August 25, 1987

Dockets Nos.: 50-321
and 50-366

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Subject: Issuance of Amendment Nos. 147 and 83 to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5 - Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (TACS 55865/55866)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 147 and 83 to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5, for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 31, 1986.

The amendments modify the Technical Specifications related to testing of the onsite emergency diesel generators.

Also enclosed is a copy of a Notice of Denial of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Opportunity for Hearing related to a portion of the March 31, 1986, letter.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Bi-Weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

/S/

Lawrence P. Crocker, Project Manager
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 147 to DPR-57
2. Amendment No. 83 to NPF-5
3. Notice of Denial
4. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II
MDuncan/mac	LCrocker	DHood, Acting Director
08/5 /87	08/6 /87	08/24/87

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Chairman
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County Courthouse
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DATED August 25, 1987

AMENDMENT NO. 147 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57, EDWIN I. HATCH, UNITS 1 & 2
AMENDMENT NO. 83 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-05, EDWIN I. HATCH, UNITS 1 & 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-321

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 147
License No. DPR-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia, (the licensee) dated March 31, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 147, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Darl S. Hood, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 25, 1987

PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	OGC-Bethesda	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II
MDuncan/mac	LCrocker	M. Lawman	DHood, Acting Director
08/5 /87	08/6 /87	08/10/87	08/24/87

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 147

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57

DOCKET NO. 50-321

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page	Insert Page
1.0-10	1.0-10
3.5-2	3.5-2
3.5-3	3.5-3
3.5-4	3.5-4
3.5-6	3.5-6
3.5-10	3.5-10
--	3.5-10a
3.5-12	3.5-12
3.5-13	3.5-13
3.5-14	3.5-14
3.5-15	3.5-15
3.9-1	3.9-1
3.9-2	3.9-2
--	3.9-2a
3.9-5	3.9-5
--	3.9-6b

EEE. MILK ANIMAL

A cow or goat that is producing milk for human consumption.

FFF. DOSE EQUIVALENT IODINE

The DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcurie/gram), which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The tyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in table III of TID-14844 or those in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1, October 1977

GGG. ACTION

ACTION shall be that part of a specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

HHH. CHANNEL CHECK

A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

III. STAGGERED TEST BASIS

STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:

a. A test schedule for n systems, subsystems trains or other designated components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals,

b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train or other designated components at the beginning of each subinterval.

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.5.A.2. Operation with Inoperable Components

If one CS system loop is inoperable, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed seven (7) days providing all active components in the other CS system loop, the RHR system LPCI mode and the diesel generators (per Specification 4.9.A.2.a) are operable.

4.5.A.2. Surveillance with Inoperable Components

When it is determined that one core spray loop is inoperable at a time when operability is required, the other core spray loop, and the RHR system LPCI mode shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately. The operable core spray loop shall be demonstrated to be operable daily until both loops are returned to normal operation.

3. Shutdown Requirements

If Specification 3.5.A.1.a or 3.5.A.2. cannot be met the reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours.

B. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (LPCI and Containment Cooling Mode)

1. Normal System Availability

a. The RHR System shall be operable:

(1) Prior to reactor startup from a cold condition, or

(2) When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor pressure is greater than atmospheric except as stated in Specification 3.5.B.2.

B. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (LPCI and Containment Cooling Mode)

1. Normal Operational Tests

RHR system testing shall be performed as follows:

Item	Frequency
a. Air test on drywell headers and nozzles and air or water test on torus headers and nozzles	Once/5 years

3.5.B.1. Normal System Availability (Cont.)

One RHR loop with two pumps or two loops with one pump per loop shall be operable in the shutdown cooling mode when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor pressure is atmospheric except prior to a reactor startup as stated in Specification 3.5.B.1.a.

c. The reactor shall not be started up with the RHR system supplying cooling to the fuel pool.

d. During reactor power operation, the LPCI system discharge cross-tie valve, E11-F010, shall be in the closed position and the associated valve motor starter circuit breaker shall be locked in the off position. In addition, an annunciator which indicates that the cross-tie valve is not in the fully closed position shall be available in the control room.

e. Both recirculation pump discharge valves shall be operable prior to reactor startup (or closed if permitted elsewhere in these specifications).

4.5.B.1. Normal Operational Tests

Item	Frequency
b. Simulated Automatic Actuation Test	Once/Operating Cycle
c. System flow rate: Each RHR Pump shall deliver at least 7700 gpm against a system head of at least 20 psig.	Once/3 months
d. Pump Operability	Once/month
e. Motor Operated valve operability	Once/month

f. Both recirculation pump discharge valves shall be tested for operability during any outage exceeding 48 hours, if operability tests have not been performed during the preceding month.

