

June 10, 1996

Mr. Ted C. Feigenbaum
Executive Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Northeast Utilities Service Company
c/o Mr. Terry L. Harpster
Director - Nuclear Licensing Services
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M94467)

Dear Mr. Feigenbaum:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 198 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated January 5, 1996, as supplemented on May 31, 1996.

The amendment implements the guidance of Generic Letter 93-08 by relocating Tables 3.3-2, "Reactor Protective Instrumentation Response Times" and 3.3-5, "Engineered Safety Features Response Times" from the Technical Specifications to the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). In accordance with Generic Letter 93-08, the Limiting Conditions for Operations for Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1, 3.3.2.1, and 3.7.1.6 are revised to eliminate their references to the aforementioned tables. The amendment also revises Bases 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 to reference that the instrument response times are located in the TRM and that these tables in the TRM are now controlled under 10 CFR 50.59. The amendment also removes a cycle-specific note from Tables 3.3-3 and 3.3-4.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Daniel G. McDonald, Senior Project Manager
Northeast Utilities Project Directorate
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 198 to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Daniel G. McDonald, Jr.".

Daniel G. McDonald, Jr., Senior Project Manager
Northeast Utilities Project Directorate
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 198 to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

T. Feigenbaum
Northeast Utilities Service Company

Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 2

cc:

Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Nuclear Counsel
Northeast Utilities Service Company
P.O. Box 270
Hartford, CT 06141-0270

Mr. D. B. Miller, Jr.
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Safety and Oversight
Northeast Utilities Service Company
P.O. Box 270
Waterford, CT 06141-0270

Mr. Kevin T. A. McCarthy, Director
Monitoring and Radiation Division
Department of Environmental Protection
79 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06106-5127

P. M. Richardson, Nuclear Unit Director
Millstone Unit No. 2
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. Allan Johanson, Assistant Director
Office of Policy and Management
Policy Development and Planning Division
80 Washington Street
Hartford, CT 06106

Charles Brinkman, Manager
Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering
12300 Twinbrook Pkwy, Suite 330
Rockville, MD 20852

Mr. S. E. Scace, Vice President
Nuclear Reengineering Implementation
Northeast Utilities Service Company
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

Mr. E. A. DeBarba
Vice President - Nuclear Technical
Services
Northeast Utilities Service Company
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

Regional Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. F. C. Rothen
Vice President - Nuclear Work Services
Northeast Utilities Service Company
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385

First Selectmen
Town of Waterford
Hall of Records
200 Boston Post Road
Waterford, CT 06385

Ernest C. Hadley, Esq.
1040 B Main Street
P.O. Box 549
West Wareham, MA 02576

Mr. P. D. Swetland, Resident Inspector
Millstone Nuclear Power Station
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 513
Niantic, CT 06357

Mr. John Buckingham
Department of Public Utility Control
Electric Unit
10 Liberty Square
New Britain, CT 06051



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
DOCKET NO. 50-336
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 198
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated January 5, 1996, as supplemented on May 31, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.198 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Phillip F. McKee, Director
Project Directorate Northeast Utilities
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 10, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 198

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 3-1
3/4 3-6
3/4 3-10
3/4 3-15
3/4 3-20
3/4 3-21
3/4 3-22
3/4 3-22a
3/4 7-9a
B 3/4 3-1
B 3/4 3-1a

Insert

3/4 3-1
3/4 3-6
3/4 3-10
3/4 3-15
3/4 3-20
3/4 3-21
3/4 3-22
3/4 3-22a
3/4 7-9a
B 3/4 3-1

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

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INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2.1 The engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

- a. With an engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, either adjust the trip setpoint to be consistent with the value specified in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 within 2 hours or declare the channel inoperable and take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
- b. With an engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1.1 Each engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER					
a. Manual	1/pump	1/pump	1/pump	1, 2, 3	1
b. Steam Generator Level - Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	2

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
8. LOSS OF POWER		
a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays) - level one	≥ 2912 volts	≥ 2877 volts
b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays) - level two	≥ 3700 volts with an 8.0 ± 2.0 second time delay	≥ 3663 volts with an 8.0 ± 2.0 second time delay
9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER		
a. Manual	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Steam Generator Level - Low	≥ 12%	≥ 10%

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PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICs)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.6 Each feedwater isolation component listed in Table 3.7-3 shall be OPERABLE.

