

## B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### B 3.8.1 AC Sources — Operating

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The Unit 1 Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and alternate), and the onsite standby power sources (diesel generators (DGs) 1A, 1B, and 1C). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The Class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load groups, so loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each load group has connections to two preferred offsite power supplies and a single DG.

Offsite power is supplied to the 230 kV and 500 kV switchyards from the transmission network by eight transmission lines. From the 230 kV switchyards, two electrically and physically separated circuits provide AC power, through startup auxiliary transformers 1C and 1D, to 4.16 kV ESF buses 1E, 1F, and 1G. A detailed description of the offsite power network and circuits to the onsite Class 1E ESF buses is found in the FSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4 (Ref. 2).

An offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E ESF bus or buses.

Startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) 1D provides the normal source of power to the ESF buses 1E, 1F, and 1G. If any 4.16 kV ESF bus loses power, an automatic transfer from SAT 1D to SAT 1C occurs. At this time, 4.16 kV buses 1A and 1B and supply breakers from SAT 1C also trip open, disconnecting all nonessential loads from SAT 1C to preclude overloading of the transformer.

SATs 1C and 1D are sized to accommodate the simultaneous starting of all required ESF loads on receipt of an accident signal without the need for load sequencing.

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BASES

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BACKGROUND  
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A description of the Unit 2 offsite power sources is provided in the Bases for Unit 2 LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources—Operating."

The onsite standby power source for 4.16 kV ESF buses 1E, 1F, and 1G consists of three DGs. DGs 1A and 1C are dedicated to ESF buses 1E and 1G, respectively. DG 1B (the swing DG) is a shared power source and can supply either Unit 1 ESF bus 1F or Unit 2 ESF bus 2F. A DG starts automatically on a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal (i.e., low reactor water level signal or high drywell pressure signal) or on an ESF bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal. After the DG has started, it automatically ties to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with a LOCA signal. The DGs also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus on a LOCA signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, load shed relays strip nonpermanent loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the automatic load sequence timing devices. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG.

In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a LOCA.

Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading of the DGs in the process. After the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service (i.e., the loads are energized.)

DGs 1A, 1B and 1C have the following ratings:

- a. 2850 kW — 1000 hours, and
- b. 3250 kW — 168 hours.

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BASES

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BACKGROUND (continued) A description of the Unit 2 onsite power sources is provided in the Bases for Unit 2 LCO 3.8.1.

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Refs. 3 and 4, respectively) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all onsite AC power sources; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.

AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 14).

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BASES (continued)

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LCO

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 1 Class 1E Distribution System and three separate and independent DGs (1A, 1B, and 1C) ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. In addition, since some components required by Unit 1 are powered from Unit 2 sources (i.e., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System), one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 2 Class 1E Distribution System, and one Unit 2 DG (2A or 2C), capable of supplying power to one required Unit 2 SGT subsystem, must also be OPERABLE.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR, and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses. For the purpose of this LCO, each Unit 1 offsite circuit consists of incoming breaker and disconnect to the respective 1C and 1D SATs, the 1C and 1D transformers, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4.16 kV ESF buses. (However, for design purposes, the offsite circuit excludes the feeder breakers to each 4.16 kV ESF bus). Feeder breakers from each circuit to the 1F ESF bus are required to be OPERABLE; however, only one feeder breaker per bus to the 1E and 1G ESF buses is required to be OPERABLE, but they must be from different SATs (e.g., 1E feeder breaker from the 1C SAT and the 1G feeder breaker from the 1D SAT). With 1E and 1G ESF buses both fed from one SAT (normal line up is both buses fed from 1D SAT), both feeder breakers to each of these ESF buses are required to be OPERABLE. The Unit 2 offsite circuit also consists of the incoming breaker and disconnect to the 4.16 kV ESF buses required to be OPERABLE to provide power to the Unit 2 equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3.

Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated frequency and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These

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BASES

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LCO  
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capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions, such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient condition.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

The AC sources must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) (Ref. 1) of other AC sources. For the DGs, the separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC sources, the separation and independence are to the extent practical. A circuit may be connected to more than one ESF bus, with automatic transfer capability to the other circuit OPERABLE, and not violate separation criteria. A circuit that is not connected to an ESF bus is required to have OPERABLE automatic transfer capability to at least two ESF buses (one of which must be to the 1F bus) to support OPERABILITY of that circuit.

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APPLICABILITY

The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The AC power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 and other conditions in which AC Sources are required, are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources — Shutdown."

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ACTIONS

A.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the remaining required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition D, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

A.2

Required Action A.2, which only applies if a 4160 V ESF bus cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure of the associated DG does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has no offsite power.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. The 4160 V ESF bus has no offsite power supplying its loads; and
- b. A redundant required feature on the other division is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.

Discovering no offsite power to one 4160 V ESF bus of the onsite Class 1E Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable redundant required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with any

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.2 (continued)

other ESF bus that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before the unit is subjected to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuits and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection may have been lost for the required feature's function; however, function is not lost. The 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

A.3

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. With one required offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. In this condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.

The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, the swing DG is inoperable, and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.3 (continued)

could lead to a total of 10 days, since initial failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a, b, and c, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, the swing DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 7 days (for a total of 17 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of LCO 3.8.1.a, b, and c. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hours and 10 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c was initially not met, instead of at the time that Condition A was entered.

B.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one Unit 1 or the swing DG inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions must then be entered.

B.2

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a Unit 1 or swing DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features

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ACTIONS

B.2 (continued)

associated with a division redundant to the division that has an inoperable DG.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. An inoperable Unit 1 or swing DG exists; and
- b. A redundant required feature on the other division (Division 1 or 2), or divisions in the case of the Unit 1 and 2 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System, is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one Unit 1 or swing DG inoperable), a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering one required DG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable redundant required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
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B.3.1 and B.3.2

Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.2.a does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), they are declared inoperable upon discovery, and Condition F of LCO 3.8.1 is entered. Once the failure is repaired, and the common cause failure no longer exists, Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2.a suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those DGs. In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the deficiency control program, as appropriate, will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition B.

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours is a reasonable time to confirm that the OPERABLE DGs are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

B.4

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. However, if the inoperable DG is the swing DG, operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 7 days. In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Unit 1 Class 1E Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The 7 day Completion Time for the swing DG also takes into consideration the fact that the DG is common to both units, and that time must be provided to perform routine maintenance on the DG without requiring a dual unit shutdown.

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BASES

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ACTIONS

B.4 (continued)

The third Completion Time for Required Action B.4 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c may already have been not met for up to 72 hours. This situation could lead to a total of 10 days, since initial failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a, b, and c, to restore the DG. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 13 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of LCO 3.8.1.a, b, and c. The 10 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 10 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

As in Required Action B.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time that LCO 3.8.1.a, b, or c was initially not met, instead of the time that Condition B was entered.

C.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the required Unit 2 DG inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions must then be entered.

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
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C.2

Required Action C.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that the required Unit 2 DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has an inoperable DG.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. An inoperable required Unit 2 DG exists; and
- b. A redundant required feature on the other division (Division 1 or 2), or divisions in the case of the Unit 1 and 2 SGT System, is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (required Unit 2 DG inoperable), a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering required Unit 2 DG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable redundant required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable

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BASES

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ACTIONS

C.2 (continued)

required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

C.3.1 and C.3.2

Required Action C.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 3.8.1.2.a does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), they are declared inoperable upon discovery, and Condition F of LCO 3.8.1 is entered. Once the failure is repaired, and the common cause failure no longer exists, Required Action C.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2.a suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those DGs. In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either C.3.1 or C.3.2, the deficiency control program, as appropriate, will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition C.

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours is a reasonable time to confirm that the OPERABLE DGs are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

C.4

In Condition C, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit is adequate to supply electrical power to the required onsite Unit 2 Class 1E Distribution System. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC source, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. In addition, the shortest restoration time allowed for the systems affected by the inoperable DG is 7 days in the individual system's LCOs.

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
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D.1 and D.2

Required Action D.1 addresses actions to be taken in the event of inoperability of redundant required features concurrent with inoperability of two or more required offsite circuits. Required Action D.1 reduces the vulnerability to a loss of function. The Completion Time for taking these actions is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed with one 4160 V ESF bus without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety divisions are OPERABLE. (While this ACTION allows more than two circuits to be inoperable, Regulatory Guide 1.93 assumed two circuits were all that were required by the LCO, and a loss of those two circuits resulted in a loss of all offsite power to the Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System. Thus, with the Plant Hatch design, a loss of more than two required offsite circuits results in the same conditions assumed in Regulatory Guide 1.93.) When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions, (i.e., single division systems are not included in the list). Redundant required features failures consist of any of these features that are inoperable because any inoperability is on a division redundant to a division with inoperable offsite circuits.

The Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A redundant required feature is inoperable.

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BASES

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ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (two or more required offsite circuits inoperable), a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 24 hours. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this degradation level:

- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With two or more of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

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BASES

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ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with the available offsite AC sources two less than required by the LCO (which as stated earlier, generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources; this is the condition experienced by Plant Hatch when two or more required circuits are inoperable), operation may continue for 24 hours. If all required offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestricted operation may continue. If all but one required offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

E.1 and E.2

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition E is entered with no AC source to any ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems — Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition E to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit and one DG without regard to whether a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.7 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized ESF bus.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition E for a period that should not exceed 12 hours. In Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. However, since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition D (loss of two or more required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure.

The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

F.1

With two or more Unit 1 and swing DGs inoperable, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for the majority of ESF equipment at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown. (The immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power.) Since any inadvertent unit generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with two or more DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours. (Regulatory Guide 1.93 assumed the unit has two DGs. Thus, a loss of both DGs results in a total loss of onsite power. Therefore, a loss of more than two DGs, in the Plant Hatch design, results in degradation no worse than that assumed in Regulatory Guide 1.93. In addition, the loss of a required Unit 2 DG concurrent with the loss of a Unit 1 or swing DG, is analogous to the loss of a single DG in the Regulatory Guide 1.93 assumptions, thus, entry into this Condition is not required in this case.)

G.1 and G.2

If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

H.1

Condition H corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages under simulated accident conditions. The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are generally consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 9), Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 11), although Plant Hatch Unit 1 is not committed to these Regulatory Guides. Specific commitments relative to DG testing are described in FSAR section 8.4 (Ref. 2).

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following summary is applicable. The allowable values for achieving steady state voltage are specified within a range of minus 10 percent (3740 V) and plus 2 percent (4243 V) of 4160 V. The Allowable Value of 3740 V is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 for demonstrating that the diesel generator is capable of attaining the required voltage. A more limiting value of 4243 V is specified as the allowable value for overvoltage due to overvoltage limits on the 600 V buses. The plus 2 percent value maintains the required overvoltage limits. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to  $\pm 2\%$  of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations found in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 9).

The SRs are modified by a NOTE to indicate that SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18 apply only to the Unit 1 AC sources, and that SR 3.8.1.19 applies only to the Unit 2 AC sources.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.1

This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.

SR 3.8.1.2

This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition, and verifies that the DGs are capable of proper startup, synchronizing, and accepting a load approximately 50% of the continuous load rating. This demonstrates DG capability while minimizing the mechanical stress and wear on the engine. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, this SR has been modified by a Note (Note 2) to indicate that all DG starts for this Surveillance may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.

For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

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SR 3.8.1.2 (continued)

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, the DG manufacturer recommends a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. These start procedures are the intent of Note 3.

SR 3.8.1.5.a requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4). The 12 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 3), when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, the 12 second start voltage and frequency requirements of SR 3.8.1.5.a apply.

