

January 12, 1993

Docket Nos. 50-348
and 50-364

Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Executive Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

Dear Mr. Hairston:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 96 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 88 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. -
NPF-8 REGARDING FIRE PROTECTION - JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT,
UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M79873 AND M79874)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 96 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 88 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments change the Technical Specifications in response to your submittal dated February 26, 1991, as supplemented on May 6, 1991.

The amendments revise the fire protection license conditions of the Facility Operating Licenses and relocate the fire protection Technical Specifications to plant procedures and to the Final Safety Analysis Report, in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letters 86-10 and 88-12.

Your February 26, 1991, letter also requested our review of proposed revisions to the Safety Evaluations supporting issuance of Exemption Request Nos. 1-38 and 2-35 to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. As discussed in the enclosed Safety Evaluation, we have found that the revisions do not affect the exemptions as granted.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

9301190063 930112
PDR ADDCK 05000348
P PDR

Stephen T. Hoffman, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 96 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No. 88 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

140059

* See previous concurrence

OFC	LA:PD21:DRPE	PM:PD21:DRPE	DSSA:SPLB *	D:PD21:DRPE	OGC
NAME	SEttle	SHoffman:tms	CMcCracken	EAdamsam	S. Hoff
DATE	12/18/92	12/18/92	12/16/92	12/12/92	12/28/92

Document Name: FAR79873.AMD

CP-1

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Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

cc:

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AMENDMENT NO. 96 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 - FARLEY, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT NO. 88 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 - FARLEY, UNIT 2

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C. Grimes 11-E-22
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E. Merschoff, R-II

cc: Farley Service List



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-348

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 96
License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company* dated February 26, 1991, as supplemented on May 6, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

*Subsequent to these submittals, Amendment No. 90 to Facility Operating License NPF-2 was issued authorizing Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., (Southern Nuclear), to become the licensed operator. This change was implemented on December 23, 1991.

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 96, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. License Condition 2.C.(4) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

E. Fire Protection

Southern Nuclear shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports dated February 12, 1979, August 24, 1983, December 30, 1983, November 19, 1985, September 10, 1986, and December 29, 1986. Southern Nuclear may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

4. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Elinor G. Adensam, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 12, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 96
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2
DOCKET NO. 50-348

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

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3/4.3.3.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

This specification deleted. Pages 3/4 3-60 and 3/4 3-60a deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

This specification deleted. Pages 3/4 7-83 through 3/4 7-93 deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

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3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

This specification deleted.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

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3/4.3.3.8 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

In the event more than four sensors in a reactor vessel level indicating system channel are inoperable, repairs may only be possible during the next refueling outage. This is because the sensors are accessible only after the missile shield is removed. If only one channel is inoperable, it shall be restored to OPERABLE status as soon as reasonably possible. If both channels are inoperable, at least one channel should be restored to OPERABLE status no later than by the end of the next refueling outage.

With the number of OPERABLE RVLIS channels less than the minimum channels required to be OPERABLE, the inoperable channels must be restored within 48 hours or an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel level must be initiated. Monitoring pressurizer level and upperhead subcooling is an acceptable alternative to the RVLIS since the RVLIS is primarily used to detect the formation of a void in the reactor vessel head.

A channel check of the RVLIS is a comparison of each valid sensor with its corresponding sensor in the opposite train to verify they display the same state (i.e., covered or uncovered). If the corresponding sensor in the opposite train is invalid then the level at that location can be determined based upon the state of the next highest sensor, pressurizer level, and upperhead subcooling.

A channel calibration of the RVLIS involves the calibration of the digital to analog and analog to digital converters, the cold reference junction, and the power supplies.

3/4.3.3.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

This specification deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

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The service life of a snubber is evaluated via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc...). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. The requirements for the maintenance of records and the snubber service life review are not intended to affect plant operation.

3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e. sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

This specification deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

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3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

This specification deleted.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.2.2 FACILITY STAFF

- a. Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.
- b. At least one licensed Reactor Operator shall be in the Control Room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator shall be in the Control Room while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4.
- c. A Health Physics Technician[#] shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor.
- d. ALL CORE ALTERATIONS shall be directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
- e. (Deleted)
- f. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions; e.g., Senior Reactor Operators, Reactor Operators, Health Physics Technicians, Auxiliary Operators, and key maintenance personnel. Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a nominal 40-hour week while the plant is operating.

In the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance or major plant modifications, on a temporary basis, the following guidelines shall be followed:

1. An individual will not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight (not including shift turnover time).
2. There will be a break of at least 8 hours (which can include shift turnover time) between work periods.

[#] The Health Physics Technician may be absent for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected circumstances provided immediate action is taken to restore the Health Physics Technician to within the minimum requirement.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-364

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 88
License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company* dated February 26, 1991, as supplemented on May 6, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

*Subsequent to these submittals, Amendment No. 83 to Facility Operating License NPF-8 was issued authorizing Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., (Southern Nuclear), to become the licensed operator. This change was implemented on December 23, 1991.

