

March 8, 1993

Docket Nos. 50-348
and 50-364

Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Executive Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

Dear Mr. Hairston:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-8 REGARDING - JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
(TAC NOS. M77349 AND M77350)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 97 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 89 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments change the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your submittal dated October 13, 1992.

The amendments change TS 3/4.4.5 and Bases Section 3/4.4.5 to include new requirements with respect to operability and surveillance of power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves. The changes are based on the guidance contained in Generic Letter 90-06 and are intended to enhance the reliability of the PORVs and block valves.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

George F. Wunder, Acting Project Manager
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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PDR ADDCK 05000348
PDR

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 97 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No. 89 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

*See Previous Concurrence

| | | | | | |
|------|--------------|--------------|----------|-------------|-----------|
| OFF | LA:PD21:DRPE | PM:PD21:DRPE | *RXB | D:PD21:DRPE | *OGC |
| NAME | Anderson | Wunder:dt | RJones | JM Mitchell | CWoodhead |
| DATE | 03/1/93 | 03/02/93 | 02/09/93 | 02/02/93 | 02/10/93 |

Document Name: FAR77349.AMD

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Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Southern Nuclear Operating
Company, Inc.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

cc:

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AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 - FARLEY, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 - FARLEY, UNIT 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-348

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 97
License No. NPF-2


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), dated October 13, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 97, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



for Jocelyn A. Mitchell, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 8, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 97

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

DOCKET NO. 50-348

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

Remove Pages

3/4 4-8

-

B3/4 4-2

-

Insert Pages

3/4 4-8

3/4 4-8a

B3/4 4-2

B3/4 4-2a

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.5 Both power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV in manual control. Restore the inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. With both block valves inoperable, within 1 hour restore both block valves to OPERABLE status or place their associated PORV in manual control. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour and restore the remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.5.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel during MODE 3 or 4, and
- b. Operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel using the backup PORV control system, and
- c. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

4.4.5.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b or c in Specification 3.4.5.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 345,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12 hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant Pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)

The power operated relief valves and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

The OPERABILITY of the PORVs and block valves is determined on the basis of their being capable of performing the following functions:

- A. Manual control of PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure. This is a function that is used for the steam generator tube rupture accident and for plant shutdown.
- B. Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This is a function that is related to controlling identified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
- C. Manual control of the block valve to: (1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of reactor coolant system pressure (Item A), and (2) isolate a PORV with excessive seat leakage (Item B).
- D. Manual control of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements found in Specification 4.4.5.1 for the PORVs and Specification 4.4.5.2 for the block valves improve reliability and provide the assurance that the PORVs and block valves can perform their functions. The PORVs are stroke tested during MODES 3 or 4 with the associated block valves closed in order to eliminate uncertainty introduced by testing the PORVs at lesser system temperatures than expected during actual operating conditions. The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements. This precludes the need to cycle the valves with full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to operable status. Surveillance requirement 4.4.5.1.b includes testing which demonstrates the functionality of the backup PORV control system.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-364

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 89
License No. NPF-8


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear), dated October 13, 1992, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 89 , are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



for Jocelyn A. Mitchell, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 8, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 89
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8
DOCKET NO. 50-364

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

| <u>Remove Pages</u> | <u>Insert Pages</u> |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| 3/4 4-8 | 3/4 4-8 |
| - | 3/4 4-8a |
| B3/4 4-2 | B3/4 4-2 |
| - | B3/4 4-2a |

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.5 Both power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- d. With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV in manual control. Restore the inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. With both block valves inoperable, within 1 hour restore both block valves to OPERABLE status or place their associated PORV in manual control. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour and restore the remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.5.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

- a. Operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel during MODES 3 or 4, and
- b. Operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel using the backup PORV control system, and
- c. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

4.4.5.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b or c in Specification 3.4.5.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 345,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12 hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant Pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)

The power operated relief valves and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES

The OPERABILITY of the PORVs and block valves is determined on the basis of their being capable of performing the following functions:

- A. Manual control of PORVs to control reactor coolant system pressure. This is a function that is used for the steam generator tube rupture accident and for plant shutdown. This function has been classified as safety related for more recent plant designs.
- B. Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This is a function that is related to controlling identified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
- C. Manual control of the block valve to: (1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of reactor coolant system pressure (Item A), and (2) isolate a PORV with excessive seat leakage (Item B).
- D. Manual control of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements found in Specification 4.4.5.1 for the PORVs and Specification 4.4.5.2 for the block valves improve reliability and provide the assurance that the PORVs and block valves can perform their functions. The PORVs are stroke tested during MODES 3 or 4 with the associated block valves closed in order to eliminate uncertainty introduced by testing the PORVs at lesser system temperatures than expected during actual operating conditions. The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with the ACTION requirements. This precludes the need to cycle the valves with full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to operable status. Surveillance requirement 4.4.5.1.b includes testing which demonstrates the functionality of the backup PORV control system.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2
AND AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 13, 1992, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Farley), Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise Technical Specification 3/4.4.5 and Bases Section 3/4.4.5 to include new requirements with respect to operability and surveillance of power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves. The changes are based on the guidance contained in Generic Letter (GL) 90-06 and are intended to enhance the reliability of the PORVs and block valves.

2.0 BACKGROUND

On June 25, 1990, the staff issued GL 90-06, "Resolution Of Generic Issue 70, 'Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors,' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)." The GL represented the technical resolution of the above-mentioned generic issues.

Generic Issue 70, "Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability," involves the evaluation of the reliability of power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves and their safety significance in PWR plants. The GL discussed how PORVs are increasingly being relied on to perform safety-related functions and the corresponding need to improve the reliability of both PORVs and their associated block valves. Proposed staff positions and improvements to the plant's TS were recommended to be implemented at all affected facilities. This issue is applicable to all Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and Combustion Engineering designed facilities with PORVs.

Generic Issue 90, "Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors," addresses concerns with the implementation of the requirements set forth in the resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-26, "Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection (Overpressure Protection)." The GL discussed the continuing occurrence of overpressure events and the need to further restrict the allowed outage time for a low-temperature overpressure protection channel in operating modes 4, 5, and 6. This issue is only applicable to Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering facilities.

By letter dated October 13, 1992, the licensee proposed changes to the Farley TS in response to GL 90-06.

3.0 EVALUATION

The actions proposed by the NRC staff to improve the reliability of PORVs and block valves represent a substantial increase in overall protection of the public health and safety and a determination has been made that the attendant costs are justified in view of this increased protection. The technical findings and the regulatory analysis related to Generic Issue 70 are discussed in NUREG-1316, "Technical Findings and Regulatory Analysis Related to Generic Issue 70 - Evaluation of Power-Operated Relief Valve Reliability in PWR Nuclear Power Plants."

The proposed changes to the Farley TS included in the licensee's letter of October 13, 1992, are consistent with that proposed in the staff's GL (Example: One of the proposed changes involves plant operations with the block valves closed due to leaking PORVs. The licensee has adopted the staff position by stipulating that power be maintained to the block valve during such conditions so that they can be readily opened from the control room upon demand....)

The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed modifications to the Farley TS. Since the proposed modifications are consistent with the staff's position previously stated in the GL and found to be justified in the above-mentioned regulatory analysis, the staff finds the proposed modifications to be acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 7005). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: R. Kirkwood
S. Hoffman

Date: March 8, 1993