March 21,	1997	
Mr. Jack D. Woodard	DISTRIBUTION	TLH3 mail SE only)
Senior Vice Presiden	Docket File	JJohnson, RII MWaterman
Nuclear Operations	PUBLIC	GHill(4)
Georgia Power Company	PDII-2 RF	CGrimes
P. 0. Box 1295	SVarga	ACRS
Birmingham, AL 35201	PSkinner,RII	OGC

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M97007 AND M97008)

Dear Mr. Woodard:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 205 to Facility Operating License DPR-57 and Amendment No. 146 to Facility Operating License NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated October 29, 1996, as supplemented February 19, 1997. These amendments revise the TS associated with the installation of a digital Power Range Neutron Monitoring system.

Consistent with your request to implement changes to the TS for each unit, Amendment No. $_{205}$ is to be implemented for Unit 1 prior to its startup from the fall of 1997 refueling outage. Likewise, Amendment No. 146 is to be implemented for Unit 2 prior to its startup from the spring of 1997 refueling outage.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly <u>Federal Register</u> notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Kahtan N. Jabbour, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 205to DPR-57 2. Amendment No. 146to NPF-5 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 21, 1997

Mr. Jack D. Woodard Senior Vice President -Nuclear Operations Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201

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Consistent with your request to implement changes to the TS for each unit, Amendment No. 205 is to be implemented for Unit 1 prior to its startup from the fall of 1997 refueling outage. Likewise, Amendment No. $_{146}$ is to be implemented for Unit 2 prior to its startup from the spring of 1997 refueling outage.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly <u>Federal Register</u> notice.

Sincerely,

Kake N. Jahlon

Kahtan N. Jabbour, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 205 to DPR-57 2. Amendment No. 146 to NPF-5 3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Georgia Power Company

cc:

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-321

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 205 License No. DPR-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

- A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated October 29, 1996, as supplemented February 19, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
- B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
- C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
- D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
- F. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 205 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to Unit 1 startup from the fall of 1997 refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Herbert N. Berków, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: March 21, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 205

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57

DOCKET NO. 50-321

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Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Power Range Neutron Monitor System

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3.3-1	3.3-1
3.3-2	3.3-2
3.3-3	3.3-3
3.3-4	3.3-4
3.3-5	3.3-5
3.3-6	3.3-6
3.3-7	3.3-7
3.3-16	3.3-16
3.3-19	3.3-19
3.4-1	3.4-1
3.10-20	3.10-20
3.10-22	3.10-22

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
Α.	One or more required channels inoperable.	A.1 <u>OR</u> A.2	Place channel in trip. Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d. Place associated trip system in trip.	12 hours 12 hours
Β.	Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d. One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable in both trip systems.	B.1 <u>OR</u> B.2	Place channel in one trip system in trip. Place one trip system in trip.	6 hours 6 hours

(continued)

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1

ACTIONS (continued)

	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
с.	One or more Functions with RPS trip capability not maintained.	C.1	Restore RPS trip capability.	1 hour
D.	Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.	D.1	Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the channel.	Immediately
Ε.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	E.1	Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 30% RTP.	4 hours
F.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	F.1	Be in MODE 2.	6 hours
G.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	G.1	Be in MODE 3.	12 hours
Η.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	H.1	Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.	Immediately

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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- Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR	3.3.1.1.1	Perform CHANNEL CHECK.	12 hours
SR	3.3.1.1.2	Not required to be performed until 12 hours after THERMAL POWER $\geq 25\%$ RTP.	
		Verify the absolute difference between the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is $\leq 2\%$ RTP while operating at $\geq 25\%$ RTP.	7 days
SR	3.3.1.1.3	(Not used.)	
SR	3.3.1.1.4	Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.	
		Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	7 days
SR	3.3.1.1.5	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	7 days

(continued)

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR	3.3.1.1.6	Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels overlap.	Prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position
SR	3.3.1.1.7	Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.	
		Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap.	7 days
SR	3.3.1.1.8	Calibrate the local power range monitors.	1000 effective full power hours
SR	3.3.1.1.9	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	92 days
SR	3.3.1.1.10	For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.	
<u> </u>		Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	184 days

(continued)