Since SR 3.8.1.5.a does require a 12 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2. This procedure is the intent of Note 1.

To minimize testing of the swing DG, this SR is modified by a note (Note 4) to allow a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units, using the starting circuitry of one unit for one periodic test and the starting circuitry of the other unit during the next periodic test. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance, to ensure DG OPERABILITY, is still being verified on the proper frequency, the starting circuits historically have a very low failure rate, as compared to the DG itself, and that, while each starting circuit is only being tested every second test (due to the staggering of the tests), some portions of the starting circuits are common to both units. If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillance, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

Note 5 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.2 (continued)

Note 6 modifies the Surveillance by stating that starting transients above the upper voltage limit do not invalidate this test.

Note 7 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary load transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.

Note 8 indicates that this Surveillance is required to be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10). This Frequency provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 3.8.1.3

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of DG operation at full load plus 10%. The actual amount required to meet the SR (900 gallons) will provide approximately 3.5 hours of DG operation at full load.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.4

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 184 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.4 (continued)

This is a means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the day tank may come from condensation, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has shown to be acceptable through operating experience. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

SR 3.8.1.5

This SR helps to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of a "fast cold" start, synchronizing, and accepting a load more closely simulating accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

SR 3.8.1.5 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR Chapter 6 (Ref. 4).

For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation.

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REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.5 (continued)

The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.5 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7). This Frequency provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, this SR has been modified by a Note (Note 1) to indicate that all DG starts for this Surveillance may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.

Note 2 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized.

Note 3 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary voltage or load transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test.

Note 4 indicates that this Surveillance is required to be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 5 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units, with the DG started using the starting circuitry of one unit and synchronized to the ESF bus of that unit for one periodic test and started using the starting circuitry of the other unit and synchronized to the ESF bus of that unit during the next periodic test. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance, to ensure DG OPERABILITY, is still being verified on the proper frequency, and each unit's starting circuitry and breaker control circuitry, which is only being tested every second test (due to the staggering of the tests), historically have a very low failure rate. If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

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REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.6

Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 18 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment taking into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed on the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1 or 2.

SR 3.8.1.7

Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. The largest single load for DGs 1A and 1C is a core spray pump at rated flow (1275 bhp). For DG 1B, the largest single load is a residual heat removal service water pump at rated flow (1225 bhp). This Surveillance may be accomplished by: a) tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power or while solely supplying the bus, or b) tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus. Although Plant Hatch Unit 1 is not committed to IEEE-387-1984 (Ref. 12), this SR is consistent with the IEEE-387-1984 requirement that states the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. For all DGs, this represents 65.5 Hz, equivalent to 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.

The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the nominal range for the DG. SR 3.8.1.7.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.7.b is the voltage to which the DG must recover following load rejection. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10).

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing is performed with only the DG providing power to the associated 4160 V ESF bus. The DG is not synchronized with offsite power.

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REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 2 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.8

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor  $\leq 0.88$ . This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.8 (continued)

continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 2 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.9

This Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source and is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(1). This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG auto-start time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.9 (continued)

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(1), takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.9 (continued)

Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.10

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for  $\geq 5$  minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the loading logic for loading onto offsite power. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, low pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could potentially cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1 or 2 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1 or 2.

SR 3.8.1.11

This Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ECCS initiation signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, and low lubricating oil pressure) are available to trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)

Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DG from service. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1 or 2 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.12

Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(3), requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours. The first 2 hours of this test are performed at  $\geq 3000$  kW and the last 22 hours of this test are performed at  $\geq 2775$  kW and  $\leq 2825$  kW, which is near the continuous rating of the DG. This is in accordance with commitments described in FSAR Section 8.4 (Ref. 2). The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor  $\leq 0.88$ . This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. A load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in

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REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(3); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance has been modified by four Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. Note 3 is provided in recognition that if the offsite electrical power distribution system is lightly loaded (i.e., system voltage is high), it may not be possible to raise voltage without creating an overvoltage condition on the ESF bus. Therefore, to ensure the bus voltage, supplied ESF loads, and DG are not placed in an unsafe condition during this test, the power factor limit does not have to be met if grid voltage or ESF bus loading does not permit the power factor limit to be met when the DG is tied to the grid. When this occurs, the power factor should be maintained as close to the limit as practicable. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 4 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(5).

This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at near full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. To minimize testing of the swing DG, Note 3 allows a single test (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit (no unit specific DG components are being tested). If the swing DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.14

This Surveillance is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(6), and ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(6), and takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.15

Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing. Interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if an ECCS initiation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. Although Plant Hatch Unit 1 is not committed to this standard, this SR is consistent with the provisions for automatic switchover required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 13), paragraph 6.2.6(2).

The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.10. The intent in the requirements associated with SR 3.8.1.15.b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads,

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SR 3.8.1.15 (continued)

testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(8); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.16

Under accident conditions, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequence timing devices. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10), paragraph 2.a.(2); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.17

In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.9, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil

(continued)

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)

being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR. This Surveillance tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 1 swing bus. The comparable test specified in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications tests the applicable logic associated with the Unit 2 swing bus. Consequently, a test must be performed within the specified Frequency for each unit. The Note specifying the restriction for not performing the test while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3 does not have applicability to Unit 2. As the Surveillance represents separate tests, the Unit 1 Surveillance should not be performed with Unit 1 in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and the Unit 2 test should not be performed with Unit 2 in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

SR 3.8.1.18

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. It is permissible to place all three DGs in test simultaneously, for the performance of this Surveillance.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.18 (continued)

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 10). This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing.

SR 3.8.1.19

With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.18) are applied only to the Unit 1 DG and offsite circuits, and swing DG. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1 Surveillance requirement. Several exceptions are noted to the Unit 2 SRs: SR 3.8.1.6 is excepted since only one Unit 2 circuit is required by the Unit 1 Specification (therefore, there is not necessarily a second circuit to transfer to); SRs 3.8.1.10, 11, 15, and 17 are excepted since they relate to the DG response to a Unit 2 ECCS initiation signal, which is not a necessary function for support of the Unit 1 requirement for an OPERABLE Unit 2 DG; and SR 3.8.1.18 is excepted since there is only one Unit 2 DG required by the Unit 1 Specification (therefore, there are not necessarily multiple DGs for simultaneous start).

The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
2. FSAR, Sections 8.3 and 8.4.
3. FSAR, Chapter 5.
4. FSAR, Chapter 6.
5. FSAR, Chapter 14.

(continued)

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BASES

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REFERENCES  
(continued)

6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
  7. Generic Letter 84-15.
  8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
  9. Regulatory Guide 1.9, March 1971.
  10. Regulatory Guide 1.108, August 1977.
  11. Regulatory Guide 1.137, October 1979.
  12. IEEE Standard 387-1984.
  13. IEEE Standard 308-1980.
  14. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources — Shutdown

BASES

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**BACKGROUND** A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources — Operating."

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Postulated worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed

(continued)

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that certain testing and maintenance activities must be conducted, provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 4 and 5, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 4 and 5, the activities are generally planned and administratively controlled. Relaxations from typical MODES 1, 2, and 3 LCO requirements are acceptable during shutdown MODES, based on:

- a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration.
- b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements applied to systems credited in operation MODE analyses, or both.
- c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems.
- d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODES 1, 2, and 3 OPERABILITY requirements) with systems assumed to function during an event.

In the event of an accident during shutdown, this LCO ensures the capability of supporting systems necessary for avoiding immediate difficulty, assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite (diesel generator (DG)) power.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 1).

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LCO

One Unit 1 offsite circuit capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems — Shutdown," ensures that all required Unit 1 loads are powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE Unit 1 DG, associated with a Distribution System Engineered

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BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

Safety Feature (ESF) bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, ensures that a diverse power source is available for providing electrical power support assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 1 are powered from Unit 2 sources (i.e., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System). Therefore, one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Unit 2 Class 1E Distribution System, and one Unit 2 DG capable of supplying power to one required Unit 2 SGT subsystem, must also be OPERABLE. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuits and DGs ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuits must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF buses, and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 offsite circuits consist of incoming breaker and disconnect to the 1C or 1D and the 2C or 2D startup auxiliary transformers (SATs), associated 1C or 1D and 2C or 2D SATs, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3.8.8. (However, for design purposes, the offsite circuit excludes the feeder breakers to each 4.16 kV ESF bus).

The required DGs must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated frequency and voltage, connecting to their respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

(continued)

BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

It is acceptable during shutdown conditions, for a single offsite power circuit to supply all 4.16 kV ESF buses on a Unit. No fast transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.

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APPLICABILITY

The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment to provide assurance that:

- a. Systems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

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ACTIONS

A.1

An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF 4160 V bus. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, the remaining buses with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

With one or more offsite circuits not available to all required 4160 V ESF buses, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable (per Required Action A.1). Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With one or more required DGs inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4  
(continued)

immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a bus is de-energized. LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized bus.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1

SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.1.6 is not required to be met since only one Unit 1 and one Unit 2 offsite circuits are required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.15 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DG(s) is not required to undergo periods of being synchronized to the offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.18 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4160 V ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit(s) and the DG(s). It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

SR 3.8.2.2

This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DG and offsite circuit are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1 Surveillance requirement. The Frequency

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.2 (continued)

required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

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REFERENCES

1. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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## B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

### B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

Each diesel generator (DG) is provided with a storage tank. The 33,000 gallons required to be maintained in each of the Unit 1 and swing DG's fuel oil tanks represent a total volume of oil sufficient to operate any two DGs at 3250 kW for a period of 7 days (Reference 1). In addition, it provides excess fuel to also operate the other Unit's required DGs at a load sufficient to maintain power to the components, required to be OPERABLE by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications, for approximately 7 days. This onsite fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the DGs for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources.

Fuel oil is transferred from storage tank to day tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each storage tank. Valving is also available so that fuel oil can be transferred between fuel oil storage tanks and the day tanks. Redundancy of pumps and piping precludes the failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve, or tank to result in the loss of more than one DG. All outside tanks, pumps, and piping are located underground.

For proper operation of the standby DGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the stored fuel oil. The fuel oil property monitored is the total particulate concentration. Periodic testing of the stored fuel oil total particulate concentration is a method to monitor the potential degradation related to long term storage and the potential impact to fuel filter plugging as a result of high particulate levels.

The DG lubrication system is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated DG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during operation. Each engine oil sump contains an inventory capable of supporting a minimum of 7 days of operation. The onsite storage in addition to the engine oil sump is sufficient to ensure 7 days' continuous operation. This

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BASES

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BACKGROUND  
(continued)

supply is sufficient to allow the operator to replenish lube oil from outside sources.

Each DG has an air start system with adequate capacity for five successive start attempts on the DG without recharging the air start receivers.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref. 2), and Chapter 14 (Ref. 3), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil and transfer, lube oil, and starting air subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

---

LCO

Stored diesel fuel oil is required to have sufficient supply for 7 days of full load operation. Three fuel oil storage tanks (the Unit 1 and swing DGs), each  $\geq 33,000$  gallons, will provide the necessary volume. Included in this requirement is the transfer capability automatically from the Unit 1 and swing DGs storage tanks to the associated day tank and manually from each Unit 1 and swing DG storage tank to the day tanks of each required DG. It is also required to meet specific standards for quality. Additionally, sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure the capability to operate at full load for 7 days. This requirement, in conjunction with an ability to obtain replacement supplies within 7 days, supports the availability of DGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power. DG day tank fuel oil requirements are

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BASES

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LCO (continued) addressed in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources — Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources — Shutdown."

The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for five successive DG start attempts without recharging the air start receivers. Only one air start receiver per DG is required, since each air start receiver has the required capacity.

