

November 10, 1987

Docket Nos.: 50-413
and 50-414

Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Tucker:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment No. 31 to Facility Operating License NPF-35
and Amendment No. 22 to Facility Operating License NPF-52 - Catawba
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (TACS 66051/66052)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 31 to Facility Operating License NPF-35 and Amendment No. 22 to Facility Operating License NPF-52 for the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your letter dated July 31, 1987.

The amendments change the Technical Specifications (TS) to revise the limiting condition for operation action statements to increase the time allowance for restoration of boron concentration in an accumulator that is out of specifications and to reflect these changes in the TS Bases.

A copy of the related safety evaluation supporting Amendment No. 31 to Facility Operating License NPF-35 and Amendment No. 22 to Facility Operating License NPF-52 is enclosed.

Notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's next bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

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Kahtan Jabbour, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

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Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 31 to NPF-35
2. Amendment No. 22 to NPF-52
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl:
See next page

DISTRIBUTION:
See attached page

PDII-3/DRPI/II PDII-3/DRPI/II
KJabbour MDuncan
09/18/87 09/25/87

PDII-3/DRPI/II
Acting PD
09/18/87

me
11/10/87

Mr. H. B. Tucker
Duke Power Company

Catawba Nuclear Station

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

NORTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION

SALUDA RIVER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-413

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 31
License No. NPF-35

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-35 filed by the Duke Power Company acting for itself, North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation and Saluda River Electric Cooperative, Inc., (licensees) dated July 31, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-35 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 31, and the Environmental Protection Plan

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contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Power Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LSA

Lawrence P. Crocker, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: November 10, 1987

PDII-3/DRPI/II
MB Duncan/rad
09/25/87

KNT
PDII-3/DRPI/II
KJabbour
09/28/87

DF
BR RSB
RHodges
09/29/87
mw

with deletion of sentence indicated in SE per telecon
OGC-Bethesda
Woodhead
10/20/87

for NRR/OTSE
EButcher
09/26/87
RE

mp
DRPI/II/Acting PD
Lawrence P. Crocker
09/28/87
11/10/87

AD/DRPI/II
GLainas
09/ /87



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUKE POWER COMPANY

NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY NO. 1

PIEDMONT MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY

DOCKET NO. 50-414

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 22
License No. NPF-52

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-52 filed by the Duke Power Company acting for itself, North Carolina Municipal Power Agency No. 1 and Piedmont Municipal Power Agency, (licensees) dated July 31, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachments to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-52 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 22, and the Environmental Protection Plan

contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. Duke Power Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Lawrence P. Crocker, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: November 10, 1987

PDII-3/DRPI/II
MDuncan/rad
09/25/87

KNJ
PDII-3/DRPI/II
KJabbour
09/29/87

for RSB
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w/ deletion of sentence in SE per telecon
OGC-Bethesda
Woodhead
10/20/87

RTE
NRR/OTSA
EButcher
09/16/87

MC
DRPI/II/Acting PD
L. Crocker
09/17/87
11/10/87

AD/DRPI/II
GLainas
09/16/87
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 31

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-35

DOCKET NO. 50-413

AND

TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 22

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-52

DOCKET NO. 50-414

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

<u>Amended</u> <u>Page</u>	<u>Overleaf</u> <u>Page</u>
3/4 5-1	3/4 5-2
3/4 5-1a (new page)	
B 3/4 5-1	B 3/4 5-2

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

COLD LEG INJECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The discharge isolation valve open,
- b. A contained borated water volume of between 7853 and 8171 gallons,
- c. A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2100 ppm,
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 385 and 481 psig, and
- e. A water level and pressure channel OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

- a. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron concentration less than 1900 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one cold leg injection accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With one accumulator inoperable due to boron concentration less than 1900 ppm and:
 - 1) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators 1900 ppm or greater, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 24 hours of the low boron determination or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.
 - 2) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators less than 1900 ppm but greater than 1500 ppm, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status or return the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators to greater than 1900 ppm and enter ACTION c.1 within 6 hours of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

- 3) The volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators 1500 ppm or less, return the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators to greater than 1500 ppm and enter ACTION c.2 within 1 hour of the low boron determination or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1.1.1 Each cold leg injection accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 12 hours by:
 - 1) Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
 - 2) Verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve is open.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 75 gallons by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution;
- c. At least once per 31 days when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is above 2000 psig by verifying that power is removed from the isolation valve operators on Valves NI54A, NI65B, NI76A, and NI88B and that the respective circuit breakers are padlocked; and
- d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each cold leg injection accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:**
 - 1) When an actual or a simulated Reactor Coolant System pressure signal exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) Setpoint, and
 - 2) Upon receipt of a Safety Injection test signal.

