

September 11, 1995

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Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
Vice President - Plant Hatch  
Georgia Power Company  
P. O. Box 1295  
Birmingham, AL 35201

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS - EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT,  
UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M92467 AND M92468)

Dear Mr. Beckham:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 198 to Facility Operating License DPR-57 and Amendment No. 139 to Facility Operating License NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated June 6, 1995, and supplemented August 9, 1995.

The amendments revise TS Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 and 3.6.4.1.4 for the secondary containment drawdown. The revision reduces the SR acceptance criteria to greater than or equal to 0.20 inch water gauge (wg) negative pressure from greater than or equal to 0.25 inch wg negative pressure. The appropriate TS Bases pages are also changed to reflect the TS revision.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,  
Original signed by:  
Kahtan N. Jabbour, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 198 to DPR-57
2. Amendment No. 139 to NPF-5
3. Safety Evaluation

**NRG FILE CENTER COPY**

cc w/encl: See next page

\*See previous concurrence

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 11, 1995

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Vice President - Plant Hatch  
Georgia Power Company  
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Sincerely,

*Kahtan N. Jabbour*

Kahtan N. Jabbour, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 198 to DPR-57
2. Amendment No. 139 to NPF-5
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encl: See next page

Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
Georgia Power Company

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-321

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 198  
License No. DPR-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated June 6, 1995, and supplemented August 9, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 198 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: September 11, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 198

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57

DOCKET NO. 50-321

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

3.6-38  
B 3.6-76  
B 3.6-79  
B 3.6-88

Insert Pages

3.6-38  
B 3.6-76  
B 3.6-79  
B 3.6-88

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.4.1.3 -----NOTE-----                      The number of standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to <math>\geq 0.20</math> inch of vacuum water gauge in <math>\leq 120</math> seconds.</p>	<p>18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS</p>
<p>SR 3.6.4.1.4 -----NOTE-----                      The number of SGT subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain <math>\geq 0.20</math> inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment for 1 hour at a flow rate <math>\leq 4000</math> cfm for each subsystem.</p>	<p>18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS</p>

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES  
(continued)

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

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LCO

An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum (0.20 inch of vacuum) can be established and maintained. The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of doors, hatches, refueling floor plugs, SCIVs, and available flow paths to SGT Systems. The required boundary encompasses the zones which can be postulated to contain fission products from accidents required to be considered for the condition of each unit, and furthermore, must include zones not isolated from the SGT subsystems being credited for meeting LCO 3.6.4.3. Allowed configurations, associated SGT subsystem requirements, and associated SCIV requirements are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3).

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APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment (the reactor building zone and potentially the refueling floor zone). Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during OPDRVs, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. (Note, moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may

(continued)

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BASES

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SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the appropriate SGT System(s) will rapidly establish and maintain a negative pressure in the secondary containment. This is confirmed by demonstrating that the required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to  $\geq 0.20$  inch of vacuum water gauge in  $\leq 120$  seconds. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.4 demonstrates that the required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain  $\geq 0.20$  inch of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour at a flow rate  $\leq 4000$  cfm for each SGT subsystem. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, each SGT subsystem or combination of subsystems will perform this test. The number of SGT subsystems and the required combinations are dependent on the configuration of the secondary containment and are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3). The Note to SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 specifies that the number of required SGT subsystems be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 14.4.3.
  2. FSAR, Section 14.4.4.
  3. Technical Requirements Manual.
  4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.
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BASES

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BACKGROUND  
(continued)

maintained at a negative pressure when the system is in operation, to conservatively ensure zero exfiltration of air from the building when exposed to winds as high as 31 mph.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to < 70% (Refs. 2 and 3). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorbers remove gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems automatically start and operate in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, all required charcoal filter train fans start. Upon verification that the required subsystems are operating, the redundant required subsystem is normally shut down.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems is to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Refs. 2 and 3). For all events analyzed, the SGT Systems are shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5).

