NOV 1 0 1981

Docket No. 50-364

Mr. F. L. Clayton Senior Vice President Alabama Power Company Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 **DISTRIBUTION:** Docket File R. Diggs NRC PDR NSIC Local PDR TERA ORB #1 Rdg D. Eisenhut C. Parrish E. Reeves OELD 0I&E(4)G. Deegan L. Schneider ACRS (10 STS Group

Dear Mr. Clayton:

On March 31, 1981, we issued the Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Plant, Unit No. 2.

Through an administrative error pages 3/4 2-8, 3/4 4-19, 3/4 7-66, 3/4 8-9, 3/4 8-23 and B3/4 9-2 to the Technical Specifications contained typographical errors. Please correct your copy of the Technical Specifications with the enclosed revised pages.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED

Edward A. Reeves, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Licensing

Enclosures: Revised Technical Specification Pages

cc: See next page



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Mr. F. L. Clayton Alabama Power Company

cc: Mr. W. O. Whitt Executive Vice President Alabama Power Company Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291

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Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 24-Route 2 Columbia, Alabama 36319

State Department of Public Health ATTN: State Health Officer State Office Building Montgomery, Alabama 36104

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_{\Delta H}^{N}$

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION


3.2.3 $F_{\Delta H}^{N}$ shall be limited by the following relationship: $F_{\Delta H}^{N} \leq 1.55 [1 + 0.2 (1-P)] [1-RBP(BU)]$ where $P = \frac{THERMAL POWER}{RATED THERMAL POWER}$, and

RBP(BU) = Rod Bow Penalty as a function of region average burnup as shown in Figure 3.2-3, where a region is defined as those assemblies with the same loading date (reloads) or enrichment (first cores).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1

ACTION:

- With $F_{A \perp}^{N}$ exceeding its limit:
- a. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to \leq 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours,
- b. Demonstrate through in-core mapping that $F_{\Delta H}^{N}$ is within its limit within 24 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours, and
- c. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by a or b, above; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that F is demonstrated through in-core mapping to be within its limit at a nominal 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER prior to exceeding this THERMAL POWER, at a nominal 75% of PATED THERMAL POWER prior to exceeding this THERMAL power and within 24 hours after attaining 95% or greater RATED THER = POWER.



FARLEY-UNIT 2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

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TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

Q2E11V016A Q2E11V001A Q2E11V016A 02E11V001R	

Q2E11V051A Q2E11V051B Q2E11V051B Q2E11V021A Q2E11V021B Q2E11V021C Q2E11V022C	Q2E21V077A* Q2E21V077B* Q2E21V076A* Q2E21V076A*
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FARLEY-UNIT 2

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TABLE 3.7-8

AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

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ARE	4	TEMPERATURE LIMIT (°F)			
<u>ESF</u>	Pump Room:				
a.	RHR Pump 2A	150°F			
b.	RHR Pump 2B	150°F			
c.	AFW Pump 2A	150°F			
d.	AFW Pump 2B	150°F			
e.	CCW Pump Room	150°F			
f.	Containment Spray Pump 2A	150°F			
g.	Containment Spray Pump 2B	150°F			
h.	Charging Pump Room 2A	150°F			
i.	Charging Pump Room 2B	150°F			
j.	Charging Pump Room 2C	150°F			
Electrical Areas:					
a.	MCC 2A Room	150°F			
b.	MCC 2B Room	150°F			
c.	600 Volt Load Center 2D Room	150°F			
d.	600 Volt Load Center 2E Room	150°F			
e.	Battery Charger R	150°F			
f.	Battery Charger F	150°F			
g.	Battery Room A	120°F			
h.	Battery Room B	120°F			
i.	Diesel Generator	150°F			
j.	Diesel Generator :	150°F			
	ESF a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. Elec a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. c. h. i. j. f. j. f. j. f. j. f. j. f. j. f. j. f. f. j. f. f. j. f. f. j. f. f. j. f. f. f. j. f. f. f. j. f. f. f. j. f. f. f. f. f. f. f. f. f. f. f. f. f.	 b. RHR Pump 2B c. AFW Pump 2A d. AFW Pump 2B e. CCW Pump Room f. Containment Spray Pump 2A g. Containment Spray Pump 2B h. Charging Pump Room 2A i. Charging Pump Room 2B j. Charging Pump Room 2C <u>Electrical Areas:</u> a. MCC 2A Room b. MCC 2B Room c. 600 Volt Load Center 2D Room d. 600 Volt Load Center 2E Room e. Battery Charger F g. Battery Room A h. Battery Room B i. Diesel Generator 			

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

A.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.1 The following A.C. electrical busses and inverters shall be OPERABLE and energized.

