DR. SCHROCK: Did they have some reason
4	for doing that?
5	MR. HARRISON: The rationale again is that
6	the PRA is supposed to reflect more of your realistic
7	operations, and the plant will typically be operating
8	at a lower thermal limit to achieve the same
9	electrical output, except for I think during the
10	summer months.
11	And there might be periods during the
12	summer where they actually have to increase that to
13	get that output. So, yes, it was mostly just to get
14	a realistic perspective.
15	Again, the staff would have preferred that
16	they do it at the license level to just take any doubt
17	out. So that was just to recognize that that was the
18	condition.
19	DR. KRESS: Did they do any uncertainty
20	analysis?
21	MR. HARRISON: No. They did do
22	sensitivity analysis I think in the past, and I think
23	you heard some of that yesterday. But there were no,
24	if you will, sensitivity calculations done at a higher
25	thermal limit, or at least not provided to the staff

to verify that they were acceptable in that area. 1 DR. FORD: To somebody in the public, the 2 use of your words, use of simplified models and 3 4 simplistic calculations, is somewhat negative. Could they have used a more professional approach? 5 This is not questioning MR. HARRISON: 6 7 their professionalism. This is more recognizing -- and maybe I need to change my words, 8 but recognize the fact that in some cases they were 9 designing a circuit, or designing a feature at the 10 same time that they were modeling that feature. 11 And Exelon took the approach of trying to 12 13 bound that, and they bounded it by using simple models. 14 But that --15 DR. FORD: Simplified bounding. DR. SHACK: 16 Simplified bounding, or 17 MR. HARRISON: simplified conservative models. Again, there is not 18 a confirmation at the end to ensure that the circuit 19 that they actually did install is bound. I mean, 20 21 there is uncertainty there. And again if this had been a risk informed 22 scenario, we would probably be chasing down that 23 confirmatory analysis to make sure that what was 24 25 installed is truly bounded by what they actually analyzed.

Typically, an example would be that on the reactor recirculation pump run back feature. They increased their turbine trip initiating event frequency by a few percent, and ran it through their model, and did not take credit for at Dresden the fact that the recirc pump would keep you from tripping.

So in that sense the staff then has confidence that their analysis should have bound the impact.

DR. FORD: The only reason why I am bringing up this question is that this is open to the public, and someone in the public could construe that as being a simple, but inadequate, analysis, and that is not your meaning.

MR. HARRISON: Right. That is not my meaning. I am meaning to say that it is a -- if you want to use a conservative -- well, I don't like using bounding in PRA language, but that seems like an oxymoron.

It is a conservative approach to trying to address the condition you are in, where you are designing a component while you are modeling it at the same time. So it just recognizes that fact. If we could move to the next slide.

1 We also looked at external events and shutdown operations and PRA quality, and we have 2 already touched a little bit on the last one. 3 staff spent quite a bit of time on the external events 4 portion, primarily in the area of seismic outliers. 5 The IPEEE for both of these stations 6 7 identified outliers in the seismic margins analysis, and we aggressive pursued those with the licensee. 8 And especially for the seismic dam failure, which I 9 think you have heard about now at least partially 10 twice. 11 12 13 14 15

We saw after addressing those scenarios specifically from a risk specific to see where we At Dresden, the rest of the plant meets its seismic margins analysis criteria for a .3G focus scope plant.

We didn't pursue those things that were We wanted to see where the already at that level. outliers were. The results of that were that we had some -- I think if you add it all up on the seismic side, it comes out just a little below 10 to the minus 5 as the risk.

And that includes not just the outliers, but also taking into account the fact that you could lose the isolation condenser seismically as well. And

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if you add that on, you get it right around 10 to the 1 minus 5 as a CDF value. 2 And the isolation condenser does meet the 3 .3G margins analysis, but I put that in just as a 4 perspective. On the fire analysis, they indicated 5 that there was a small risk increase that is mostly 6 7 due to operator actions. Dresden again, using as an However, 8 example, their methodology is what I would call a 9 progressive screening criteria type methodology, where 10 if you get an acceptable answer, you stop analyzing. 11 MR. SIEBER: That was strictly a control 12 room fire. 13 MR. HARRISON: That was a control room 14 fire, and they took a 50 percent chance of going to 15 core damage if I lose the control room. So any kind 16 of operator actions that changed by 5, 10, 15 percent, 17 are never going to raise to the level that would 18 offset that high of a conditional core damage 19 probability, unless you find out that you just can't 20 do it. That would be about the only way to get there. 21 I think we have talked in the past about 22 shutdown operations for BWRs. Typically, you have 23 24 long times to boil, and it is not a concern as much as

it would be for, say, a PWR.

