

November 16, 1987

Docket Nos. 50-348
and 50-364

DISTRIBUTION
See attached sheet

Mr. R. P. McDonald
Senior Vice President
Alabama Power Company
Post Office Box 2641
Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400

Dear Mr. McDonald:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 66 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 - JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, REGARDING CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (TAC NOS. 65454/65455)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 74 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 66 to NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your submittal dated May 4, 1987.

The amendments revise the Limiting Condition for Operation and associated Action and Surveillance Requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.1.7, Containment Ventilation System. Also, the Technical Specification and Bases sections for Containment Ventilation are changed to be consistent with the guidance provided to the licensee by the NRC staff in a letter dated June 19, 1986. This action also finalizes your request of April 19, 1985, relating to potential backfit considerations.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,



Edward A. Reeves, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 74 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No. 66 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

LA: PDR1/DRPR
PAnderson/dsf
10/3/87

PM: PD21:DRPR
EReeves
10/3/87

D: PD21:DRPR
EAdensam
10/4/87

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PDR ADDCK 05000348
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Mr. R. P. McDonald
Alabama Power Company

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

cc:

Mr. W. O. Whitt
Executive Vice President
Alabama Power Company
Post Office Box 2641
Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400

D. Biard MacGuineas, Esquire
Volpe, Boskey and Lyons
918 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006

Mr. Louis B. Long, General Manager
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Post Office Box 2625
Birmingham, Alabama 35202

Charles R. Lowman
Alabama Electric Corporation
Post Office Box 550
Andalusia, Alabama 36420

Chairman
Houston County Commission
Dothan, Alabama 36301

Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Claude Earl Fox, M.D.
State Health Officer
State Department of Public Health
State Office Building
Montgomery, Alabama 36130

Robert A. Buettner, Esquire
Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne,
Williams and Ward
Post Office Box 306
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Mr. J. D. Woodard
General Manager - Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 470
Ashford, Alabama 36312

Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Post Office Box 24 - Route 2
Columbia, Alabama 36319



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-348

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 74
License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee), dated May 4, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 74, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to startup from the next refueling outage scheduled to start March 1988.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Elinor G. Adensam, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 16, 1987

*changed implementation
as above ..*

*See Previous Concurrence

LA:PD21:DRPR
PAnderson/dsf*
11/03/87

PM:PD21:DRPR
EReeves*
11/03/87

OGC-B
BVogler*
11/10/87

D:PD21:DRPR
EAdensam*
11/04/87

BCB for 11/16/87

16

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 74

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

DOCKET NO. 50-348

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 6-10
- -
- -
B 3/4 6-2
- -

Insert Pages

3/4 6-10
- -
- -
B 3/4 6-2
B 3/4 6-2a

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 Containment purge supply and exhaust valves shall be OPERABLE* and:

- a. The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-3198A, 3198D, 3196, 3197) shall be de-activated and secured in their closed position.
- b. The 8-inch containment mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-2866C, 2866D, 2867C, 2867D) may be open for safety-related reasons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

- a. With one 48-inch containment purge supply or one 48-inch containment purge exhaust isolation valve open or not de-activated, de-activate and secure in the closed position the open valve(s) or isolate the penetration within four hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With the leakage rate for the containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the limit of Specification 4.6.1.7.2 or 4.6.1.7.3.a within 12 hours either:
 - 1. Reduce the leakage to within the limit, or
 - 2. Isolate the containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust penetrations as required to reduce the leakage rate from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to within the limit of Specification 4.6.1.7.2 by the use of at least:
 - a) One OPERABLE de-activated 48-inch inside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, and one OPERABLE de-activated 8-inch inside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, or

*This specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- b) One OPERABLE de-activated 48-inch outside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, and one OPERABLE de-activated 8-inch outside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, or
- 3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With the leakage rate for containment purge supply or exhaust penetrations exceeding the limit of Specification 4.6.1.7.3.b, reduce the leakage to within the limit:
 - 1. Prior to entering MODE 4 following the next COLD SHUTDOWN if the existing leakage is determined during quarterly testing pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.7.2, or
 - 2. Prior to entering MODE 4 if excess leakage is determined during COLD SHUTDOWN pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.7.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined de-activated in the closed position at least once per 31 days.