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RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SI	8 3.3.1.1.11	Verify Turbine Stop Valve — Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure — Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is \geq 30% RTP.	184 days
SR	3.3.1.1.12	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	18 months
SR	3.3.1.1.13	1. Neutron detectors are excluded.	
		2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.	
		Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.	18 months
SR	3.3.1.1.14	(Not used.)	
SR	3.3.1.1.15	Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.	18 months
SR	3.3.1.1.16	Neutron detectors are excluded.	······································
		Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits.	18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS

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FUNCTION	APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM	CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1	SURVEILLANCE REGUIREMENTS	ALLOMABLE
1. Intermediate Range Monitor					VALUE
a. Neutron Flux — Nigh	2	3	C	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.6	s 120/125 divisions of full scale
	5(8)	3		SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.15	≤ 120/125 divisions of
b. Inop	2	3	G.	SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15	NA NA
2. Average Power Range Monitor	5(*)	3	- M	SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15	NA
 Neutron Flux - Nigh (Setdown) 	2	3(c)	6	SR 3.3.1.1.1	≤ 20% RTP
		·	:	SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13	
b. Simulated Thermat Power — High	1	3(c)	F	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2	≤ 0.58 ¥ + 62% RTP and
				SR 3.3.1.1.8	≤ 115.5% RTP(b)
				SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13	
				•	frontinued

Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3) Reactor Protection System Instrumentation

(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

(b) 0.58 W + 62% - 0.58 AW RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating."

(c) Each APRH channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

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FUNCTION	APPLICABLE NODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM	CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1	SURVE ILLANCE REGUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE
2. Average Power Range Monitor (continued)					
c. Neutron Flux — High	1	3(c)	F	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8	S 120% RTP
				SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13	
d. Inop	1,2	3(c)	G	SR 3.3.1.1.10	NA
e. Two-out-of-Four Voter	1,2	2	. 0	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16	NA
3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15	≤ 1085 psig
 Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 	1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15	≥0 inches
5. Nain Steam Isolation Valve - Closure	1	8	F	SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15	≤ 10% closed
5. Drywell Pressure — High	1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15	≤ 1.92 psig

Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3) Reactor Protection System Instrumentation

(c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION			REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
E.	One or more Reactor Mode Switch — Shutdown Position channels	E.1	Suspend control rod withdrawal.	Immediately	
	inoperable.				
		E.2	Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.	Immediately	

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- NOTES-----1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.
- 2. When an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

		FREQUENCY	
SR	3.3.2.1.1	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	184 days

(continued)

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Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of 1) Control Rod Block Instrumentation

	APPLICABLE			
FUNCTION	NODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Red Block Monitor				
e. Low Power Range - Upscale	(a)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.7	s 115.5/125 divisions of full scale
b. Intermediate Power Range - Upscale	(b)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.7	≤ 109.7/125 divisions of fuli scale
c. High Power Range — Upscale	(c),(d)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.7	\$ 105.9/125 divisions of full scale
d. Inop	(d),(e)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1	NA
e. Downscale	(d),(e)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.7	≥ 93/125 divisions of full scale
. Rod Worth Minimizer	1 ^(f) ,2 ^(f)	1	SR 3.3.2.1.2 SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.8	. NA
. Reactor Node Switch - Shutdown Position	(g)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.6	NĄ

(a) THERMAL POWER 2 29% and < 64% RTP and HCPR < 1.70.

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(b) THERMAL POWER 2 64% and < 84% RTP and MCPR < 1.70.

(c) THERMAL POWER 2 84% and < 90% RTP and MCPR < 1.70.

(d) THERNAL POWER ≥ 90% RTP and MCPR < 1.40.

(c) THERMAL POWER 2 29% and < 90% RTP and NCPR < 1.70.

(f) With THERMAL POWER < 10% RTP.