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1	MR. SIEBER: They did not have a shutdown
2	PRA?
3	MR. HARRISON: They do not have a shutdown
4	PRA. They do have a risk management program called
5	ORAM.
6	MR. SIEBER: Yes, and I am not sure that
7	you get a quantitative number out of that. You get a
8	color, and it really just looks at multiple paths.
9	MR. HARRISON: Right, success paths.
10	MR. SIEBER: So I am not exactly sure how
11	you can draw a conclusion that says negatively small
12	increase in risk from using an ORAM as a tool.
13	MR. HARRISON: Right. We are not basing
14	our conclusion there on a model. It is more of a
15	qualitative conclusion saying operator actions will be
16	reduced by some amount because of the higher decay
17	heat.
18	However, they do have a risk management
19	process in place, and I think there was a discussion
20	yesterday about their backup cooling systems, and that
21	whole topic becomes moot because of their short
22	refueling cycles, and refueling outages.
23	If you are only out for 20 days and it
24	takes you 26 days of cool down to get to a point where
25	you could use a pump, it becomes a non-issue. That

1	pump is not available.
2	So given that, we are just acknowledging
3	the fact that there would be some impact, but we don't
4	believe that it would be significant.
5	MR. SIEBER: Okay. Now, I do not recall
6	anyplace in the safety evaluation where the idea that
7	the refuelings are probably going to be a day or so
8	longer because of the higher decay heat level. Was
9	that evaluated at all, and will that have an impact on
10	shutdown risk?
11	MR. HARRISON: I would answer that in two
12	ways. No, I did not evaluate that, but off the top of
13	my head, if you are and again if I am not going to
14	get well, yes, there would be some increased risk,
15	because you are operating another day out there.
16	MR. SIEBER: Right.
17	MR. HARRISON: Again, the backup systems
18	that would be available are marginal at that point
19	anyway. So you would be just progressing your risk
20	management just a little further.
21	You could also argue that backwards and
22	say then if I can shorten my outage by a day or two I
23	save risk. Given the drive of the industry, the
24	shorter they go it is an economics question.
25	The licensee is going to drive for a short

outage, and if he can shorten that outage, he will. 1 So there is no way to quantify that type of an answer. 2 On PRA quality, like I said before, they 3 did go through the owners group peer certification 4 process. The last two bullets just point out the fact 5 that with simple models and simplistic calculations, 6 7 don't necessarily have a hundred you confidence that everything is precise. 8 When you are in PRA, nothing is precise. 9 So there is a little bit of -- I would like to make me 10 feel a little if they did a few extra things, but they 11 don't think -- I don't think that would be -- it 12 wouldn't change the answers and that is the bottom 13 line. 14 The last bullet really just recognizes 15 that in the IPEEE the plant too credit for conditions 16 that do not exist, and they are in the process of 17 making modifications to make that fit. 18 And as part of our review, I believe they 19 conducted their -- they had a seismic condition with 20 the dam failure, and they had assumed that the LOCA 21 conditions were fine. 22 And as part of our questioning, I think 23 they went back and did the study that they had 24 committed to in the IPEEE a few years ago, and the 25

1	results of that were that they do need to add a means
2	of an alternate means of or a seismically
3	qualified means of getting a containment cooling
4	service water path in.
5	MR. SIEBER: But those modifications were
6	just hangers in supports, right?
7	MR. HARRISON: Those modifications for
8	Quad Cities were mostly anchorage. For Dresden, it is
9	not. For Dresden, the modifications that we are
10	talking about are the portable pumps, the hoses, the
11	connections, being able to route the lines through,
12	and drop the pumps in, and get the water where you
1 2	need it.
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14	MR. SIEBER: Right.
14	MR. SIEBER: Right.
14 15	MR. SIEBER: Right.  MR. HARRISON: That is how they are going
14 15 16	MR. SIEBER: Right.  MR. HARRISON: That is how they are going to address the seismic issues at Dresden. It is not
14 15 16 17	MR. SIEBER: Right.  MR. HARRISON: That is how they are going to address the seismic issues at Dresden. It is not going to be a hard-wired implant system. The next
14 15 16 17	MR. SIEBER: Right.  MR. HARRISON: That is how they are going to address the seismic issues at Dresden. It is not going to be a hard-wired implant system. The next slide just goes over what we concluded through our
14 15 16 17 18	MR. SIEBER: Right.  MR. HARRISON: That is how they are going to address the seismic issues at Dresden. It is not going to be a hard-wired implant system. The next slide just goes over what we concluded through our review.
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. SIEBER: Right.  MR. HARRISON: That is how they are going to address the seismic issues at Dresden. It is not going to be a hard-wired implant system. The next slide just goes over what we concluded through our review.  Again, this recognizes that we identified a number of issues, and the licensee the methodology that they used, and the simple