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APPLICABILITY

The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated DBA. Because stored diesel fuel oil and transfer, lube oil, and starting air subsystem support LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, stored diesel fuel oil and transfer, lube oil, and starting air are required to be within limits when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE.

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ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each DG. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable DG subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable DG subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable DG subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1

With one or more required DGs with one fuel oil transfer pump inoperable, the inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE fuel transfer pump is adequate to perform the fuel transfer function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE pump could result in loss of the associated DG and loss of the fuel oil in the respective tank. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the remaining fuel oil

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

transfer capability, and the low probability of the need for the DG concurrent with a worst case single failure.

B.1

In this condition, the 7 day fuel oil supply for a required DG is not available. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel oil level reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. These circumstances may be caused by events such as:

- a. Full load operation required for an inadvertent start while at minimum required level; or
- b. Feed and bleed operations that may be necessitated by increasing particulate levels or any number of other oil quality degradations.

This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing the analyses required prior to addition of the fuel oil to the tank. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required level prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

C.1

With a required DG lube oil inventory < 400 gal, sufficient lube oil to support 7 days of continuous DG operation at full load conditions may not be available. However, the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required volume prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

D.1

This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion for particulates. Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. Poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine, since particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance Frequency intervals, and since proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declaring the associated DG inoperable. The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling, and re-analysis of the DG fuel oil.

E.1

With required starting air receiver pressure < 225 psig, sufficient capacity for five successive DG start attempts does not exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is  $\geq$  170 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the DG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most DG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

F.1

With a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met, one or more required DG fuel oil transfer subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, one or more required DG fuel oil storage tanks with fuel oil level not within limits for reasons other than Condition B, or the stored diesel lube oil or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Condition C or E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the Unit 1 and swing DG storage tanks to support the required DGs' operation for 7 days at the assumed load.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.3.2

This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lubricating oil inventory (combined inventory in the DG lubricating oil sump and stored in the warehouse) is available to support at least 7 days of full load operation for each required DG. The 400 gal requirement is based on the DG manufacturer's consumption values for the run time of the DG. Implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the DG, since the DG lube oil sump does not hold adequate inventory for 7 days of full load operation without the level reaching the manufacturer's recommended minimum level.

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since DG starts and run time are closely monitored by the plant staff.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.3.3

This SR verifies that the required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil testing is performed in accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Tests are a means of monitoring the potential degradation related to long term storage and the potential impact to fuel filter plugging as a result of high particulate levels. Specific sampling requirements, frequencies, and additional information are discussed in detail in the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.

SR 3.8.3.4

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each required DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of five engine start cycles without recharging. A start cycle is defined by the DG vendor, but usually is measured in terms of time (seconds of cranking) or engine cranking speed. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the five starts can be accomplished using one air receiver.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

SR 3.8.3.5

This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer are OPERABLE.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.5 (continued)

The design of the fuel transfer systems is such that pumps operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following DG testing. Therefore, a 31 day Frequency is specified to correspond to the maximum interval for DG testing.

SR 3.8.3.6

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel storage tanks once every 184 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water in the storage tank may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during performance of the Surveillance.

SR 3.8.3.7

This Surveillance demonstrates that each required Unit 1 and swing DG fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to each required DG's day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources, since fuel from three storage tanks is needed to supply fuel for two DGs to meet the 7 day supply requirement discussed in the Background section of these Bases. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pumps are OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.7 (continued)

system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for manual fuel transfer are OPERABLE.

Since the fuel oil transfer pumps are being tested on a 31 day Frequency in accordance with SR 3.8.3.5, the 18 month Frequency has been determined to be acceptable based on engineering judgement and operating experience.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 8.4.
  2. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
  3. FSAR, Chapter 14.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.4 DC Sources — Operating

BASES

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BACKGROUND

The DC electrical power system provides the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment. As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system also conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).

The station service DC power sources provide both motive and control power to selected safety related and nonsafety related equipment. Each DC subsystem is energized by one 125/250 V station service battery and three 125 V battery chargers (two normally inservice chargers and one standby charger). Each battery is exclusively associated with a single 125/250 VDC bus. Each set of battery chargers exclusively associated with a 125/250 VDC subsystem cannot be interconnected with any other 125/250 VDC subsystem. The normal and backup chargers are supplied from the same AC load groups for which the associated DC subsystem supplies the control power. The loads between the redundant 125/250 VDC subsystem are not transferable except for the Automatic Depressurization System, the logic circuits and valves of which are normally fed from the Division 1 DC system.

The diesel generator (DG) DC power sources provide control and instrumentation power for their respective DG and their respective offsite circuit supply breakers. In addition, DG 1A power source provides circuit breaker control power for the respective Division I loads on 4160 VAC buses 1E and 1F, and DG 1C power source provides circuit breaker control power for the respective Division II loads on 4160 VAC buses 1F and 1G. Each DG DC subsystem is energized by one 125 V battery and two 125 V battery chargers (one normally inservice charger and one standby charger).

(continued)

BASES

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BACKGROUND  
(continued)

During normal operation, the DC loads are powered from the respective station service and DG battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system.

In case of loss of normal power to any battery charger, the DC loads are automatically powered from the associated battery. This will result in the discharging of the associated battery (and affect the battery cell parameters).

The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution System — Operating," and LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution System — Shutdown."

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for approximately 2 hours (Ref. 4).

Each DC battery subsystem is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution panels. Each subsystem is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other subsystems to ensure that a single failure in one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E subsystems such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels.

The batteries for DC electrical power subsystems are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life. The minimum design voltage limit is 105/210 V.

Each battery charger of DC electrical power subsystem has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining a fully charged battery. Each battery charger has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours while supplying normal steady state loads (Ref. 4).

A description of the Unit 2 DC power sources is provided in the Bases for Unit 2 LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources—Operating."

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref. 5) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 6), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation. The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC power sources or all onsite AC power sources; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 13).

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LCO

The Unit 1 DC electrical power subsystems — with: 1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V batteries in series, two battery chargers, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus; and 2) each DG DC subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling — are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. In addition, some components required by Unit 1 require power from Unit 2 sources (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System). Therefore, the Unit 2 DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to provide DC power to the required Unit 2 components are also required to be OPERABLE. Thus, loss of any DC electrical power subsystem does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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APPLICABILITY

The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 4 and 5, and other conditions in which DC Sources are required, are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources — Shutdown."

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ACTIONS

A.1

If one or more of the required Unit 2 DG DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable battery charger(s), or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), or if the swing DG DC electrical power subsystem is inoperable due to performance of SR 3.8.4.7 or SR 3.8.4.8, and a loss of function has not occurred as described in Condition E, the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. In the case of an inoperable required Unit 2 DG DC electrical power subsystem, since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of certain safety functions (e.g., SGT System), continued power operation should not exceed 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources, and is based on the shortest restoration time allowed for the systems affected by the inoperable DC source in the respective system Specification.

In the case of an inoperable swing DG DC electrical power subsystem, since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power operation should also not exceed 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based upon the swing

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

DG DC electrical power subsystem being inoperable due to performance of SR 3.8.4.7 or SR 3.8.4.8. Performance of these two SRs will result in inoperability of the DC battery. Since this battery is common to both units, more time is provided to restore the battery, if the battery is inoperable for performance of required Surveillances, to preclude the need to perform a dual unit shutdown to perform these Surveillances. The swing DG DC electrical power subsystem also does not provide power to the same type of equipment as the other DG DC sources (e.g., breaker control power for 4160 V loads is not provided by the swing DG battery). The Completion Time also takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources.

B.1

If a Unit 1 or swing DG DC electrical power subsystem is inoperable (for reasons other than Condition A), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 12 hours. The 12 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining the DG DC electrical power subsystem OPERABLE. (The DG DC electrical power subsystem affects both the DG and the offsite circuit, as well as the breaker closure power for various 4160 V AC loads, but does not affect 125/250 V DC station service loads.)

C.1

Condition C represents one Unit 1 station service division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The 2 hour limit is consistent with

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

the allowed time for an inoperable DC Distribution System division.

If one of the required DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable battery charger(s), or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

D.1 and D.2

If the DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).

E.1

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the DC electrical power subsystems that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one DC source is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued

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BASES

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ACTIONS

E.1 (continued)

operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

The SRs are modified by a NOTE to indicate that SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8 apply only to the Unit 1 DC sources, and that SR 3.8.4.9 applies only to the Unit 2 DC sources.

SR 3.8.4.1

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. Voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The voltage requirement for battery terminal voltage is based on the open circuit voltage of a lead-calcium cell of nominal 1.215 specific gravity. Without regard to other battery parameters, this voltage is indicative of a battery that is capable of performing its required safety function. The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer's recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

SR 3.8.4.2

Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.2 (continued)

The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Reference 9).

The Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to detecting corrosion trends.

SR 3.8.4.3

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The 18 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the desired plant conditions to perform the Surveillance. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5

Visual inspection and resistance measurements of inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connections provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anti-corrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection.

The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5 (continued)

The connection resistance limits are established to maintain connection resistance as low as reasonably possible to minimize the overall voltage drop across the battery and the possibility of battery damage due to heating of connections. The resistance values for each battery connection are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (Reference 9).

The 18 month Frequency of the Surveillances is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the desired plant conditions to perform the Surveillance. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.4.6

Battery charger capability requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10), each battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

The Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 18 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.4.7

A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.7 (continued)

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 10) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 11), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 18 months.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test.

The modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates: the 1 minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated 1 minute discharge represent a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

A modified performance discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service discharge test.

The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.7 (continued)

events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.

SR 3.8.4.8

A battery performance discharge test is a constant current capacity test to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. Initial conditions consistent with IEEE-450 need to be met prior to the performing of a battery performance discharge test. The test results reflect the overall effects of usage and age.

A battery modified performance discharge test is described in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.7. Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.8, while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.7 at the same time.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 8) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 12). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. Although there may be ample capacity, the battery rate of deterioration is rapidly increasing.

The Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected application service life and capacity is  $\leq 100\%$  of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected application service life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity  $\geq 100\%$  of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.8 (continued)

indicated, according to IEEE-450 (Ref. 8), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% of rated capacity from its capacity on the previous performance test or is more than 10% below the manufacturer's rating. All these Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance. The swing DG DC battery is exempted from this restriction, since it is required by both units' LCO 3.8.4 and cannot be performed in the manner required by the Note without resulting in a dual unit shutdown.

SR 3.8.4.9

With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8) are applied only to the Unit 1 DC sources. This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DC sources are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1 Surveillance Requirement.

The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
2. Regulatory Guide 1.6.
3. IEEE Standard 308-1971.
4. FSAR, Section 8.5.

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BASES

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REFERENCES  
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5. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
  6. FSAR, Chapter 14.
  7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
  8. IEEE Standard 450-1987.
  9. Technical Requirements Manual.
  10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
  11. Regulatory Guide 1.129, December 1974.
  12. IEEE Standard 485-1983.
  13. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources — Shutdown

BASES

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**BACKGROUND** A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources — Operating."

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

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**LCO** The necessary Unit 1 DC electrical power subsystems — with:  
1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two .125 V batteries in series, two battery chargers, and the

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BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling; and 2) each DG DC subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling — are required to be OPERABLE to support required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems — Shutdown." In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 1 require power from Unit 2 sources (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System). Therefore, the Unit 2 DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to provide DC power to the required Unit 2 components are also required to be OPERABLE. This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

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APPLICABILITY

The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4

If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power sources inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1

SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

SR 3.8.5.2

This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DC sources are governed by the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable Unit 2 Surveillances will satisfy both any Unit 2 requirements, as well as satisfying this Unit 1 Surveillance Requirement. The Frequency required by the applicable Unit 2 SR also governs performance of that SR for both Units.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
  2. FSAR, Chapter 14.
  3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

BASES

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**BACKGROUND** This LCO delineates the limits on electrolyte temperature, level, float voltage, and specific gravity for the DC electrical power subsystems batteries. A discussion of these batteries and their OPERABILITY requirements is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources — Operating," and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources — Shutdown."