4.6.1.7.2 At least once per 92 days, each penetration containing 8-inch and 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that when the leakage rates from degradation tests for both penetrations are added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.1.7.3 Each containment purge supply and exhaust penetration containing isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to startup after each COLD SHUTDOWN, if not performed in the previous 92 days, by verifying that:

- a) When the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$, and
- b) The leakage rate for each containment purge supply and exhaust penetration is less than or equal to $0.05 L_a$.

In addition, the leakage rate for the containment purge isolation valves shall be compared to the previously measured leakage rate (for the containment purge isolation valves) to detect excess valve degradation. An engineering evaluation shall be performed to determine what corrective action, if any, is necessary.

4.6.1.7.4 The resilient material valve seals of the 48-inch and the 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be replaced at least once per 5 years.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is 45 psig. The limit of 3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 48 psig which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA or steam line break accident.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48 psig in the event of a LOCA. The measurement of the containment lift off force, visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of paragraph C.1.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.35 "Inservice Surveillance of UngROUTED Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," January 1976.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed in MODES above COLD SHUTDOWN since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch vent supply and exhaust isolation valves to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident during venting operations.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

Safety-related reasons for venting containment during operation (MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4) include controlling containment pressure and reducing airborne radioactivity.

The purpose of the quarterly degradation tests of the isolation valves in the containment purge supply and exhaust lines per Specification 4.6.1.7.2 is to identify excessive degradation of the resilient seals for these valves. In addition, these degradation tests are not subject to the requirements applicable to 10CFR50 Appendix J testing but are to be utilized to provide reasonable assurance that at least one set (inside containment or outside containment) of isolation valves provides a sufficient barrier to containment leakage. These degradation tests do not replace Appendix J testing, but are performed in addition to the Type C tests required by Appendix J. Type C testing that is conducted pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.7.3 will conform to the requirements of Appendix J. Failure to satisfy the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve leakage rate specifications while in MODES 1-4 will be governed exclusively by the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.6.1.7 and not by other specifications.

The 12-hour time limit in ACTION Statement b provides the necessary time to confirm that containment integrity exists or to take appropriate corrective action. Isolation of a penetration with leakage in excess of the limit by use of an OPERABLE valve or a blind flange allows maintenance to be performed on the inoperable valve in that penetration. ACTION Statement b.2 requires a determination be made that the leakage rate from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is less than or equal to the margin available to 0.60 La; however, it does not require quantification of the leakage.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-364

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 66
License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee), dated May 4, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 66, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of receipt of the amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Elinor G. Adensam, Director
Project Directorate II-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: November 16, 1987

LA:PD21:DRPR
PAnderson/dsf
10/3/87

PM:PD21:DRPR
EReeves
10/3/87

OGC-B
10/10/87

D:PD21:DRPR
EAdensam
10/16/87

BCB for

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 66

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

DOCKET NO. 50-364

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

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Insert Pages

3/4 6-10
3/4 6-10a
3/4 6-10b
B 3/4 6-2
B 3/4 6-2a

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.6.1.7 Containment purge supply and exhaust valves shall be OPERABLE* and:
- a. The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-3198A, 3198D, 3196, 3197) shall be de-activated and secured in their closed position.
 - b. The 8-inch containment mini-purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-2866C, 2866D, 2867C, 2867D) may be open for safety-related reasons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 .