1 probably require some type of confirmation that the simple models and the simple calculations truly are 2 bounding the conditions. 3 And to actually analyze the procedures 4 that they are creating for like load shedding in a 5 transformer, to verify that their screening human 6 error probability really is screening, and there is 7 not something out there that might be higher. 8 The last bullet there just says, however, 9 the submittal is not risk informed. They are meeting 10 their deterministic requirements, and the information 11 that we have does not make us question the adequate 12 13 protection of the plant. So with that conclusion, we pass it back 14 to the deterministic folks to address the issues in 15 their areas, and that's all that I had on the risk 16 17 assessment piece of it. Are there any questions? 18 MR. SIEBER: Does anyone have If not, thank you very much. 19 questions? 20 Again -- well, I'm sorry, but DR. FORD: 21 just about the last thing, when you say that submittal is not risk-informed. It doesn't have to be risk-22 informed does it by the regulations? 23 MR. HARRISON: 24 No. DR. FORD: The deterministic requirements, 25

1	are they adequate?
2	MR. HARRISON: That is not a judgment for
3	me to make. That is a judgment for each of the
4	deterministic branches that do their reviews
5	collectively and come together as a basis for the
6	final solution.
7	MR. SIEBER: Actually, the submittal is
8	risk-informed, and the decision making was not.
9	MR. HARRISON: Was not, yes. And we may
LO	be talking about technical questions, but risk
L1	information is provided, but in the terminology of
L2	risk informed, it is not risk informed.
L3	MR. SIEBER: Right.
L4	MR. HARRISON: And again we kind of talked
L5	past ourselves.
16	MR. RUBIN: This is Mark Rubin from the
17	staff. It was not submitted as a risk informed
18	licensing action.
19	DR. FORD: Well, the reason that I am
20	bringing it up is that it might sound nitpicking, but
21	again I come to this public perception being that it
22	is out there, and that bold statement of not risk
23	informed.
24	On the face of it, it would sound
25	negative. It is not negative. It just is not

1	required. It is a factual statement.
2	MR. HARRISON: And it is a factual
3	statement in that it just recognizes that the LTAR
4	requires them to provide risk information. We review
5	that information, and it is not conveying that there
6	is something wrong with the submittal the way it is.
7	I don't want to convey that. Thank you.
8	MR. BOEHNERT: Again, I would like to get
9	copies of your slides.
10	MR. HARRISON: I will make them now and
11	give them to you.
12	MR. BOEHNERT: Thank you very much.
13	MR. ROSSBACH: Okay. Next in our
14	presentation well, actually, we didn't have further
15	presentations prepared, but we do have reviewers
16	available to answer questions in these other areas.
17	The first one we have listed is material
18	degradation issues, and it is because in your letter
19	responding to Duane Arnold, you pointed out the
20	significance of flow assisted corrosion and irradiated
21	stress corrosion cracking to the evaluations.
22	Although in yesterday's licensee's
23	presentation, you seemed to be satisfied with that,
24	but we do have reviewers here if there are questions
25	in these areas.

1	MR. SIEBER: Do we have any questions? I
2	recall someone suggesting that they would like further
3	information on seismic.
4	DR. FORD: As an independent person with
5	a conflict of interest, I have no problems at all with
6	the materials degradation. I was more interested in
7	just the process by which you evaluated those
8	potential degradation modes. And I don't know if this
9	is the forum to ask those questions. For instance
10	MR. ROSSBACH: Would you like us to
11	address the process?
12	DR. FORD: in the flow area, a lot
13	depends on the CHECWORKs and its qualification, et
14	cetera. Did you perform or did you oversee that
15	qualification of the use of CHECWORKs?
16	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Yes, we did look at it,
17	you know, because this is the only way
18	MR. BOEHNERT: Could you identify yourself
19	for the record, Kris?
20	DR. FORD: Kris Parczewski, from Material
21	Chemical Engineering Branch, NRR. You need to look at
22	the other CHECWORKs prediction, and we were satisfied
23	that there were relatively low, and what is most
24	important is that the licensee has the program,
25	ongoing program.

1	And you can always verify, and if you are
2	going to verify the prediction, then he will be able
3	to project it in the future. So this will be a well
4	controlled process for the licensee.
5	And I find that it is not really a very
6	significant change due to a power uprate. The highest
7	one is obviously in the feed water because of the high
8	velocity change.
9	The other components are considerably
10	smaller changes, and so it is not very significant
11	really.
12	DR. FORD: There are a few other minor
13	questions in the area of flow induced vibrations, for
14	instance, and in the new design of putting in a steam
15	dryer. Were those reviewed?
16	MR. ROSSBACH: That would be the
17	mechanical engineering branch.
18	DR. FORD: And the transfer of those loads
19	to the support brackets, and the effect they may have
20	on stress corrosion cracking in that area which is not
21	protected by Noble Chem.
22	MR. MANOLY: My name is Ken Manoly, and I
23	am a section chief in the Mechanic Branch, and I would
24	like to address your questions on the steam dryers.
25	I have one slide to maybe give you a summary of what

1 are the conclusions in that area.