2. Operation with Inoperable Components

a. One LPCI Pump Inoperable

If one LPCI pump is inoperable, the reactor may remain in operation for a period of not to exceed seven (7) days provided that the remaining LPCI pumps, both LPCI subsystem flow paths, the Core Spray system, and the associated diesel generators are operable (per Specification 4.9.A.2.a).

b. One LPCI Subsystem Inoperable

A LPCI subsystem is considered to to be inoperable if (1) both of the LPCI pumps within that system are inoperable or (2) the active valves in the subsystem flow path are inoperable.

2. Surveillance with Inoperable Components

a. One LPCI Pump Inoperable

When one LPCI pump is inoperable the remaining LPCI pumps and associated flow paths, and the Core Spray system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter, until the inoperable LPCI pump is restored to normal service.

b. One LPCI Subsystem Inoperable

When one LPCI subsystem is inoperable, all active components of the remaining LPCI subsystem and the Core Spray system shall be demonstrated to be operable, immediately

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.5.B.2. Operation with Inoperable Components (Continued)	4.5.B.2. Surveillance with Inoperable Components (Continued)
b. If one LPCI subsystem is inoperable, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed seven (7) days provided that all active components of the remaining LPCI subsystem, the Core Spray system, and the associated diesel generators are operable (per Specification 4.9.A.2.a).	and daily thereafter, until the inoperable LPCI subsystem is restored to normal service.

3.5.C.3. Two Pumps Inoperable

If two RHR service water pumps are inoperable, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed seven (7) days provided all redundant active components in both of the RHR service water subsystems are operable.

4.5.C.3. Two Pumps Inoperable

When two RHR service water pumps are inoperable, the remaining operable RHR service water subsystems shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter for seven (7) days or until the inoperable components are returned to normal operation.

4. Shutdown Requirements

If Specifications 3.5.C cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours.

D. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System

1. Normal System Availability

a. The HPCI System shall be operable:

1. Prior to reactor startup from a cold condition, or

2. When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor pressure is greater than 150 psig, except as stated in Specification 3.5.D.2. *

D. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System

1. Normal Operational Tests

HPCI system testing shall be performed as follows:

Item	Frequency
a. Simulated automatic actuation test	Once/Operating Cycle
b. Flow rate at normal reactor vessel operating pressure and	Once/3 months
Flow rate at 150 psig reactor pressure	Once/Operating Cycle

*HPCI is not required to be operable for performance of inservice hydrostatic or leak testing with reactor pressure greater than 150 psig and all control rods inserted.

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.5.G. Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability

During any period when one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, continued reactor operation is limited to seven (7) days unless operability of the diesel generator is restored within this period. During such seven (7) days all of the components in the RHR system LPCI mode and containment cooling mode shall be operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours. Specification 3.9 provides further guidance on electrical system availability.

Any combination of inoperable components in the core and containment cooling systems shall not defeat the capability of the remaining operable components to fulfill the core and containment cooling functions.

When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown Condition, both core spray systems and the LPCI and containment cooling subsystems of the RHR system may be inoperable provided that the shutdown cooling subsystem of the RHR system is operable in accordance with Specification 3.5.B.1.b and that no work is being done which has the potential for draining the reactor vessel.

4.5.G. Surveillance of Core and Containment Cooling Systems

When it is determined that one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, all of the components in the RHR system LPCI mode and containment cooling mode connected to the operable diesel generators shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
H. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipes Whenever the core spray system, LPCI, HPCI, or RCIC are required to be operable, the discharge piping from the pump discharge of these systems to the last block valve shall be filled. The suction of the HPCI pumps shall be aligned to the condensate storage tank.	H. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipes The following surveillance requirements shall be performed to assure that the discharge piping of the core spray system, LPCI, HPCI, and RCIC are filled when required: 1. Every month prior to the testing of the LPCI and core spray systems, the discharge piping of these systems shall be vented

3.5.J. Plant Service Water Systems

1. Normal Availability

The reactor shall not be made critical from the cold shutdown condition unless the Plant Service Water System (including 4 plant service water pumps and the standby service water pump) is operable.

2. Inoperable Components

a. The standby service water pump may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 60 days provided that an alternate Unit 1 plant service water cooling source to the 1B diesel generator is OPERABLE.

b. One PSW pump may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 30 days provided all diesel generators are operable per Specification 4.9.A.2.a.

c. One PSW pump and the standby service water pump may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 30 days provided all diesel generators are operable per Specification 4.9.A.2.a.

d. Two PSW pumps or one PSW division may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 7 days provided the diesel generators associated with the operable PSW components are operable per Specification 4.9.A.2.a.