(g) Reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation,

<u>OR</u>

One recirculation loop shall be in operation with:

- a. The following limits applied when the associated LCO is applicable:
 - LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;
 - LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;
 - LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power — High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation; and
- b. Core flow as a function of core thermal power in the "Operation Allowed Region" of Figure 3.4.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS

	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A.	No recirculation loops in operation.	A.1	Place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.	Immediately

(continued)

3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test - Refueling

LCO 3.10.8 The reactor mode switch position specified in Table 1.1-1 for MODE 5 may be changed to include the startup/hot standby position, and operation considered not to be in MODE 2, to allow SDM testing, provided the following requirements are met:

- a. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation," MODE 2 requirements for Functions 2.a, 2.d, and 2.e of Table 3.3.1.1-1;
- b. 1. LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," MODE 2 requirements for Function 2 of Table 3.3.2.1-1, with the banked position withdrawal sequence requirements of SR 3.3.2.1.8 changed to require the control rod sequence to conform to the SDM test sequence,
 - <u>OR</u>
 - 2. Conformance to the approved control rod sequence for the SDM test is verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff;
- c. Each withdrawn control rod shall be coupled to the associated CRD;
- d. All control rod withdrawals during out of sequence control rod moves shall be made in notch out mode;
- e. No other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress; and
- f. CRD charging water header pressure \geq 940 psig.
- APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in startup/hot standby position.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR	3.10.8.1	Perform the MODE 2 applicable SRs for LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a, 2.d, and 2.e of Table 3.3.1.1-1.	According to the applicable SRs
SR	3.10.8.2	Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.3 satisfied.	
		Perform the MODE 2 applicable SRs for LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2 of Table 3.3.2.1-1.	According to the applicable SRs
SR	3.10.8.3	Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.2 satisfied.	
	2	Verify movement of control rods is in compliance with the approved control rod sequence for the SDM test by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.	During control rod movement
SR	3.10.8.4	Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress.	12 hours

(continued)



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-366

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 146 License No. NPF-5

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated October 29, 1996, as supplemented February 19, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 146 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to Unit 2 startup from the spring of 1997 refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Technical Specification Changes

Date of Issuance: Ma

March 21, 1997

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 146

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5

DOCKET NO. 50-366

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Power Range Neutron Monitor System

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
3.3-1	3.3-1
3.3-2	3.3-2
3.3-3	3.3-3
3.3-4	3.3-4
3.3-5	3.3-5
3.3-7	3.3-7
3.3-8	3.3-8
3.3-17	3.3-17
3.3-20	3.3-20
3.4-1	3.4-1
3.10-20	3.10-20
3.10-22	3.10-22

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

	CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION		COMPLETION TIME	
A.	One or more required channels inoperable.	A.1	Place channel in trip.	12 hours	
		OR			
		A.2	Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d.		
			Place associated trip system in trip.	12 hours	
B.	Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, and 2.d.	в.1 <u>OR</u>	Place channel in one trip system in trip.	6 hours	
	One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable in both trip systems.	B.2	Place one trip system in trip.	6 hours	

(continued)

ACTIONS ((continued)

	CONDITION				
_			REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
с.	One or more Functions with RPS trip capability not maintained.	C.1	Restore RPS trip capability.	1 hour	
D.	Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.	D.1	Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the channel.	Immediately	
Ε.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	E.1	Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 30% RTP.	4 hours	
F.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	F.1	Be in MODE 2.	6 hours	
6.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	G.1	Be in MODE 3.	12 hours	
H.	As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.	H.1	Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies:	Immediately	

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- ----NOTES-------1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.
- 2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR	3.3.1.1.1	Perform CHANNEL CHECK.	12 hours
SR	3.3.1.1.2	Not required to be performed until 12 hours after THERMAL POWER $\geq 25\%$ RTP. Verify the absolute difference between the average power range monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is $\leq 2\%$ RTP while operating at $\geq 25\%$ RTP.	7 days
SR	3.3.1.1.3	(Not used.)	
SR	3.3.1.1.4	Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2. Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	7 days
SR	3.3.1.1.5	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	7 days

(continued)

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR	3.3.1.1.6	Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels overlap.	Prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position
SR	3.3.1.1.7	Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.	
		Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap.	7 days
SR	3.3.1.1.8	Calibrate the local power range monitors.	1000 effective full power hours
SR	3.3.1.1.9	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	92 days
SR	3.3.1.1.10	For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2.	
	·	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	184 days

(continued)

