September 9, 1986

Docket Nos. 50-348
and 50-364

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Mr. R. P. McDonald
Senior Vice President
Alabama Power Company
Post Office Box 2641
Birmingham, Alabama 35291

Dear Mr. McDonald:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 65 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 58 to NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated February 7, 1986.

The amendments modify Technical Specifications (TS) to require all three reactor coolant loops to be operating in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) or that the rod control system be disabled.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Edward A. Reeves, Project Manager
PWR Project Directorate #2
Division of PWR Licensing-A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 65 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No. 58 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

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|---|---|---|---|
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| 8/ /86 | 8/27/86 | 8/ /86 | 9/2/86 |

Mr. R. P. McDonald
Alabama Power Company

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-348

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 65
License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee) dated February 7, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 65 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of receipt of the amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Lester S. Rubenstein, Director
PWR Project Directorate #2
Division of PWR Licensing-A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 9, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 65

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

DOCKET NO. 50-348

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

| Remove Pages | Insert Pages |
|---|---|
| 3/4 4-2 | 3/4 4-2 |
| B3/4 4-1 | B3/4 4-1 |

## 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

### STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.1 All Reactor Coolant loops shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.*

ACTION:

With less than the above required Reactor Coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.4.1.1 The above required Reactor Coolant loops shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

HOT STANDBY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 All three Reactor Coolant Loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and in operation when the rod control system is operational or at least two Reactor Coolant Loops listed below shall be OPERABLE with one Reactor Coolant Loop in operation when the rod control system is disabled by opening the Reactor Trip Breakers or shutting down the rod drive motor/generator sets:*

1. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump,

2. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump,

3. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required Reactor Coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With less than three Reactor Coolant loops in operation and the rod control system operational, within 1 hour open the Reactor Trip Breakers or shut down the rod drive motor/generator sets.

c. With no Reactor Coolant loops in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required Reactor Coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 The required Reactor Coolant loop(s) shall be verified to be in operation and circulating Reactor Coolant at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.2.3 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 10% of wide range indication at least once per 12 hours.

*All Reactor Coolant pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

## 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all Reactor Coolant loops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one Reactor Coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

In MODE 3, three reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient decay heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented; i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip Breakers or shutting down the rod drive motor/generator sets. When a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, a single reactor coolant or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5, single failure considerations require two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump with one or more Reactor Coolant System cold legs less than or equal to 310°F are provided to prevent Reactor Coolant System pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10CFR Part 50. The Reactor Coolant System will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into, or (2) by restricting starting of the Reactor Coolant Pumps to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

## 3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 345,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

## 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12 hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant Pressure and establish natural circulation.

## 3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES (PORV's)

The power operated relief valves and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORV's minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-364

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 58
License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee) dated February 7, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.58 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of receipt of the amendment.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LS Rubenstein

Lester S. Rubenstein, Director
PWR Project Directorate #2
Division of PWP Licensing-A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 9, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 58

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

DOCKET NO. 50-364

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

| Remove Pages | Insert Pages |
|---|---|
| 3/4 4-2 | 3/4 4-2 |
| B3/4 4-1 | B3/4 4-1 |

## 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

### 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

### STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION

### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.1 All Reactor Coolant loops shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.*

ACTION:

With less than the above required Reactor Coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.4.1.1 The above required Reactor Coolant loops shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

HOT STANDBY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 All three Reactor Coolant Loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and in operation when the rod control system is operational or at least two Reactor Coolant Loops listed below shall be OPERABLE with one Reactor Coolant Loop in operation when the rod control system is disabled by opening the Reactor Trip Breakers or shutting down the rod drive motor/generator sets:*

1. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump,
2. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump,
3. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and Reactor Coolant pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required Reactor Coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With less than three Reactor Coolant loops in operation and the rod control system operational, within 1 hour open the Reactor Trip Breakers or shut down the rod drive motor/generator sets.

c. With no Reactor Coolant loops in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required Reactor Coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 The required Reactor Coolant loop(s) shall be verified to be in operation and circulating Reactor Coolant at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.2.3 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 10% of wide range indication at least once per 12 hours.

*All Reactor Coolant pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

## 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all Reactor Coolant loops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one Reactor Coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour.

In MODE 3, three reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient decay heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented; i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip Breakers or shutting down the rod drive motor/generator sets. When a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, a single reactor coolant or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5, single failure considerations require two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump with one or more Reactor Coolant System cold legs less than or equal to 310°F are provided to prevent Reactor Coolant System pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10CFR Part 50. The Reactor Coolant System will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into, or (2) by restricting starting of the Reactor Coolant Pumps to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

## 3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 345,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

## 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12 hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant Pressure and establish natural circulation.

## 3/4.4.5 RELIEF VALVES (PORV's)

The power operated relief valves and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORV's minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2

AND AMENDMENT NO.58 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

## Introduction

By letter dated February 7, 1986, Alabama Power Company (the licensee) proposed Technical Specification changes for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 in response to an inconsistency between the FSAR safety analyses and the Standard Technical Specifications of Westinghouse-designed NSSS plants. The inconsistency involves the number of reactor coolant loops operating in Mode 3 during the postulated rod bank withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition. Technical Specifications 3.4.1.2, 4.4.1.2.2 and Bases 3/4.4.1 allow operation with only one loop.

According to the Westinghouse analyses, the Mode 2 analysis for the rod bank withdrawal accident, which requires all three reactor coolant loops operating, envelopes the Mode 3 conditions. However, the Farley Technical Specifications currently allow only a single reactor coolant loop to be operating during Mode 3. As a result of this inconsistency, the licensee proposes two solutions: (1) All three loops must be operating in Mode 3 to satisfy the analysis for the rod bank withdrawal accident since all three coolant loops are required to be operating in Mode 2, or (2) the rod control system must be disabled to ensure that this accident cannot occur. The disabling of the rod control system may be accomplished by opening the reactor trip breakers or shutting down the rod drive motor/generator sets.

Therefore, the licensee proposes that the Technical Specification reactor coolant loop operability requirements for Mode 3 be modified to reflect the conservative plant procedural requirements already in place. Our evaluation follows.

## Evaluation

Technical Specification 3.4.1.2 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION is revised to reflect the new requirements consistent with the licensee's proposals, i.e., all three loops must be operating in Mode 3 or the rod control system must be disabled to ensure that the rod withdrawal accident cannot occur. This change removes the inconsistency from the Technical Specifications. Thus, these changes are acceptable.

Technical Specification 4.4.1.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS is revised to require three coolant loops operation to be verified to be in operation at least every 12 hours. This change is consistent with the new LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION. Thus, the change is acceptable.

Technical Specification Bases 3/4.4.1 is revised to be consistent with the analyses in Mode 3. The single failure considerations that require two loops be operable at all times are unchanged. The change is acceptable.

Safety Summary

Our review of the licensee proposed Technical Specification changes concerning reactor coolant loop operability make the Technical Specifications consistent with the rod withdrawal accident analysis during Mode 3 operation. Therefore, on the basis of our evaluation, we conclude that the Technical Specification changes for reactor coolant loop operability during Mode 3 operation are acceptable for Farley Units 1 and 2.

Environmental Consideration

These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of the facilities components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: September 9, 1986

Principal Contributors:

S. Wu
E. Reeves