4.5.J. Plant Service Water System

1. The automatic pump start functions and automatic isolation functions shall be tested once per operating cycle.

2. Inoperable Components

a. With the standby service water subsystem inoperable for up to 60 days, provide Unit 1 service water cooling to the 1B diesel generator by verifying OPERABILITY of an alternate Unit 1 service water cooling source within 8 hours. Otherwise, declare the 1B diesel generator inoperable and take the action required by Specification 3.9.B.2.

b. When one PSW pump is made or found to be inoperable, the standby service water pump, the three remaining PSW pumps, and both PSW divisions shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter.

c. When one PSW pump and the standby service water pump are made or found to be inoperable, the three remaining PSW pumps, and both PSW divisions shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and weekly thereafter.

d. When two PSW pumps or one PSW division are made or found to be inoperable, the standby service water pump and all active components of the operable division or divisions shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.5.J. Plant Service Water Systems

2. Inoperable Components (Cont'd)

e. Two PSW pumps or one PSW division, and the standby service water pump may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 7 days provided the diesel generators associated with the operable PSW components are operable per Specification 4.9.A.2.a.

For each condition above in which the standby service water pump is inoperable, cooling water to diesel generator 1B shall be intertied with the PSW divisional piping supply.

3. Shutdown Requirements

If the requirements of Specifications 3.5.J.1 and 3.5.J.2 cannot be met the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

4.5.J. Plant Service Water System

2. Inoperable Components (Cont'd)

e. When two PSW pumps or one PSW division, and the standby service water pump are made or found to be inoperable, all active components of the operable division or divisions shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

When cooling water to diesel generator 1B is intertied with the PSW divisional piping supply, operability of the divisional interlock valves shall be demonstrated.

3.5.K. Equipment Area Coolers

1. The equipment area coolers serving the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Core Spray or Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps must be operable at all times when the pump or pumps served by that specific cooler is considered to be operable.

2. When an equipment area cooler is not operable, the pump(s) served by that cooler must be considered inoperable for Technical Specification purposes.

4.5.K. Equipment Area Coolers

1. Each equipment area cooler is operated in conjunction with the equipment served by that particular cooler; therefore, the equipment area coolers are tested at the same frequency as the pumps which they serve.

3.5. CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS

A. Core Spray (CS) System

1. Normal System Availability

Analyses presented in Section 6 of the FSAR and Appendix I of the HNP-2 PSAR demonstrated that the core spray system provides adequate cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident and to limit fuel clad temperature to below 2,300°F which assures that core geometry remains intact and to limit any clad metal-water reaction to less than one percent. Core spray distribution has been shown in tests of systems similar in design to HNP-1 to exceed the minimum requirements. In addition, cooling effectiveness has been demonstrated at less than half the rated flow in simulated fuel assemblies with heater rods to duplicate the decay heat characteristics of irradiated fuel.

The intent of the CS system specifications is to prevent operation above atmospheric pressure without all associated equipment being operable. However, during operation, certain components may be out of service for the specified allowable repair times. The allowable repair times have been selected using engineering judgment based on experiences and supported by availability analysis. Assurance of the availability of the remaining systems is increased by demonstrating operability immediately and by requiring selected testing during the outage period.

When the reactor vessel pressure is atmospheric, the limiting conditions for operation are less restrictive. At atmospheric pressure, the minimum requirement is for one supply of makeup water to the core. Requiring two operable RHR pumps and one CS pump provides redundancy to ensure makeup water availability.

2. Operation with Inoperable Components

Should one core spray loop become inoperable: the remaining core spray loop and the RHR system are demonstrated to be operable to ensure their availability should the need for core cooling arise. These provide extensive margin over the operable equipment needed for adequate core cooling. With due regard for this margin, the allowable repair time of 7 days was chosen.

B. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (LPCI and Containment Cooling Mode)

1. Normal System Availability

The RHR system LPCI mode is designed to provide emergency cooling to the core by flooding in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This system is completely independent of the core spray system; however, it does function in combination with the core spray system to prevent excessive fuel clad temperature. The LPCI mode of the RHR system and the core spray system provide adequate cooling for break areas of approximately 0.2 square feet up to and including the double-ended recirculation line break without assistance from the high-pressure emergency core cooling systems.

3.5.B.1. Normal System Availability (Continued)

Observation of the stated requirements for the containment cooling mode assures that the suppression pool and the drywell will be sufficiently cooled, following a loss-of-coolant accident, to prevent primary containment overpressurization. The containment cooling function of the RHR system is permitted only after the core has reflooded to the two-thirds core height level. This prevents inadvertently diverting water needed for core flooding to the less urgent task of containment cooling. The two-thirds core height level interlock may be manually bypassed by a keylock switch.