SUF	EVEILLANCE REI	QUIREMENTS (continued)	
		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR	3.3.1.1.11	Verify Turbine Stop Valve — Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure — Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is \geq 30% RTP.	18 months
SR	3.3.1.1.12	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	18 months
SR	3.3.1.1.13	 Neutron detectors are excluded. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours after entering MODE 2. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 	18 months
SR	3.3.1.1.14	(Not used.)	· ·
SR	3.3.1.1.15	Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.	18 months

(continued)

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Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3) Reactor Protection System Instrumentation

FUNCTION	APPLICABLE NODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM	CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Intermediate Range Monitor					
a. Neutron Flux - High	2	3	6	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7	≤ 120/125 divisions of full scale
	5(*)	3	H	sk 3.3.1.1.15 sk 3.3.1.1.15 sk 3.3.1.1.1 sk 3.3.1.1.5 sk 3.3.1.1.15 sk 3.3.1.1.15	≤ 120/125 divisions of full scale
b. Inop	2	3	G	SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.15	NA
2. Average Power Range	5(a)	3	H	SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15	NA
Wonitor G. Neutron Flux — High (Setdown)	2	3(c)	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13	≤ 20% RTP
b. Simulated Thermal Power - High	1	3(c)	F	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13	≤ 0.58 ₩ + 62% RTP and ≤ 115.5% RTP(b)
					(continued)

(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

(b) 0.58 W + 62X - 0.58 AW RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating."

(c). Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

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T	ble	3.3.1.	1-1 (page	2 0	f 3	>
Reactor	Prot	ection	Syst	em In	str	une	ntation

	· FUNCTION	APPLICABLE NODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM	CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE
2.	Average Power Range Monitor (continued)					
	c. Neutron Flux — High	1	3(c)	F	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.10	S 120% RTP
	d. Inco	1 2	, (c)		SR 3.3.1.1.13	
		1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.10	NA
	e. Two-out-of-four Voter	1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16	NA
3.	Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High	1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16	≤ 1085 psig
4.	Reactor Vessel Water Level — Low, Level 3	1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16	≥ 0 inches
5.	Nain Steam Isolation Valve – Closure	1	8	F .	SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.16	≤ 10% closed
6.	Drywell Pressure — High	1,2	2	G	SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15	≤ 1.92 p sig

(continued)

(c) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both trip systems.

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Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION			REQUIRED ACTION		
				COMPLETION TIME	
E. One or m Mode Swit Position	ore Reactor tch — Shutdown channels	E.1	Suspend control rod withdrawal.	Immediately	
inoperabl	e.	AND			
		E.2	Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.	Immediately	

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 1. Refer to Table 3.3.2.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Control Rod Block Function.
- 2. When an RBM channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains control rod block capability.

		FREQUENCY	
SR	3.3.2.1.1	Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.	184 days

(continued)

Table 3.3.2.1-1 (page 1 of 1) Control Rod Block Instrumentation

	FUNCTION	APPLICABLE NODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1	Rod Block Honitor				
	a. Low Power Range — Upscale	(a)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.7	≤ 115.5/125 divisions of full scale
	b. Intermediate Power Range — Upscale	(b)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.7	≤ 109.7/125 divisions of full scale
	c. High Power Range - Upscale	(c),(d)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.4 SR 3.3.2.1.7	≤ 105.9/125 divisions of full scale
	d. Inop	(d),(e)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.1	NA
	e. Downscale	(d),(e)	Ż	SR 3.3.2.1.1 SR 3.3.2.1.7	≥ 93/125 divisions of full scale
2.	Rod Worth Minimizer	1 ^(f) ,2 ^(f)	1	SR 3.3.2.1.2 SR 3.3.2.1.3 SR 3.3.2.1.5 SR 3.3.2.1.8	NA
3.	Reactor Node Switch — Shutdown Position	(g)	2	SR 3.3.2.1.6	NA

(a) THERMAL POWER \ge 29% and < 64% RTP and HCPR < 1.70.

(b) THERMAL POWER \geq 64% and < 84% RTP and MCPR < 1.70.

(c) THERMAL POWER ≥ 84% and < 90% RTP and MCPR < 1.70.