FW Isolation Components	Description
FW-38A	A FP Discharge MOV
FW-38B	B FP Discharge MOV
FW-42A	A FW Block MOV
FW-42B	B FW Block MOV
FW-41A	A FW Regulating Bypass Valve
FW-41B	B FW Regulating Bypass Valve
FW-51A	A FW Regulating Valve
FW-51B	B FW Regulating Valve
H5A	A SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry
H5B	B SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry

Table 3.7-3

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 & 3

ACTION:

- a. With one feedwater isolation component inoperable in either or both feedwater flow paths, either:
 1. Restore the inoperable component(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or
 2. Close or isolate the inoperable feedwater isolation valve(s) within 72 hours, and verify that the inoperable feedwater isolation valve(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days, or
 3. Secure or isolate the feedwater pump(s) with inoperable feedwater pump trip circuitry within 72 hours and verify that the inoperable feedwater pump(s) is secured or isolated once per 7 days, or
 4. Be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. The Reactor Protective and Engineered Safety Feature response times are contained in the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Requirements Manual. Changes to the Technical Requirements Manual require a 10CFR50.59 review as well as a review by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

The containment airborne radioactivity monitors (gaseous and particulate) are provided to initiate closure of the containment purge valves upon detection of high radioactivity levels in the containment. Closure of these valves prevents excessive amounts of radioactivity from being released to the environs in the event of an accident.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 198

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 5, 1996, as supplemented on May 31, 1996, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested amendment would change the TS to modify the requirements of TS 3.3.1, TS 3.3.2 and TS 3.7.1.6 and Tables 3.3-2 and 3.3-5, which provide the response time limits for the reactor protection system (RPS) and the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instruments, from the TS to the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The proposed amendment would also revise Bases 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 to reference that the instrument response times would be located in the TRM and that these tables in the TRM would be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee has stated that upon issuance of the proposed amendment, the TRM will be updated to include these tables. The NRC provided guidance to all holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors on the proposed TS changes in Generic Letter 93-08, "Relocation of Technical Specification Tables of Instrument Response Time Limits," dated December 29, 1993. The amendment would also remove a cycle-specific note from Tables 3.3-3 and 3.3-4. The May 31, 1996, letter indicated that the licensee will include a reference to the TRM in the Millstone, Unit No. 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) at the next scheduled update. The additional reference in the UFSAR does not affect the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the "Act") requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to include TS as part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TS include items in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits,

limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS. The Commission provided guidance for the contents of TS in its "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" ("Final Policy Statement"), 58 FR 39132 (July 22, 1993), in which the Commission indicated that compliance with the Final Policy Statement satisfies Section 182a of the Act. These criteria were subsequently incorporated into the regulations by an amendment to 10 CFR 50.36, 60 CFR 36953 (July 19, 1995). In particular, the Commission indicated that certain items could be relocated from the TS to licensee-controlled documents, consistent with the standard enunciated in *Portland General Electric Co.* (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979). In that case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board indicated that "technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety."

Consistent with this approach, the four criteria defined by 10 CFR 50.36, for determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TS limiting conditions for operations, are as follows:

- (1) Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
- (2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident or Transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;
- (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier;
- (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

As a result, existing TS requirements which fall within or satisfy any of the above criteria must be retained in the TS, while those TS requirements which do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other, licensee-controlled documents. In order to reduce staff and licensee resources required to process amendments associated with the relocation of selected TS requirements, the staff has maintained the line item improvement process, through the issuance of generic letters. The NRC provided guidance related to the relocation of TS tables of instrument response time limits in Generic Letter 93-08.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed changes to TS 3.3.1, TS 3.3.2 and TS 3.7.1.6 that remove the references to Tables 3.3-2 and 3.3-5 and deletes these tables from the TS. The licensee committed to relocate the tables on response time limits to the TRM if the proposed amendment is issued. Generic Letter 93-08 spoke to relocation of TS tables to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) rather than to the TRM. The licensee has proposed to add a statement to the Bases of TS 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 that any changes to the RPS and ESFAS response time shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. This is consistent with the Final Policy Statement and is also consistent with the manner in which other Millstone 2 TS requirement relocations have been performed. The TRM is updated more frequently than the UFSAR, the staff is provided with changes as they occur, the 50.59 process and Plant Operations Review Committee approval are required for changes, and finally relocation of these requirements removed from the TS into a single controlled document reduces confusion. The staff finds that for the above reasons, the proposed relocation to the TRM, rather than the UFSAR preserves the advantages associated with the relocation to the UFSAR. Thus the proposed change is consistent with the guidance in Generic Letter 93-08.