The intent of the RHR system specifications is to prevent operation above atmospheric pressure without all associated equipment being operable. However, during operation, certain components may be out of service for the specified allowable repair times. The allowable repair times have been selected using engineering judgment based on experiences and supported by availability analysis. Assurance of the availability of the remaining systems is increased by demonstrating operability immediately and by requiring selected testing during the outage period.

When the reactor vessel pressure is atmospheric, the limiting conditions for operation are less restrictive. At atmospheric pressure, the minimum requirement is for one supply of makeup water to the core.

2. Operation with Inoperable Components

With one LPCI pump inoperable or one LPCI subsystem inoperable, adequate core flooding is assured by the demonstrated operability of the redundant LPCI pumps and LPCI subsystem, and the Core Spray system. The reduced redundancy justifies the specified 7 day out-of-service period.

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.9. AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS

Applicability

The Limiting Conditions for Operation apply to the auxiliary electrical power systems.

Objective

The objective of the Limiting Conditions for Operation is to assure an adequate supply of electrical power for operation of those systems required for safety.

Specifications

A. Requirements for Reactor Startup

The reactor shall not be made critical from the Cold Shutdown Condition unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Offsite Power Sources

At least two 230 kV offsite transmission lines shall be available and each shall be capable of supplying auxiliary power to the emergency 4160 volt buses (1E, 1F, and 1G) and each shall be capable of supplying power to both startup auxiliary transformers (1C and 1D).

2. Standby AC Power Supply (Diesel Generators 1A, 1B, and 1C)

Three diesel generators 1A, 1B and 1C) shall be operable and capable of supplying power to the emergency 4160 volt buses (1E, 1F, and 1G).

For each diesel generator to be operable and capable of supplying power, the following conditions must be met:

4.9. AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS

Applicability

The Surveillance Requirements apply to the periodic testing requirements of the auxiliary electrical power systems.

Objective

The objective of the Surveillance Requirements is to verify the operability of the auxiliary electrical systems.

Specifications

A. Auxiliary Electrical Systems Equipment

Tests shall be performed at scheduled intervals as follows to detect deterioration of equipment and to demonstrate that auxiliary electrical systems equipment and components are operable.

1. Offsite Power Sources

Verify correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability at least once per 7 days.

2. Standby AC Power Supply (Diesel Generators 1A, 1B, and 1C)

The following periodic tests and surveillance of the standby AC power supply (Diesel Generators 1A, 1B, and 1C) shall be performed:

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3.9.A.2. Standby AC Power Supply (Diesel Generators 1A, 1B, and 1C) (Contintued)

a. Operability
The diesel generator itself and its auxiliaries are operable.

b. Diesel Battery (125 Volt)
Each 125 volt diesel battery is operable and capable of supplying the required load.

c. Battery Charger
An operable battery charger is available. Each battery charger shall have adequate capacity to restore its battery to full charge within 24 hours from a discharged condition while carrying the DC load.

d. Diesel Fuel
There shall be a minimum of 80,000 gallons of acceptable diesel fuel in the diesel fuel storage tanks.

4.9.A.2. Standby AC Power Supply (Diesel Generators 1A, 1B, and 1C) (Continued)

a. Operability

1. Each diesel generator shall be manually started and loaded to demonstrate operational readiness in accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.9-1 on a Staggered Test Basis. Verify that each diesel starts from ambient condition, gradually load the generator to 1710-2000 KW* and operate for $\geq$ 60 minutes. During the generator test, the starting air compressor shall be checked for operation and for its ability to recharge the air system.

2. At least once per 184 days, each diesel generator shall be started and verified to reach sychronous speed in $\leq$ 12 seconds, loaded to an indicated 2250-2400 KW* for 1A and 1C and 2360-2425 KW* for 1B in $\leq$ 120 seconds, and operated for $\geq$ 60 minutes.

b. Diesel Battery (125 Volt)
Each 125 volt diesel battery shall be subjected to the same periodic surveillance as the plant batteries in Specification 4.9.A.3.

c. Battery Charger
Indicators shall be provided to monitor the status of the battery charger supply. This instrumentation shall include indication of output current and output voltage.

d. Diesel Fuel
Each month the quantity of diesel fuel available in each fuel storage tank shall be measured and recorded.

*Momentary variations outside this band shall not invalidate the test.

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.A.2. Standby AC Power Supply Diesel Generators 1A, 1B, and 1C) (Continued)

d. Diesel Fuel (Cont'd)
At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D-270-65, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-74 when checked for viscosity, water and sediment.

e. Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps
The operation of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps shall be demonstrated once each month.