4.5.1.1.2 Each cold leg injection accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by the performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, and
- b. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

** This surveillance need not be performed until prior to entering HOT STANDBY following the Unit 1 refueling.

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs from the cold leg injection accumulators and directly into the reactor vessel from the upper head injection accumulators in the event the Reactor Coolant System pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The allowed down time for the accumulators are variable based upon boron concentration to ensure that the reactor is shutdown following a LOCA and that any problems are corrected in a timely manner. -Subcriticality is assured when boron concentration is above 1500 ppm, so additional down time is allowed when concentration is above 1500 ppm. A concentration of less than 1900 ppm in any single accumulator or as a volume weighted average may be indicative of a problem, such as valve leakage, but since reactor shutdown is assured, additional time is allowed to restore boron concentration in the accumulators.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the coolant temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump and one Safety Injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and Safety Injection pumps except the required OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump to be inoperable below 285°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the refueling water storage tank and the Reactor Coolant System water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the refueling water storage tank also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 31 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-35
AND AMENDMENT NO. 22 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-52
DUKE POWER COMPANY
DOCKET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 31, 1987, Duke Power Company, et al., (the licensee) proposed changes to Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1.1 to increase the time allowance for restoration of boron concentration in an accumulator that is out of specifications.

The changes proposed by the licensee are intended to reduce the number of unnecessary plant mode changes and provide the operator more time in which to diagnose and correct low boron concentration while maintaining plant conditions which satisfy safety analyses assumptions.

EVALUATION

Current TS 3.5.1.1 does not distinguish inoperable status of an accumulator due to reduced boron concentration from other inoperable conditions. The changes proposed by the licensee would draw this distinction.

In a large break LOCA analysis, the accumulator in the broken leg is assumed to dump out of the break. The ECCS analysis is based on the average boron concentration of the three accumulators in the intact loops. In large break LOCA ECCS analysis, control rods are simply assumed to fail to insert. The reactor is then shutdown due to void formation during blowdown. Sufficient boron concentration is maintained in the accumulators and refueling water storage tank to ensure that the reactor does not return to criticality following refill and reflood. The magnitude of the required boron concentration is determined by an analysis separate from that of the ECCS analyses. As long as the average value of boron concentration is preserved, variation in individual accumulators will not affect the LOCA analysis.

However, because the accumulators are part of the emergency core cooling system, reasonable time requirements for restoration of boron concentration in each accumulator are established.

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The changes proposed by the licensee specify time limitations on the permissible boron concentration in the accumulators. Presently, if boron concentration in any one accumulator is found to be below 1900 ppm, one hour is allowed for restoration of boron concentration to 1900 ppm. The proposed changes would vary this time allowance relative to boron concentration in the three limiting accumulators. Limiting is defined as the combination of the three accumulators which would deliver the minimum volume weighted average boron concentration. The accumulator which would have provided maximum boron delivery is assumed to be in the broken loop.

Specifically, if boron concentration in only one accumulator is found to be below 1900 ppm and if the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators is greater than 1900 ppm, the licensee has proposed twenty-four hours to be allowed for restoration of the affected accumulator to a boron concentration of 1900 ppm. If this time limit were not met, the plant would be in HOT STANDBY in the next six hours, and pressurizer pressure reduced below 1000 psig in the following six hours. This time extension, from the current one to twenty-four hours, is acceptable because the volume weighted average of 1900 ppm boron in the limiting accumulators provides reactor shutdown capability without control rod availability and with the designated shutdown margin.

If boron concentration fell below 1900 ppm in a single accumulator and the volume weighted average boron concentration of the three limiting accumulators was less than 1900 ppm but greater than 1500 ppm, six hours would be allowed for restoration of the volume weighted average to 1900 ppm. If this requirement is not met, the unit would be in HOT STANDBY in the next six hours and pressurizer pressure reduced below 1000 psig in the following six hours.

The impact of dilution of boron concentration below 1900 ppm raises questions on the ability of the three limiting accumulators to shutdown the reactor. The purpose of boron in the accumulator water is to maintain subcriticality of the reactor following a design basis LOCA. Although the design limit for boron concentration is 1900 ppm, as specified in Catawba TSs, the 1500 ppm boron concentration would maintain shutdown of the reactor at zero power, $k_{eff} = 1.0$, all control rod assemblies out, including a 1% uncertainty (Table 4.3.2-2 Catawba FSAR, 1987 Update). Dual level and pressure controls on each accumulator will prevent extensive dilution of boron concentration in the accumulators. An extension from one to six hours as a time limit on raising volume weighted average boron concentration above 1900 ppm in the three limiting accumulators, therefore, seems reasonable.

However, if boron concentration drops below 1500 ppm in the limiting accumulators, the ability to shutdown the reactor at maximum criticality conditions without control rods is lost. Therefore, 1500 ppm is the lower limit on boron

concentration in the three limiting accumulators which would be permitted. If the volume weighted average boron concentration in the three limiting accumulators were to drop below 1500 ppm, one hour should be allowed for restoring the volume weighted average 1500 ppm. If this requirement is not met, the unit should be in HOT STANDBY in the next six hours and pressurizer pressure reduced below 1000 psig in the following six hours.

In addition to the above evaluation, the increase in probability of a LOCA when an accumulator downtime is increased from one to six or twenty-four hours is small. Furthermore, the decrease of boron concentration in an accumulator over these time periods will have little effect on the safety of the plant.

Based on the foregoing review, the changes submitted by the licensee to TS 3.5.1.1 are acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments involve changes to the installation or use of facilities' components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposures. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 35791) on September 23, 1987, and consulted with the state of South Carolina. No public comments were received, and the state of South Carolina did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Kahtan N. Jabbour, PDII-3/DRPI/II

Dated: November 10, 1987

DATED November 10, 1987

AMENDMENT NO. 31 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-35 -
CATAWBA NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT NO. 22 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-52 -
CATAWBA NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2

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