Tables 3.3-2 and 3.3-5 contain the values of the response time limits for the RPS and ESFAS instruments. The limiting conditions for operation for the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation specify these systems shall be operable with the response times as specified in these tables. These limits are the acceptance criteria for the response time tests performed to satisfy the surveillance requirements of TS 4.3.1.1.3 and TS 4.3.2.1.3 for each applicable RPS and ESFAS trip function. These surveillances ensure that the response times of the RPS and ESFAS instruments are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses performed for design basis accidents and transients. The changes associated with the implementation of Generic Letter 93-08 involve only the relocation of the RPS and ESFAS response time tables but retain the surveillance requirement to perform response time testing. The TRM will now contain the acceptance criteria for the required RPS and ESFAS response time surveillances. Because it does not alter the TS requirements to ensure that the response times of the RPS and ESFAS instruments are within their limits, the staff has concluded that relocation of these response time limit tables from the TS to TRM is acceptable.

The staff's determination is based on the fact that the removal of the specific response time tables does not eliminate the requirements for the licensee to ensure that the protection instrumentation is capable of performing its safety function. Although the tables containing the specific response time requirements are relocated from the TS to the TRM, the licensee must continue to evaluate any changes to response time requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Should the licensee's determination conclude that an unreviewed safety question is involved, NRC approval and a license amendment would be required prior to implementation of the change.

The staff's review concluded that 10 CFR 50.36 does not require the response time tables to be retained in TS. Requirements related to the operability, applicability, and surveillance requirements, including performance of testing to ensure response times, for RPS and ESFAS systems are retained due to those systems' importance in mitigating the consequences of an accident. However, the staff determined that the inclusion of specific response time requirements for the various instrumentation channels and components addressed by Generic Letter 93-08 was not required. The response times are considered to be an operational detail related to the licensee's safety analyses which are adequately controlled by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the continued processing of license amendments related to revisions of the affected instrument or component response times, where the revisions to those requirements do not involve an unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59, would afford no significant benefit with regard to protecting the public health and safety. Further, the response time requirements do not constitute a condition or limitation on operation necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety, in that the ability of the RPS and ESFAS systems to perform their safety functions are not adversely impacted by the relocation of the response time tables from the TS to the TRM. In addition to removing the response times from the TS, the licensee is modifying the TS Bases Sections 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 to reflect these changes. These changes are acceptable in that they merely constitute administrative changes required to implement the TS change discussed above.

These TS changes are consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 93-08, are not required to be in the TS under 10 CFR 50.36 or Section 182a of the Act, and are not required to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety. Further, they do not fall within any of the four criteria which were set forth in the Commission's Final Policy Statement and incorporated into 10 CFR 50.36. In addition, the staff finds that sufficient regulatory controls exist under 10 CFR 50.59 to address future changes to these requirements. Accordingly, the staff has concluded that these requirements may be relocated from the TS to the licensee's TRM, which is referenced in the UFSAR. The staff has determined that the proposed changes to the TS for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 are acceptable.

The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will also modify Tables 3.3-3 and 3.3-4 by removing a cycle-specific note that is no longer applicable. The note, which applied to Cycle 12 only, stated that operability of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) automatic initiation logic is reliant on an operator action to ensure successful initiation of AFW. For Cycle 13, a design change was implemented which provides automatic initiation of AFW. Therefore, since this note is no longer applicable, the staff has determined that the removal of the note is acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Connecticut official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 5816). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: G. Vissing

Date: June 10, 1996