LIMITING CONDTIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.9.B.1. One Startup Auxiliary Transformer (1C or 1D) Inoperable or Only One Offsite Power Source Available (230 kV Transmission Line) Reactor operation is permissible for seven days from the date that one startup auxiliary transformer (1C or 1D) is inoperable or incoming power is available from only one 230 kV offsite transmission line provided the increased Surveillance Requirements as stated in Specification 4.9.B.1 are implemented.	4.9.B.1. One Startup Auxiliary Transformer (1C or 1D) Inoperable or Only One Offsite Power Source Available (230 kV Transmission Line) When it is established that one startup auxiliary transformer (1C or 1D) is inoperable or incoming power is available from only one 230 kV offsite transmission line, verify correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability within one hour and at least once per eight hours thereafter, and perform Surveillance Requirements 4.9.A.2.a within 24 hours .
2. One Diesel Generator (1A, 1B, or 1C) Inoperable From and after the date that one of the diesel generators is made or found to be inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible in accordance with Specification 3.5.G for a period not to exceed seven days provided that two 230 kV offsite transmission lines are available, both remaining diesel generators and associated emergency buses are operable, and the increased Surveillance Requirements as stated in Specification 4.9.B.2. are implemented.	2. One Diesel Generator (1A, 1B, or 1C) Inoperable When it is established that one diesel generator (1A, 1B, or 1C) is inoperable, verify correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability within one hour and at least once per eight hours thereafter, and perform Surveillance Requirement 4.9.A.2.a within 24 hours, and every 72 hours thereafter.
3. One 125/250 Volt DC Power System (Plant Battery 1A or 1B) Inoperable From and after the date that one of the two 125/250 volt plant batteries is made or found to be inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding seven (7) days within electrical safety considerations, provided repair work is initiated immediately to return the failed component to an operable state, Specification 3.5.G is satisfied,	3. One 125/250 Volt DC Power System (Plant Battery 1A or 1B) Inoperable When it is established that one of the 125/250 volt DC power systems (plant battery 1A or 1B) is made or found to be inoperable, the pilot cell voltage and specific gravity and the overall battery voltage of the operable plant battery shall be tested daily and determined to be satisfactory.

Table 4.9-1

DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE

Number of Failures In Last 20 Valid Tests*	Test Frequency
≤ 1	At least once per 31 days
≥ 2	At least once per 7 days

*Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, except that only the last 20 tests are used, and are determined on a per diesel basis.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-366

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 83
License No. NPF-5

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia, (the licensee) dated March 31, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 83 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/S/

Darl S. Hood, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 25, 1987

PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	OGC-Bethesda	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II
MDuncan/mac	LCrocker	MKarman	DHood, Acting Director
08/5/87	08/6/87	08/10/87	08/24/87

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 83

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5

DOCKET NO. 50-366

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page	Insert Page
3/4 8-1	3/4 8-1
3/4 8-2	3/4 8-2
3/4 8-3	3/4 8-3
--	3/4 8-3a
3/4 8-5	3/4 8-5
3/4 8-8	3/4 8-8

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

A.C. SOURCES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDTION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and

b. Three separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

1. A separate day tank containing a minimum of 900 gallons of fuel,

2. A separate fuel storage tank containing a minimum of 32,000 gallons of fuel, and

3. A separate fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: CONDTIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one offsite circuit of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining offsite A.C. source by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, and performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 24 hours. Restore at least two offsite circuits to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, and by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 24 hours. Restore at least three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

c. With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, and by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 8 hours. Restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. Restore the other A.C. power source (offsite circuit or diesel generator set) to OPERABLE status in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.8.1.1, Action Statements a or b, as appropriate, from the time of initial loss.

d. With two of the above required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of three diesel generators by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 8 hours, unless the diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN with the next 12 hours. With only one offsite source restored, restore the remaining offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

e. With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1.a. and 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. Restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. Restore three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:

a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability, and

b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by transferring, manually and automatically, unit power supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.

4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8.1.1.2-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1. Verifying the fuel level in the day fuel tanks.

2. Verifying the fuel level in the plant fuel storage tank.

3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day tank.

4. Verifying that each diesel starts from ambient condition by gradually loading the generator to 1710-2000 kW*, and operating for $\geq$ 60 minutes.

5. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses.

6. Verifying the pressure in both diesel air start receivers to be $\geq$ 225 psig.

b. At least once per 184 days by verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to synchronous speed in $\leq$ 12 seconds, is loaded to 2764-2825 kW* for diesel generator 2A, 2360-2425 kW* for diesel generator 1B, and 2742-2825 kW* for diesel generator 2C in $\leq$ 120 seconds, and operates for $\geq$ 60 minutes thereafter.

c. At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D270-65, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-74 when checked for viscosity, water and sediment.

