

March 30, 1987

Docket Nos. 50-348  
and 50-364

Mr. R. P. McDonald  
Senior Vice President  
Alabama Power Company  
Post Office Box 2641  
Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	T. Barnhart (4)
<u>Docket File</u>	N. Thompson
NRC PDR	V. Benaroya
Local PDR	E. Reeves (2)
PD#2 Reading	R. Ballard
T. Novak	S. Lee
D. Miller	ACRS (10)
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L. Harmon	L. Tremper, LFMB
E. Jordan	Gray File
B. Grimes	
J. Partlow	

Dear Mr. McDonald:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.69 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 61 to NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated September 2, 1986, as supplemented February 9, 25 and 27, 1987.

The amendments modify Technical Specification (TS) 4.7-9 and add a new Table 4.7-3 relating to the visual inspection requirements for snubbers. The new requirements will be applicable on a one-time basis until startup from the eighth and fifth refueling outages on Units 1 and 2, respectively. This one-time action will preclude unnecessary plant shutdowns on Units 1 and 2 by April 20, and July 18, 1987, respectively. We would consider a permanent, genetic TS change based on a statistical methodology after completion of a study of the long-term consequences of this approach.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/s/

Edward A. Reeves, Project Manager  
PWR Project Directorate #2  
Division of PWR Licensing-A  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 69 to MPF-2
2. Amendment No. 61 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures  
See next page

LA: PAD#2  
D Miller  
3/18/87

PM: PAD#2  
E Reeves  
3/18/87  
Ed. R.  
3/30/87

L&P  
PD: PAD#2  
L Rubenstein  
3/30/87

OGC  
for J. Sciuto  
3/27/87

Mr. R. P. McDonald  
Alabama Power Company

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

cc:

Mr. W. O. Whitt  
Executive Vice President  
Alabama Power Company  
Post Office Box 2641  
Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400

D. Biard MacGuineas, Esquire  
Volpe, Roskey and Lyons  
918 16th Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006

Mr. Louis B. Long, General Manager  
Southern Company Services, Inc.  
Post Office Box 2625  
Birmingham, Alabama 35202

Charles R. Lowman  
Alabama Electric Corporation  
Post Office Box 550  
Andalusia, Alabama 36420

Chairman  
Houston County Commission  
Dothan, Alabama 36301

Regional Administrator, Region II  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire  
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge  
2300 N Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20037

Claude Earl Fox, M.D.  
State Health Officer  
State Department of Public Health  
State Office Building  
Montgomery, Alabama 36130

Robert A. Buettner, Esquire  
Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne,  
Williams and Ward  
Post Office Box 306  
Birmingham, Alabama 35201

Mr. J. D. Woodard  
General Manager - Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 470  
Ashford, Alabama 36312

Resident Inspector  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Post Office Box 24 - Route 2  
Columbia, Alabama 36319



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-348

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 69  
License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee) dated September 2, 1986, as supplemented February 9, 25, and 27, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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P PDR

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 69, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be effective until the startup following the eighth refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Lester S. Rubenstein, Director  
PWR Project Directorate #2  
Division of PWR Licensing-A  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 30, 1987

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 69

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

DOCKET NO. 50-348

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 7-20

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Insert Pages

3/4 7-20

3/4 7-20a

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or the failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. (MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES).

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.9.c on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Visual Inspections

The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be performed after four months but within 10 months of POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers within the scope of Specification 3.7.9. If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperable during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed 12 months + 25% from the date of the first inspection. Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule: \*\*

<u>No. of Inoperable Snubbers per Inspection Period</u>	<u>Subsequent Visual Inspection Period*#</u>
0	18 months + 25%
1	12 months + 25%
2	6 months + 25%
3, 4	124 days + 25%
5, 6, 7	62 days + 25%
8 or more	31 days + 25%

The snubbers may be categorized into two groups: Those accessible and those inaccessible during reactor operation. Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with the above schedule.

\* The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

# The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

\*\* This is a one-time Technical Specification change until startup from the eighth refueling outage. Table 4.7-3 should be utilized during this interval to determine the subsequent visual inspection period.

