

October 1, 1999

Mr. D. N. Morey
Vice President - Farley P. oct
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF
AMENDMENTS — NIS POWER RANGE CHANNEL DAILY SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS (TAC NOS. MA4153 AND MA4154)

Dear Mr. Morey:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 144 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 135 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated November 6, 1998.

The amendments revise the TS nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) surveillance requirements. The revised TS changes require Southern Nuclear Company to adjust the NIS power range channels only when calorimetric-calculated power is greater than the power range indicated power by more than +2 percent rated thermal power. The proposed TS changes are for both the current TS and the improved TS.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:
L. Mark Padovan, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 144 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No. 135 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 1, 1999

Mr. D. N. Morey
Vice President - Farley Project
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF
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REQUIREMENTS (TAC NOS. MA4153 AND MA4154)

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L. Mark Padovan".

L. Mark Padovan, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

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Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

cc:

Mr. L. M. Stinson
General Manager -
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Post Office Box 470
Ashford, Alabama 36312

Rebecca V. Badham
SAER Supervisor
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
P. O. Box 470
Ashford, Alabama 36312

Mr. Mark Ajluni, Licensing Manager
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

Mr. M. Stanford Blanton
Balch and Bingham Law Firm
Post Office Box 306
1710 Sixth Avenue North
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Mr. J. D. Woodard
Executive Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

State Health Officer
Alabama Department of Public Health
434 Monroe Street
Montgomery, Alabama 36130-1701

Chairman
Houston County Commission
Post Office Box 6406
Dothan, Alabama 36302

Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
7388 N. State Highway 95
Columbia, Alabama 36319



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-348

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 144
License No. NPF-2


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), dated November 6, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 144, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 1, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 144

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

DOCKET NO. 50-348

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 3-14

Insert

3/4 3-14

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- * - With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.
- (1) - If not performed in previous 7 days.
- (2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP). Adjust NIS channel if calorimetric calculated power exceeds NIS indicated power by more than +2% RTP.
- (3) - Compare incore to excore axial flux difference every 31 EFPD. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3 percent.
- (4) - Manual ESF functional input check every 18 months.
- (5) - Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- (6) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- (7) - Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint. Upon reaching P-6 from MODE 2 the CHANNEL CHECK must be performed within 1 hour.
- (8) - Logic only, if not performed in previous 92 days.
- (9) - CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST will consist of verifying that each channel indicates a turbine trip prior to latching the turbine and indicates no turbine trip prior to P-9.
- (10) - If not performed in the previous 31 days.
- (11) - Independently verify OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuitry for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.
- (12) - Verify reactor trip breaker and reactor trip bypass breaker open upon actuation of each Main Control Board handswitch.
- (13) - Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service. Local manual undervoltage trip prior to placing breaker in service.
- (14) - Undervoltage trip via Reactor Protection System.
- (15) - Local manual shunt trip.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-364

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 135
License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), dated November 6, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 135 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Richard L. Emch, Jr., Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 1, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 135

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

DOCKET NO. 50-364

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 3-14

Insert

3/4 3-14

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- * - With the reactor trip system breakers closed and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.
- (1) - If not performed in previous 7 days.
- (2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP). Adjust NIS channel if calorimetric calculated power exceeds NIS indicated power by more than +2% RTP.
- (3) - Compare incore to excore axial flux difference every 31 EFPD. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3 percent.
- (4) - Manual ESF functional input check every 18 months.
- (5) - Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
- (6) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- (7) - Below the P-6 (Block of Source Range Reactor Trip) setpoint. Upon reaching P-6 from MODE 2 the CHANNEL CHECK must be performed within 1 hour.
- (8) - Logic only, if not performed in previous 92 days.
- (9) - CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST will consist of verifying that each channel indicates a turbine trip prior to latching the turbine and indicates no turbine trip prior to P-9.
- (10) - If not performed in the previous 31 days.
- (11) - Independently verify OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuitry for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.
- (12) - Verify reactor trip breaker and reactor trip bypass breaker open upon actuation of each Main Control Board handswitch.
- (13) - Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service. Local manual undervoltage trip prior to placing breaker in service.
- (14) - Undervoltage trip via Reactor Protection System.
- (15) - Local manual shunt trip.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 144 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2
AND AMENDMENT NO. 135 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Southern Nuclear Operating Company's (SNC's) letter of November 6, 1998, requested changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise nuclear instrumentation system (NIS) surveillance requirements. When operating above 15 percent rated thermal power (RTP), the current Farley TS require SNC to adjust the NIS power range (PR) channels when the absolute difference (\pm) between the NIS PR indicated power and the secondary side calorimetric-calculated power is > 2 percent RTP. Complying with this TS requirement might result in a nonconservative channel calibration during reduced power operations. The proposed TS changes require SNC to adjust the NIS PR channels only when calorimetric-calculated power is greater than the PR indicated power by more than $+ 2$ percent RTP. SNC stated that the proposed TS changes will prevent unnecessary adjustments of the NIS PR channels and reduce operational challenges.