*Momentary variations outside this band shall not invalidate the test.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for this class of standby service.

2. Verifying that the automatic load sequence timer is OPERABLE with the interval between each load block within $\pm$ 10% of its design interval.

3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of $\geq$ 798 kw while maintaining voltage at 4160 $\pm$ 400 volts and frequency at 60 $\pm$ 2 Hz.

9. Verifying that the diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours. During the first 2 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to ≥ 2950 kW for diesel generator 2A, ≥ 2547 kW for diesel generator 1B and ≥ 2928 kW for diesel generator 2C and during the remaining 22 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to 2764-2825 kW* for diesel generator 2A, 2360-2425 kW* for diesel generator 1B and 2742-2825 kW* for diesel generator 2C. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, repeat Specification 4.8.1.1.2.d.5.

10. Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2 hour rating of 3135 kw.

11. Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:

    a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power,

    b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and

    c) Proceed through its shutdown sequence.

12. Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test mode (connected to its bus), a simulated safety injection signal overrides the test mode by (1) returning the diesel generator to standby operation and (2) automatically energizes the emergency loads with offsite power.

13. Verifying that the fuel transfer pump transfers fuel from each fuel storage tank to the day tank of each diesel via the installed cross connection lines.

e. At least once per 5 years by verifying that with both air start receivers pressurized to ≤ 225 psig and the compressors secured, the diesel generator starts at least 5 times from ambient conditions and accelerates to sychronous speed in ≤ 12 seconds.

f. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting both diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that both diesel generators accelerate to synchronous speed in ≤ 12 seconds.

*Momentary variations outside this band shall not invalidate the test.

TABLE 4.8.1.1.2-1

DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE

Number of Failures In Last 20 Valid Tests*	Test Frequency
≤ 1	At least once per 31 days
≥ 2	At least once per 7 days

*Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, except that only the last 20 tests are used and are determined on a per diesel basis.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NOS. 147 AND 83 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND NPF-5

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 31, 1986, Georgia Power Company (GPC, the licensee) requested a number of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes pertain to the testing of the onsite emergency diesel generators.

The objective of diesel generator (DG) testing is to assure operability of the DG by timely failure detection and corrective actions as necessary. Such testing provides a degree of assurance of the availability of the DG during the periods between tests. The existing DG testing concept is that assurance of operability has to be demonstrated by more frequent testing as the number of DG failures increases. Thus, the Technical Specifications (TS) require that DGs be tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electrical Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," with the test interval dependent upon the demonstrated DG performance, i.e., the interval shortens as the number of failures increases. Furthermore, the test interval is established conservatively on a per nuclear unit basis, rather than on a per diesel basis.

The licensee's March 31, 1986, letter requested revisions to the TS that would reduce the required number of "fast cold" starts of the DGs, eliminate excessive testing of the DGs, reduce the frequency of certain testing that has the potential for causing DG degradation, and modify the basis for the test interval to "failures per diesel generator" rather than "DG failures per nuclear unit."

EVALUATION

The changes requested by the licensee are addressed individually.

1. The licensee proposes to change the test interval frequency such that it is based upon failures per diesel generator rather than DG failures per nuclear unit. The primary purpose of this change is to avoid test starting all diesel generators due to failures experienced on one diesel generator. Our past experience has shown that many licensees have been

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testing their good diesel generators mainly to quickly get out of the frequent test cycles imposed by the Standard Technical Specifications. The staff and industry consensus is that current requirements for testing of good diesel generators do not improve reliability of the good diesel generators, and may be a factor in potential degradation of the good diesel generators, including negative effects or their overall expected life; hence, such testing is not warranted. Therefore, we concur with the licensee's proposal to reckon diesel generator failures on a per diesel generator basis rather than on a per nuclear unit basis. This is consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 guidelines on diesel generator reliability and is, therefore, acceptable.

2. The licensee proposes changes to TS Surveillance Requirements 4.9.A.2.a for Unit 1 and 4.8.1.1.2.a for Unit 2 to include routine testing at intervals of 31 days or 7 days based on the number of failures per diesel in the last 20 tests. The proposed test interval is based on GL 84-15 which gives a diesel generator reliability goal of 0.95 and is consistent with the resolution of ongoing generic issue (GI) B-56 on Diesel Generator Reliability in support of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-44 Station Blackout. This change is, therefore, acceptable.

3. The licensee proposes to add the definition of Staggered Test Basis as stated in the Unit 2 TS to the definitions in the Unit 1 TS. We find this to be acceptable.

