

February 5, 1998

Mr. D. N. Morey  
Vice President - Farley Project  
Southern Nuclear Operating  
Company, Inc.  
Post Office Box 1295  
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT,  
UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M99829 and M99830)

Dear Mr. Morey:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.135 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No.127 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments change the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your submittal dated October 16, 1997.

The amendments change the Farley Units 1 and 2 TS by revising the number of allowable charging pumps capable of injecting into the reactor coolant system (RCS) when the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is equal to or less than 180°F.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Jacob I. Zimmerman, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No.135 to NPF-2
- 2. Amendment No.127 to NPF-8
- 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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OFFICE	PDII-2/PM	PDII-2/PM	PDII-2/LA	OGC	RDII-2/PD
NAME	WGLEAVES <i>wcg</i>	J.ZIMMERMAN <i>JZ</i>	L.BERRY <i>LB</i>	<i>APH</i>	H.BERKOW
DATE	1/14/98	1/14/98	1/13/98	1/22/98	2/15/98
COPY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	YES NO	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 5, 1998

Mr. D. N. Morey  
Vice President - Farley Project  
Southern Nuclear Operating  
Company, Inc.  
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The amendments change the Farley Units 1 and 2 TS by revising the number of allowable charging pumps capable of injecting into the reactor coolant system (RCS) when the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is equal to or less than 180°F.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jacob I. Zimmerman".

Jacob I. Zimmerman, Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No.135 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No.127 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

cc:

Mr. R. D. Hill, Jr.  
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company  
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-348

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 135  
License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), dated October 16, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 135, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Handwritten signature of J. B. Berkow in cursive, with the word "FOR" written below it.

Herbert N. Berkow, Director  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 5, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 135

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

DOCKET NO. 50-348

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

Remove

3/4 1-9  
B 3/4 1-3  
B 3/4 1-4

Insert

3/4 1-9  
B 3/4 1-3  
B 3/4 1-4\*

\*overflow - no change

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5\* and 6.

ACTION:

- a. With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
- b. With more than one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS, except as allowed during pump swap operations, immediately take action to render all but the above required OPERABLE pump inoperable as specified in 4.1.2.3.2.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential pressure<sup>#</sup> of greater than or equal to 2458 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.

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\* A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 180°F; however, two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area.

# Differential pressure is not required to be verified when the RCS is in a water solid condition.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single RHR relief valve. Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS for a short time to allow the pumps to be swapped. This allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus, minimizing the potential for RCP number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal. Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully reseal when pressure is reapplied. Low temperature overpressure protection is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid. Mass input transients can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event. For these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of injecting into the RCS only when the RCS is in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of at least 5.7 square inches. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relief valves.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the COLR after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.



## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

For purposes of determining compliance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, any inoperability of full length control rod(s), due to being immovable, invokes ACTION statement "a".

The intent of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is to ensure that before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c" that the rod urgent failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem is detected in the rod control system by minimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to determine if rod immovability is due to an electrical problem in the rod control system.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with  $T_{avg}$  greater than or equal to 541°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-364

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 127  
License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), dated October 16, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.127 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. N. Berkow", with the word "For" written in smaller letters underneath.

Herbert N. Berkow, Director  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 5, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 127

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

DOCKET NO. 50-364

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

Remove

3/4 1-9  
B 3/4 1-3  
B 3/4 1-4

Insert

3/4 1-9  
B 3/4 1-3  
B 3/4 1-4\*

\*overflow - no change

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5\* and 6.

ACTION:

- a. With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
- b. With more than one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS, except as allowed during pump swap operations, immediately take action to render all but the above required OPERABLE pump inoperable as specified in 4.1.2.3.2.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential pressure<sup>#</sup> of greater than or equal to 2458 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.

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\* A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 180°F; however, two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area.

# Differential pressure is not required to be verified when the RCS is in a water solid condition.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 11,336 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 44,826 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single RHR relief valve. Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS for a short time to allow the pumps to be swapped. This allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus, minimizing the potential for RCP number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal. Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully reseal when pressure is reapplied. Low temperature overpressure protection is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid. Mass input transients can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event. For these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of injecting into the RCS only when the RCS is in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of at least 5.7 square inches. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relief valves.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the COLR after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

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The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

For purposes of determining compliance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, any inoperability of full length control rod(s), due to being immovable, invokes ACTION statement "a".

The intent of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is to ensure that before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c" that the rod urgent failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem is detected in the rod control system by minimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to determine if rod immovability is due to an electrical problem in the rod control system.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with  $T_{avg}$  greater than or equal to 541°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 135 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 127 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8  
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.  
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 16, 1997, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC or licensee) et al., submitted a request for changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would increase the number of allowable operable charging pumps when the reactor coolant system (RCS) is less than 180 °F. It would also modify Farley TS 3.1.2.3 to allow a maximum of two charging pumps to be capable of injecting into the RCS during charging pump swap operations for a maximum of 15 minutes and add an action statement to address having more than one charging pump capable of injection into the RCS.

2.0 BACKGROUND

SNC proposed to change the TS for both Farley Units 1 and 2. The changes to the TS for both units are identical. The licensee proposed to change Section 3.1.2.3 that applies to charging pumps while in Modes 5 and 6. The current limiting condition for operation states:

- a. With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

The requested change retains this condition as paragraph "a." and adds:

- b. With more than one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS, except as allowed during pump swap operations, immediately take action to render all but the above required OPERABLE pump inoperable as specified in 4.1.2.3.2.

A note that applies to the mode of applicability for the above limiting condition for operation is also supplemented. The current text states:



A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 180°F,

The requested change adds the following phrase:

...; however, two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non water solid condition and both RHR [residual heat removal] relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area.

The TS Bases Section 3/4.1.2 for each Farley unit is also supplemented to address the requested changes to TS 3.1.2.3.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

In order to maintain a steady supply of filtered seal water to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) number one seal while swapping the charging pump, it is necessary to have two charging pumps running momentarily. The proposed changes to TS 3.1.2.3 will allow two charging pumps to be capable of injecting into the reactor coolant system for a period not to exceed 15 minutes while RCS cold leg temperature is at or below 180°F. This will allow the operator to start a second pump long enough to ensure that it operates properly and then to secure the pump that was running originally. This order of pump operation will allow seal injection flow to be maintained to the RCS pumps number one seal continuously, thus preventing loss of pressure to the seals and maintaining filtered water flow through the seals. In order to prevent an RCS mass addition transient during the pump swap operation, the RCS should be in a nonwater solid condition and the residual heat removal relief valves must be operable or the RCS must be vented. These proposed changes include sufficient controls to prevent an RCS overpressurization event.

### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such

finding (62 FR 63983 dated December 3, 1997). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded that the proposed TS changes provide an operational flexibility during the pump swap operation while providing sufficient controls to prevent a RCS overpressurization event, and that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: K. Desai

Date: February 5, 1998