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LCO

Following a DBA, a minimum number of SGT subsystems are required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of the minimum number of SGT subsystems in the event of a single active failure. The required number of SGT subsystems is dependent on the

(continued)

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION  
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA  
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA  
DOCKET NO. 50-366  
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2  
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 139  
License No. NPF-5

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated June 6, 1995, and supplemented August 9, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 139, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Herbert N. Berkow, Director  
Project Directorate II-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Technical Specification  
Changes

Date of Issuance: September 11, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.139

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5

DOCKET NO. 50-366

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

3.6-40  
B 3.6-83  
B 3.6-86  
B 3.6-95

Insert Pages

3.6-40  
B 3.6-83  
B 3.6-86  
B 3.6-95

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.6.4.1.3 -----NOTE-----                      The number of standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to <math>\geq 0.20</math> inch of vacuum water gauge in <math>\leq 120</math> seconds.</p>	<p>18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS</p>
<p>SR 3.6.4.1.4 -----NOTE-----                      The number of SGT subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify required SGT subsystem(s) can maintain <math>\geq 0.20</math> inch of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment for 1 hour at a flow rate <math>\leq 4000</math> cfm for each subsystem.</p>	<p>18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS</p>

BASES

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSIS  
(continued)

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

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APPLICABILITY

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(continued)

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

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REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.
2. FSAR, Section 15.1.41.
3. Technical Requirements Manual.
4. NRC No. 93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.



BASES

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BACKGROUND  
(continued)

maintained at a negative pressure when the system is in operation, to conservatively ensure zero exfiltration of air from the building when exposed to winds as high as 31 mph.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to < 70% (Refs. 2 and 3). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorbers remove gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems is to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Refs. 2, 3, 4, and 5). For all events analyzed, the SGT Systems are shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 7).

---

LCO

Following a DBA, a minimum number of SGT subsystems are required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of the minimum number of SGT subsystems in the event of a single active failure. The required number of SGT subsystems is dependent on the

(continued)



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 198 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57  
AND AMENDMENT NO. 139 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 6, 1995, as supplemented August 9, 1995, Georgia Power Company, et al. (the licensee), proposed license amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would revise TS Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 and 3.6.4.1.4 for the secondary containment drawdown and reduce the SR acceptance criteria to greater than or equal to 0.20 inch water gauge (wg) negative pressure from greater than or equal to 0.25 inch wg negative pressure. Also, the licensee proposed to change the Bases which reflect the proposed TS changes. The August 9, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the scope of the June 6, 1995, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 LICENSEE'S PROPOSAL FOR SECONDARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE REDUCTION

The licensee stated that the secondary containment performs no active function in response to either design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or fuel handling accident (FHA). However, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by Units 1 and 2 standby gas treatment (SBGT) systems prior to discharge to the environment.

The LOCA and FHA dose analyses do not assume that the secondary containment is at a specific vacuum. The analyses conservatively assume that releases are unfiltered and occur at ground level prior to secondary containment drawdown, which is 120 seconds after the SBGT system initiation. Also, the analyses assume that the releases, except bypass leakage, are filtered by the SBGT system and occur at an elevated point after 120 seconds. The dose analysis dispersion factors are based on neutral to stable stability class conditions that maximize the calculated dose.

The consequences of the previously evaluated accidents are not affected because, at the wind conditions assumed in the accident analysis, the building will be at a negative pressure and no exfiltration is postulated.

Furthermore, the estimated wind speed of 31 mph at which exfiltration might take place is not a frequent occurrence at Plant Hatch. Wind speeds of greater than 24 mph occur less than 0.5% of the time based on the plant-specific meteorological data.

The change in the vacuum acceptance criteria results in a slightly lower wind speed that may result in exfiltration from the building. However, the 31 mph wind speed is infrequent at Plant Hatch. Furthermore, there are numerous conservatisms in the existing dose calculations including: neutral to stable meteorological conditions, ground level release until establishment of the required vacuum, accident source terms at event initiation, and no credit for plateout. The secondary containment would be maintained at a slight negative pressure shortly after the SGBT fans are running and the releases would be from the main stack (well before the accident source term would be present in the secondary containment). Some plateout would also occur and this is conservatively ignored.