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power subsystems provide normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining at least one division of DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions, in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.

Since battery cell parameters support the operation of the DC electrical power subsystems, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

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**LCO** Battery cell parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. Cell parameter limits are established to allow continued DC electrical system function even with Category A and B limits not met.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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**APPLICABILITY** The battery cell parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC electrical power subsystem. Therefore, these cell parameters are only required when the DC power source is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussions in Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.

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**ACTIONS** A Note has been added providing that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each battery. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable battery. Complying with the Required Actions for battery cell parameters allows for restoration and continued operation, and subsequent out of limit battery cell parameters may be governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With parameters of one or more cells in one or more batteries not within limits (i.e., Category A limits not met or Category B limits not met, or Category A and B limits not met) but within the Category C limits specified in Table 3.8.6-1, the battery is degraded but there is still sufficient capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of Category A or B limits not met, and continued operation is permitted for a limited period.

The pilot cell electrolyte level and float voltage are required to be verified to meet the Category C limits within 1 hour (Required Action A.1). This check provides a quick indication of the status of the remainder of the battery cells. One hour provides time to inspect the electrolyte level and to confirm the float voltage of the pilot cells. One hour is considered a reasonable amount of time to perform the required verification.

Verification that the Category C limits are met (Required Action A.2) provides assurance that during the time needed to restore the parameters to the Category A and B limits,

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

the battery is still capable of performing its intended function. A period of 24 hours is allowed to complete the initial verification because specific gravity measurements must be obtained for each connected cell. Taking into consideration both the time required to perform the required verification and the assurance that the battery cell parameters are not severely degraded, this time is considered reasonable. The verification is repeated at 7 day intervals until the parameters are restored to Category A and B limits. This periodic verification is consistent with the normal Frequency of pilot cell surveillances.

Continued operation is only permitted for 31 days before battery cell parameters must be restored to within Category A and B limits. Taking into consideration that, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and to allow time to fully restore the battery cell parameters to normal limits, this time is acceptable for operation prior to declaring the associated DC battery inoperable.

B.1

When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit for any connected cell, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not ensured and the corresponding DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. Additionally, other potentially extreme conditions, such as not completing the Required Actions of Condition A within the required Completion Time or average electrolyte temperature of representative cells falling below the appropriate limit (65°F for station service and 40°F for DG batteries), also are cause for immediately declaring the associated DC electrical power subsystem inoperable.

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BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.6.1

This SR verifies that Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends regular battery inspections (at least one per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte level of pilot cells.

SR 3.8.6.2

The 92 day inspection of specific gravity, cell voltage, and level is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). In addition, within 24 hours of a battery overcharge > 150 V, the battery must be demonstrated to meet Category B limits. This inspection is also consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends special inspections following a severe overcharge, to ensure that no significant degradation of the battery occurs as a consequence of such overcharge.

SR 3.8.6.3

This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is within limits is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) that states that the temperature of electrolyte in representative cells should be determined on a quarterly basis.

Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity. This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on IEEE-450 or the manufacturer's recommendations when provided.

Table 3.8.6-1

This table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. The meaning of each category is discussed below.

Category A defines the normal parameter limit for each designated pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage, and

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

electrolyte specific gravity approximate the condition of the entire battery.

The Category A limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer's recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), with the extra ¼ inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperature and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote a to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours.

The Category A limit specified for float voltage is  $\geq 2.13$  V per cell. This value is based on the recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that prolonged operation of cells below 2.13 V can reduce the life expectancy of cells.

The Category A limit specified for specific gravity for each pilot cell is  $\geq 1.200$  (0.015 below the manufacturer's fully charged nominal specific gravity) or a battery charging current that had stabilized at a low value. This value is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. According to IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), the specific gravity readings are based on a temperature of 77°F (25°C).

The specific gravity readings are corrected for actual electrolyte temperature and level. For each 3°F (1.67°C) above 77°F (25°C), 1 point (0.001) is added to the reading; 1 point is subtracted for each 3°F below 77°F. The specific gravity of the electrolyte in a cell increases with a loss of water due to electrolysis or evaporation. Level correction will be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations.

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected cell. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

The Category B limits specified for electrolyte level and float voltage are the same as those specified for Category A and have been discussed above. The Category B limit specified for specific gravity for each connected cell is  $\geq 1.195$  (0.020 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity) with the average of all connected cells 1.205 (0.010 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity). These values are based on manufacturer's recommendations. The minimum specific gravity value required for each cell ensures that the effects of a highly charged or newly installed cell do not mask overall degradation of the battery.

Category C defines the limits for each connected cell. These values, although reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limit, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists, and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C limits specified for electrolyte level (above the top of the plates and not overflowing) ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability. The Category C limit for voltage is based on IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that a cell voltage of 2.07 V or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement.

The Category C Allowable Value of average specific gravity  $\geq 1.195$ , is based on manufacturer's recommendations (0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended fully charged, nominal specific gravity). In addition to that limit, it is required that the specific gravity for each connected cell must be no less than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells. This limit ensures that the effect of a highly charged or new cell does not mask overall degradation of the battery.

The footnotes to Table 3.8.6-1 that apply to specific gravity are applicable to Category A, B, and C specific gravity. Footnote b of Table 3.8.6-1 requires the above mentioned correction for electrolyte level and temperature,

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

with the exception that level correction is not required when battery charging current, while on float charge, is < 1 amp for station service batteries and < 0.5 amp for DG batteries. This current provides, in general, an indication of overall battery condition.

Because of specific gravity gradients that are produced during the recharging process, delays of several days may occur while waiting for the specific gravity to stabilize. A stabilized charger current is an acceptable alternative to specific gravity measurement for determining the state of charge of the designated pilot cell. This phenomenon is discussed in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). Footnote c to Table 3.8.6-1 allows the float charge current to be used as an alternate to specific gravity for up to 7 days following a battery recharge.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
  2. FSAR, Chapter 14.
  3. IEEE Standard 450-1987.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems — Operating

BASES

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BACKGROUND

The onsite Class 1E AC and DC electrical power distribution system is divided into redundant and independent AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems.

The primary AC distribution system consists of three 4.16 kV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses each having an offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel generator (DG) source. Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is normally connected to a normal source startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) (1D). During a loss of the normal offsite power source to the 4.16 kV ESF buses, the alternate supply breaker from SAT 1C attempts to close. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite emergency DGs supply power to the 4.16 kV ESF buses.

The secondary plant distribution system includes 600 VAC emergency buses 1C and 1D and associated load centers, and transformers.

There are two independent 125/250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystems and three independent 125 VDC DG electrical power distribution subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF functions.

A description of the Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for Unit 2 LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution System—Operating."

The list of required Unit 1 distribution buses is presented in LCO 3.8.7.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor

(continued)

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6 Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power sources or all onsite AC electrical power sources; and
- b. A postulated worst case single failure.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

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LCO

The Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The required Unit 1 electrical power distribution subsystems listed in LCO 3.8.7 ensure the availability of AC and DC electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Should one or more buses not listed in LCO 3.8.7 become inoperable due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LCO 3.8.7 (e.g., a breaker supplying a single MCC faults open), the individual loads on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCOs governing the individual loads would be entered. If however, one or more of these buses is inoperable due to a failure also affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in LCO 3.8.7 (e.g., loss of a 4.16 kV ESF bus, which results in de-energization of all buses powered from the 4.16 kV ESF bus), the Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LCO 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the

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BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; the 4.16 kV ESF bus). In addition, since some components required by Unit 1 receive power through Unit 2 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System), the Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

Maintaining the Division 1 and 2 and swing bus AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

The AC electrical power distribution subsystem requires the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger.

In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC and DC power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). If any tie breakers are closed, the electrical power distribution subsystem which is not being powered from its normal source (i.e., it is being powered from its redundant electrical power distribution subsystem) is considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class 1E 4.16 kV ESF buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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APPLICABILITY      The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 4 and 5, and other conditions in which AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required, are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems — Shutdown."

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ACTIONS

A.1

If one or more of the required Unit 2 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems are inoperable, and a loss of function has not occurred as described in Condition F, the remaining AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of certain safety functions (e.g., SGT System), continued power operation should not exceed 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, and is based on the shortest restoration time allowed for the systems affected by the inoperable AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem in the respective system Specification.

B.1

If a Unit 1 or swing DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem is inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent postulated worst case single failure could,

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BASES

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ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a postulated worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 12 hours. The 12 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining the DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem OPERABLE. (The DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem affects both the DG and the offsite circuit, as well as the breaker closure power for various 4160 V AC loads, but does not affect 125/250 V DC station service loads). The 12 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because:

- a. There is a potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected bus(es) to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.
- b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. (The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.5.10, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).")

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, a Unit 1 or swing AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 20 hours, since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the Unit 1 and swing DG DC distribution system. At this time a Unit 1 or swing AC bus could again become inoperable, and Unit 1 and swing DG DC distribution system could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

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BASES

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ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

C.1

With one or more required Unit 1 or swing AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, or distribution panels in one subsystem inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours.

The Condition C postulated worst scenario is one 4160 V bus without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the 4160 V bus and the associated DG inoperable). In this condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of Unit 1 AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operators' attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining buses by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected buses. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because:

- a. There is a potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected bus(es) to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

- b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. (The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.5.10, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).")

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition C is entered while, for instance, a Unit 1 station service DC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 2 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the Unit 1 and swing AC distribution system. At this time a Unit 1 station service DC bus could again become inoperable, and Unit 1 and swing AC distribution system could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition C was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

D.1

With one Unit 1 station service DC bus inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required Unit 1 DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

D.1 (continued)

Condition D represents one Unit 1 division without adequate DC power, potentially with both the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all Unit 1 station service DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining division, and restoring power to the affected division.

This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the majority of components that would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours, is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety when requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while not allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power, while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division;
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

The second Completion Time for Required Action D.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition D is entered while, for instance, Unit 1 or swing AC bus is inoperable and subsequently restored OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure

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BASES

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ACTIONS

D.1 (continued)

of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the Unit 1 station service DC distribution system. At this time, Unit 1 or swing AC bus could again become inoperable, and Unit 1 station service DC distribution system could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition D was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely.

E.1 and E.2

If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1

Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical power distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem is lost, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

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BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical buses are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
  2. FSAR, Chapter 14.
  3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems — Shutdown

BASES

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**BACKGROUND** A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems — Operating."

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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**LCO** Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the Unit 1 electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components — both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY. In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 1 receive power through Unit 2 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System). Therefore, the Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

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**APPLICABILITY** The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

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BASES

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APPLICABILITY      The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem  
(continued)        requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

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ACTIONS            A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5

Although redundant required features may require redundant electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR-SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR-SDC ACTIONS.

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5 (continued)

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem is functioning properly, with the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the electrical power distribution subsystems, as well as other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6.
  2. FSAR, Chapter 14.
  3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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## B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The refueling interlock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed conditions, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods, when fully inserted, serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions during all fuel movement activities and accidents.