(d) THERMAL POWER ≥ 90% RTP and NCPR < 1.40.

(e) THERMAL POWER ≥ 29% and < 90% RTP and MCPR < 1.70.

(f) With THERMAL POWER < 10% RTP.

(g) Reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.

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3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

LCO 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation,

<u>or</u>

One recirculation loop shall be in operation with:

- a. The following limits applied when the associated LCO is applicable:
 - LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;
 - LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;
 - 3. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitor Simulated Thermal Power — High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation; and
- b. Core flow as a function of core thermal power in the "Operation Allowed Region" of Figure 3.4.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS

	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
Α.	No recirculation loops in operation.	A.1	Place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.	Immediately

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3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test - Refueling

- LCO 3.10.8 The reactor mode switch position specified in Table 1.1-1 for MODE 5 may be changed to include the startup/hot standby position, and operation considered not to be in MODE 2, to allow SDM testing, provided the following requirements are met:
 - a. LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation," MODE 2 requirements for Functions 2.a, 2.d, and 2.e of Table 3.3.1.1-1;
 - b. 1. LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," MODE 2 requirements for Function 2 of Table 3.3.2.1-1, with the banked position withdrawal sequence requirements of SR 3.3.2.1.8 changed to require the control rod sequence to conform to the SDM test sequence,
 - <u>OR</u>
 - 2. Conformance to the approved control rod sequence for the SDM test is verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff;
 - c. Each withdrawn control rod shall be coupled to the associated CRD;
 - d. All control rod withdrawals during out of sequence control rod moves shall be made in notch out mode;
 - e. No other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress; and
 - f. CRD charging water header pressure \geq 940 psig.
- APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in startup/hot standby position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

		SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SF	3.10.8.1	Perform the MODE 2 applicable SRs for LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a, 2.d, and 2.e of Table 3.3.1.1-1.	According to the applicable SRs
SR	3.10.8.2	Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.3 satisfied.	
		Perform the MODE 2 applicable SRs for LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2 of Table 3.3.2.1-1.	According to the applicable SRs
SR	3.10.8.3	Not required to be met if SR 3.10.8.2 satisfied.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		Verify movement of control rods is in compliance with the approved control rod sequence for the SDM test by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff.	During control rod movement
SR	3.10.8.4	Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress.	12 hours

(continued)



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 205 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57

AND AMENDMENT NO. 146 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated October 29, 1996, as supplemented February 19, 1997, Georgia Power Company, et al. (the licensee), proposed license amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would reflect design changes that upgrade the analog power monitoring system in the two Hatch plants with a General Electric (GE) Company Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor System (NUMAC-PRNMS), including the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) function. The February 19, 1997, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination or expand the scope of the Federal Register notice.

By letter dated September 5, 1995, the staff approved GE licensing topical report (LTR) NEDC-32410P, "Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC-PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option III Stability Trip Function." The staff review of this topical report determined that NEDC-32410P contains acceptable guidance for replacing the existing power range monitors in a boiling water reactor (BWR) with a digital NUMAC-PRNMS. By letter dated December 26, 1996, the staff approved Supplement 1 to NEDC-32410P, which provided clarification of issues related to the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) and APRM technical specifications, and included proposed technical specifications for the OPRM.

The licensee's proposed TS amendments applicable to the APRM portion of the Hatch TS are to be implemented following installation of the NUMAC-PRNMS. The OPRM functions will not be connected to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip relays during the first 6 months of operation of the NUMAC-PRNMS modification. At the end of the 6-month period, following NRC staff review and approval of the operating data, setpoints and margins, the OPRM trip function will be connected to the RPS channels, and OPRM-specific TS amendments will be implemented. During this test period, the existing interim corrective actions for determining and mitigating power oscillations will remain in effect. The following safety evaluation addresses only the APRM TS changes for Hatch, Units 1 and 2. A separate safety evaluation will address the OPRM TS changes.

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2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Using the existing local power range monitors (LPRMs) and the recirculation coolant loop flows, the NUMAC-PRNM system provides APRM and OPRM trip signals to the RPS. The APRM system averages LPRM signals, processes flow signals from the reactor core recirculation flow instrumentation, and then compares the results to RPS trip set points. The OPRM detects and suppresses reactor core power instabilities using the Option III approach described in LTR NEDO-31960, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology," dated June 1991.