## 2.2 STAFF POSITIONS ON SECONDARY CONTAINMENT NEGATIVE PRESSURE

The staff positions relating to secondary containment negative pressure are specified in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Sections 6.2.3 and 6.5.3. Typically, a secondary containment system has a design leakage rate of 100% per day at an internal pressure of 0.25 inch wg negative pressure under neutral wind conditions. In the event of a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the secondary containment initially experiences a period of positive pressure due to transient heating effects and primary containment leakage. During this period, all primary containment leakage into the secondary containment is assumed (in dose calculations) to leak outward at ground level. This exfiltration period is assumed to last until a 0.25 inch wg negative pressure is established by the operation of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system. At that time, the filtered and elevated release path is assumed to begin functioning and the secondary containment is assumed to begin leaking inward. The value of 0.25 inch wg negative pressure is normally incorporated into the TS as a test requirement for two related surveillances: (1) the secondary containment leakage tests, and (2) the SGBT system performance tests.

As noted in the SRP (CSB BTP 6-3), exfiltration of fission products would only occur under outward positive differential pressure conditions. However, the SRP considers a positive pressure as a pressure less than 0.25 inch wg negative pressure. This value is intended to account for wind effects and test measurement errors. Surveillance testing is assumed to be conducted under neutral wind conditions (i.e., less than 5 mph) using permanently installed, calibrated instruments subject to normal drift and calibration errors. When 0.25 inch wg negative pressure is used for the surveillance test acceptance criterion, it is reasonable to assume that under accident conditions with high winds, any true positive pressure within the secondary containment would end within the time frame specified for establishing the

negative pressure (typically 2 minutes), and no exfiltration would occur thereafter.

In Information Notice (IN) 88-76, the staff reported the discovery of a previously unknown temperature/elevation phenomenon affecting secondary containment performance. During winter conditions, delta-P instruments located at lower elevations will give non-conservative readings for secondary containment and SGBT system surveillance tests. This phenomenon is due to the difference in density between air in the secondary containment and the outside air. In evaluating the licensee's request to change the surveillance test negative pressure criterion from 0.25 inch wg negative pressure to 0.20 inch wg negative pressure, the staff considered the plant-specific effects of wind and measurement errors including the IN 88-76 temperature/elevation effect. The staff verified that the revised surveillance test acceptance criterion would be adequate to preclude exfiltration by accounting for (1) wind, (2) instrument error, and (3) IN 88-76 phenomenon.

Wind: The licensee's supplemental information states that the 95% upper bound wind, which results in exfiltration, is 24 mph corresponding to a 0.12 inch water gauge negative pressure.

Instrument error: The licensee's supplemental information indicates that the maximum instrument error is  $\pm 0.045$  inch wg.

IN 88-76 Phenomenon: The licensee's supplemental information states that the secondary containment negative pressure surveillance testing at Hatch is being performed on a three-zone, multi-configurational basis (The Unit 1 reactor building is Zone I, the Unit 2 reactor building is Zone II, and the common refueling floor is Zone III). Each zone is tested using differential pressure instruments located within the zone being tested. A differential pressure instrument is available at the high-elevation refueling floor level. Because of this feature the IN 88-76 phenomenon is adequately accounted for by the surveillance tests.

The licensee also stated that recent surveillance test results indicate no significant pressure differentials among the secondary containment zones after test conditions have stabilized.

Based on the above considerations, the staff finds that a 0.20 inch wg negative test pressure is sufficient to ensure that fission product exfiltration from the secondary containment will be adequately controlled in a manner consistent with the bounding assumptions used in the calculations of radiological consequences of the fuel handling and design-basis LOCA accidents. Also, the staff finds that this change does not pose an undue risk to public health and safety. Therefore, it is acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 32364 dated June 21, 1995). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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