Instrumentation is provided to sense the position of the refueling platform, the loading of the refueling platform fuel grapple, and the full insertion of all control rods. Additionally, inputs are provided for the loading of the refueling platform frame-mounted hoist, the loading of the refueling platform trolley-mounted hoist, the full retraction of the fuel grapple, and the loading of the service platform hoist. With the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refueling position, the indicated conditions are combined in logic circuits to determine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod insertion are satisfied.

A control rod not at its full-in position interrupts power to the refueling equipment and prevents operating the equipment over the reactor core when loaded with a fuel assembly. Conversely, the refueling equipment located over the core and loaded with fuel inserts a control rod withdrawal block in the Control Rod Drive System to prevent withdrawing a control rod.

The refueling platform has two mechanical switches that open before the platform or any of its hoists are physically

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BASES

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BACKGROUND  
(continued)

located over the reactor vessel. All refueling hoists have switches that open when the hoists are loaded with fuel.

The refueling interlocks use these indications to prevent operation of the refueling equipment with fuel loaded over the core whenever any control rod is withdrawn, or to prevent control rod withdrawal whenever fuel loaded refueling equipment is over the core (Ref. 2).

The hoist switches open at a load lighter than the weight of a single fuel assembly in water.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The refueling interlocks are explicitly assumed in the FSAR analyses for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3) and the fuel assembly insertion error during refueling (Ref. 4). These analyses evaluate the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling and also fuel assembly insertion with a control rod withdrawn. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

Criticality and, therefore, subsequent prompt reactivity excursions are prevented during the insertion of fuel, provided all control rods are fully inserted during the fuel insertion. The refueling interlocks accomplish this by preventing loading of fuel into the core with any control rod withdrawn or by preventing withdrawal of a rod from the core during fuel loading.

The refueling platform location switches activate at a point outside of the reactor core such that, with a fuel assembly loaded and a control rod withdrawn, the fuel is not over the core.

Refueling equipment interlocks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5).

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LCO

To prevent criticality during refueling, the refueling interlocks ensure that fuel assemblies are not loaded with any control rod withdrawn.

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BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

To prevent these conditions from developing, the all-rods-in, the refueling platform position, the refueling platform fuel grapple fuel loaded, the refueling platform trolley-mounted hoist fuel loaded, the refueling platform frame-mounted hoist fuel loaded, the refueling platform fuel grapple full-up position, and the service platform hoist fuel loaded inputs are required to be OPERABLE. These inputs are combined in logic circuits, which provide refueling equipment or control rod blocks to prevent operations that could result in criticality during refueling operations.

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APPLICABILITY

In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and CORE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

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ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. In-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to unit operations personnel.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
  2. FSAR, Section 7.6.3.
  3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
  4. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.
  5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock

BASES

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BACKGROUND

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock restricts the movement of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock prevents the selection of a second control rod for movement when any other control rod is not fully inserted (Ref. 2). It is a logic circuit that has redundant channels. It uses the all-rods-in signal (from the control rod full-in position indicators discussed in LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication") and a rod selection signal (from the Reactor Manual Control System).

This Specification ensures that the performance of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock in the event of a Design Basis Accident meets the assumptions used in the safety analysis of Reference 3.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The refueling position one-rod-out interlock is explicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis for the control rod withdrawal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock and adequate SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "Shutdown Margin (SDM)") prevent criticality by preventing withdrawal of more than one control rod. With

(continued)

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BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

one control rod withdrawn, the core will remain subcritical, thereby preventing any prompt critical excursion.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

---

LCO

To prevent criticality during MODE 5, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock ensures no more than one control rod may be withdrawn. Both channels of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock are required to be OPERABLE and the reactor mode switch must be locked in the refuel position to support the OPERABILITY of these channels.

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APPLICABILITY

In MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the OPERABLE refuel position one-rod-out interlock provides protection against prompt reactivity excursions.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock is not required to be OPERABLE and is bypassed. In MODES 1 and 2, the Reactor Protection System (LCO 3.3.1.1) and the control rods (LCO 3.1.3) provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions. In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1) ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

---

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With one or both channels of the refueling position one-rod-out interlock inoperable, the refueling interlocks may not be capable of preventing more than one control rod from being withdrawn. This condition may lead to criticality.

Control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended, and action must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all such

(continued)

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

control rods are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.1

Proper functioning of the refueling position one-rod-out interlock requires the reactor mode switch to be in Refuel. During control rod withdrawal in MODE 5, improper positioning of the reactor mode switch could, in some instances, allow improper bypassing of required interlocks. Therefore, this Surveillance imposes an additional level of assurance that the refueling position one-rod-out interlock will be OPERABLE when required. By "locking" the reactor mode switch in the proper position (i.e., removing the reactor mode switch key from the console while the reactor mode switch is positioned in refuel), an additional administrative control is in place to preclude operator errors from resulting in unanalyzed operation.

The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other administrative controls utilized during refueling operations to ensure safe operation.

SR 3.9.2.2

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel demonstrates the associated refuel position one-rod-out interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested. The 7 day Frequency is considered adequate because of demonstrated circuit reliability, procedural controls on control rod withdrawals, and visual and audible indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted. To perform the required testing, the applicable condition must be entered (i.e., a control rod must be withdrawn from its full-in position). Therefore, SR 3.9.2.2 has been modified by a Note that states the

(continued)

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.2 (continued)

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
  2. FSAR, Section 7.6.3.
  3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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## B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

Control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the Control Rod Drive System. During refueling, movement of control rods is limited by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2) or the control rod block with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (LCO 3.3.2.1).

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refueling interlocks allow a single control rod to be withdrawn at any time unless fuel is being loaded into the core. To preclude loading fuel assemblies into the core with a control rod withdrawn, all control rods must be fully inserted. This prevents the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling operations.

---

#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided, when required, by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The safety analysis for the control rod withdrawal error during refueling in the FSAR (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. The analysis for the fuel assembly insertion error (Ref. 3) assumes all control rods are fully inserted. Thus, prior to fuel reload, all control rods must be fully inserted to minimize the probability of an inadvertent criticality. Control rod position satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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LCO All control rods must be fully inserted during applicable refueling conditions to minimize the probability of an inadvertent criticality during refueling.

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APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, loading fuel into core cells with the control rods withdrawn may result in inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the control rods must be inserted before loading fuel into a core cell. All control rods must be inserted before loading fuel to ensure that a fuel loading error does not result in loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, this Specification is not applicable in these MODES.

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ACTIONS

A.1

With all control rods not fully inserted during the applicable conditions, an inadvertent criticality could occur that is not analyzed in the FSAR. All fuel loading operations must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

---

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.3.1

During refueling, to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical, all control rods must be fully inserted prior to and during fuel loading. Periodic checks of the control rod position ensure this condition is maintained.

The 12 hour Frequency takes into consideration the procedural controls on control rod movement during refueling as well as the redundant functions of the refueling interlocks.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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- REFERENCES
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
  2. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
  3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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## B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The full-in position indication channel for each control rod provides necessary information to the refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling operations. During refueling, the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2) use the full-in position indication channel to limit the operation of the refueling equipment and the movement of the control rods. The absence of the full-in position channel signal for any control rod removes the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks and prevents fuel loading. Also, this condition causes the refuel position one-rod-out interlock to not allow the withdrawal of any other control rod.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

---

**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided, when required, by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The safety analysis for the control rod withdrawal error during refueling (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. The analysis for the fuel assembly insertion error (Ref. 3) assumes all control rods are fully inserted. The full-in position indication channel is required to be OPERABLE so that the refueling interlocks can ensure that fuel cannot be loaded with any control rod withdrawn and that no more than one control rod can be withdrawn at a time.

Control rod position indication satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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LCO Each control rod full-in position indication channel must be OPERABLE to provide the required input to the refueling interlocks. A channel is OPERABLE if it provides correct position indication to the refueling interlock logic.

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APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, the control rods must have OPERABLE full-in position indication channels to ensure the applicable refueling interlocks will be OPERABLE.

In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for control rod position are specified in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY." In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1) ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

---

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to control rod position indication channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable control rod position indication channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, this Note has been provided, which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable required control rod position indication channel.

A.1.1, A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1, and A.2.2

With one or more required full-in position indication channels inoperable, compensating actions must be taken to protect against potential reactivity excursions from fuel assembly insertions or control rod withdrawals. This may be accomplished by immediately suspending in-vessel fuel movement and control rod withdrawal, and immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control

(continued)

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1.1, A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1, and A.2.2 (continued)

rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Actions must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted. Suspension of in-vessel fuel movements and control rod withdrawal shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.

Alternatively, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert the control rod(s) associated with the inoperable full-in position indicator(s) and disarm (electrically or hydraulically) the drive(s) to ensure that the control rod is not withdrawn. A control rod can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. A control rod can be electrically disarmed by disconnecting power from all four direction control valve solenoids. Actions must continue until all associated control rods are fully inserted and drives are disarmed. Under these conditions (control rod fully inserted and disarmed), an inoperable full-in channel may be bypassed to allow refueling operations to proceed. An alternate method must be used to ensure the control rod is fully inserted (e.g., use the "00" notch position indication).

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.4.1

The full-in position indication channels provide input to the one-rod-out interlock and other refueling interlocks that require an all-rods-in permissive. The interlocks are actuated when the full-in position indication for any control rod is not present, since this indicates that all rods are not fully inserted. Therefore, testing of the full-in position indication channels is performed to ensure that when a control rod is withdrawn, the full-in position indication is not present. The full-in position indication channel is considered inoperable even with the control rod fully inserted, if it would continue to indicate full-in with the control rod withdrawn. Performing the SR each time a control rod is withdrawn from the full-in position is considered adequate because of the procedural controls on control rod withdrawals and the visual and audible indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
  2. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
  3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY — Refueling

BASES

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BACKGROUND

Control rods are components of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System, the primary reactivity control system for the reactor. In conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, the CRD System provides the means for the reliable control of reactivity changes during refueling operation. In addition, the control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the CRD System.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The CRD System is the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

---

APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided, when required, by refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The safety analyses for the control rod withdrawal error during refueling (Ref. 2) and the fuel assembly insertion error (Ref. 3) evaluate the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling and also fuel assembly insertion with a control rod withdrawn. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. Control rod scram provides protection should a prompt reactivity excursion occur.

Control rod OPERABILITY during refueling satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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LCO Each withdrawn control rod must be OPERABLE. The withdrawn control rod is considered OPERABLE if the scram accumulator pressure is  $\geq 940$  psig and the control rod is capable of being automatically inserted upon receipt of a scram signal. Inserted control rods have already completed their reactivity control function, and therefore, are not required to be OPERABLE.

---

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, withdrawn control rods must be OPERABLE to ensure that in a scram the control rods will insert and provide the required negative reactivity to maintain the reactor subcritical.

For MODES 1 and 2, control rod requirements are found in LCO 3.1.2, "Reactivity Anomalies," LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." During MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions.

---

ACTIONS A.1

With one or more withdrawn control rods inoperable, action must be immediately initiated to fully insert the inoperable control rod(s). Inserting the control rod(s) ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. Actions must continue until the inoperable control rod(s) is fully inserted.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2

During MODE 5, the OPERABILITY of control rods is primarily required to ensure a withdrawn control rod will automatically insert if a signal requiring a reactor shutdown occurs. Because no explicit analysis exists for

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)

automatic shutdown during refueling, the shutdown function is satisfied if the withdrawn control rod is capable of automatic insertion and the associated CRD scram accumulator pressure is  $\geq 940$  psig.

The 7 day Frequency takes into consideration equipment reliability, procedural controls over the scram accumulators, and control room alarms and indicating lights that indicate low accumulator charge pressures.