The GE NUMAC-PRNMS consists of four APRM channels and four voter channels. Trip signals from the each of the four APRM channels are sent to all four voter channels. One voter module is dedicated to each RPS trip relay. A reactor trip occurs when two or more of the four APRM functions calculate a trip condition.

3.0 EVALUATION

As stated in the staff's safety evaluation of NEDC-32410P, to receive NRC approval of a NUMAC-PRNM system installation, the licensee must confirm:

- 1. The applicability of NEDC-32410P, including clarifications and reconciled differences between the specific plant design and the topical report design descriptions,
- 2. The applicability of the BWR Owners' Group topical reports that address the NUMAC-PRNM system and associated instability functions, set points and margins,
- 3. Plant-specific revised TSs for the NUMAC-PRNM system functions are consistent with NEDC-32410P, Appendix H, and Supplement 1,
- 4. Plant-specific environmental conditions are enveloped by the NUMAC-PRNM system equipment environmental qualification values, and
- 5. Administrative controls are provided for manually bypassing APRM/OPRM channels or protective functions, and for controlling access to the APRM/OPRM panel and channel bypass switch.

The licensee's actions with regard to the above conditions are discussed in the following sections.

3.1 Applicability of the NUMAC-PRNM System Design to the Hatch Plant Design

The staff compared the applicable Hatch design features with the corresponding design features in NEDC-32410P. The NUMAC-PRNMS design modification proposed for Hatch Units 1 and 2 conforms to the NUMAC-PRNM system design description in NEDC-32410P and is compatible with the existing plant neutron monitoring system and RPS. Therefore, the staff finds that the NUMAC-PRNM system design is applicable to the Hatch plants.

3.2 PRNMS Instability Functions, Set Points, and Margins

The licensee will test the PRNMS instability function (OPRM), including the adequacy of the setpoint values and margins during the initial 6 months of OPRM operation. At the end of the 6-month period, following NRC staff review and approval of the operating data, the OPRM trip function will be connected to the RPS channels, and an OPRM-specific TS amendment will be implemented. The staff approved the 6-month period for OPRM confirmatory testing in the safety evaluation of NEDC-32410P, and therefore, finds the licensee approach acceptable. The TS amendment will be approved in a separate safety evaluation.

3.3 <u>Plant-Specific Revised Technical Specifications</u>

The staff reviewed the APRM TS amendments. The Hatch Unit 1 and Hatch Unit 2 TS and TS Bases conform to the staff-approved model TS in NEDO-32410P-A, Appendix H, and Supplement 1. In the following discussion, the staff addresses only those TS changes that are different from the reference LTR TS. Differences between the licensee submittal and the LTR are as follows.

- 3.3.1 Page E1A-6, Proposed Change 5. Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3), APRM Downscale Function (currently 2.d) is deleted. The Hatch accident analyses do not credit the APRM Downscale interlock for enabling the intermediate range monitor (IRM) Flux or Inop trip in the Run Mode. Plant Hatch TSs require the APRMs to be OPERABLE and available when the Mode switch is placed in the Run Mode. The NUMAC APRMs include automatic self-test features that are interlocked with an Inop trip. Plant Hatch operating procedures require confirmation that the APRMs are on scale prior to switching to the Run Mode. These features and procedures provide acceptable assurance that APRM trip functions will be available without the APRM Downscale interlock with coincident trip from the associated IRM. The staff, therefore, finds this change acceptable.
- 3.3.2 Page E1A-10, Proposed Change 12. Table 3.3.1.1-1 Voter Function 2.e is discussed in the proposed Hatch TS Bases, and is referenced in Hatch Limiting Condition for Operation 3.10.8 and SR 3.10.8.1. In the existing Hatch TS, Function 2.e is the APRM Inoperability function. This function was changed to Function 2.d by deletion of the previous Hatch TS Function 2.d (APRM Downscale Function) in Proposed Change 5 (above) and insertion of the Voter Function 2.e, which adds in the

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requirement that the Voters be operable, which is appropriate. This proposed change, therefore, is acceptable.

