May 17, 1995

Mr. John F. Opeka
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, CT 06141-0270

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M89441)

Dear Mr. Opeka:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 188 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated May 6, 1994, supplemented March 27, 1995.

The amendment incorporates additional sections and their associated surveillance requirements and bases into the Millstone Unit 2 TS that impose additional requirements on components that are credited to provide feedwater isolation in the event of a main steam line break inside containment.

In addition, the amendment makes modifications to the TS Bases Sections 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 by denoting that the feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately upon receipt of a main steam line isolation signal; and makes several miscellaneous editorial changes.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Guy S. Vissing, Senior Project Manager Project
Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 188 to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 17, 1995

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 188 to DPR-65
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 188
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated May 6, 1994, supplemented March 27, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 188, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 90 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Phillip F. McKee, Director
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 17, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 188

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
VIII	VIII
--	3/4 7-9a
--	3/4 7-9b
--	3/4 8-6a
--	3/4 8-11
--	3/4 8-12
B 3/4 3-1a	B 3/4 3-1a
B 3/4 7-3	B 3/4 7-3
B 3/4 8-1	B 3/4 8-1

INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICs)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.6 Each feedwater isolation component listed in Table 3.7-3 shall be OPERABLE with response times as given in Table 3.3-5.

FW Isolation Components	Description
FW-38A	A FP Discharge MOV
FW-38B	B FP Discharge MOV
FW-42A	A FW Block MOV
FW-42B	B FW Block MOV
FW-41A	A FW Regulating Bypass Valve
FW-41B	B FW Regulating Bypass Valve
FW-51A	A FW Regulating Valve
FW-51B	B FW Regulating Valve
H5A	A SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry
H5B	B SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry

Table 3.7-3

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 & 3

ACTION:

a. With one feedwater isolation component inoperable in either or both feedwater flow paths, either:

1. Restore the inoperable component(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or

2. Close or isolate the inoperable feedwater isolation valve(s) within 72 hours, and verify that the inoperable feedwater isolation valve(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days, or

3. Secure or isolate the feedwater pump(s) with inoperable feedwater pump trip circuitry within 72 hours and verify that the inoperable feedwater pump(s) is secured or isolated once per 7 days, or

4. Be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With two or more of the feedwater isolation components inoperable in the same flow path, either:

1. Restore the inoperable component(s) to OPERABLE status within 8 hours until Action 'a' applies, or

2. Isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours, and verify that the inoperable feedwater isolation components are closed or isolated/secured once per 7 days, or

3. Be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.6 Each feedwater isolation valve/feedwater pump trip circuitry shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on 'A' main steam isolation test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, and

b. Verifying that on 'B' main steam isolation test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, and

c. Verifying that on 'A' main steam isolation test signal, each feedwater pump trip circuit actuates, and

d. Verifying that on 'B' main steam isolation test signal, each feedwater pump trip circuit actuates.

3/4.8.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

A.C. DISTRIBUTION - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

3.8.2.1A Inverters 5 and 6 shall be OPERABLE and available for automatic transfer via static switches VS1 and VS2 to power busses VIAC-1 and VIAC-2, respectively.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 & 3

ACTION:

a. With inverter 5 or 6 inoperable, restore the inverter to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With inverter 5 or 6 unavailable for automatic transfer via static switch VS1 or VS2 to power bus VIAC-1 or VIAC-2, respectively, restore the automatic transfer capability within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

c. With inverters 5 and 6 inoperable or unavailable for automatic transfer via static switches VS1 and VS2 to power busses VIAC-1 and VIAC-2, respectively, restore the inverters to OPERABLE status or restore their automatic transfer capability within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.1A

a. Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency, and alignment for automatic transfer via static switches VS1 and VS2 to power busses VIAC-1 and VIAC-2, respectively, at least once per 7 days.

b. Verify that busses VIAC-1 and VIAC-2 automatically transfer to their alternate power sources, inverters 5 and 6, respectively, at least once per refueling during shutdown.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

D.C. DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (TURBINE BATTERY) — OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.5 The following D.C. electrical power subsystem shall be OPERABLE and energized:

The Turbine Battery D.C. electrical power subsystem, consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus 201D and 125-volt D.C. battery bank 201D.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 & 3

ACTION:

a. With the 125-volt D.C. bus inoperable, restore the inoperable bus to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With the 125-volt D.C. battery inoperable, restore the inoperable battery to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.5.1 Verify 125-volt D.C. bus 201D is OPERABLE and energized at least once per 7 days.