SR 3.9.5.1 is modified by a Note that allows 7 days after withdrawal of the control rod to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must first be withdrawn before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore avoids potential conflicts with SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.4.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
  2. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
  3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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## B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The movement of fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV requires a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level in the reactor vessel cavity. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. 1 and 2). Sufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to well below the guideline doses of 10 CFR 100, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

---

**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** During movement of fuel assemblies or handling of control rods, the water level in the RPV is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of 23 ft (Regulatory Position C.1.c of Ref. 1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Position C.1.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Ref. 1).

Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a minimum water level of 23 ft and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis and test programs demonstrate that the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water and that offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 4). The related assumptions include the worst case dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly onto the reactor core loaded with irradiated fuel assemblies.

RPV water level satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5).

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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**LCO** A minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

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**APPLICABILITY** LCO 3.9.6 is applicable when moving fuel assemblies or handling control rods (i.e., movement with other than the normal control rod drive) within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level."

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**ACTIONS**

A.1

If the water level is < 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV, all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of fuel movement and control rod handling shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

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**SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.9.6.1

Verification of a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).

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(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.6.1 (continued)

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

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REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23, 1972.
  2. FSAR, Section 14.4.4.
  3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.
  4. 10 CFR 100.11.
  5. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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## B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### B 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) — High Water Level

#### BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as required by GDC 34 (Ref. 1). Each of the two shutdown cooling loops of the RHR System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of two motor driven pumps, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchangers, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RHR Service Water System. The RHR shutdown cooling mode is manually controlled.

In addition to the RHR subsystems, the volume of water above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange provides a heat sink for decay heat removal.

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**APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES** With the unit in MODE 5, the RHR System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The RHR System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The RHR System satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

---

**LCO** Only one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is required to be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level  $\geq$  22 ft 1/8 inches above the RPV flange (equivalent to 21 ft of water above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks). Only one subsystem is required because the volume of water above the RPV flange provides backup decay heat removal capability.

(continued)

BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, an RHRSW pump providing cooling to the heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. In MODE 5, the RHR cross tie valve is not required to be closed; thus, the valve may be opened to allow RHR pumps in one loop to discharge through the opposite recirculation loop to make a complete subsystem. In addition, the RHRSW cross tie valves may be open to allow RHRSW pumps in one loop to provide cooling to a heat exchanger in the opposite loop to make a complete subsystem.

Additionally, each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception to shut down the operating subsystem every 8 hours.

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APPLICABILITY

One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level  $\geq 22$  ft 1/8 inches above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. RHR shutdown cooling subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). RHR Shutdown Cooling subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level  $< 22$  ft 1/8 inches above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) — Low Water Level."

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ACTIONS

A.1

With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be established within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water above the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliability is reduced because loss of water level could

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of these alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit's Operating Procedures. For example, this may include the use of the Fuel Pool Cooling System, the Reactor Water Cleanup System, operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed, or any other subsystem that can remove heat from the coolant. The method used to remove the decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is OPERABLE and an alternate method of decay heat removal is not available in accordance with Required Action A.1, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend operations involving an increase in reactor decay heat load by suspending loading of irradiated fuel assemblies into the RPV.

Additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring: 1) secondary containment (at least including the common refueling floor zone) is OPERABLE; 2) sufficient standby gas treatment subsystem(s) are OPERABLE to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION); and 3) secondary containment isolation capability is available (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactive releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.7.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR subsystem in the control room.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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- REFERENCES
1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 34.
  2. Technical Requirements Manual.
  3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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## B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

### B 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) — Low Water Level

#### BASES

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##### BACKGROUND

The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as required by GDC 34 (Ref. 1). Each of the two shutdown cooling loops of the RHR System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of two motor driven pumps, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchangers, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RHR Service Water System. The RHR shutdown cooling mode is manually controlled.

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##### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

With the unit in MODE 5, the RHR System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The RHR System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The RHR System satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

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##### LCO

In MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level < 22 ft 1/8 inches above the RPV flange, two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE.

An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, an RHRSW pump providing cooling to the heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. The two subsystems have a common suction source and are allowed to have a common heat exchanger and common discharge piping.

Since the piping and heat exchangers are passive components that are assumed not to fail, they are allowed to be common to both subsystems. Thus, to meet the LCO, both pumps in

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BASES

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LCO  
(continued) one loop or one pump in each of the two loops must be OPERABLE. In MODE 5, the RHR cross tie valve is not required to be closed; thus, the valve may be opened to allow pumps in one loop to discharge through the opposite recirculation loop to make a complete subsystem. In addition, the RHRSW cross tie valves may be open to allow RHRSW pumps in one loop to provide cooling to a heat exchanger in the opposite loop to make a complete subsystem.

Additionally, each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception to shut down the operating subsystem every 8 hours.

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APPLICABILITY Two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and one must be in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level < 22 ft 1/8 inches above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. RHR shutdown cooling subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). RHR shutdown cooling subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level  $\geq$  22 ft 1/8 inches above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) — High Water Level."

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ACTIONS

A.1

With one of the two required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, the remaining subsystem is capable of providing the required decay heat removal. However, the overall reliability is reduced. Therefore an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided. With both required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

provided for the initial RHR shutdown cooling subsystem inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of this alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit's Operating Procedures. For example, this may include the use of the Reactor Water Cleanup System, operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed. The method used to remove decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

With the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and the required alternate method(s) of decay heat removal not available in accordance with Required Action A.1, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring: 1) secondary containment (at least including the common refueling floor zone) is OPERABLE; 2) sufficient standby gas treatment subsystem(s) are OPERABLE to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION); and 3) secondary containment isolation capability is available (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability) in each associated secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactive releases. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not

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BASES

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ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.8.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR subsystems in the control room.

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REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 34.
2. Technical Requirements Manual.
3. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

## B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

### B 3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to allow certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in MODE 4 when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing at temperatures  $> 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  (normally corresponding to MODE 3).

System hydrostatic testing and system leakage (same as inservice leakage tests) pressure tests required by Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) are performed prior to the reactor going critical after a refueling outage. Inservice system leakage tests are performed at the end of each refueling outage with the system set for normal power operation. Some parts of the Class 1 boundary are not pressurized during these system tests. System hydrostatic tests are required once per interval and include all the Class 1 boundary unless the test is broken into smaller portions. Recirculation pump operation and a water solid RPV (except for an air bubble for pressure control) are used to achieve the necessary temperatures and pressures required for these tests. The minimum temperatures (at the required pressures) allowed for these tests are determined from the RPV pressure and temperature (P/T) limits required by LCO 3.4.9, "Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits." These limits are conservatively based on the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel, taking into account anticipated vessel neutron fluence. The hydrostatic test requires increasing pressure to approximately 1106 psig. The system leakage test requires increasing pressure to approximately 1005 psig.

With increased reactor vessel fluence over time, the minimum allowable vessel temperature increases at a given pressure. Periodic updates to the RCS P/T limit curves are performed as necessary, based upon the results of analyses of irradiated surveillance specimens removed from the vessel.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

Allowing the reactor to be considered in MODE 4 during hydrostatic or leak testing, when the reactor coolant temperature is  $> 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , effectively provides an exception to MODE 3 requirements, including OPERABILITY of primary containment and the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or leak tests are performed nearly water solid (except for an air bubble for pressure control), at low decay heat values, and near MODE 4 conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be very low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Specific Activity," limits are minimized. In addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit radiation releases to the environment.

In the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The capability of the low pressure coolant injection and core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown," would be more than adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs.

(continued)

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BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSIS  
(continued)

A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation at reactor coolant temperatures  $> 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  can be in accordance with Table 1.1-1 for MODE 3 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to P/T limits, however, which require testing at temperatures  $> 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ , while the ASME system hydrostatic test itself requires the safety/relief valves to be gagged, preventing their OPERABILITY.

If it is desired to perform these tests while complying with this Special Operations LCO, then the MODE 4 applicable LCOs and specified MODE 3 LCOs must be met. This Special Operations LCO allows changing Table 1.1-1 temperature limits for MODE 4 to "NA" and suspending the requirements of LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown." The additional requirements for secondary containment LCOs to be met will provide sufficient protection for operations at reactor coolant temperatures  $> 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  for the purpose of performing either an inservice leak or hydrostatic test.

This LCO allows primary containment to be open for frequent unobstructed access to perform inspections, and for outage activities on various systems to continue consistent with the MODE 4 applicable requirements that are in effect immediately prior to and immediately after this operation.

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APPLICABILITY

The MODE 4 requirements may only be modified for the performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic tests so that these operations can be considered as in MODE 4, even though the reactor coolant temperature is  $> 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ . The additional requirement for secondary containment OPERABILITY according to the imposed MODE 3 requirements provides conservatism in the response of the unit to any event that may occur. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operation. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1

If an LCO specified in LCO 3.10.1 is not met, the ACTIONS applicable to the stated requirements are entered immediately and complied with. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of another LCO's Required Action to be in MODE 4 includes reducing the average reactor coolant temperature to  $\leq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$ .

A.2.1 and A.2.2

Required Action A.2.1 and Required Action A.2.2 are alternate Required Actions that can be taken instead of Required Action A.1 to restore compliance with the normal MODE 4 requirements, and thereby exit this Special Operation LCO's Applicability. Activities that could further increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure are suspended immediately, in accordance with Required Action A.2.1, and the reactor coolant temperature is reduced to establish normal MODE 4 requirements. The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours for Required Action A.2.2 is based on engineering judgment and provides sufficient time to reduce the average reactor coolant temperature from the highest expected value to  $\leq 212^{\circ}\text{F}$  with normal cooldown procedures. The Completion Time is also consistent with the time provided in LCO 3.0.3 to reach MODE 4 from MODE 3.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.1.1

The LCOs made applicable are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this LCO is being met. A discussion of the applicable SRs is provided in their respective Bases.

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REFERENCES

1. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
  2. FSAR, Section 14.4.5.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing

BASES

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BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit operation of the reactor mode switch from one position to another to confirm certain aspects of associated interlocks during periodic tests and calibrations in MODES 3, 4, and 5.

The reactor mode switch is a conveniently located, multiposition, keylock switch provided to select the necessary scram functions for various plant conditions (Ref. 1). The reactor mode switch selects the appropriate trip relays for scram functions and provides appropriate bypasses. The mode switch positions and related scram interlock functions are summarized as follows:

- a. Shutdown - Initiates a reactor scram; bypasses main steam line isolation scram;
- b. Refuel - Selects Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) scram function for low neutron flux level operation (but does not disable the average power range monitor scram); bypasses main steam line isolation scram;
- c. Startup/Hot Standby - Selects NMS scram function for low neutron flux level operation (intermediate range monitors and average power range monitors); bypasses main steam line isolation; and
- d. Run - Selects NMS scram function for power range operation.

The reactor mode switch also provides interlocks for such functions as control rod blocks, scram discharge volume trip bypass, refueling interlocks, and main steam isolation valve isolations.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The acceptance criterion for reactor mode switch interlock testing is to prevent fuel failure by precluding reactivity excursions or core criticality. The interlock functions of the shutdown and refuel positions normally maintained for the reactor mode switch in MODES 3, 4, and 5 are provided to

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BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

preclude reactivity excursions that could potentially result in fuel failure. Interlock testing that requires moving the reactor mode switch to other positions (run, startup/hot standby, or refuel) while in MODE 3, 4, or 5 requires administratively maintaining all control rods inserted and no other CORE ALTERATIONS in progress. With all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies, and no CORE ALTERATIONS in progress, there are no credible mechanisms for unacceptable reactivity excursions during the planned interlock testing.