TABLE 4.7-3

Snubber Visual Inspection Schedule

Current Visual Inspection Period*	Number of Inoperable Snubbers	Next Visual Inspection Period #
18 Months $\pm$ 25%	0, 1, 2	18 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	3	12 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	4	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	5, 6	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	7	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	8 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
12 Months $\pm$ 25%	0, 1	18 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2, 3	12 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	4	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	5	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	6, 7	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	8 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
6 Months $\pm$ 25%	0	12 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	3, 4	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	5 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
4 Months $\pm$ 25%	0	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	3 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
2 Months $\pm$ 25%	0	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
1 Month $\pm$ 25%	0	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%

# The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

\* Earlier visual inspections than required may be utilized. If this option is chosen, the criteria for determining the next visual inspection period shall be the criteria associated with the earlier visual inspection period selected.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-364

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 61  
License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee) dated September 2, 1986, as supplemented February 9, 25, and 27, 1987 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:



(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 61, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be effective until the startup following the fifth refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Lester S. Rubenstein, Director  
PWR Project Directorate #2  
Division of PWR Licensing-A  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 30, 1987

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 61

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

DOCKET NO. 50-364

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Pages

3/4 7-20

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Insert Pages

3/4 7-20

3/4 7-20a

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.9 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or the failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. (MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES).

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.9.c on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Visual Inspections

The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be performed after four months but within 10 months of POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers within the scope of Specification 3.7.9. If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperable during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed 12 months + 25 % from the date of the first inspection. Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule: \*\*

<u>No. of Inoperable Snubbers per Inspection Period</u>	<u>Subsequent Visual Inspection Period*#</u>
0	18 months + 25%
1	12 months + 25%
2	6 months + 25%
3, 4	124 days + 25%
5, 6, 7	62 days + 25%
8 or more	31 days + 25%

The snubbers may be categorized into two groups: Those accessible and those inaccessible during reactor operation. Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with the above schedule.

\* The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

# The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

\*\* This is a one-time Technical Specification change until startup from the fifth refueling outage. Table 4.7-3 should be utilized during this interval to determine the subsequent visual inspection period.

TABLE 4.7-3

Snubber Visual Inspection Schedule

Current Visual Inspection Period*	Number of Inoperable Snubbers	Next Visual Inspection Period #
18 Months $\pm$ 25%	0, 1, 2	18 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	3	12 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	4	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	5, 6	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	7	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	8 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
12 Months $\pm$ 25%	0, 1	18 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2, 3	12 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	4	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	5	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	6, 7	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	8 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
6 Months $\pm$ 25%	0	12 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	3, 4	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	5 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
4 Months $\pm$ 25%	0	6 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	3 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
2 Months $\pm$ 25%	0	4 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	2 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%
1 Month $\pm$ 25%	0	2 Months $\pm$ 25%
"	1 or more	1 Month $\pm$ 25%

# The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

\* Earlier visual inspections than required may be utilized. If this option is chosen, the criteria for determining the next visual inspection period shall be the criteria associated with the earlier visual inspection period selected.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 61 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8  
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY  
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2  
DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 2, 1986, Alabama Power Company (the licensee) requested changes in the Technical Specifications on snubber visual inspection frequency requirements for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The proposed revision modifies the existing snubber visual inspection frequency schedule from one that is independent of the snubber population size to one that is dependent on a snubber population of 200. The proposed revision is based on a statistical methodology that would maintain a similar level of snubber reliability as the existing visual inspection frequency schedule. The staff met with the licensee on November 20, 1986 to discuss the licensee's proposal. Based on discussions with the staff, the licensee submitted revised versions of the proposed changes by letters dated February 9, and 25, 1987 and supplementary snubber failure data by letter dated February 27, 1987.

In the February 9, 1987 submittal, the licensee advised that plant shutdowns for inspections of all snubbers would be required by April 20, and July 18, 1987, for Units 1 and 2, respectively. On that basis, we considered these potential shutdowns for inspections of snubbers as the basis of one-time emergency changes the pending completion of a long-time study of the new methodology proposed. Therefore, in the February 25, 1987 submittal, the licensee limited the requested Technical Specification changes to a one-time change that would be in effect until the startup from the next refueling outages at Farley Units 1 and 2. The next refueling outages for Farley Units 1 and 2 are currently scheduled for March 1988 (eighth refueling outage for Farley Unit 1) and September 1987 (fifth refueling outage for Farley Unit 2), respectively. Furthermore, in Attachment 5 of the February 9, 1987 submittal, the licensee requested that two of the inoperable snubbers found during the October 1986 visual inspection at Farley Unit 1 not be considered in determining the subsequent snubber visual inspection period.

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## DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

Our discussion and evaluation of the snubber visual inspection schedule and of the inoperable snubbers reported follows.

### SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION SCHEDULE

The basis for the proposed snubber visual inspection schedule was submitted by the licensee in the September 2, 1986 letter. A statistical methodology was used in deriving the proposed snubber visual inspection schedule. Based on the assumed statistical model, the proposed visual inspection schedule will provide a 95% confidence level that at least 90% of the snubbers in the plant are operable as determined by visual examinations. It is noted that the existing Technical Specifications require both visual and functional tests of snubbers. The licensee proposed changes in the snubber visual inspection schedule only.

The existing snubber visual inspection schedule is independent of the snubber population size. However, methodology used for the proposed snubber visual inspection schedule depends on the snubber population size. The licensee used a snubber population size of 200 in deriving the snubber visual inspection schedule in the February 9, 25, and 27, 1987 submittals. The snubber population sizes for Farley Units 1 and 2 are summarized in Table 1. The existing snubber visual inspection requirements in the Technical Specifications allow grouping of snubbers into "accessible" and "inaccessible" snubbers during reactor operation. The proposed snubber visual inspection schedule would not change this grouping definition. Table 1 shows that the smallest number of snubbers, either accessible or inaccessible, in Farley Units 1 and 2 is 237. Thus, it is acceptable for the licensee to assume a snubber population size of 200 in deriving the snubber visual inspection schedule for inaccessible and accessible snubbers in Farley Units 1 and 2.

The proposed snubber visual inspection schedule was revised by letter dated February 25, 1987. By letter dated February 27, 1987, the licensee provided a history and compilation of of snubbers at each unit. Table 2 shows a comparison of the existing and the proposed snubber visual inspection schedules for Farley Units 1 and 2. It is observed that both the existing and the proposed inspection schedules depend on the current inspection period and the number of inoperable snubbers found by visual examinations.

A comparison of the snubber reliabilities obtained from existing and proposed snubber visual inspection schedules was submitted by licensee letter dated February 9, 1987. Table 3 shows a summary of the confidence and reliability levels of snubbers as determined by visual examinations for the existing and proposed snubber visual inspection schedules. The same statistical model assumed in deriving the proposed inspection schedule was assumed for the existing inspection schedule for calculating the snubber reliability. Using the same statistical model provided a consistent basis for the comparison of the existing and the proposed inspection schedules. A snubber group size of

200 was assumed for both the existing and the proposed inspection schedules. The reliability level was calculated by requiring a confidence level of at least 95%. Because the proposed visual inspection schedule was revised by letter dated February 25, 1987, some reliability values were different from what the actual values would be. This is indicated in a footnote to Table 3. Specifically, for a current inspection period of 18 months, one fewer inoperable snubber is allowed for "next inspection periods" of 6, 12, and 18 months by the revised inspection schedule in the February 25, 1987 submittal as compared with the inspection schedule in the February 9, 1987 submittal.

Because fewer inoperable snubbers are allowed in the revised inspection schedule, the actual snubber reliability is expected to exceed the values in Table 3 for these cases.

From Table 3, it is observed that the statistical methodology used in deriving the proposed inspection schedule maintains a reliability level of at least 90% in the proposed inspection schedule. The proposed visual inspection schedule has a reliability greater than 90% at a 18-month current inspection period as discussed in the previous paragraph. The existing inspection schedule has a reliability of over 95% at a 18-month current inspection period, which decreases to a reliability of only 75% at a 1-month current inspection period.

From Table 3, it is observed that the snubber reliability level of the proposed visual inspection schedule exceeds that of the existing inspection schedule for current inspection periods of less than or equal to 6 months. From Table 2, it is observed that this increase in snubber reliability is achieved by allowing fewer inoperable snubbers in the proposed inspection schedule as compared with the existing inspection schedule for current inspection periods of less than or equal to 6 months. Because a short inspection period is required for a plant with a poor history of snubber failures, the proposed visual inspection schedule would provide a higher level of snubber reliability for such a plant when compared with the existing inspection schedule.

Conversely, from Table 3, it is observed that the snubber reliability level of the proposed visual inspection schedule is slightly less than that of the existing inspection schedule for current inspection periods of greater than 6 months. From Table 2, it is observed that this decrease in snubber reliability is due to the allowance of more inoperable snubbers in the proposed inspection schedule as compared with the existing inspection schedule for current inspection periods of greater than 6 months. Because a long inspection period is allowed for a plant with few prior snubber failures, the proposed visual inspection schedule would result in a slight decrease in snubber reliability for such a plant when compared with the existing inspection schedule.

These changes in snubber reliability are considered acceptable until startup from the next refueling outages since the decrease in reliability is slight for long inspection periods, and since snubber reliabilities have been calculated on the basis of a snubber population size smaller than the smallest snubber group size for Farley Units 1 and 2.