4. The licensee proposes to change the Hatch Unit 1 TS Surveillance Requirements 4.5.A.2, 4.5.B.2, 4.5.C.3, 4.5.G and 4.5.J.2 to eliminate diesel generator testing when core spray, low pressure coolant injection, RHR service water and plant service water systems are declared inoperable. Failures experienced in the above mentioned systems do not adversely affect the performance of the diesel generators, although, failure of a division of plant service water will cause the diesel associated with that division to become inoperable. However, increased testing of the redundant diesel generator under such circumstances is not required. This proposed change for Hatch 1 is consistent with the current Hatch 2 TS, is in accordance with the Standard Technical Specifications, and is, therefore, acceptable.

5. Hatch Unit 2 TS 3.8.1.1 Action Statements presently require that every diesel generator be demonstrated to be operable, by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4, within one hour and at least once per eight hours thereafter in the event an emergency AC power source or offsite power source is declared inoperable. GPC proposes to change the Action Statements of TS 3.8.1.1 so that:

   (a) With one DG or one offsite power source inoperable, the remaining DGs must be demonstrated to be operable within 24 hours, by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4.

(b) With two offsite power sources inoperable, the DGs must be demonstrated to be operable within eight hours, by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4.

(c) With two DGs inoperable, the remaining DG must be demonstrated to be operable within four hours, by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4.

The staff concludes that the test frequency can be reduced as proposed by the licensee without adversely affecting the overall diesel generator reliability, is in accordance with Generic Letter 84-15, and is, therefore, acceptable.

6. The existing Action Statements of TS 3.8.1.1 for Hatch Unit 2 also require that if two DGs are inoperable, at least one of the inoperable DGs must be returned to operable status within two hours. The licensee proposes to extend the time for restoring operability of one of the DGs from two hours to 24 hours. This change would leave the unit inadequately protected from a loss of offsite power for a 24-hour period and is not in accordance with the guidelines of Generic Letter 84-15 or the staff position on Generic Issue B-56. It is, therefore, unacceptable.

7. The licensee also proposes to separate the existing Action Statement a. of Hatch Unit 2 TS 3.8.1.1 into two new Action Statements, a. and b., and renumber existing Action Statements b., c. and d. as c., d. and e., respectively. This is an administrative change only and is acceptable.

8. The licensee proposes changes to Surveillance Requirements 4.9.B.1 and 4.9.B.2 for Hatch Unit 1 similar to those proposed for Hatch Unit 2, discussed in item 5 above, to reduce testing of the DGs from every 8 hours to once within 24 hours when an offsite power source or a DG is declared inoperable. This is in accordance with Generic Letter 84-15 and is, therefore, acceptable.

9. The licensee also proposes to add a Surveillance Requirement 4.9.A.1 to the Hatch Unit 1 TS to require verification of offsite power availability and breaker alignments every seven days. Such a requirement is presently in Hatch Unit 2 TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a. This change would provide added assurance of the availability of offsite power and is, therefore, acceptable.

10. The licensee proposes changes to Hatch Unit 1 Surveillance Requirement 4.9.A.2.a, and to Hatch Unit 2 Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 to require verification of operability by starting each diesel generator, loading it gradually, and running the load test for 1 hour. Hatch Unit 1 TS Surveillance Requirement 4.9.A.2.a.2 and Hatch Unit 2 TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.b would be changed to require "fast-cold" starts of the DGs once every 6 months. This is in accordance with the current Standard Technical Specifications and is, therefore, acceptable.

11. The licensee proposes to revise the Hatch Unit 1 TS 4.9.A.2.a to include a load range of 1710 Kw - 2000 Kw to preclude the possibility of overloading diesel generators 1A, 1B and 1C for monthly testing, and load ranges of 2250 Kw-2400 Kw for diesel generators 1A and 1C and 2360 Kw -

2425 Kw for diesel generator 1B for the 184 days fast-cold start testing. It should be noted that Hatch 1 is not governed by the Standard Technical Specifications; however, the proposed change is an improvement over the existing Technical Specifications and is, therefore, acceptable.

