January 29, 1987

Dockets Nos. 50-321/50-366

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 134&72 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5, for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. In response to your request dated November 20, 1986 as supplemented January 27, 1987, the amendments have been prepared and issued on an emergency basis to avoid the necessity of shutting down Unit 1. It consists of changes to the Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications deleting the requirements that a snubber be declared inoperable if visible signs of leakage are present.

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for Hearing will be included in the Commission's Bi-Weekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
G. W. Rivenbark

George W. Rivenbark, Project Manager
BWR Project Directorate #2
Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 134 to DPR-57
2. Amendment No. 72 to NPF-5
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

DBL:PD#2	DBL:PD#2	OGC - Bethesda	DBL:PD#2
SNorris	GRivenbark		DMuller
1/28/87	1/29/87	1/29/87	1/29/87

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION

MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-321

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 134
License No. DPR-57

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al., (the licensee) dated November 20, 1986 as supplemented January 27, 1987 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 134, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Daniel R. Muller, Director
BWR Project Directorate #2
Division of BWR Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 29, 1987

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 134

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57

DOCKET NO. 50-321

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

Pages
3.6-10b

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

systems associated with the safety-related mechanical snubbers shall be inspected to determine if there has been a severe dynamic event. (b) In the event of a severe dynamic event, snubbers in that system which experienced the event shall be inspected during the refueling outage to assure the snubbers have freedom of movement and are not frozen up. The inspection shall consist of verifying freedom of motion using one of the following: (i) Manually induced snubber movement; (ii) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel. If one or more mechanical snubbers are found to be frozen up during this inspection, those snubbers shall be replaced (or overhauled) before returning to power. Re-inspection shall subsequently be performed according to the schedule of 4.6.L.1., but the scope of the examination shall be limited to the systems associated with the safety-related mechanical snubbers. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the "as found" condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.L.4. or 4.6.L.5., as applicable. However, if a hydraulic snubber is found to contain less than the required minimum volume of reserve fluid, the snubber shall be determined inoperable and cannot be determined OPERABLE via functional testing for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval.

3. Functional Tests

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, a representative sample of 10% of the total of each type (hydraulic or mechanical) safety-related snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.6.L.4. or 4.6.L.5., an additional sample of at least 1/2 the size of the initial lot of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested.

Functional testing shall continue until no additional inoperable snubbers of a particular type are found within a sample or until all safety-related snubbers of that type have been functionally tested.

The representative sample selected for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating environments and the range of size and capacity of snubbers. The representative sample shall be selected randomly from the total population of safety-related snubbers. At least 25% of the snubbers in the

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CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

DOCKET NO. 50-366

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 72
License No. NPF-5

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al., (the licensee) dated November 20, 1986 as supplemented January 27, 1987 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 72 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Daniel R. Muller, Director
BWR Project Directorate #2
Division of BWR Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 29, 1987

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 72

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5

DOCKET NO. 50-366

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines. The overleaf page is provided for convenience.

Page
3/4 7-12

3/4.7.4 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.4 All snubbers* shall be operable. The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed on non-safety related systems and then only if their faiure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: Conditions 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.4.c on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.4 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Visual Inspections

All safety-related snubbers shall be visually examined to verify snubber operability. Visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

No. Inoperable Snubbers per Inspection Period	Subsequent Visual Inspection Period**#
0	18 months ± 25%
1	12 months ± 25%
2	6 months ± 25%
3, 4	124 days ± 25%
5, 6, 7	62 days ± 25%
8 or more	31 days ± 25%

The snubbers may be categorized into two groups: Those accessible and those inaccessible during reactor operation. Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with the above schedule.

*The applicable snubbers shall be identified in plant procedures.
**The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.
#The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify (1) that there are no visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure, and (3) for mechanical snubbers where snubber movement can be manually induced, the snubbers shall be inspected as follows: (a) At each refueling, systems associated with the safety-related mechanical snubbers shall be inspected to determine if there has been a severe dynamic event. (b) In the event of a severe dynamic event, snubbers in that system which experienced the event shall be inspected during the refueling outage to assure the snubbers have freedom of movement and are not frozen up. The inspection shall consist of verifying freedom of motion using one of the following: (i) Manually induced snubber movement; (ii) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel. If one or more mechanical snubbers are found to be frozen up during this inspection, those snubbers shall be replaced (or overhauled) before returning to power. Re-inspection shall subsequently be performed according to the schedule of 4.7.4.a, but the scope of the examination shall be limited to the systems associated with the safety-related mechanical snubbers. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the "as found" condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.4.d or 4.7.4.e, as applicable. However, if a hydraulic snubber is found to contain less than the required minimum volume of reserve fluid, the snubber shall be determined inoperable and cannot be determined OPERABLE via functional testing for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval.

c. Functional Tests

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, a representative sample of 10% of the total of each type (hydraulic or mechanical) safety-related snubber in use in the plant shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.4.d or 4.7.4.e, an additional sample of at least 1/2 the size of the initial lot of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested.