3.3.3 Page B 3.3-7, the LTR states, "...In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, at least [20] LPRM inputs, with at least [three] LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel. For the OPRM Upscale, Function 2.f, LPRMs are assigned to "cells" of [4] detectors. A minimum of [later] cells, each with a minimum of [2] LPRMs, must be OPERABLE for the OPRM Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE."

The proposed Hatch Bases state, "...In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, at least 17 LPRM inputs, with at least three LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at which the LPRMs are located, must be operable for each APRM channel." The lesser number of LPRM inputs into each APRM channel (17 vs. 20) in the Hatch TS is consistent with the Hatch core design, which is smaller than the core design referenced in the LTR. The staff, therefore, concurs with the proposed changes.

3.3.4 Page B 3.3-11. The LTR Bases state, in Function 2.d, Average Power Range Monitor - Inop, three of the four APRM channels are required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRM Functions. The Hatch Bases state, "Three of the four APRM channels and all four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE for each of the APRM Functions." The additional requirement of Voter operability is consistent with the APRM Power Range Monitor operability requirements discussion in the LTR Bases and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.4 <u>Plant-Specific Environmental Conditions</u>

The staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation of environmental conditions in the Hatch plants and concludes that the Hatch environmental conditions are enveloped by the GE equipment qualification parameters established for the NUMAC-PRNMS modification. In addition, the LTR restricts ARC welding practices, particularly during times when the potentially sensitive NUMAC-PRNMS equipment is required to be operational for plant safety. The licensee stated that reasonable ARC welding control and shielding practices will be used. The licensee clarified this statement in a letter dated February 19, 1997, by stating that arc welding will be restricted in the main control room where the NUMAC-PRNMS equipment is located, shielding will be evaluated, and the plant operating status will be considered prior to conducting arc welding. This approach conforms to the LTR recommendations approved by the staff concerning control of the electro-magnetic interference (EMI) environment in conformance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases," and is, therefore, acceptable.

The LTR also states that new equipment and plant modifications not produce unacceptable levels of noise emissions that could adversely affect NUMAC equipment, or the licensee is to take action to prevent these emissions from reaching potentially sensitive equipment. These measures apply for both noise susceptibility and emissions. The licensee indicated that Hatch design procedures state that all digital equipment systems to be installed or used within the plant shall be evaluated for susceptibility and emissions of EMI in accordance with EPRI Guideline TR-102323. The staff finds this approach acceptable for ensuring the EMI environment conforms to the requirements of GDC 4.

As described in the LTR, the PRNMS uses the same panel interfaces as the existing power range monitor equipment. High frequency filters will be installed on the ac power supply, and shielded cables for all signal leads will be used in lieu of testing nonsafety equipment noise effects on the PRNMS. Although more sensitive to EMI effects than the PRNMS, the licensee stated that the existing power range monitoring system has not been affected by the EMI environment resulting from the PRNMS modification. The staff finds the licensee's evaluation of the EMI environment and the measures taken to reduce adverse EMI affects to be an acceptable approach for ensuring the EMI environment conforms to the requirements of GDC 4.

3.5 Administrative controls

In the safety evaluation of NEDC-32410P, the staff found acceptable the design features that control access to setpoint adjustments, calibrations, and test points. Since the licensee has not proposed design changes that would override these controls, the staff finds that the licensee has acceptable controls for controlling access to the PRNMS panel and the APRM/OPRM channel bypass switch.

4.0 STAFF CONCLUSION

Based on the above review and justifications for the TS changes, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed APRM TS changes for Hatch Units 1 and 2 for the NUMAC-PRNM system are consistent with the staff-approved guidance in NEDC-32410P and its supplement, which are incorporated by reference herein. The staff further concludes that the licensee has properly addressed the plant-specific conditions described in the staff's safety evaluation for NEDC-32410P, and therefore, finds the NUMAC-PRNM system modification and associated APRM TS changes to be acceptable.

5.0 <u>STATE CONSULTATION</u>

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 130 dated January 2, 1997). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: M. Waterman

Date: March 21, 1997