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Docket No. 50-321

Georgia Power Company
Oglethorpe Electric Membership Corporation
ATTN: Mr. I. S. Mitchell, III
Vice President and Secretary
Georgia Power Company
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

Gentlemen:

By our letter dated November 22, 1976, we transmitted to you Amendment No. 24 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. 1.

Through an oversight, the Amendment included incorrect Technical Specification pages (pages 1.1-4, 1.1-14, and 1.1-15). Please replace pages 1.1-4, 1.1-14, and 1.1-15 of Amendment No. 24 to License No. DPR-57 with the enclosed corrected pages 1.1-4, 1.1-14, and 1.1-15.

Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Pages 1.1-4, 1.1-14,
and 1.1-15 of Amendment
No. 24

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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2.1.A.4. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram Trip Setting

Turbine control valve fast closure scram trip shall initiate within 30 milliseconds of start of control valve fast closure. Fast closure is sensed by measuring electro-hydraulic control oil line pressure which decreases rapidly upon generator load rejection and just prior to fast closure of the control valves. This scram is only effective when turbine steam flow is above 30% of rated, as measured by turbine first stage pressure.

5. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure Scram Trip Setting

Scram trip setting from main steam line isolation valve closure shall be ≤ 10 percent valve closure from full open. This scram is effective in the Run Mode and above 1045 psig in the Start & Hot Stand-by Mode.

6. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure on Low Pressure

Main steam line isolation valve closure on low pressure at inlet to turbine valves shall occur at ≥ 825 psig, while in the Run Mode.

7. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure on Low Condenser Vacuum

Main steam line isolation valve closure on low condenser vacuum shall occur at ≥ 7 inches Hg vacuum.

2.1.A.3. Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram Trip Settings

The turbine stop valve closure scram trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux and heat flux increase that could result from rapid closure of the turbine stop valves. With a scram trip setting of ≤ 10 percent of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in surface heat flux is limited such that MCPR remains above 1.05 during the worst case transient that assumes the turbine bypass is closed. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30% of rated, as measured by turbine first stage pressure.

4. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram Trip Setting

This turbine control valve fast closure scram anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from fast closure of the turbine control valves due to load rejection exceeding the capability of the turbine bypass. The Reactor Protection System initiates a scram when fast closure of the control valves is initiated by the fast acting solenoid valves. This is achieved by the action of the fast acting solenoid valves in rapidly reducing hydraulic control oil pressure at the main turbine control valve actuator disc dump valves. This loss of pressure is sensed by pressure switches whose contacts form the one-out-of-two-twice logic input to the reactor protection system. This trip setting, a nominally 50% greater closure time and a different valve characteristic from that of the turbine stop valve, combine to produce transients very similar and no more severe than for the stop valve. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30% of rated, as measured by turbine first stage pressure.

5. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure Scram Trip Setting

The main steam line isolation valve closure scram occurs within 10% of valve movement from the fully open position and thus anticipates the neutron flux and pressure scrams which remain as available backup protection. This scram function is bypassed automatically when the reactor pressure is below 1045 psig and the Mode Switch is not in the RUN position.

6. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure on Low Pressure

The low pressure isolation of the main steam lines at 825 psig was provided to protect against rapid reactor depressurization and the resulting rapid cooldown of the vessel, which might result from a pressure regulator failure causing inadvertent opening of the control and/or bypass valves.

2.1.A.6. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure on Low Pressure (Continued)

Advantage is taken of the scram trip feature that occurs when the main stream line isolation valves are closed, to provide for reactor shutdown so that high power operation at low reactor pressure does not occur, thus providing protection for the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit. Operation of the reactor at pressures lower than 825 psig requires that the reactor Mode Switch be in the START & HOT STANDBY position, where protecting of the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is provided by IRM's and the APRM 15% scram (Start and Hot Standby Mode). Thus, the combination of main steam line low pressure isolation and isolation valve closure scram trip assures the availability of neutron flux scram protection over the entire range of applicability of the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit. The reactor pressure vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the turbine bypass valves when not in the Run Mode is less severe than the loss of feedwater transient. Therefore closure of the MSIV's for thermal transient protection when not in the Run Mode is not required.

7. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure on Low Condenser Vacuum

To provide backup protection for the main condenser against over-pressure due to in-leakage, assuming that the turbine stop valves and bypass valves fail to close, a loss of condenser vacuum initiates automatic closure of all main steam isolation valves, the main steam line drain isolation valve and the reactor water sample line valve (i.e. initiates a Group 1 isolation). Closure of these valves prevents excessive loss of reactor coolant and the release of significant amounts of radioactive material from the nuclear system. The low vacuum trip set point is selected far enough above the normal operating vacuum to avoid spurious isolation, however, low enough to provide backup isolation prior to the rupture of the condenser.

B. Reactor Water Level Trip Settings Which Initiate Core Standby Cooling Systems (CSCS)

The core standby cooling systems are designed to provide sufficient cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident and to assure that core geometry remains intact and to limit any clad metal-water reaction to less than 1%. To accomplish their intended function, the capacity of each Core Standby Cooling System component was established based on the reactor water low level scram trip setting. To lower the trip setting of the water low level scram trip would increase the capacity requirement for each of the CSCS components. Thus, the reactor vessel water low level scram trip was set low enough to permit margin for operation, yet will not be set lower because of CSCS capacity requirements.

The design of the CSCS components to meet the above guidelines was dependent upon three previously set parameters: the maximum break size, the water low level scram trip setting and the CSCS initiation trip setting. To lower the trip setting for initiation of the CSCS may lead to a decrease in effective core cooling. To raise the CSCS initiation trip setting would be in a safe direction, but it would reduce the margin established to prevent actuation of the CSCS during normal operation or during normally expected transients. Transient and accident analyses reported in Section 14 of the FSAR demonstrate that these conditions result in adequate safety margin for the fuel.

DEC 1 6 1976

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Docket No. 50-321

Georgia Power Company
Oglethorpe Electric Membership Corporation
ATTN: Mr. I. S. Mitchell, III
Vice President & Secretary
Georgia Power Company
Atlanta, Georgia 30302

Gentlemen:

RE: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 1

We are enclosing a corrected Specification 4.7.11.2 that has been sent to you as part of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for Fire Protection by letter dated December 2, 1976.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Specification 4.7.11.2

cc w/encl:
See next page

OFFICE ➤	ORB #1	ORB #3	ORB #3			
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DATE ➤	12/15/76	12/16/76	12/16/76			

Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-526-166

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PLANT SYSTEMS

SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.11.2 The spray and/or sprinkler systems located in the following areas shall be OPERABLE:

a.

b. (Plant dependent)

c.

APPLICABILITY: All modes

ACTIONS:

With a spray and/or sprinkler system inoperable establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment in the unprotected area(s), and

1. In MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4 restore the system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

2. In MODES 5 or 6 restore the system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of inoperability and the plans for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.11.2 The spray and/or spinkler systems shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 92 days by cycling each testable valve through one complete cycle.

b. At least once per 12 months:

1. By performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions.

2. By inspection of spray headers to verify their integrity

3. By inspection of each nozzle to verify no blockage.

c. At least once per 5 years by an air flow test of the open head spray and/or sprinkler system.