We noticed that you were interested in the topic last time and that's why we gave it more of a focused attention this time, and pretty much the conclusions from both plant reviews, both from Dresden and Quad, were pretty much the same.

That there is no increase in the actual pressure of the temperature, and the core flow is not much increased. The only increase is in the steam flow, and to get into flow induced vibration, maybe I can get into detail if you want to get into that.

The key thing to emphasize in the submittal is that the component is not faulty, but they still want to ensure its integrity for the fault condition, which is a main steam line break.

And for that they evaluate the stresses to the ASME NG Section 3, which is fairly new. It came way after the plant was built. The stresses all meet the code limits.

DR. FORD: Just to interrupt you and to save time, I can see all those factual things there. What is not covered is when we had the Duane Arnold review, they stated that there would be a transference of those stresses to the dryer support brackets welded to the RPV.

1	MR. MANOLY: Right.
2	DR. FORD: I assume the same would apply
3	in this situation, too.
4	MR. MANOLY: That's true.
5	DR. FORD: Was there an analysis done on
6	your behalf of the impact that it might have on
7	environmentally specific cracking on that welded
8	bracket?
9	MR. MANOLY: Well, we didn't do that
10	analysis. We responded to questions in REIs about the
11	adequacy of the anchorages.
12	DR. FORD: Good.
13	MR. MANOLY: And they said to evaluate the
14	anchorages, and they were fine.
15	DR. FORD: And how would that be managed,
16	by the inspection process? Would the dryer brackets
17	also be inspected by BWRVIP-06?
18	MR. MANOLY: Yes. I think with every
19	refueling that the dryers are inspected and removed.
20	DR. FORD: And the brackets, the brackets
21	are also inspected?
22	MR. MANOLY: I am not certain, but I can
23	get back to you on that. I am not quite so certain
24	about the brackets.
25	DR. FORD: The reason that I keep pushing

this is because if they fail, then the whole thing 1 falls, or potentially falls. 2 MR. MANOLY: Right. That would be a very 3 easy thing to verify, the statement in the VIP, 4 because we have the VIP SERs already written up. 5 DR. FORD: I am moving along here, Jack, 6 7 am just trying to get a feeling of the assessment that went through. On the cracking issues, 8 the cracking of the main structural welds in the 9 reactor, in the core shroud, for instance, H-4 and H-10 3, H-6 welds, was there any analysis done on how the 11 increase in flux of 17 percent, how that is going to 12 affect the cracking of those components? 13 MR. MANOLY: I will have to defer that to 14 15 the materials branch. This is Gene Carpenter MR. CARPENTER: 16 with the materials and chemical engineering branch. 17 Basically, what we have done with the core shroud or 18 other internals is that we have asked licensees to 19 take a look at just what their fluence levels are. 20 And when they get to a certain threshold 21 limit, that drops them into a higher crack growth rate 22 regime, and at that time they have an increased amount 23 24 of inspection that is required. DR. FORD: Okay. Is the current -- I have 25

1	forgotten the VIP numbers. There are so many of them.
2	But are those fluence values that might be accrued in
3	the next since they are going for license renewal
4	in the next 10 years, are they likely to get into
5	fluence regions where they might be a marked increment
6	in cracking susceptibility?
7	MR. CARPENTER: Some licensees have
8	already reached the 5E to the 20th neutrons per square
9	centimeter fluence value, which is what we consider
10	the threshold value.
11	And as these reactors age, they obviously
12	have more internals coming to that point. Now, when
13	I say some licensees, what I am saying is that is at
14	the core shroud. We are not talking about the vessel.
15	DR. FORD: I asked a question the other
16	day about the delta-P across the access hole covers,
17	and I presume there will be an increased delta-P, and
18	they mentioned that they had a redesign of the access
19	hole covers. Was that analyzed or examined by the
20	staff? Is there any increase in the cracking of
21	and I am not too sure what the redesign is. Are they
22	still welded designs or bolted designs for the access
23	hole covers?
24	MR. MANOLY: I cannot respond to the
25	guestion right now. I need to get back to you to see