4.8.2.5.2 The 125-volt battery bank 201D shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:

1. The electrolyte level of each pilot cell is between the minimum and maximum level indications marks, and
2. The pilot cell specific gravity, corrected to 77°F, is $\geq$ 1.200, and
3. The pilot cell voltage is $\geq$ 2.08 volts, and
4. The overall battery voltage is $\geq$ 125 volts.

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that:

1. The voltage of each connected cell is $\geq$ 2.08 volts under float charge, and
2. The specific gravity, corrected to 77°F, of each cell is $\geq$ 1.200.

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

1. The cells, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or deterioration, and
2. The cell-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual loads for 1 hour when the battery is subjected to a battery service test.

e. At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. This performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test.

3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

CAR fan response time for the case without a loss of power is composed of signal generation and valves stroke time.

Feedwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isolation of feed flow to the steam generators via the feedwater regulating valves, feedwater bypass valves and, as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The response time includes signal generation time and valve stroke. Feed line block valves also receive a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Since the block valves are not credited with isolation, they are not required to operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all valves are specified. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI signal.

The containment airborne radioactivity monitors (gaseous and particulate) are provided to initiate closure of the containment purge valves upon detection of high radioactivity levels in the containment. Closure of these valves prevents excessive amounts of radioactivity from being released to the environs in the event of an accident.

3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY (Continued)

of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. The dose calculations for an assumed steam line rupture include the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICs)

Feedwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isolation of feed flow to the steam generators via the feedwater regulating valves, feedwater bypass valves, and as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The response time includes signal generation time and valve stroke. Feed line block valves also receive a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Since the block valves are not credited with isolation, they are not required to operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all valves are specified. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI signal.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RT_{NDT} of 50°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR 50.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one of each of the onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C.and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that 1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the facility status.

The non-safety grade 125V D.C. Turbine Battery is required for accident mitigation for a main steam line break within containment with a coincident loss of a vital D.C. bus. The Turbine Battery provides the alternate source of power for Inverters 1 & 2 respectively via non-safety grade Inverters 5 & 6. For the loss of a D.C. event with a coincident steam line break within containment, the feedwater regulating valves are required to close to ensure containment design pressure is not exceeded. The feedwater regulating valves require power to close. On loss of a vital D.C. bus, the alternate source of power to the vital A.C. bus via the Turbine Battery ensures power is available to the affected feedwater regulating valve such that the valve will isolate feed flow into the faulted generator. The Turbine Battery is considered inoperable when bus voltage is less than 125 volts D.C, thereby ensuring adequate capacity for isolation functions via the feedwater regulating valves during the onset of a steam line break.

The Turbine Battery Charger is not required to be included in Technical Specifications even though the Turbine Battery is needed to power backup Inverters 5 & 6 for a main steam line break inside containment coincident with a loss of a Class 1E D.C. bus. This is due to the fact that feedwater isolation occurs within seconds from the onset of the event.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 188

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 6, 1994, as supplemented March 27, 1995, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The request would incorporate additional sections and their associated surveillance requirements and bases into the Millstone Unit 2 TS that would impose additional requirements on components that are credited to provide feedwater isolation in the event of a main steam line break inside containment. In addition, the amendment would make modifications to the TS Bases Sections 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 by denoting that the feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately upon receipt of a main steam line isolation signal; and several miscellaneous editorial changes. The March 27, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

In the event of a main steamline break (MSLB) inside containment, feedwater to the faulted steam generator (SG) must be isolated within 14 seconds to ensure that containment pressure and temperature remain within design limits. Feedwater (FW) is isolated during an MSLB by closing the FW regulating valves, FW pump discharge isolation valves, FW block valves, and FW regulating bypass valves on a main steam isolation signal.

On February 18, 1994, the licensee discovered a condition that was outside the design basis of the Millstone Unit 2 power plant, and reported the condition to the NRC as documented in Licensee Event Report 50-336/94-003-00. The condition was identified during an engineering review of synchronism problems between vital 120-V ac inverter-1 and non-vital 120-V ac inverter-5, and involved the invalidation of an assumption used in the analysis of an MSLB inside containment.