UNITED STATES
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NOS. 134 AND 72 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-57 AND NPF-5

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKETS NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 20, 1986, supplemented by letter dated January 27, 1987, the Georgia Power Company (licensee) proposed a revision to the Technical Specifications for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The proposed revision will delete one visual inspection acceptance criterion for safety related snubbers in the TS surveillance requirements for both Hatch units.

2.0 EVALUATION

The Georgia Power Company proposed to delete the parenthesized clause from Section 4.6.L.2 (for Unit 1) and Section 4.7.4.b (for Unit 2) of the current Technical Specification:

"However, if a hydraulic snubber is found to contain less than the required minimum volume of reserve fluid (or if visible signs of leakage are present), the snubber shall be determined inoperable and cannot be determined OPERABLE via functional testing for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval."

The Standard Technical Specification (STS) permit licensees to determine the operability of snubber with leakage via functional testing, unless the snubber does not have the required minimum amount of hydraulic fluid reserve. The Hatch Technical Specifications have the additional restriction such that when visible signs of leakage are present, the licensee is not permitted to demonstrate snubber operability by functional testing.

The STS permit operability demonstration via functional testing because it is recognized that after a certain amount of service life, slow leakage will develop in hydraulic snubbers. The STS and the current Technical Specifications both require that the service life of hydraulic snubbers be monitored so that a proper maintenance program, including seal replacement,

can be implemented effectively. If the leaking snubber can still perform its design function and the leakage is corrected in time, then the leakage does not have safety significance. Correction of leakage to assure continued operability of the snubber would be a function of the maintenance program. The current Hatch Technical Specifications call for unnecessary inspections and attendant shutdowns.

The proposed Hatch Technical Specifications follow the requirements of the STS, and provide adequate protection for snubbers and systems. The staff recommends its approval.

3.0 EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

The licensee, during a scheduled snubber inspection that was entered on November 14, 1986 declared 7 snubbers to be inoperable, 6 of them on the basis of a Technical Specification that states that snubbers with "visible signs of leakage present" be declared inoperable. The Technical Specifications also require that if 5, 6 or 7 snubbers are found to be inoperable in an inspection period the subsequent visual inspection period shall be 62 days ±25%. Based on declaring 7 snubbers inoperable the Unit 1, snubbers are currently scheduled to be visually reinspected by February 5, 1987. The existing Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specification is more restrictive than the current staff criteria and guidelines which do not require that snubbers be declared inoperable based on "visible signs of leakage."

Based on conversations with the licensee as documented by letter dated January 27, 1987, except for this visible signs of leakage" requirement only 4 snubbers would have been declared inoperable and the reinspection interval would be 124 days ±25%.

The licensee requested, in a submittal dated November 20, 1986, that the "visible signs of leakage" requirement be deleted from the Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications. No urgency was noted in this request.

The emergency results from the situation where it was only recently recognized that the inspection, and related shutdown, that would be required by the current Technical Specification provision by February 5, 1987 would be an unnecessary shutdown of an operating plant.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: or

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The requested changes delete the requirements that a snubber be declared inoperable if visible signs of leakage are present. As noted above in this Safety Evaluation, we have concluded that this change is acceptable.

The changes do not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because they do not involve changes in the design or operation of the plant and the unchanged provisions of the Technical Specifications continue to assure there is sufficient liquid in the snubbers and that the snubbers are shown to be operable by functional testing.

The changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because these changes do not affect the plant design or result in any new modes of operation.

The changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, because the proposed changes continue to assure that there is sufficient liquid in the snubber such that it will perform its snubbing function when needed and that the functional capability of the snubber is assured by functional testing.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the amendments to Facility Operating licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5 deleting the requirement to declare a snubber inoperable if visible signs of leakage are present involves no significant hazards consideration.

The State of Georgia was consulted on this matter and had no comments on the determination.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to the amendments. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR §51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:

Dated: January 29, 1987