12. The licensee proposes to revise the Hatch Unit 2 TS 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 to include a load range of 1710 Kw-2000 Kw to preclude the possibility of overloading the generator for monthly testing, and to revise TS 4.8.1.1.2.b to specify load ranges of 2764 Kw-2825 Kw for diesel 2A, 2360 Kw-2425 Kw for diesel 1B and 2742 Kw-2825 Kw for 2C for the 184 days fast-cold start testing. Table 8.3-6 of the Hatch 2 FSAR lists the load distribution on emergency buses (for loss-of-offsite Power and 0-10 minutes post-LOCA) as 2669 Kw for diesel 2A, 2360 Kw for diesel 1B and 2597 Kw for diesel 2C. The continuous rating of each diesel generator is 2850 Kw. Though this proposed revision is a deviation from the Standard Technical Specifications (requiring the diesel generators to be loaded to their continuous rating for periodic testing), it is consistent with the engineering rationale for 184 days fast-cold start testing (requiring the testing of the diesel generator to the design basis accident conditions) included in GL 84-15 and is, therefore, acceptable.

13. The licensee proposed to revise the Hatch Unit 2 TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.c.9 to require rated load testing of the diesel generators during the first 22 hours to allow engine preconditioning and the generators then be subjected to overload condition during the last two hours of the test. This is not in accordance with Regulatory Position C.14 of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," which states that immediately following the 2-hour short-time load test, load equal to the continuous rating should be applied for 22 hours. The purpose of this test is to demonstrate that the diesel generator is capable of immediately assuming the full LOCA load and then carrying the long term load for the remainder of the 24-hour period. The licensee's proposed test does not accomplish this purpose and it is, therefore, unacceptable.

14. The licensee proposes to reduce the test frequency on Hatch Unit 2 for demonstrating that the diesel generator starts at least 5 times from ambient condition and accelerates to synchronous speed in 120 seconds using the pressurized air (225 psig) stored in the two air start receivers (with compressors secured). The licensee proposes to replace current Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.c.14 which requires that this test be performed once every 18 months with new Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.e which would require that the test be performed once every five years. The primary reason for this test is to demonstrate adequate equipment sizing of the air start system. It is a test that is usually required only during initial startup testing. The current Standard Technical specifications do not require this test, but instead require routine surveillance to assure that the pressure in the air start receivers is adequate. The Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications include this requirement (that the pressure is verified to be 225 psig at least once every 31 days). The licensee has proposed this change in order to reduce abusive fast starts of the diesel generator. On the basis of the above discussion, we have concluded that the proposed reduction in frequency of this test is desirable and is acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there should be no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR §51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 22237) on June 18, 1986, and consulted with the state of Georgia. No public comments were received, and the state of Georgia did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: L. Crocker
N. Trehan

Dated: August 25, 1987

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

DENIAL OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSES AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has denied in part a request by the licensee for amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5, issued to the Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensee) for operation of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (the facility) located in Appling County, Georgia.

The denied amendments, as proposed by the licensee, would modify the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to extend from 2 to 24 hours, the time allowed to restore operability of one of two inoperable diesel generators; and would modify the Unit 2 TS to allow the diesel generator two hour overload test to be performed following the 22 hour continuous rating load test instead of before the 22 hour test as currently required.

The licensee's application for the amendments was dated March 31, 1986. Notice of consideration of issuance of these amendments was published in the Federal Register on June 18, 1986 (51 FR 22237). Other changes requested in that letter were approved in license amendments 147 and 83 dated August 25, 1987, to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5.

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The proposed change to extend from 2 hours to 24 hours the time within which one diesel generator must be returned to operable status when two diesel generators are inoperable was found to be unacceptable because it would leave the nuclear unit inadequately protected against a loss of offsite power for a 24-hour period, and it is not in accordance with the guidelines of Generic Letter 84-15 or the staff position on Generic Issue B-56.

The proposed change to perform the overload test prior to the 22 hour continuous rating load test was found to be unacceptable because it does not conform with Regulatory Position C.14 of Regulatory Guide 1.9 "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies" and because it does not accomplish the purpose of the test which is to demonstrate the capability to immediately assume the full LOCA load and then carry the long-term load for the remainder of the 24-hour period.

Accordingly the requests were denied. The licensee was notified of the Commission's denial of this request by letter dated .

By September 30, , 1987, the licensee may demand a hearing with respect to the denial described above and any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding may file a written petition for leave to intervene.

A request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., by the above date.

A copy of any petitions should also be sent to the Office of General Counsel-Bethesda, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

20555 and to Bruce W. Churchill, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20037, attorney for the licensee.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated March 31, 1986, and (2) the Commission's letter to Georgia Power Company dated August 25 , 1987, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., and at the Appling County Public Library, 301 City Hall Drive, Baxley, Georgia 31513. A copy of item (2) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects I/II.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 25th day of August 1987 .

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/S/

Darl S. Hood, Acting Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects, I/II

* SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II	OGC-Bethesda	PD#II-3/DRP-I/II
*MDuncan/mac	LCrocker	*MKarmon	DSH
08/07/87	08/ /87	08/10/87	DHood, Acting Director
			08/24/87