The proposed TS changes are for both the current TS (CTS) and the Improved TS (ITS). The CTS change is in Table 4.3-1 and the ITS changes are in SR 3.3.1.2 and its Bases. The ITS Bases changes also explain adjusting the PR neutron flux - high bistable settings to ≤ 85 percent RTP when adjusting the NIS PR channel below 50 percent RTP or during a post-refueling startup.

2.0 BACKGROUND

In 1996, Westinghouse identified that at less than about 70 percent RTP there is uncertainty in the calorimetric-power calculation that might result in non-conservative NIS PR channel calibration. Westinghouse issued Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-92-14-R1, "Decalibration Effects Of Calorimetric Power Measurements on the NIS High Power Reactor Trip At Power Levels Less Than 70% RTP," on February 6, 1996, and made six recommendations to resolve the uncertainty.

SNC stated that feedwater flow measurement (typically measuring ΔP across a feedwater venturi) is the primary error contributor to instrument uncertainty when calculating secondary-side calorimetric power. While the ΔP measurement uncertainty remains constant as power

Enclosure

decreases, the uncertainty increases as a square term when translated into flow. Thus, a 1 percent flow error at 100 percent power can approach a 10 percent error at 30 percent RTP even though the ΔP error has not changed. ESBU-TB-92-14-R1 described how the potential effects of this error increase at lower power levels. An example in the Technical Bulletin shows that for a 10 percent error in secondary-side calorimetric-calculated power, the NIS PR could be non-conservatively biased enough to prevent a reactor trip assumed in the safety analyses. This event is rod withdrawal from 10 percent RTP for the Farley plant.

Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-92-14-R1 recommendation No. 6 conflicts with the Farley TS PR daily surveillance requirement. Recommendation No. 6 suggests that if the NIS PR indicates a higher power than the secondary-side calorimetric-calculated power measurement at power levels below approximately 70 percent, the PR channel(s) should not be adjusted. However, the Farley TS requires PR channel adjustment whenever the absolute difference is > 2 percent above 15 percent RTP.

In response to ESBU-TB-92-14-R1, SNC determined that the ± 2 percent RTP calorimetric-calculated power measurement uncertainty is valid for power levels ≥ 50 percent RTP based on the Farley-specific calorimetric measurement procedure. Farley also determined that resetting the NIS PR high neutron flux-high setpoint reactor trip to ≤ 85 percent RTP is an acceptable administrative addition to adjusting the NIS PR channel to reflect the calorimetric-calculated power below 50 percent RTP. SNC is adding this to the ITS Bases.

The Westinghouse Owners Group initiated a program (MUHP-3034) to obtain NRC approval to relax the present TS requirements to always adjust NIS channels when indicated power differs from calorimetric-calculated power by more than 2 percent. Farley is the lead plant for this generic program.

3.0 EVALUATION

SNC analyzed the impact of the proposed NIS PR surveillance changes on the Farley licensing basis and demonstrated that the proposed changes will not adversely affect safe plant operation. We evaluate SNC's proposed TS changes below.

3.1 NIS PR Indication and Reactor Trip System (RTS) Functions

When operating above 15 percent RTP, Farley plant operators daily normalize (i.e., calibrate) each PR channel to match thermal power calculation results from a secondary-side calorimetric heat balance. SNC's proposed changes to the NIS PR daily surveillance TS requirements potentially impact the following:

- PR indications
- RTS functions
- control system functions
- miscellaneous alarm functions

We discuss each of these below.

3.1.1 PR Indications

SNC stated that plant operators monitor reactor power to ensure that they operate the unit within the limits of the Facility Operating License and safety analyses. SNC's proposed daily PR surveillance requirements will have a conservative effect on PR channel indication (i.e., indicated power will be greater than actual power). With regard to safety limits, reactor power is one of the parameters used in the Revised Thermal Design Procedure (RTDP). The RTDP safety analyses assume a reactor power uncertainty of ± 2 percent RTP. The proposed PR surveillance changes do not invalidate the Farley-specific uncertainty calculation. Therefore, the RTDP and safety analyses reactor power uncertainty assumption of ± 2 percent RTP continues to be a bounding allowance for the core safety limits and safety analyses.

3.1.2 RTS Functions

SNC performed plant-specific calculations for the high neutron flux-high reactor trip setpoint, the high neutron flux-low reactor trip setpoint, and permissives P-8, P-9, and P-10. SNC's setpoint uncertainty calculations demonstrated that there is a conservative margin between the TS nominal trip setpoints and safety analyses limits. The proposed changes do not affect the PR high-positive and high-negative rate reactor trips since they are generated by relative comparison circuits.

SNC also studied the effect of the proposed changes on the permissive P-10 reset delay and determined that the time for P-10 reset would be very short. During this brief period, the PR high neutron flux-high setpoint reactor trip would provide core protection. The PR high positive rate, overtemperature delta temperature, and overpower delta temperature reactor trips provide additional protection. Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not adversely affect PR RTS functions.