ACTION:

- a. With one 48-inch containment purge supply or one 48-inch containment purge exhaust isolation valve open or not de-activated, de-activate and secure in the closed position the open valve(s) or isolate the penetration within four hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With the leakage rate for the containment purge supply and exhaust penetrations exceeding the limit of Specification 4.6.1.7.2 or 4.6.1.7.3.a within 12 hours either:
 1. Reduce the leakage to within the limit, or
 2. Isolate the containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust penetrations as required to reduce the leakage rate from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to within the limit of Specification 4.6.1.7.2 by the use of at least:
 - a) One OPERABLE de-activated 48-inch inside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, and one OPERABLE de-activated 8-inch inside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, or

*This specification is governing for the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation penetration leakage and 48-inch isolation valve position.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- b) One OPERABLE de-activated 48-inch outside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, and one OPERABLE de-activated 8-inch outside containment purge supply or both supply and exhaust isolation valves secured in the closed position or secured by use of a blind flange, or
3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With the leakage rate for containment purge supply or exhaust penetrations exceeding the limit of Specification 4.6.1.7.3.b, reduce the leakage to within the limit:
 1. Prior to entering MODE 4 following the next COLD SHUTDOWN if the existing leakage is determined during quarterly testing pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.7.2, or
 2. Prior to entering MODE 4 if excess leakage is determined during COLD SHUTDOWN pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.7.3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined de-activated in the closed position at least once per 31 days.

4.6.1.7.2 At least once per 92 days, each penetration containing 8-inch and 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that when the leakage rates from degradation tests for both penetrations are added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.1.7.3 Each containment purge supply and exhaust penetration containing isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to startup after each COLD SHUTDOWN, if not performed in the previous 92 days, by verifying that:

- a) When the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to $0.60 L_a$, and
- b) The leakage rate for each containment purge supply and exhaust penetration is less than or equal to $0.05 L_a$.

In addition, the leakage rate for the containment purge isolation valves shall be compared to the previously measured leakage rate (for the containment purge isolation valves) to detect excess valve degradation. An engineering evaluation shall be performed to determine what corrective action, if any, is necessary.

4.6.1.7.4 The resilient material valve seals of the 48-inch and the 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be replaced at least once per 5 years.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is 45 psig. The limit of 3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 48 psig which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA or steam line break accident.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48 psig in the event of a LOCA. The visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test, along with the data obtained from Unit 1 tendon surveillance, is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of paragraph C.1.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.35 "Inservice Surveillance of UngROUTed Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," January 1976.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed in MODES above COLD SHUTDOWN since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch vent supply and exhaust isolation valves to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident during venting operations.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

Safety-related reasons for venting containment during operation (MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4) include controlling containment pressure and reducing airborne radioactivity.

The purpose of the quarterly degradation tests of the isolation valves in the containment purge supply and exhaust lines per Specification 4.6.1.7.2 is to identify excessive degradation of the resilient seals for these valves. In addition, these degradation tests are not subject to the requirements applicable to 10CFR50 Appendix J testing but are to be utilized to provide reasonable assurance that at least one set (inside containment or outside containment) of isolation valves provides a sufficient barrier to containment leakage. These degradation tests do not replace Appendix J testing, but are performed in addition to the Type C tests required by Appendix J. Type C testing that is conducted pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.7.3 will conform to the requirements of Appendix J. Failure to satisfy the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve leakage rate specifications while in MODES 1-4 will be governed exclusively by the ACTION requirements of Specification 3.6.1.7 and not by other specifications.

The 12-hour time limit in ACTION Statement b provides the necessary time to confirm that containment integrity exists or to take appropriate corrective action. Isolation of a penetration with leakage in excess of the limit by use of an OPERABLE valve or a blind flange allows maintenance to be performed on the inoperable valve in that penetration. ACTION Statement b.2 requires a determination be made that the leakage rate from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is less than or equal to the margin available to 0.60 La; however, it does not require quantification of the leakage.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

AND AMENDMENT NO. 66 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 4, 1987, in response to our letter dated June 19, 1986, the Alabama Power Company submitted a request for changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS).