For postulated accidents, such as control rod removal error during refueling or loading of fuel with a control rod withdrawn, the accident analysis demonstrates that fuel failure will not occur (Refs. 2 and 3). The withdrawal of a single control rod will not result in criticality when adequate SDM is maintained. Also, loading fuel assemblies into the core with a single control rod withdrawn will not result in criticality (provided adequate SDM is maintained), thereby preventing fuel failure.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. MODES 3, 4, and 5 operations not specified in Table 1.1-1 can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.1, "Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation," LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal — Hot Shutdown," LCO 3.10.4, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal — Cold Shutdown," and LCO 3.10.8, "SDM Test — Refueling") without meeting this LCO or its ACTIONS. If any testing is performed that involves the reactor mode switch interlocks and requires repositioning beyond that specified in Table 1.1-1 for the current MODE of operation, the testing can be performed, provided all interlock functions potentially defeated are administratively controlled. In MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the reactor mode switch in shutdown as specified in Table 1.1-1,

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BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

all control rods are fully inserted and a control rod block is initiated. Therefore, all control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies must be verified fully inserted while in MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor mode switch in other than the shutdown position. The additional LCO requirement to preclude CORE ALTERATIONS is appropriate for MODE 5 operations, as discussed below, and is inherently met in MODES 3 and 4 by the definition of CORE ALTERATIONS, which cannot be performed with the vessel head in place.

In MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, only one control rod can be withdrawn under the refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock"). The refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks") appropriately control other CORE ALTERATIONS. Due to the increased potential for error in controlling these multiple interlocks, and the limited duration of tests involving the reactor mode switch position, conservative controls are required, consistent with MODES 3 and 4. The additional controls of administratively not permitting other CORE ALTERATIONS will adequately ensure that the reactor does not become critical during these tests.

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APPLICABILITY

Any required periodic interlock testing involving the reactor mode switch, while in MODES 1 and 2, can be performed without the need for Special Operations exceptions. Mode switch manipulations in these MODES would likely result in unit trips. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, this Special Operations LCO is only permitted to be used to allow reactor mode switch interlock testing that cannot conveniently be performed without this allowance or testing which must be performed prior to entering another MODE. Such interlock testing may consist of required Surveillances, or may be the result of maintenance, repair, or troubleshooting activities. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the interlock functions provided by the reactor mode switch in shutdown (i.e., all control rods inserted and incapable of withdrawal) and refueling (i.e., refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticality during CORE ALTERATIONS) positions can be administratively controlled adequately during the performance of certain tests.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2

These Required Actions are provided to restore compliance with the Technical Specifications overridden by this Special Operations LCO. Restoring compliance will also result in exiting the Applicability of this Special Operations LCO.

All CORE ALTERATIONS except for control rod insertion, if in progress, are immediately suspended in accordance with Required Action A.1, and all insertable control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted within 1 hour, in accordance with Required Action A.2. This will preclude potential mechanisms that could lead to criticality. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude the completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted control rods remain inserted and result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. Alternatively, if in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch may be placed in the refuel position, which will also result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. A Note is added to Required Action A.3.2 to indicate that this Required Action is not applicable in MODES 3 and 4, since only the shutdown position is allowed in these MODES. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods and place the reactor mode switch in the required position, based on operating experience, and is acceptable given that all operations that could increase core reactivity have been suspended.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.2.1 and SR 3.10.2.2

Meeting the requirements of this Special Operations LCO maintains operation consistent with or conservative to operating with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (or the refuel position for MODE 5). The functions of the reactor mode switch interlocks that are not in effect, due to the testing in progress, are adequately compensated for by the Special Operations LCO requirements. The administrative controls are to be periodically verified to ensure that the operational requirements continue to be met. The Surveillances performed at the 12 hour and 24 hour

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.2.1 and SR 3.10.2.2 (continued)

Frequencies are intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 7.2.3.7.
  2. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
  3. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal — Hot Shutdown

BASES

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BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 3 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing while in hot shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 3, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the other installed interlocks that are actuated when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position. However, circumstances may arise while in MODE 3 that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., friction tests, scram timing, and coupling integrity checks). These single control rod withdrawals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow a single control rod withdrawal in MODE 3.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 3, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling.

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BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

Alternate backup protection can be obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 3 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.2, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing") without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 3, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. "Withdrawal," in this application, includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod, as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn. To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2), the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by this Special Operations LCO's requirements in Item d.1. Alternately, provided a sufficient number of control rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are known to be inserted and incapable of withdrawal (Item d.2), the possibility of criticality on withdrawal of this control rod is sufficiently precluded, so as not to require the scram capability of the withdrawn control rod. Also, once this alternate (Item d.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod, and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the

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BASES

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LCO (continued) withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

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APPLICABILITY Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with this Special Operations LCO or Special Operations LCO 3.10.4, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position. For these conditions, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication"), full insertion requirements for all other control rods and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, Control Rod OPERABILITY — Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item d.2 of this Special Operations LCO, minimize potential reactivity excursions.

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ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 3. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1

If one or more of the requirements specified in this Special Operations LCO are not met, the ACTIONS applicable to the stated requirements of the affected LCOs are immediately entered as directed by Required Action A.1. Required

(continued)

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BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Action to insert all control rods. This Required Action includes exiting this Special Operations Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has been added, which clarifies that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

A.2.1 and A.2.2

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are alternate Required Actions that can be taken instead of Required Action A.1 to restore compliance with the normal MODE 3 requirements, thereby exiting this Special Operations LCO's Applicability. Actions must be initiated immediately to insert all insertable control rods. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure all inserted rods remain inserted and restore operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour to place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, and SR 3.10.3.3

The other LCOs made applicable in this Special Operations LCO are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification in accordance with SR 3.10.3.2 is required to preclude the possibility of criticality. SR 3.10.3.2 has been modified by a Note, which clarifies that this SR is not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements, since SR 3.10.3.2 demonstrates that the alternative LCO 3.10.3.d.2 requirements are satisfied. Also, SR 3.10.3.3 verifies that all control rods other than the control rod being withdrawn are fully inserted. The 24 hour

(continued)

BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, and SR 3.10.3.3 (continued)

Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawal, the protection afforded involved, and hardwire interlocks that preclude additional control rod withdrawals.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal — Cold Shutdown

BASES

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**BACKGROUND** The purpose of this MODE 4 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing or maintenance, while in cold shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 4, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the installed interlocks associated with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Circumstances may arise while in MODE 4, however, that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., friction tests, scram time testing, and coupling integrity checks). Certain situations may also require the removal of the associated control rod drive (CRD). These single control rod withdrawals and possible subsequent removals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch.

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**APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES**

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 4, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection in the event normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks fail to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Alternate backup protection can be obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered

(continued)

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal. This alternate backup protection is required when removing a CRD because this removal renders the withdrawn control rod incapable of being scrambled.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 4 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other LCOs (i.e., Special Operations LCO 3.10.2, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing") without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 4, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. "Withdrawal", in this application, includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod, as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn. At the time CRD removal begins, the disconnection of the position indication probe will cause LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and therefore, LCO 3.9.2 to fail to be met. Therefore, prior to commencing CRD removal, a control rod withdrawal block is required to be inserted to ensure that no additional control rods can be withdrawn and that compliance with this Special Operations LCO is maintained.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2) or the control rod withdrawal block, the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by the Special Operations LCO requirements in Item c.1. Alternatively, when the scram function is not OPERABLE, or when the CRD is to be removed,

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BASES

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LCO  
(continued)      a sufficient number of rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are required to be inserted and made incapable of withdrawal (Item c.2). This precludes the possibility of criticality upon withdrawal of this control rod. Also, once this alternate (Item c.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod, and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

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APPLICABILITY      Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, or this Special Operations LCO, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position.

During these conditions, the full insertion requirements for all other control rods, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4), and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY — Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item b.2 and Item c.2 of this Special Operations LCO, provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions.

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ACTIONS      A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 3. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

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BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod insertable, these Required Actions restore operation consistent with normal MODE 4 conditions (i.e., all rods inserted) or with the exceptions allowed in this Special Operations LCO. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies that the intent of any other LCO's Required Actions to insert all control rods. This Required Action includes exiting this Special Operations Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has been added to Required Action A.1 to clarify that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are specified, based on the assumption that the control rod is being withdrawn. If the control rod is still insertable, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods and within 1 hour place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod not insertable, withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD must be immediately suspended. If the CRD has been removed, such that the control rod is not insertable, the Required Actions require the most expeditious action be taken to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, and SR 3.10.4.4

The other LCOs made applicable by this Special Operations LCO are required to have their associated surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to meet the SDM requirements. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the affected control rod. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawals, the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardwire interlocks to preclude an additional control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.10.4.2 and SR 3.10.4.4 have been modified by Notes, which clarify that these SRs are not required to be met if the alternative requirements demonstrated by SR 3.10.4.1 are satisfied.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
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## B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

### B 3.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal — Refueling

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit the removal of a single CRD during refueling operations by imposing certain administrative controls. Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. The refueling interlocks use the full-in position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the full-in position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection in the event normal refueling procedures, and the refueling interlocks described above, fail to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. The requirement for this function to be OPERABLE precludes the possibility of removing the CRD once a control rod is withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. This Special Operations LCO provides controls sufficient to ensure the possibility of an inadvertent criticality is precluded, while allowing a single CRD to be removed from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. The removal of the CRD involves disconnecting the position indication probe, which causes noncompliance with LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and, therefore, LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refueling Position One-Rod-Out Interlock." The CRD removal also requires isolation of the CRD from the CRD Hydraulic System, thereby causing inoperability of the control rod (LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY — Refueling").

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied, these analyses will bound the consequences of accidents. Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that proper operation of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists. By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement to suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS adequately compensates for the inoperable all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1).

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Since the scram function and refueling interlocks may be suspended, alternate backup protection required by this Special Operations LCO is obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and are incapable of being withdrawn (by insertion of a control rod block).

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with any of the following LCOs, LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5 not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single CRD removal from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is desired in MODE 5, controls consistent with those required by LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 must be implemented, and this Special Operations LCO applied.

By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement to suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS adequately compensates for the inoperable all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1). Ensuring that the five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal adequately satisfies the backup protection that LCO 3.3.1.1 and LCO 3.9.2 would have otherwise provided. Also, once these requirements (Items a, b, and c) are completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

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APPLICABILITY Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The allowance to comply with this Special Operations LCO in lieu of the ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 is appropriately controlled with the additional administrative controls required by this Special Operations LCO, which reduce the potential for reactivity excursions.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for failure to meet LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 (i.e., all control rods inserted) or with the allowances of this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2.1, and Required Action A.2.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO. Actions must continue until either Required Action A.2.1 or Required Action A.2.2 is satisfied.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, SR 3.10.5.3, SR 3.10.5.4,  
and SR 3.10.5.5

Verification that all the control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted is required to ensure the SDM is within limits. Verification that the local five by five array of control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for removal of the associated CRD, is inserted and disarmed, while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the withdrawn control rod. The Surveillance for LCO 3.1.1, which is made applicable by this Special Operations LCO, is required in order to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. Verification that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are being made is required to ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis are satisfied. While not required by this LCO, verification of the core loading may be prudent to ensure that a fuel loading error has not invalidated the assumptions of the safety analysis.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, SR 3.10.5.3, SR 3.10.5.4,  
and SR 3.10.5.5 (continued)

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative controls on control rod removal and hardwire interlock to block an additional control rod withdrawal.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal — Refueling

BASES

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BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit multiple control rod withdrawal during refueling by imposing certain administrative controls.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. When all four fuel assemblies are removed from a cell, the control rod may be withdrawn with no restrictions. Any number of control rods may be withdrawn and removed from the reactor vessel if their cells contain no fuel.