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 88, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. License Condition 2.C.(6) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

E. Fire Protection

Southern Nuclear shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports dated February 12, 1979, August 24, 1983, December 30, 1983, November 19, 1985, September 10, 1986, and December 29, 1986. Southern Nuclear may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

4. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Elinor G. Adensam, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 12, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 88
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8
DOCKET NO. 50-364

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

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3/4.3.3.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

This specification deleted. Pages 3/4 3-60 and 3/4 3-60a deleted.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

=====

3/4.3.3.8 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.

In the event more than four sensors in a reactor vessel level indicating system channel are inoperable, repairs may only be possible during the next refueling outage. This is because the sensors are accessible only after the missile shield is removed. If only one channel is inoperable, it shall be restored to OPERABLE status as soon as reasonably possible. If both channels are inoperable, at least one channel should be restored to OPERABLE status no later than by the end of the next refueling outage.

With the number of OPERABLE RVLIS channels less than the minimum channels required to be OPERABLE, the inoperable channels must be restored within 48 hours or an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel level must be initiated. Monitoring pressurizer level and upperhead subcooling is an acceptable alternative to the RVLIS since the RVLIS is primarily used to detect the formation of a void in the reactor vessel head.

A channel check of the RVLIS is a comparison of each valid sensor with its corresponding sensor in the opposite train to verify they display the same state (i.e., covered or uncovered). If the corresponding sensor in the opposite train is invalid then the level at that location can be determined based upon the state of the next highest sensor, pressurizer level, and upperhead subcooling.

A channel calibration of the RVLIS involves the calibration of the digital to analog and analog to digital converters, the cold reference junction, and the power supplies.

3/4.3.3.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

This specification deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

This specification deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

This specification deleted. Pages 3/4 7-53 through 3/4 7-63 deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

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The service life of a snubber is evaluated via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc...). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. The requirements for the maintenance of records and the snubber service life review are not intended to affect plant operation.

3/4.7.10 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e. sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

This specification deleted.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

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3/4.7.12 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS

This specification deleted.

3/4.7.13 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY. The temperature limits include an allowance for instrument error of 2 F.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

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6.2.2 FACILITY STAFF

- a. Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.
- b. At least one licensed Reactor Operator shall be in the Control Room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator shall be in the Control Room while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4.
- c. A Health Physics Technician* shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor.
- d. ALL CORE ALTERATIONS shall be directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
- e. (Deleted)
- f. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions; e.g., Senior Reactor Operators, Reactor Operators, Health Physics Technicians, Auxiliary Operators, and key maintenance personnel. Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. The objective shall be to have operating personnel work a nominal 40-hour week while the plant is operating.

In the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance or major plant modifications, on a temporary basis, the following guidelines shall be followed:

- 1. An individual will not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight (not including shift turnover time).
- 2. There will be a break of at least 8 hours (which can include shift turnover time) between work periods.

* The Health Physics Technician may be absent for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to accommodate unexpected circumstances provided immediate action is taken to restore the Health Physics Technician to within the minimum requirement.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 96 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2
AND AMENDMENT NO. 88 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 26, 1991, Alabama Power Company submitted a request for changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (Farley), Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would remove requirements for the fire detection systems, fire suppression systems, fire barriers, and fire brigade staffing requirements as recommended by Generic Letter (GL) 86-10. Guidance on these proposed TS changes was provided to all power reactor licensees and applicants by GL 88-12, dated August 2, 1988.

Subsequent to the February 26, 1991, submittal, Alabama Power Company requested in a May 6, 1991, letter, that Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., (Southern Nuclear) become the licensed operator of Farley, Units 1 and 2. The May 6, 1991, letter requested that the license conditions proposed in the February 26, 1991, letter be amended to reflect Southern Nuclear as the operator once the change in licensed operators was implemented. Amendment Nos. 90 and 83 to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-2 and 8, respectively, were issued authorizing Southern Nuclear (the licensee) to become the licensed operator. This change was implemented on December 23, 1991. Therefore, the May 6, 1991, letter did not affect the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

In the letter dated February 26, 1991, the licensee also requested that the staff review proposed revisions to the Safety Evaluations supporting issuance of Exemption Request Nos. 1-38 and 2-35 to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, and issue corrected Safety Evaluations. The revisions were proposed to correct the Safety Evaluations to reflect the as-built condition of the plant.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Following the fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant on March 22, 1975, the Commission undertook a number of actions to ensure that improvements were implemented in the Fire Protection Programs for all power reactor facilities. Because of the extensive modification of Fire Protection Programs and the number of open issues resulting from staff evaluations, a number of revisions and alterations occurred in these programs over the years. Consequently, the

licensees were requested by GL 86-10 to incorporate the final NRC-approved Fire Protection Program into their Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs). In this manner, the Fire Protection Program, including the systems, the administrative and technical controls, the organization, and other plant features associated with fire protection, would have a status consistent with that of other plant features described in the FSAR. In addition, the Commission concluded that a standard license condition, requiring compliance with the provisions of the Fire Protection Program as described in the FSAR, should be used to ensure uniform enforcement of fire protection requirements. Finally, the Commission stated that with the requested actions, licensees may request an amendment to delete the fire protection TSs that would now be unnecessary.

