

Docket Nos.: 50-413
and 50-414

16 MAY 1986

Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Tucker:

Enclosed for your information is a "Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating Licenses and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing" related to your May 5, 1986, request concerning extension of certain surveillance requirements for Catawba Unit 1 until the first refueling outage.

The notice has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely,

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Kahtan Jabbour, Project Manager
PWR Project Directorate #4
Division of PWR Licensing-A, NRR

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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for PWR#4:DPWR-A
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Mr. H. B. Tucker
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDUKE POWER COMPANY, ET ALDOCKET NOS. 50-413 and 50-414NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS
CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52, issued to Duke Power Company, et. al. (the licensee), for operation of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, located in York County, South Carolina.

Although amendments will be issued for both Units 1 and 2, changes are proposed for Unit 1 only. Unit 2 is included in this notice only because the Technical Specifications are combined in one document for both units.

The amendments would extend, on a one-time basis and until the first refueling outage, the 18-month or 24-month technical specification (TS) surveillances for the following items which can only be conducted when Unit 1 is shut down:

1. Position Indicators for the Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) and Associated Block Valves - TS Table 4.3-7, Items 11 and 12. Channel calibration would be extended from July 24, 1986, and would be performed prior to entering HOT STANDBY following first refueling.
2. High Range Radiation Monitor (EMF-53 A&B) for the Containment Area - TS Table 4.3-7, Item 18. Channel calibration would be extended from August 25, 1986, and would be performed prior to entering HOT STANDBY following first refueling.

3. Loose-Parts Detection Systems - TS 4.3.3.9C. Channel calibration would be extended from August 14, 1986, and would be performed prior to entering STARTUP following first refueling.

4. Turbine Overspeed Protection Instrumentation - TS 4.3.4.2C. Channel calibration would be extended from 8/19/86 and would be performed prior to entering HOT STANDBY following first refueling.

5. Reactor Coolant Leakage Detection Systems - TS 4.4.6.1b. Channel calibration of the containment floor and equipment pump level and flow monitoring subsystem would be extended from 8/9/86 and would be performed prior to entering HOT SHUTDOWN following first refueling.

6. Type C Tests for Containment Leakage - TS 4.6.1.2d. Local (Type C) leak testing of those penetrations identified in a new Table 3.6-1a would be extended from the present range of 8/19/86 through 8/22/86 and would be performed prior to entering HOT SHUTDOWN following first refueling. The penetration designations (and their associated services) identified in new Table 3.6-1a would be: M230 (nuclear service water from reactor coolant pump and lower containment ventilation units), M215 (breathing air), M219 (station air), M358 (refueling water pump suction), M356 (equipment decontamination line), M345 (recycle holdup tank from reactor coolant drain tank - valve 1 WL806 only), M204 (containment air addition), M259 (reactor makeup water flush header), E101 through 450 (electrical penetrations for various equipment), and M374 (containment floor sump and incore instrumentation sump pumps discharge). This extension would also be subject to the granting of a partial exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a) (50 FR 50764)

7. Steam Generator Level Transmitter 1 CFLT 5632, TS 4.7.13.6. Channel calibration of this transmitter would be extended from 7/2/86 and would be performed prior to entering HOT STANDBY following first refueling.

8. Diesel Generator (DG), TS 4.8.1.1.2g.1. The inspection to procedures based upon the DG manufacturer's recommendations would be extended from 7/3/86 (for DG 1A) and 8/15/86 (for DG 1B) and would be performed prior to entering HOT SHUTDOWN following first refueling.

9. Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices, TS 4.8.4a. Channel calibration and various functional tests for the devices identified in TS table 3.8-1A would be extended from 8/2/86 and would be performed prior to entering HOT SHUTDOWN following first refueling.

Normally, since refueling outages occur about every 18 months, extension beyond the 18-month or 24-month surveillance interval required by the Technical Specifications for such calibrations and testing as in the above nine items is usually not necessary. However, due to the extended length of the Unit 1 startup program and cycle 1, the licensee must either request and receive an extension or shut down prior to the first scheduled refueling outage. Unit 1 is currently scheduled to enter its first refueling outage in late August 1986, but no later than September 28, 1986. Therefore, with the exception of the DG surveillance which involves an extension of about 4 months, the requested extensions entail a period of about 3 months or less.

The proposed amendments are in accordance with the licensee's request dated May 5, 1986. The changes would be accomplished by adding a footnote usually stating that this surveillance need not be performed until prior to entering HOT SHUTDOWN, HOT STANDBY or STARTUP, as applicable, following the Unit 1 first refueling outage, and clarifying that the footnote (i.e., the extension) applies to Unit 1 only.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has provided certain examples (48 FR 14870) of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations. The request involved in this case does not match any of those examples. However, the licensee has concluded and the Commission agrees that each technical specification change in the requested amendments does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the reasons set forth below:

1. Position Indicators for PORVs and Associated Block Valves. The extension to the surveillance interval for channel calibration would be for a relatively brief period (about 2 months). These indicators are designed, installed and maintained to standards which assure high reliability and operating experience to date has been most favorable. Other surveillances not changed by the proposed amendments require periodic operation of the PORV (TS 4.4.4.1b) and their block valves (TS 4.4.4.2) through one complete cycle of full travel, and thus ensure continued operability of these valves. The changes do not alter any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendments involves no design change and no change in the method and manner of plant operations, it

would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

2. High Range Radiation Monitor (EMF-53A and B) for the Containment Area. EMF-53A and B is a reliable radiation monitor whose purpose is to detect high levels of radiation which might be released during an accident. The extension to the surveillance interval for channel calibration would be brief (about one month). Monthly channel checks for EMF-53A and B required by TS Table 4.3-7 would not be altered by the proposed amendments and these checks ensure continued operability. The proposed amendments for EMP-53A and B would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendment would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Loose-Parts Detection System. The extension in surveillance interval for channel calibration would be brief (about 1½ months). Other TS surveillance requirements for daily channel checks and monthly analog channel operational tests, plus system capability of overlap testing of the circuits, would not be changed by the proposed amendments and ensure continued operability of the system. The proposed amendments with respect to this system would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this

portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendments would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

4. Turbine Overspeed Protection Instrumentation. The extension in surveillance interval for channel calibration of this instrumentation is brief (about 1½ months).. Other TS surveillance requirements for weekly cycling of the high pressure turbine intermediate stop valves and low pressure turbine intercept valves, and for monthly cycling of the high pressure turbine control valves, would not be changed by the proposed amendments and will ensure continued operability of the system. The proposed amendments with respect to this instrumentation would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendments would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

5. Reactor Coolant Leakage Detection Systems. The extension in surveillance interval for channel calibration of the containment floor and equipment sump level and flow monitoring subsystem would be brief (less than 2

months). Other TS surveillance requirements with respect to the containment atmosphere gaseous and particulate monitoring system and the containment ventilation unit condensate drain tank level monitoring subsystem would not be changed by the proposed amendments and assure adequate capability to monitor reactor coolant system leakage. The proposed amendments with respect to this system would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendments would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

6. Type C Leak Rate Tests. The extension of the 24 month surveillance interval associated with leak rate testing of the several containment penetrations identified for the proposed amendments would be brief (about 1½ months). The previous leak rate test results for each of these penetrations were quite good, and there is no reason to suspect significant degradation would have occurred since the previous tests. The proposed amendments with respect to these tests would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion

of the proposed amendments would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. This extension request also requires a partial, one-time exemption from Section III.D.3 of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50. Such exemption is currently being considered by the Commission based upon licensee's exemption request of May 9, 1986.

7. Steam Generator Level Transmitter 1 CFLT 5632. This transmitter provides indication within the Standby Shutdown Facility of the Steam Generator "C" wide range level. This is a non-safety related transmitter which provides Control Room indication but has no actuation capability. The extension of the surveillance interval for channel calibration would apply only to this single transmitter; the other three level transmitters (one per steam generator) would continue to be calibrated as presently required. The surveillance interval extension for transmitter 1 CFLT 5632 would be relatively brief (about 3 months). The proposed amendments would not change existing TS requirements for monthly channel checks for all four level transmitters. The proposed amendments with respect to this transmitter would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendments would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

8. DG Inspection - An extension of about 4 months (i.e., from July 3, 1986,

to about October 28, 1986) would be provided by the proposed amendments to complete the inspection of the first of the two diesel generators. The inspection to procedures prepared to the manufacturer's recommendations involves the disassembly of the diesel and normally requires up to 30 days to perform. (Since one DG is required to be operable in COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING, the inspections must be performed one at a time, and the 30 days is included in the extension period to complete inspection of the first diesel starting September 28, 1986). During this time period, one diesel would remain operable and the appropriate surveillances would be conducted to assure its operability. Extensive inspections were performed on each diesel prior to Unit 1 startup (see SSER 4). All other required surveillances would continue to be performed (with the exception of those related to the ESF actuation surveillance interval extension previously granted by Amendment 7) and will provide assurance of continued diesel generator operability. The proposed amendments to extend this DG inspection interval would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendments would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

9. Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices. The proposed amendments would provide for a relatively brief extension (about 2 months) of the surveillance interval associated with channel calibration of certain protective relays and functional testing of a 10% sample of circuit breakers and

fuses listed in TS Table 3.8-1A. The licensee reports that the breakers and fuses have been highly reliable with no failures or actuations recorded to date. The proposed amendments with respect to these devices would not change any design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints or limiting conditions for operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with this portion of the proposed amendments would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Because this portion of the proposed amendment would not change the design or operation of the plant, it would not (3) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that these changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.

Written comments may be submitted to the Rules and Procedures Branch, Division of Rules and Records, Office of Administration, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555 and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Comments may also be delivered to Room 4000, Maryland National Bank Building, Bethesda, Maryland from 8:15 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

By June 19, 1986 , the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facility operating licenses and any person who interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Request for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR §2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspects(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days

prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitation in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination of the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expir-

ation of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at (800) 325-6000 (in Missouri (800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to B. J. Youngblood: petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, and to Mr. William Porter, Duke Power Company, 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions,

16 MAY 1986

supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendments which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., and at the York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this day of

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ISI

P. O'Connor, Acting Director
PWR Project Directorate #4
Division of PWR Licensing-A, NRR

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