1 what information we have on it. DR. FORD: It is not a major safety issue 2 I don't believe. Thank you. Those are the only major 3 questions that I had. I just wanted to understand 4 5 what the process was. MR. SIEBER: Do we have anything else that 6 7 the staff would like to present? MR. ROSSBACH: Earlier, we did have one 8 question from the ACRS dealing with the pipe supports 9 modifications, and if you want any information on 10 that, I can tell you that some main steam and TORUS 11 attached piping systems were determined to require 12 support modifications to bring the piping within code 13 level stress limits. 14 Now, some TORUS attached piping support 15 MODS are required due to higher power uprate thermal 16 loads, and some main steam support modifications are 17 required as a result of applying the turbine stop 18 valve closure loads. If you want any elaboration on 19 that the staff is here. 20 Well, that is basically in 21 MR. SIEBER: the SER, almost verbatim. So does anyone have any 22 I would like to -- I think we are questions? Okay. 23 done now, and so I would like to thank the staff for 24 25 their presentation, and also Exelon and G.E.

1	I think it was very informative, and very
2	knowledgeable, and you certainly brought enough people
3	with you to cover anything and everything that we
4	could have asked.
5	What I would like to do now though is
6	spend some time with the members so that we can get an
7	idea of what members comments are at this point so
8	that we can provide those comments to Dr. Wallis while
9	he begins drafting a letter.
LO	I presume that the staff wants a letter
L1	from us at their next full meeting, and so with that,
L2	Dr. Shack, do you have any comments that you would
L3	like to make?
14	DR. SHACK: No. I missed much of
L5	yesterday's presentation and so I feel a little
16	restricted about making comments and so I will just
L7	defer to the members who attended the full session.
18	MR. SIEBER: Okay. Dr. Ford.
19	DR. FORD: There seems to me to be five
20	kind of areas in the materials degradation area that
21	needed or should have been addressed, and in large
22	part were.
23	And those include the flow induced
24	vibration, and the flow assisted corrosion, the
25	embrittlement of the pressure vessel, and the whole

question of cracking of the main structural welds in 1 the reactor, all of which could conceivably be 2 affected one way or the other. 3 I think they all have been addressed both 4 by the licensee and analysis done by the staff of all 5 of those. And I don't think that with the ACRS that 6 they should be discussed in any detail. I don't think 7 8 there is a major problem that cannot be managed with the management programs that exist. 9 It would be an idea just to put those up 10 as I mentioned yesterday in just one page just to 11 record that they have been analyzed. And one area 12 that wasn't discussed yesterday was a question of 13 14 Nitrogen-16, which would depend very much on the adherence of Noble Chem with the higher flow rates. 15 I personally don't think it is a problem, 16 something that should be addressed 17 is somewhere. 18 MR. BAILEY: Would you like to discuss 19 that now? 20 Well, I am just asking has it 21 DR. FORD: really been looked at and are people satisfied. 22 it be managed. 23 This is Gene Carpenter MR. CARPENTER: 24 25 again with materials and chemical engineering branch.

We have been looking quite closely at the chemistry 1 internals, involved with the BWR 2 is specifically hydrogen water chemistry and the Noble 3 Chem issues. 4 Obviously if you have an increase in N-16, 5 you are going to have an increase in shine, and so it 6 is a very easy problem to ascertain that you have. 7 We have also asked the industry to go back 8 and have a monitoring program to ensure that the NMCA 9 is appropriately applied, and that it is maintained 10 throughout the operating cycles so that they do need 11 to know when they are going to reapply it to maintain 12 effectiveness. 13 have also asked them to have an 14 effective hydrogen water chemistry program in place, 15 and we have been making some great strides towards 16 that. So the N-16 problem, I think, is under control. 17 Well, that was actually MR. SIEBER: 1.8 discussed in the safety evaluation report and the 19 issues were does this provide additional safety to 20 workers, and does it affect equipment qualification, 21 and things of this nature. 22 And obviously N-16 without some additional 23 offsetting treatment is proportional to the change in 24 power, and that the safety evaluation radiological 25

evaluation indicated that the increase was negligible 1 as far as to workers and potential dose off-site. 2 And in equipment qualifications space, I 3 think they had to run or get additional data on 4 Rosemont transmitters. And there were some 5 transmitters that were installed that weren't EQ, and 6 that had to be changed out to make them EQ. 7 And so I think the N-16 issue was pretty well covered. 8 MR. CARPENTER: Yes. 9 And as far as fluence is MR. SIEBER: 10 concerned, it seems to me that the Dresden and Quad 11 Cities reactor vessels are fairly large compared to 12 So there is some the core that is inside them. 13 absorption that takes place, which means that the 14 fluence does go up by 17 percent at the vessel wall or 15 the shroud. 16 And so the impact isn't as great as one 17 might presume, and also in that type of vessel there 18 are other plants that operate with higher power 19 levels, and so that doesn't make Dresden or Quad 20 Cities any different than those plants, at least in my 21 22 way of reasoning. DR. FORD: That is my point. 23 DR. SHACK: Just to come back to Peter's 24 25 question, and again it is a question for Gene. The

