Docket No. 50-364

NOV 10 1981

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Mr. F. L. Clayton
Senior Vice President
Alabama Power Company
Post Office Box 2641
Birmingham, Alabama 35291

Dear Mr. Clayton:

On March 31, 1981, we issued the Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Plant, Unit No. 2.

Through an administrative error pages 3/4 2-8, 3/4 4-19, 3/4 7-66, 3/4 8-9, 3/4 8-23 and B3/4 9-2 to the Technical Specifications contained typographical errors. Please correct your copy of the Technical Specifications with the enclosed revised pages.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED

Edward A. Reeves, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
Revised Technical
Specification Pages

cc: See next page

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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OFFICE	DL:ORB#1	DL:ORB#1					
SURNAME	CParrish	EReeves:ms					
DATE	11/10/81	11/10/81					

Mr. F. L. Clayton
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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.3 NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F^N_{\Delta H}$

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3 $F^N_{\Delta H}$ shall be limited by the following relationship:

$$F^N_{\Delta H} \leq 1.55\ [1 + 0.2\ (1-P)]\ [1-RBP(BU)]$$

where $P = \dfrac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$, and

RBP(BU) = Rod Bow Penalty as a function of region average burnup as shown in Figure 3.2-3, where a region is defined as those assemblies with the same loading date (reloads) or enrichment (first cores).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1

ACTION:

With $F^N_{\Delta H}$ exceeding its limit:

a. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to $\leq$ 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours,

b. Demonstrate through in-core mapping that $F^N_{\Delta H}$ is within its limit within 24 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours, and

c. Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by a or b, above; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that $F^N_{\Delta H}$ is demonstrated through in-core mapping to be within its limit at a nominal 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER prior to exceeding this THERMAL POWER, at a nominal 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER prior to exceeding this THERMAL power and within 24 hours after attaining 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

Q2E11V016A
Q2E11V001A
Q2E11V016A
Q2E11V001B

Q2E11V051A
Q2E11V051B
Q2E11V051C
Q2E11V021A
Q2E11V021B
Q2E11V021C
Q2E11V042A
Q2E11V042B

Q2E21V077A*
Q2E21V077B*
Q2E21V076A*
Q2E21V076B*

Q2E21V062A
Q2E21V062B
Q2E21V062C
Q2E21V066A
Q2E21V066B
Q2E21V066C
Q2E21V077C
Q2E21V078A
Q2E21V078B
Q2E21V078C
Q2E21V079A
Q2E21V079B
Q2E21V079C

[illegible]A*
[illegible]*

TABLE 3.7-8

AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

AREA		TEMPERATURE LIMIT (°F)
1.	ESF Pump Room:	
a.	RHR Pump 2A	150°F
b.	RHR Pump 2B	150°F
c.	AFW Pump 2A	150°F
d.	AFW Pump 2B	150°F
e.	CCW Pump Room	150°F
f.	Containment Spray Pump 2A	150°F
g.	Containment Spray Pump 2B	150°F
h.	Charging Pump Room 2A	150°F
i.	Charging Pump Room 2B	150°F
j.	Charging Pump Room 2C	150°F
2.	Electrical Areas:	
a.	MCC 2A Room	150°F
b.	MCC 2B Room	150°F
c.	600 Volt Load Center 2D Room	150°F
d.	600 Volt Load Cent[illegible] 2E Room	150°F
e.	Battery Charger R	150°F
f.	Battery Charger F	150°F
g.	Battery Room A	120°F
h.	Battery Room B	120°F
i.	Diesel Generator	150°F
j.	Diesel Generator	150°F

3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

A.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.1 The following A.C. electrical busses and inverters shall be OPERABLE and energized.

4160	volt Emergency Bus # F, H and K
4160	volt Emergency Bus # G, J and L
600	volt Load Centers # D, H, K and R
600	volt Load Centers # E, J, L and S
120	volt A.C. Vital Bus # A energized from inverter #A connected to D.C. Bus Train A* and 600 volt Load Center D through 600 volt Motor Control Center A.
120	volt A.C. Vital Bus # B energized from inverter #B connected to D.C. Bus Train A* and 600 volt Load Center D through 600 volt Motor Control Center A.
120	volt A.C. Vital Bus # C energized from inverter #C connected to D.C. Bus Train B* and 600 volt Load Center E through 600 volt Motor Control Center B.
120	volt A.C. Vital Bus # D energized from inverter #D connected to D.C. Bus Train B* and 600 volt Load Center E through 600 volt Motor Control Center B.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above complement of A.C. busses OPERABLE and energized, restore the inoperable busses to OPERABLE and energized status within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one inverter inope[illegible]e, energize the associated A.C. Vital Bus within 8 hours; restore the i[illegible] to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY with[illegible] next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.1 The specified A.C. [illegible]ters shall be determined OPERABLE and energized at least once [illegible]fying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availab[illegible]

*Two inverters may be discon[illegible]ource for up to 24 hours for the purpose of performing a[illegible] their associated battery bank provided (1) their vital bus[illegible]nergized, and (2) the vital busses associated with the o[illegible]ERABLE and energized.

Corrected Page

TABLE 3.8-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Device Number and Location	Trip Setpoint (Ampere)	Response Time (Seconds)	System Powered
6. 600VAC Pressurizer Distr. Pnl 2B			
BKR #1	750-1600	.01.-016	Pressurizer Htr Group 2B
BKR #2	750-1600	.01.-016	Terminal Box N2TB011
BKR #3	750-1600	.01.-016	
BKR #4	750-1600	.01.-016	
BKR #5	750-1600	.01.-016	
7. 600VAC Pressurizer Htr. Distr. Pnl 2C Circuit Bkrs.			
BKR #1	750-1600	.01-.016	Pressurizer Htr Group 2C
BKR #2	750-1600	.01-.016	Terminal Box N2TB008
BKR #3	750-1600	.01-.016	
BKR #4	750-1600	.01-.016	
BKR #5	750-1600	.01-.016	
BKR #6	750-1600	.01-.016	
BKR #7	750-1600	.01-.016	
8. 600VAC Pressurizer Htr. Distr. Pnl 2D Circuit Bkrs.			
BKR #1	750-16[illegible]	.01-.016	Pressurizer Htr Group 2D
BKR #2	750-1[illegible]	.01-.016	Terminal Box N2TB007
BKR #3	750-[illegible]	.01-.016	
BKR #4	750-[illegible]	.01-.016	
9. 600VAC Pressurizer HTR. Distr. Pnl 2E Circuit Bkrs.			
BKR #1	750-[illegible]	[illegible]16	Pressurizer Htr Group 2E
BKR #2	750-[illegible]	[illegible]5	Terminal Box N2TB009
BKR #3	750-[illegible]		
BKR #4	750-[illegible]		
BKR #5	750-[illegible]		

MANIPULATOR CRANE (Continued)

or fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING - BRIDGE CRANE and SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped 1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and 2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

The outdoor overhead gantry crane does not meet the design requirements for wire rope strength and fleet angle safety margins of reeving systems, therefore the ropes must be inspected to assure that they meet the requirements of the standard specified in the surveillance. Cold proof tests of the crane will be performed to demonstrate OPERABILITY. It is permissible to operate the crane at temperatures less than the temperature at which it was proof tested, provided these operations take place at derated loads as stated in the action statement.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal loop be in operation ensures that 1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and 2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained thru the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to ha [illegible] RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the [illegible] pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the oper [illegible] loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capa [illegible] the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the [illegible] vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core coo [illegible] event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequa [illegible] to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.