The licensees for the Callaway and Wolf Creek plants submitted lead-plant proposals to remove fire protection requirements from their TSs. This action was an industry effort to obtain NRC guidance on an acceptable format for license amendment requests to remove fire protection requirements from the TSs.

Additionally, in the licensing review of new plants, the staff has approved applicant requests to remove fire protection requirements from TSs issued with the operating license. Thus, on the basis of the lead-plant proposals and the staff's experience with TSs for new licenses, GL 88-12 was issued to provide guidance on removing fire protection requirements from the TSs.

3.0 EVALUATION

The proposed changes were reviewed against the guidance provided in GLs 86-10 and 88-12. GL 86-10 recommended the removal of fire protection requirements from the TSs. Although a comprehensive Fire Protection Program is essential to plant safety, the basis for this recommendation is that many details of this program that are currently addressed in the TSs can be modified without affecting nuclear safety. Such modifications can be made provided that there are suitable administrative controls over these changes. These details, that are presently included in the TSs and which are removed by this amendment, do not constitute performance requirements necessary to ensure safe operation of the facility and, therefore, do not warrant being included in the TSs. At the same time, suitable administrative controls ensure that there will be careful review and analysis by competent individuals of any changes in the Fire Protection Program, including those technical and administrative requirements removed from the TSs, to ensure that nuclear safety is not adversely affected.

These controls include (1) the TS administrative controls that are applicable to the Fire Protection Program; (2) the license condition on implementation of, and subsequent changes to, the Fire Protection Program; and (3) the 10 CFR 50.59 criteria for evaluating changes to the Fire Protection Program as described in the FSAR.

The proposed TS changes include the following:

1. Revision of the fire protection License Conditions 2.C.(4) for Unit 1 and 2.C.(6) for Unit 2 to provide consistency with the standard fire protection license condition contained in GL 86-10.
2. Deletion of Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire protection TS 3/4.3.3.9 (Fire Detection Instrumentation), 3/4.7.11 (Fire Suppression Systems), 3/4.7.12 (Fire Barrier Penetrations), and associated Bases sections.
3. Deletion of the minimum fire brigade staffing requirement, TS 6.2.2.e, for both units.

The proposed license conditions for Units 1 and 2 are as follows:

Southern Nuclear shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports dated February 12, 1979, August 24, 1983, December 30, 1983, November 19, 1985, September 10, 1986, and December 29, 1986. Southern Nuclear may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

The licensee incorporated their Fire Protection Program into the July 1987 FSAR update as Appendix 9B. Attachment C to Appendix 9B contains operability and surveillance requirements for the fire protection equipment and systems that currently exist in the plant's TSs. Fire brigade staffing requirements are also included in Appendix 9B. Appendix 9B also contains a list of implementing procedures by number and title, which implement the Fire Protection Program as described in the FSAR. Many of these procedures are currently based on requirements in the TSs. The licensee states in their February 26, 1991, submittal that these procedures will be modified to reflect the FSAR based Fire Protection Program within 90 days of NRC approval by which time the TS changes will be implemented.

The list of implementing procedures along with their identified performance frequencies were compared with existing TSs and found to be consistent. Therefore eliminating TSs would not reduce the level of safety and is consistent with guidance in GLs 86-10 and 88-12.

In addition, current TS 6.5.1.6(b) requires that the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) review the safety evaluations for all programs required by Specification 6.8 and changes thereto. Specification 6.8.1(f) requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering Fire Protection Program implementation. Therefore, the guidance in GL 88-12 calling for the addition of these sections into the TSs has been met.

The licensee also states in their February 26, 1991, submittal that they will relocate, to administrative procedures, the requirement that currently exists in TS 3/4.7.11.1 to shutdown the reactor in the event of loss of all fire water for greater than 24 hours. Maintaining this requirement is consistent

with guidance provided in GL 88-12. The proposed license condition was also found to be consistent with the license condition provided in GL 86-10 and is considered acceptable.

By letter dated February 26, 1991, the licensee stated that Safety Evaluations for Exemption Request Nos. 1-38 and 2-35 to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, required revision to reflect the actual plant condition at the time of the requests. The exemption requests and the supporting Safety Evaluations were issued in staff letters dated September 10 and December 29, 1986, respectively. Specifically, the licensee identified that the room cooler for the Train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump room was located outside of the pump room instead of inside the room as stated in the original submittal to the NRC. The location change for the room cooler does not change the staff's conclusion which states that a fire in this area will leave auxiliary feedwater flow to at least one steam generator.

4.0 SUMMARY

Based on the review of the February 26, 1991, submittal, as supplemented on May 6, 1991, requesting changes to the operating license and fire protection portions of the TSs for Farley, Units 1 and 2, it is concluded that the licensee has followed the guidance provided in GLs 86-10 and 88-12. Therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable. Additionally, the change in the indicated location for the room cooler does not affect the original exemptions as granted.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The amendment also relates to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 20026). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Date: January 12, 1993