The Amendments revise the Limiting Condition for Operation and associated Action and Surveillance Requirements of TS 3.6.1.7, Containment Ventilation System. Also, the TS Bases sections for Containment Ventilation are changed to be consistent with the guidance provided to the licensee by the NRC staff in a letter dated June 19, 1986.

2.0 EVALUATION

In the NRC staff Safety Evaluation transmitted to Alabama Power Company (APCo), by letter dated January 31, 1985, the staff concluded that the modified purge/vent systems at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 were acceptable. The staff found that the purge/vent systems at Farley 1 and 2 met the systems design and performance criteria as set forth in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4, NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, and the guidance developed as part of Multi-Plant Action B-24. However, certain modifications to the plant TS would be required to reflect system operational limitations and surveillance requirements. By letter dated January 17, 1986, APCo submitted changes to address containment purge/vent system operational limitations and surveillance requirements. Based on several staff discussions with the licensee, the licensee's proposed TS changes were revised and submitted by letter dated May 4, 1987.

With respect to the staff's concern over periodic surveillance of the resilient seats in the 48-inch and 8-inch (mini-purge) isolation valves, the licensee has proposed quarterly degradation tests in TS 4.6.1.7.2. The revised Bases provided by the licensee states that the purpose of the testing is to identify excessive degradation of the resilient seats in these valves, that the tests may be performed using the pressure decay method, and that the degradation tests are performed in addition to the Type C local leak rate tests required by Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.

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The consequences of failing to satisfy the degradation test acceptance criterion while in MODES 1-4 are governed by the Action Statements of TS 3.6.1.7. The Action Statements prescribe three alternative actions to be taken within 12 hours if the leakage rate exceeds the prescribed limit. The Surveillance Requirement in TS 4.6.1.7.2 requires that once per 92 days, on a staggered test basis, each containment ventilation penetration with purge valves having resilient material seats is to be demonstrated operable by verifying that the leakage rate is within the specified acceptance criterion. We have reviewed the licensee proposal regarding the testing of resilient seats of the containment ventilation purge valves and find that the revised TS adequately address our concerns.

The Limiting Condition for Operation of TS 3.6.1.7 currently requires that the 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will remain sealed (deactivated and secured closed) while reactor coolant temperature exceeds 200° F, as recommended by Item II.E.4.2.6 of NUREG-0737. In proposed TS 3.6.1.7.b, the 8-inch mini-purge supply and exhaust containment isolation valves may be open for safety-related reasons including control of containment pressure and reducing airborne radioactivity. Furthermore, offsite dose analyses and the minimum containment pressure analysis for the existing Emergency Core Cooling System performance capability evaluation were based on the use of 18-inch isolation valves. The analyses remain valid and are more conservative for the 8-inch valves. We conclude that the revised TS covering the use of the mini-purge system is acceptable.

By letter dated April 19, 1985, the licensee advised that additional leakage testing and a study to reduce containment building purging is the initiation of a requirement for backfitting. During subsequent discussions between the NRC staff and the licensee staff, agreement was reached to proceed with TSs to meet current regulatory requirements relating to the issue of purging or venting of reactor containments. Therefore, the issuance of the licensee's proposed TS changes will satisfactorily resolve the backfit question of the licensee's letter dated April 19, 1985.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released off site and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligi-

bility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 23045) on June 17, 1987, and consulted with the State of Alabama. No public comments or requests for hearing were received and the State of Alabama did not have any comments.

The Staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: C. Li
E. Reeves

Dated: November 16, 1987

AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPR-2 - FARLEY, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT NO. 66 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 - FARLEY, UNIT 2

DISTRIBUTION:

Docket No. 50-348
Docket No. 50-364
NRC PDR
Local PDR
PD21 r/f
S. Varga
G. Lainas
P. Anderson
E. Reeves (2)
OGC-B
D. Hagan
E. Jordan
J. Partlow
T. Barnhart (8)
Wanda Jones
E. Butcher
C. Li
ACRS (10)
GPA/PA
ARM/LFMB