way the hydrogen water chemistry will run under the 1 Noble Chem is that they may not be continuously 2 modeling potential. 3 And so they will probably be putting in a 4 fixed amount of hydrogen, which means that if they 5 lost their Noble metal coating, what would really 6 happen would be their susceptibility to cracking would 7 go up for a portion of the cycle. 8 That is correct. MR. CARPENTER: 9 DR. SHACK: And then with an N-16 concern, 10 their susceptibility would increase presumably until 11 the end of the cycle and they found out that they had 12 somehow mis-estimated the potential wear rate for the 13 Isn't that the way it would work Noble Chem. 14 15 basically? That is the way that it MR. CARPENTER: 16 would work, and we have also asked the industry to go 17 back and have a way to monitor during the operation 18 that they do have an effective hydrogen water 19 chemistry in place at least 80 percent of the time, 20 which we believe is sufficient to ensure the crack 21 growth rate will maintain itself at a sufficiently low 22 23 level. I quess from my 24 SIEBER: Okay. standpoint, I am not -- I need to study some more 25

1	about the unit auxiliary transformer and the RAT to
2	assure myself in my mind that what has been done is
3	okay from an electrical standpoint and I will do that
4	on my own.
5	I did have another question where I would
6	note that a number of set points have been changed,
7	and the safety evaluation, the draft safety evaluation
8	discusses the set point change methodology, which I
9	presume originally came from Commonwealth Edison?
10	MR. BAILEY: Actually, it was done more
11	recently. We just approved a new revision or a new
12	version of their set point methodology with the ITS or
13	improved tech specs, which was granted to these two
14	plants this March.
15	MR. SIEBER: Since March?
16	MR. BAILEY: Yes, since March.
17	MR. SIEBER: And do you have a safety
18	evaluation specifically for subpoint methodology?
19	MR. BAILEY: It is part of the approved
20	tech spec safety evaluation.
21	MR. SIEBER: Which is probably huge,
22	right?
23	MR. BAILEY: It is big.
24	MR. SIEBER: Is there a chance that
25	somebody could send me the pages that relate to the

1	set point methodology?
2	MR. BAILEY: You would like the pages
3	related to the set point methodology?
4	MR. SIEBER: Right, because you referenced
5	them, and I remember Commonwealth Edison set point
6	methodology from a few years back, and so I would like
7	to assure myself that what they are doing now is in
8	conformance with the way that the industry is doing
9	that.
10	MR. BAILEY: Okay. It was done as part of
11	their transition to a 24-month fuel cycle.
12	MR. SIEBER: Okay. But just send me the
13	pages, as opposed to sending me the whole thing,
14	because my office is now full of papers. Dr. Kress.
15	DR. KRESS: One of my points that I would
16	like to have a little more help from the staff was how
17	they were able to assure themselves that the LOCA
18	codes to meet the figures of merit, and Appendix K
19	requirements were still valid for flat flux, knowing
20	that the validation was based on 2D and 3D type tasks,
21	which did not have a flat flux.
22	I would like to know how they assured themselves
23	that the codes were still valid. The other thing that
24	I would be interested in is maybe a little more on
25	Virgil's point about the Origin code, and how they

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1	assured themselves that it was used properly to get
2	the right inventory.
3	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
4	DR. KRESS: And I guess I would like to
5	see a little better explanation of why the MELLLA
6	curves were different, even though I understand that
7	there is good reason for them to be different. But
8	maybe a little explanation of why precisely they were
9	different.
10	MR. SIEBER: Okay.
11	MR. BAILEY: I understand at the break
12	that the licensee has looked at them again, and sees
13	only differences in the low flow region. Did you want
14	to
15	MR. PAPPONE: I don't know where the
16	proper forum is to address that is, but we can address
17	that with the staff or with the ACRS afterwards, or at
18	any time.
19	MR. BAILEY: Okay.
20	MR. SIEBER: Well, I think if we are going
21	to discuss it, we ought to discuss it while we are in
22	formal session, as opposed to having a sidebar that is
23	not on the record.
24	MR. BAILEY: Dan, can you give a
25	description of what we learned about those curves.