The refueling interlocks use the full-in position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the full-in position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.

To allow more than one control rod to be withdrawn during refueling, these interlocks must be defeated. This Special Operations LCO establishes the necessary administrative controls to allow bypassing the full-in position indicators.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will prevent unacceptable reactivity excursions during refueling. To allow multiple control rod withdrawals, control rod removals, associated control rod drive (CRD) removal, or any combination of these, the full-in position indication is allowed to be bypassed for each withdrawn control rod if all fuel has been removed from the cell. With no fuel assemblies in the core cell, the associated control rod has no reactivity control function

(continued)

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

and is not required to remain inserted. Prior to reloading fuel into the cell, however, the associated control rod must be inserted to ensure that an inadvertent criticality does not occur, as evaluated in the Reference 1 analysis.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with either LCO 3.9.3, "Control Rod Position," LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," or LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY — Refueling," not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If multiple control rod withdrawal or removal, or CRD removal is desired, all four fuel assemblies are required to be removed from the associated cells. Prior to entering this LCO, any fuel remaining in a cell whose CRD was previously removed under the provisions of another LCO must be removed. "Withdrawal", in this application, includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

When fuel is loaded into the core with multiple control rods withdrawn, special spiral reload sequences are used to ensure that reactivity additions are minimized. Spiral reloading encompasses reloading a cell (four fuel locations immediately adjacent to a control rod) on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be loaded in any sequence). Otherwise, all control rods must be fully inserted before loading fuel.

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APPLICABILITY

Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The exceptions from other LCO requirements (e.g., the ACTIONS of LCO 3.9.3, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5) allowed by this Special

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BASES

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APPLICABILITY (continued)      Operations LCO are appropriately controlled by requiring all fuel to be removed from cells whose full-in indicators are allowed to be bypassed.

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ACTIONS      A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for refueling (i.e., all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies) or with the exceptions granted by this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2.1, and Required Action A.2.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the affected CRDs and insert their control rods, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS      SR 3.10.6.1, SR 3.10.6.2, and SR 3.10.6.3

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative controls on fuel assembly and control rod removal, and takes into account other indications of control rod status available in the control room.

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REFERENCES      1. FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.

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## B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

### B 3.10.7 Control Rod Testing — Operating

#### BASES

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#### BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, by imposing certain administrative controls. Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod worth minimizer (RWM) (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"), such that only the specified control rod sequences and relative positions required by LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase that could occur during a control rod drop accident (CRDA). During these conditions, control rod testing is sometimes required that may result in control rod patterns not in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6. These tests include SDM demonstrations, control rod scram time testing, and control rod friction testing. This Special Operations LCO provides the necessary exemption to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and provides additional administrative controls to allow the deviations in such tests from the prescribed sequences in LCO 3.1.6.

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#### APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the CRDA are summarized in References 1 and 2. CRDA analyses assume the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the CRDA analyses. The RWM provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure the initial conditions of the CRDA analyses are not violated. For special sequences developed for control rod testing, the initial control rod patterns assumed in the safety analysis of References 1 and 2 may not be preserved. Therefore, special CRDA analyses may be required to demonstrate that these special sequences will not result in unacceptable consequences, should a CRDA occur during the testing. These analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are dependent on the specific test being performed.

(continued)

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Control rod testing may be performed in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6, and during these tests, no exceptions to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 are necessary. For testing performed with a sequence not in compliance with LCO 3.1.6, the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 may be suspended, provided additional administrative controls are placed on the test to ensure that the assumptions of the special safety analysis for the test sequence are satisfied. Assurances that the test sequence is followed can be provided by either programming the test sequence into the RWM, with conformance verified as specified in SR 3.3.2.1.8 and allowing the RWM to monitor control rod withdrawal and provide appropriate control rod blocks if necessary, or by verifying conformance to the approved test sequence by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a qualified shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). These controls are consistent with those normally applied to operation in the startup range as defined in the SRs and ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

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APPLICABILITY

Control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, with THERMAL POWER > 10% RTP (Ref. 2), is adequately controlled by the existing LCOs on power distribution limits and control rod block instrumentation. Control rod movement during these conditions is not restricted to prescribed sequences and can be performed within the constraints of LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," and LCO 3.3.2.1. With THERMAL POWER  $\leq$  10% RTP, the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are necessary to perform special tests that are not in conformance with the prescribed sequences of

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BASES

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APPLICABILITY  
(continued)

LCO 3.1.6. While in MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal — Hot Shutdown," or Special Operations LCO 3.10.4, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal — Cold Shutdown," which provide adequate controls to ensure that the assumptions of the safety analyses of Reference 1 and 2 are satisfied. During these Special Operations and while in MODE 5, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock,") and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY — Refueling"), or the added administrative controls prescribed in the applicable Special Operations LCOs, provide mitigation of potential reactive excursions.

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ACTIONS

A.1

With the requirements of the LCO not met (e.g., the control rod pattern is not in compliance with the special test sequence, the sequence is improperly loaded in the RWM) the testing is required to be immediately suspended. Upon suspension of the special test, the provisions of LCO 3.1.6 are no longer excepted, and appropriate actions are to be taken to restore the control rod sequence to the prescribed sequence of LCO 3.1.6, or to shut down the reactor, if required by LCO 3.1.6.

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.7.1

With the special test sequence not programmed into the RWM, a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a qualified shift technical advisor or reactor engineer) is required to verify conformance with the approved sequence for the test. This verification must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. A Note is added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be performed if SR 3.10.7.2 is satisfied.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.10.7.2

When the RWM provides conformance to the special test sequence, the test sequence must be verified to be correctly loaded into the RWM prior to control rod movement. This Surveillance demonstrates compliance with SR 3.3.2.1.8, thereby demonstrating that the RWM is OPERABLE. A Note has been added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be performed if SR 3.10.7.1 is satisfied.

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REFERENCES

1. NEDE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States, (revision specified in the COLR).
  2. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC) "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," August 15, 1986.
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B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test — Refueling

BASES

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BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit SDM testing to be performed for those plant configurations in which the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is either not in place or the head bolts are not fully tensioned.

LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," requires that adequate SDM be demonstrated following fuel movements or control rod replacement within the RPV. The demonstration must be performed prior to or within 4 hours after criticality is reached. This SDM test may be performed prior to or during the first startup following the refueling. Performing the SDM test prior to startup requires the test to be performed while in MODE 5, with the vessel head bolts less than fully tensioned (and possibly with the vessel head removed). While in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown or refuel position, where the applicable control rod blocks ensure that the reactor will not become critical. The SDM test requires the reactor mode switch to be in the startup/hot standby position, since more than one control rod will be withdrawn for the purpose of demonstrating adequate SDM. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow withdrawing more than one control rod from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies when the reactor vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of unacceptable reactivity excursions during control rod withdrawal, with the reactor mode switch in the startup/hot standby position while in MODE 5, is provided by the intermediate range monitor (IRM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"). The limiting reactivity excursion during startup conditions while in MODE 5 is the control rod drop accident (CRDA).

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BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

CRDA analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. For SDM tests performed within these defined sequences, the analyses of References 1 and 2 are applicable. However, for some sequences developed for the SDM testing, the control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 may not be met. Therefore, special CRDA analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, may be required to demonstrate the SDM test sequence will not result in unacceptable consequences should a CRDA occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, the protection provided by the normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this LCO, will maintain normal test operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Refs. 1 and 2). In addition to the added requirements for the RWM, Average Power Range Monitors, and control rod coupling, the notch out mode is specified for out of sequence withdrawals. Requiring the notch out mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity, and allows adequate monitoring of changes in neutron flux, which may occur during the test.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 2, in accordance with Table 1.1-1, without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. For SDM tests performed while in MODE 5, additional requirements must be met to ensure that adequate protection against potential reactivity excursions is available. To provide additional scram protection beyond the normally required IRMs, the Average Power Range Monitors are also required to be OPERABLE (LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.e) as though the reactor were in MODE 2. Because multiple control rods will be withdrawn and the reactor will potentially become critical, the approved control rod withdrawal sequence must

(continued)

BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2), or must be verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. To provide additional protection against an inadvertent criticality, control rod withdrawals that do not conform to the banked position withdrawal sequence specified in LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," (i.e., out of sequence control rod withdrawals) must be made in the individual notched withdrawal mode to minimize the potential reactivity insertion associated with each movement. Coupling integrity of withdrawn control rods is required to minimize the probability of a CRDA and ensure proper functioning of the withdrawn control rods, if they are required to scram. Because the reactor vessel head may be removed during these tests, no other CORE ALTERATIONS may be in progress. Furthermore, since the control rod scram function with the RCS at atmospheric pressure relies solely on the CRD accumulator, it is essential that the CRD charging water header remain pressurized. This Special Operations LCO then allows changing the Table 1.1-1 reactor mode switch position requirements to include the startup/hot standby position, such that the SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 5.

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APPLICABILITY

These SDM test Special Operations requirements are only applicable if the SDM tests are to be performed while in MODE 5 with the reactor vessel head removed or the head bolts not fully tensioned. Additional requirements during these tests to enforce control rod withdrawal sequences and restrict other CORE ALTERATIONS provide protection against potential reactivity excursions. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.

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ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more control rods discovered uncoupled during this Special Operation, a controlled insertion of each uncoupled control rod is required; either to attempt recoupling, or to preclude a control rod drop. This controlled insertion is preferred since, if the control rod fails to follow the drive as it is withdrawn (i.e., is "stuck" in an inserted position), placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position per Required Action B.1

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

could cause substantial secondary damage. If recoupling is not accomplished, operation may continue, provided the control rods are fully inserted within 3 hours and disarmed (electrically or hydraulically) within 4 hours. Inserting a control rod ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. The control rod is disarmed to prevent inadvertent withdrawal during subsequent operations. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that allows the RWM to be bypassed if required to allow insertion of the inoperable control rods and continued operation. LCO 3.3.2.1 "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," ACTIONS provide additional requirements when the RWM is bypassed to ensure compliance with the CRDA analysis.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the small number of allowed inoperable control rods, and provide time to insert and disarm the control rods in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Condition A is modified by a Note allowing separate Condition entry for each uncoupled control rod. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for this Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each uncoupled control rod. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation. Subsequent uncoupled control rods are governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions.

B.1

With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met for reasons other than an uncoupled control rod, the testing should be immediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position. This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 5 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.

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(continued)

BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.8.1, SR 3.10.8.2 and SR 3.10.8.3

LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.e, made applicable in this Special Operations LCO, are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. However, the control rod withdrawal sequences during the SDM tests may be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a qualified shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). As noted, either the applicable SRs for the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be satisfied according to the applicable Frequencies (SR 3.10.8.2), or the proper movement of control rods must be verified (SR 3.10.8.3). This latter verification (i.e., SR 3.10.8.3) must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. These Surveillances provide adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed.

SR 3.10.8.4

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The 12 hour Frequency is intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

SR 3.10.8.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the full-out notch position, or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved, as well as operating experience related to uncoupling events.

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.10.8.6

CRD charging water header pressure verification is performed to ensure the motive force is available to scram the control rods in the event of a scram signal. A minimum accumulator pressure is specified, below which the capability of the accumulator to perform its intended function becomes degraded and the accumulator is considered inoperable. The minimum accumulator pressure of 940 psig is well below the expected pressure of 1100 psig. The 7 day Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and takes into account indications available in the control room.

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REFERENCES

1. NEDE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States (revision specified in the COLR).
  2. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas, NRC, "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," August 15, 1986.
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