3.1.3 Control System Functions

SNC studied the control functions affected by PR inputs including the following:

- Control interlock C-2 which blocks automatic and manual control rod withdrawal.
- Nuclear power input signal PR-44 which controls reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature.

These controls are not required for plant safety. Furthermore, the proposed TS changes will not adversely impact the NIS PR control functions since the changes will limit the maximum allowed non-conservative calibration error.

3.1.4 Miscellaneous Alarm Functions

The NIS PR channels provide input signals to the PR channel deviation, quadrant power tilt ratio (QPTR), and N-16 leakage detection systems. The proposed TS changes will not affect the PR channel deviation and QPTR alarms since they are generated by comparing PR channel outputs.

The N-16 leakage detection system may cause some control room alarms because the proposed TS changes will allow NIS indicated power to be greater than the calorimetric-calculated power. However, SNC considers such alarms to be acceptable on the following grounds:

- The N-16 leakage detection system is a non-safety-related system used as an operational aid.
- Other radiation monitors such as the air-ejector and steam generator blowdown monitors provide continuous primary-to-secondary leakage indication.
- TS surveillance requirements specify periodic RCS leakage checks.
- SNC uses radiochemistry analysis to determine primary-to-secondary leak rates.
- Plant operators will adjust the PR channels daily when the plant is operating at nearly full power.

3.2 Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) and LOCA-Related Analyses

SNC stated that the proposed TS changes do not adversely affect the following LOCA and LOCA-related analyses:

- large and small-break LOCA
- reactor vessel and loop LOCA blowdown forces
- post-LOCA long-term cooling subcriticality
- post-LOCA long-term core cooling minimum flow
- hot-leg switchover to prevent boron precipitation

The proposed TS changes do not affect normal plant operating parameters, safeguards systems actuation or accident mitigation capabilities important to LOCA mitigation, or LOCA-related accident assumptions. The surveillance changes do not create conditions more limiting than those assumed in these analyses. Also, the proposed TS changes do not affect analysis methodology or assumptions and do not alter the steam generator tube rupture event analysis results.

3.3 Non-LOCA Related Analyses

SNC stated that the proposed NIS PR surveillance TS changes do not adversely affected non-LOCA safety analyses presented in FSAR Chapter 15. These changes do not affect normal plant operating parameters, accident mitigation capabilities, non-LOCA transient assumptions, or create conditions more limiting than those enveloped by the current non-LOCA analyses. Therefore, the conclusions presented in the FSAR remain valid.

3.4 Mechanical Components and Systems

SNC stated that the proposed TS surveillance changes do not affect RCS component integrity or the ability of a plant auxiliary system to perform its design function.

3.5 Other Safety-Related Areas and Analyses

SNC stated that the proposed TS surveillance changes do not affect the following safety-related areas and analyses:

- containment integrity analysis (short term/long term LOCA release)
- main steam line break mass and energy release
- radiological analyses
- probabilistic risk assessment
- emergency response procedures

3.6 ITS Bases Changes

The ITS Bases contain more information than the CTS Bases do. Accordingly, SNC added additional information to the ITS Bases to explain adjusting the PR neutron flux-high bistable setting to ≤ 85 percent RTP 1) whenever the NIS PR channel is set below 50 percent RTP, or 2) during a post refueling startup and reset back to TS nominal setpoint of < 109 percent RTP when the thermal power is increased above 50 percent RTP. The CTS Table 3.3.1-1 PR neutron flux-high reactor trip setting is 109 percent RTP which corresponds to a safety analysis limit of 118 percent RTP. Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-92-14-R1 indicates that a two-loop plant may have 10 percent normalization error at 30 percent RTP in the worst case. This would cause about 40 percent RTP difference between indicated and actual power at 120 percent RTP. The staff determined that with the plant at 50 percent power and the PR neutron flux-high bistable set at 85 percent RTP, if thermal power increases to 120 percent RTP then the maximum difference between the indicated power and the calculated power will be about 24 percent RTP. This is equivalent to a 109 percent (85 percent + 24 percent) RTP reactor trip setting. This resolves the limitations mentioned in the Westinghouse Technical Bulletin. SNC is presently making this PR neutron flux-high bistable adjustment under a plant procedure and proposes to continue adjusting it permanently.

3.7 Staff Conclusions

SNC's proposed TS changes are based on Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-92-R1 recommendations and SNC's plant-specific evaluations support the changes. Specifically, setting the PR neutron flux-high bistable to ≤ 85 percent RTP 1) whenever the NIS indicated power is adjusted in the decreasing power direction below 50 percent RTP, or 2) before post refueling startup effectively addresses the current TS limitations mentioned in the Westinghouse bulletin. Based on the above Section 3.0 evaluation, the staff concludes that the proposed CTS and ITS changes are acceptable. We are processing the ITS changes separately under the ITS Conversion program.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 4160, dated January 27, 1999). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: H. Balukjian
S. Mazumdar

Date: October 1, 1999