1	MR. PAPPONE: This is Dan Pappone from
2	G.E. As I said yesterday, when we draw that MELLLA
3	line on the power flow map, we are using a generic
4	line for all the plants and all the product, and so
5	that licensing line does not change. The line on that
6	map for Dresden and Quad Cities, that line is the same
7	for that.
8	DR. SCHROCK: Say that one time again?
9	MR. PAPPONE: The line itself is the same.
10	It is following the same equation as was proposed for
11	the license.
12	MR. BAILEY: Are there scaling factors
13	that make the figures look different?
14	MR. PAPPONE: Where the point of confusion
15	is coming in
16	DR. SCHROCK: Let me say that Point A has
17	numerical values in the little table in the set of 43
18	pressure, and 23 full.
19	MR. PAPPONE: Right.
20	DR. SCHROCK: And I don't have the other
21	one in front of me, but the numbers were more like 58
22	and something else.
23	MR. PAPPONE: Right. The difference
24	between the two flow maps is in the natural
25	circulation line, and we do have to investigate why we

have a difference in the two lines, and what the basis 1 for that is. 2 But that corner point, I can take the 3 equation for the rod line, which is a function of core 4 flow, and put in that core flow value, and calculate 5 the corresponding power value. 6 7 MR. BAILEY: And the points going down to, but not including, this natural cert point, would also 8 be calculated from the same equation for both plants? 9 That's right. If you laid 10 MR. PAPPONE: a ruler on that line, you would see a slight curve. 11 If you would also take a look at each corresponding 12 core flow, that power value would be the same. 13 a piece that we need to go back and investigate for 14 the basis for the natural circulation line, and the 15 difference between the plants. 16 DR. SCHROCK: And so that is an item to be 17 followed up on prior ot the full committee meeting? 18 MR. PAPPONE: That's right. We don't have 19 that information. 20 DR. SCHROCK: But let me ask it another 21 I think the question that Graham followed up 22 with was that this line is in operation limits, and so 23 24 if during your maneuvers you approach that line, you 25 have to back off?

1	MR. PAPPONE: That's right.
2	DR. SCHROCK: The position of the line in
3	the vicinities, say, of core flow of 50 and minimal
4	power on the order of 60, is different on the two
5	presentations in the two SERs. So which of those is
6	it that
7	MR. PAPPONE: Well, you may be seeing
8	different sizes of the plots if you put the two
9	together, and you may be looking at physical plot
10	scales, but the equation for that line is the same for
11	both.
12	DR. SCHROCK: I don't understand how the
13	equation can be the same and then when you use the
14	equation to plot a line, you get a different line.
15	MR. PAPPONE: That's what I am saying. If
16	I go to each one of those points along the line for a
17	given core flow for either unit, I get the same power.
18	It is just that the difference in those
19	two plotted lines, the natural circulation line, and
20	in one case it is minimum and in the other it is 32
21	percent, it is not quite the same.
22	So where those points that are identified
23	in the table, we are looking at different core flow
24	going into the calculation, and so we have a
25	corresponding different power. Does that make sense?

1	DR. SCHROCK: Not yet.
2	MR. PAPPONE: So the difference in failing
3	is the core flow.
4	MR. BAILEY: And what you are measuring is
5	in percent?
6	MR. PAPPONE: Absolutely.
7	MR. NIR: This is Israel Nir from G.E.
8	Let me help you. This is a quick mathematical
9	exercise. Look at the two maps and establish what is
10	the power level associated with 40 percent core flow,
11	and you will find that in both maps it is 58 or
12	approximately 58.
13	And I am just selecting one point, and
14	that should convince you that these two lines are
15	identical, except that one of them is extended further
16	relative to the other all the way to natural
17	circulation. But the same equation is used in the
18	definition of the two lines.
19	MR. PAPPONE: Right.
20	DR. SCHROCK: Does that explain the
21	differences in the position of Point A?
22	MR. PAPPONE: No, Point A is
23	DR. SCHROCK: Point A is a different thing
24	in each case?
25	MR. PAPPONE: That's right. And that is

1	the piece where we have to go back and get the
2	explanation for why that natural circ curve is showing
3	differently. We have a similar situation where one
4	unit plotted that minimum speed line
5	MR. NIR: Let me make another
6	clarification. As part of this effort, we redefined
7	the power level and the MELLLA boundary. Those are
8	indicated on the flow map. There are certain portions
9	of the power flow map that are not affected by power
10	uprates, and the introduction of MELLLA.
11	And those lines are the natural
12	circulation, the cavitation lines, and these are the
13	same or maintained the same as a power uprate. And
14	the differences that you observe are differences that
15	exist now. Those features that are new are identical.
16	DR. SCHROCK: So you believe there is a
17	difference in the natural circulation characteristics
18	of Quad Cities versus the Dresden plants?
19	MR. NIR: There is a difference in the
20	presentation and we need to get back with you as to
21	the reason.
22	MR. PAPPONE: That piece may tie back to
23	the historical source that was provided and that Jason
24	talked about earlier.
25	DR. SIEBER: Dr. Schrock, do you have any

additional comments that you would like to give us?

DR. SCHROCK: Well, first of all, the open issues, and the testing question I find a little puzzling. I thought that the authorities case was that testing would be unnecessary sounded pretty convincing.