- 4160 volt Emergency Bus # F, H and K
- 4160 volt Emergency Bus # G, J and L
- 600 volt Load Centers # D, H, K and R
- 600 volt Load Centers # E, J, L and S
- 120 volt A.C. Vital Bus # A energized from inverter #A connected to D.C. Bus Train A* and 600 volt Load Center D through 600 volt Motor Control Center A.
- 120 volt A.C. Vital Bus # B energized from inverter #B connected to D.C. Bus Train A* and 600 volt Load Center D through 600 volt Motor Control Center A.
- 120 volt A.C. Vital Bus # C energized from inverter #C connected to D.C. Bus Train B* and 600 volt Load Center E through 600 volt Motor Control Center B.
- 120 volt A.C. Vital Bus # D energized from inverter #D connected to D.C. Bus Train B* and 600 volt Load Center E through 600 volt Motor Control Center B.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With less than the above complement of A.C. busses OPERABLE and energized, restore the inoperable busses to OPERABLE and energized status within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one inverter inope 8 hours; restore the internet to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY with the text 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.1 The specified A.C. and energized at least once and indicated power availab:

Two inverters may be disconthe purpose of performing a provided (1) their vital bus busses associated with the ot ters shall be determined OPERABLE ifying correct breaker alignment

Source for up to 24 hours for their associated battery bank nergized, and (2) the vital ERABLE and energized.

FARLEY-UNIT 2

Corrected Page

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

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CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

	Device Number and Location	Trip Setpoint (Ampere)	Response Time (Seconds)	System <u>Powered</u>
5.	600VAC Pressurizer Distr. Pnl 2B			
	8KR #1 8KR #2 8KR #3 8KR #4 8KR #5	750-1600 750-1600 750-1600 750-1600 750-1600	.01016 .01016 .01016 .01016 .01016	Pressurizer Htr Group 2B Terminal Box N2TB011
7.	600VAC Pressurizer Htr. Distr. Pnl 2C Circuit Bkrs.			
	8KR #1 8KR #2 8KR #3 8KR #4	750-1600 750-1600 750-1600 750-1600	.01016 .01016 .01016 .01016	Pressurizer Htr Group 2C Terminal Box N2TB008
	BKR #5 BKR #6 BKR #7	750-1600 750-1600 750-1600	.01016 .01016 .01016	
8.	600VAC Pressurizer Htr. Distr. Pnl 2D Circuit Bkrs.			
	BKR #1 BKR #2 BKR #3 BKR #4	750-1600 750-10 750-10 750-10 750-10	.01016 .01016 .01016 .01016 .01016	Pressurizer Htr Group 2D Terminal Box N2TB007
9.	600VAC Pressurizer HTR. Distr. Pnl 2E Circuit 3krs.			
	8KR #1 8KR #2 8KR #3 8KR #4 8KR #5	750- 750- 750- 750- 750- 750-	116 115	Pressurizer Htr Group 2E Terminal Box N2TB009

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REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

MANIPULATOR CRANE (Continued)

or fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING - BRIDGE CRANE and SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped 1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and 2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

The outdoor overhead gantry crane does not meet the design requirements for wire rope strength and fleet angle safety margins of reeving systems, therefore the ropes must be inspected to assure that they meet the requirements of the standard specified in the surveillance. Cold proof tests of the crane will be performed to demonstrate OPERABILITY. It is permissible to operate the crane at temperatures less than the temperature at which it was proof tested, provided these operations take place at derated loads as stated in the action statement.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal loop be in operation ensures that 1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and 2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained thru the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent coron stratification.

The requirement to have 23 feet of water above the single failure of the oper residual heat removal capa 23 feet of water above the is available for core cool operating RHR loop, adequa to cool the core. PHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than pressure vessel flange ensures that a loop will not result in a complete loss of the reactor vessel head removed and revessel flange, a large heat sink event of a failure of the d to initiate emergency procedures

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