### INOPERABLE SNUBBERS IN VISUAL EXAMINATIONS

In Attachment 5 of the February 9, 1987 submittal, the licensee requested that two of the inoperable snubbers found during the October 1986 (seventh refueling outage for Farley Unit 1) visual inspection at Farley Unit 1 not be considered in determining the subsequent snubber visual inspection period.

The licensee indicated that hydraulic snubber Mark Numbers RC-R91 and RC-R219 were found with empty fluid reservoirs and with the fluid port uncovered. Both snubbers failed the functional test in their as-found conditions. Since then, both snubbers were completely rebuilt and found acceptable by functional testing.

During the rebuild, the snubber conditions were documented which indicated that the snubbers had been damaged since the last visual inspection performed at the sixth refueling outage. Specifically, snubber RC-R91 was found to have bent snubber reservoir mounting brackets, and snubber RC-R219 was found to have bent fittings connecting the hydraulic cylinder to the reservoir tubing. The licensee concluded that the cause of the bending was accidental and the bent parts were replaced.

The staff finds that snubbers RC-R91 and RC-R219, which were found inoperable in Farley Unit 1, were isolated failures with clearly established causes of failure which were remedied. Thus, in accordance with the intent of existing Technical Specifications, these two inoperable snubbers should not be counted as inoperable in determining the subsequent snubber visual inspection period.

### SAFETY SUMMARY

The staff has reviewed and evaluated the licensee's requests. We have concluded that the proposed snubber visual inspection schedule submitted in the letter dated February 25, 1987 provides a level of snubber reliability similar to that of the existing inspection schedule when compared on a consistent statistical basis using the proposed statistical model and a snubber population size of 200. The snubber population size of 200 is selected because it is less than the smallest snubber group size for Farley Units 1 and 2 and results in a conservative inspection schedule based on the statistical methodology. Thus, the proposed one-time Technical Specification changes that will be in effect until the startup from the next refueling outages at Farley Units 1 and 2 are acceptable. Furthermore, we have concluded that two of the inoperable snubbers (i.e., RC-R91 and RC-R219) found during the October 1986 visual inspection at Farley Unit 1 should not be counted as inoperable in determining the subsequent snubber visual inspection period.



### FINDING OF EXISTENCE OF EMERGENCY SITUATION

10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) provides the necessary requirements for issuing an amendment when the Commission finds that an emergency situation exists and failure to act in a timely way would result in derating or shutdown of a nuclear plant. The Commission expects its licensees to: apply for license amendments in a timely fashion; not abuse the emergency provisions by failing to make a timely application for the amendment and thus itself creating the emergency; provide an explanation as to why the emergency situation occurred; and why it could not have been avoided.

As noted above, the licensee applied for the amendment by letter dated September 2, 1986, with a projected need date of February 27, 1987. Therefore, the application was timely enough to preclude the plant shutdowns noted subsequently in the licensee letter dated February 9, 1987. However, the NRC staff review of the request for a permanent, generic change to standard TSs based on the proposed statistical methodology would require a more detailed study of the proposal. On this basis, the NRC staff proposed acceptance of the change on a one-time basis. The licensee responded on February 25, 1987, requesting the one-time TS change. Although the initial application was timely, as a result of staff action during the course of the review the applicant was requested to reduce its request to a one-time only change. Promptly upon notification by the staff, the applicant submitted its revised request on February 25, 1987, which did not provide sufficient time to enable the staff to provide its usual notice. We consider this action to be a necessary emergency action to preclude shutdowns of both units for surveillance tests of inaccessible snubbers. The emergency situation is considered unavoidable because of the extensiveness of the long term study which became evident to the NRC staff late in the review process.

### FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed change in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(c) and has determined that the change does not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because snubber operability will not be affected and a plant shutdown (transient) will not occur just to visually inspect the inaccessible snubbers in mid-cycle on both units.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated because extending the surveillance interval does not physically alter the plant or change parameters governing normal plant operation.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the visual inspection interval, although increased from that currently required, maintains a confidence level which would provide adequate assurance that the snubber system will adequately perform its design function.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission has concluded that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are satisfied. Therefore, the Commission has made a final determination that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve a change in surveillance requirements and in the installation or use of the facilities components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released off-site and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

#### CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:  
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: March 30, 1987

#### Principal Contributor:

S. Lee  
E. Reeves

#### Attachments

Tables 1, 2 and 3

ATTACHMENT

TABLE 1 FARLEY UNITS 1 AND 2 SAFETY-RELATED SNUBBER POPULATIONS

Snubber Type	Farley Unit 1		Farley Unit 2	
	Inaccessible	Accessible	Inaccessible	Accessible
Hydraulic	343	188	175	189
Mechanical	243	63	256	48
----- Total	586	251	431	237

TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION SCHEDULES

Current Inspection Period (Months)	Number of Inoperable Snubbers		Next Inspection Period (Months)
	Existing Program	Proposed Program	
18 ± 25%	0	0,1,2	18 ± 25%
	1	3	12 ± 25%
	2	4	6 ± 25%
	3,4	5,6	4 ± 25%
	5,6,7	7	2 ± 25%
	8 or more	8 or more	1 ± 25%
12 ± 25%	0	0,1	18 ± 25%
	1	2,3	12 ± 25%
	2	4	6 ± 25%
	3,4	5	4 ± 25%
	5,6,7	6,7	2 ± 25%
	8 or more	8 or more	1 ± 25%
6 ± 25%	0,1	0	12 ± 25%
	2	1	6 ± 25%
	3,4	2	4 ± 25%
	5,6,7	3,4	2 ± 25%
	8 or more	5 or more	1 ± 25%
4 ± 25%	0,1,2	0	6 ± 25%
	3,4	1	4 ± 25%
	5,6,7	2	2 ± 25%
	8 or more	3 or more	1 ± 25%
2 ± 25%	0,1,2,3,4	0	4 ± 25%
	5,6,7	1	2 ± 25%
	8 or more	2 or more	1 ± 25%
1 ± 25%	0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7	0	2 ± 25%
	8 or more	1 or more	1 ± 25%

TABLE 3 SUMMARY OF SNUBBER RELIABILITIES OBTAINED FROM EXISTING AND PROPOSED SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION SCHEDULES BASED ON A SNUBBER GROUP SIZE OF 200\*

Current Inspection Period (Months)	Existing Program		Proposed Program		Next Inspection Period (Months)
	Confidence Level (%)	Reliability Level (%)	Confidence Level (%)	Reliability Level (%)	
18 + 25%	97.3	95.5	97.0**	90.5**	18 + 25%
	96.1	95.5	95.2**	92.5**	12 + 25%
	97.4	96.5	96.4**	95.0**	6 + 25%
	97.7	96.5	96.3	96.0	4 + 25%
	95.9	97.5	95.9	97.5	2 + 25%
	***	***	***	***	1 + 25%
12 + 25%	96.5	94.0	95.7	91.5	18 + 25%
	97.4	93.5	97.0	90.5	12 + 25%
	96.1	95.5	95.6	94.0	6 + 25%
	96.6	95.5	96.4	95.0	4 + 25%
	96.4	96.5	96.4	96.5	2 + 25%
	***	***	***	***	1 + 25%
6 + 25%	96.7	89.0	96.4	92.5	12 + 25%
	96.9	92.0	97.4	93.5	6 + 25%
	95.2	92.5	95.2	94.5	4 + 25%
	96.3	94.0	96.6	95.5	2 + 25%
	***	***	***	***	1 + 25%
4 + 25%	96.7	89.0	96.6	94.0	6 + 25%
	95.5	89.5	97.4	93.5	4 + 25%
	97.1	91.5	96.1	95.5	2 + 25%
	***	***	***	***	1 + 25%
2 + 25%	95.6	81.5	96.4	92.5	4 + 25%
	96.2	85.5	97.4	93.5	2 + 25%
	***	***	***	***	1 + 25%
1 + 25%	95.6	75.0	96.4	92.5	2 + 25%
	***	***	***	***	1 + 25%

(Table 3 to be continued on the next page.)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

SUMMARY OF SNUBBER RELIABILITIES OBTAINED FROM EXISTING AND PROPOSED SNUBBER VISUAL INSPECTION SCHEDULES BASED ON A SNUBBER GROUP SIZE OF 200\*

- \* The reliability level was calculated by requiring a confidence level of at least 95%. For conservatism in the reliability estimation, the minimum allowable current inspection period (i.e., using the -25% option), the maximum allowable next inspection period (i.e., using the +25% option), and the maximum number of allowable inoperable snubbers (e.g., using 7 inoperable snubbers if 5, 6, or 7 inoperable snubbers are allowed) were assumed.
- \*\* The confidence and reliability levels shown were calculated based on allowing one more inoperable snubber than presented in Table 2. Thus, the actual reliability level will exceed the value shown.
- \*\*\* The reliability level was calculated conservatively using the maximum number of allowable inoperable snubbers. Because there is no upper bound on the number of allowable inoperable snubbers for this case, no reliability calculation was performed.