It is still unclear to me what the G.E. position was. I heard that G.E. a new submittal related to this, and I guess we didn't hear very clearly a position put forth from G.E. representatives about that, and if they could comment further on that.

It is a little unclear to me on why the staff is unable to address that position of G.E. and the utility with regard to this issue. I don't know what evidence is missing that is going to be forthcoming in the making of that decision. So I just find that whole thing a bit puzzling.

And I understand the revision done on Duane Arnold, and that we are not to take these graphs for Dresden and Quad Cities is being final either, but it is not clear to me where that stands with regard to the nature of the modifications that are going to be made, and that there are very many weaknesses in these SERs.

And over-reliance on such statements as

1 that the submittal is done in accordance with existing 2 approved codes and using existing codes, and therefore the results must be accepted, and that seems to me to 4 be overly simplistic.

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And I don't think you need a one inch thick SER to relay that message if that is really what the SER has to say. I found the SER in both of these cases to be rather weak statements of how the staff has come to the conclusion that the SERs should be accepted.

That is not to say that I don't think that they are acceptable. It looks to me like they are, but I do think that there are many ways in which things can be done with this sweep of codes that will produce different results.

And put them in the hands of different users, and they will come up with different results, and guaranteed almost every time. So, again I have not heard enough to convince me that the staff knows that the codes are applied in the right way to get the answers that justify saying that the thing is an That's really all I have. acceptable uprate.

MR. SIEBER: Well, I think that will give us some meat that we can work on over the next 10 days or so.

1	MR. BOEHNERT: Yes. I think I will get
2	with Graham and we will come up with some agenda items
3	for the licensing.
4	MR. SIEBER: That will be very good.
5	Well, again, I would like to thank the staff, the
6	Exelon, and General Electric, for their presentations.
7	MR. ROSSBACH: Mr. Sieber, I would want to
8	address a little bit of information on the question on
9	the access hole cover that was raised.
10	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Dr. Ford, you asked a
11	question about the access hole cover, and we asked the
12	question in the RAI and we evaluated the new
13	replacements and the loads increased from 70 ksi to 80
14	ksi, but that is still way below their limit of
15	159psi.
16	DR. FORD: This is a bolted design?
17	MR. PARCZEWSKI: Yes.
18	MR. NIR: This is Israel Nir of G.E.
19	again. Just for the record, there was a couple of
20	times that you mentioned the G.E. position on the
21	large transient. Let me just remind the subcommittee
22	that we were here back in June of this year, and
23	provided you some background on the constant pressure
24	power uprate.

If you go back to the minutes you will

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1	find that we provided you some information related to
2	Hatch on start up tests, and elevated power up to
3	roughly 114 percent. We also provided you some
4	background on large transient events related to
5	constant pressure.
6	And we will be happy to discuss it
7	further, and I think it will be needed to be in a
8	closed session and clarify our position.
9	DR. SCHROCK: So the reason that we didn't
10	hear any G.E. position in this meeting is that it was
11	an open meeting?
12	MR. NIR: That is the reason, yes, and I
13	cannot get into any details, but we fully support
14	Exelon's position.
15	DR. SCHROCK: All right.
16	MR. SIEBER: Are there any additional
17	comments or statements? Yes, sir?
18	MR. BAJWA: Just a closing comment on the
19	staff's presentation. I would like to thank you for
20	the opportunity to present our review of the Dresden
21	and Quad Cities extended power uprate.
22	The Commission has given a high priority
23	to these amendments. These are the first applications
24	of many that I am sure that we will see for power
25	uprates of this magnitude. I would like to emphasize

1 that the NRR staff has undertaken an extensive review of these applications and for all areas affected by 2 the uprate have been reviewed and evaluated. 3 The staff has critically examined the 4 methodologies and their application of this power 5 uprate request, and the exception of the open item as 6 7 we have mentioned, and that were discussed today on the testing issue. 8 And I would like to emphasize that these 9 applications are not risk-based applications, and the 10 evaluations which were conducted on the deterministic 11 demonstrated that evaluation analysis have 12 proposed increased power level for Dresden and Quad 13 Cities units are acceptable and meets the regulatory 14 15 requirements. This concludes the staff's presentation, 16 and if you have any questions, we would be glad to 17 answer them. 18 Thank you very much, and I MR. SIEBER: 19 think with that, it is a quarter-to-12, and so we have 20 met all of our goals, and so I will adjourn the 21 22 meeting. (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 23 24 11:45 a.m.)

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: ACRS Thermal Hydraulic

Phenomena Advisory Committee

Docket Number:

(Not Applicable)

Location:

Rockville, Maryland

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

Paul Intravia

Official Reporter

Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.