For a postulated MSLB from SG-1 inside containment and an assumed loss of the Division 1 dc bus 201A, credit is taken for automatic transfer of 120-V ac vital instrument panel VIAC-1 (bus VIAC-1), which is normally powered by inverter-1 from the Division 1 dc bus, to its alternate power supply, inverter-5, which is powered from bus 201D and the turbine battery. Bus VIAC-1 powers the control circuit for the main FW regulating valve to SG-1 which must be powered to isolate FW flow to SG-1 and limit the peak pressure inside containment. Alternate means of isolating FW flow to SG-1 are assumed to be lost for this scenario because the fast transfer capability of the 4160-V ac buses (24A and 24C) from the normal station service transformer to the reserve station service transformer relies upon control circuits powered from the Division 1 dc bus. A similar scenario for SG-2 would involve inverter-2, inverter-6, and 120-V ac vital instrument panel VIAC-2 (bus VIAC-2).

Automatic transfer between inverter-1 and inverter-5 is achieved via a "zero break" static transfer switch. The static switch is designed to transfer bus VIAC-1 from its aligned inverter to its alternate inverter if low ac voltage, load overcurrent, or inverter failure is sensed. A synchronizing signal is used to maintain synchronism between the inverters and permit automatic transfer. If synchronism is lost between the inverters, automatic transfer of the static switch is inhibited.

From approximately February 6 to February 18, 1994, inverter-1 was not capable of automatically transferring to inverter-5 at all times, as is assumed in the design basis of the plant. The lack of automatic transfer capability between inverter-1 and inverter-5 was due to intermittent synchronism problems caused by setpoint drift of an underfrequency limiter circuit. To prevent recurrence of this situation, the licensee proposed that additional requirements be incorporated into the Unit 2 TSs. The addition of these new requirements will encompass assumptions made regarding the ability to isolate feedwater flow to a steam generator during a "postulated MSLB inside containment" scenario with the loss of one division of dc power.

Consequently, by letter dated May 6, 1994, the licensee requested an amendment for Millstone Unit 2. The amendment proposed changes to incorporate the following additional sections and their associated surveillance requirement and Bases sections to the Millstone Unit 2 TSs:

a. TS Section 3/4.7.1.6, "Plant Systems - Main Feedwater Isolation Components (MFICs)."

b. TS Section 3/4.8.2.1A, "Onsite Power Distribution Systems - A.C. Distribution - Operating."

c. TS Section 3/4.8.2.5, "Onsite Power Distribution Systems - D.C. Distribution - Operating."

Also, by letter dated March 27, 1995, the licensee provided revision to the proposed TS changes in the above cited TS Section 3/4.8.2.1A and TS Section 3/4.8.2.5.

The licensee's proposal to add the above sections and their associated surveillance requirements and bases to the Millstone Unit 2 TSs would incorporate additional requirements (e.g., additional limitations, restrictions, and controls not currently in place in the Millstone Unit 2, TS) regarding components that are credited to provide feedwater isolation in the event of a MSLB inside containment.

In addition, the requested amendment would make modifications to the TS Bases Sections 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.1.2 by denoting that the feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately upon receipt of a main steam line isolation signal; and miscellaneous editorial changes.

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 Proposed TS Section 3.7.1.6.a

The licensee proposed to add a new TS Section 3.7.1.6.a to permit one feedwater isolation component per feedwater flow path to be inoperable for a period of up to 72 hours, before being either restored, closed or isolated, or secured. If none of these can be accomplished, the Action Statement requires the unit to be placed in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

The incorporation of these requirements related to feedwater isolation will impose additional limitations, restrictions, and controls not currently in place in the Millstone Unit 2 TS, and is consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants." Therefore, the staff finds it acceptable.

3.2 Proposed TS Section 3.7.1.6.b

The licensee proposed to add a new TS Section 3.7.1.6.b to permit two or more of the feedwater isolation components in the same flow path to be inoperable for a period of up to eight hours, before being restored, closed or isolated, or secured. If the number of inoperable feedwater components is reduced to one per feedwater flow path within the eight-hour period, the Action Statement directs that the requirements of Action Statement in TS Section 3.7.1.6.a be followed. If the number of inoperable feedwater isolation components per feedwater flow path cannot be reduced to one within the eight-hour period, the Action Statement requires the unit to be placed in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.

The incorporation of these requirements related to feedwater isolation will impose additional limitations, restrictions, and controls not currently in place in the Millstone Unit 2 TS, and is consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants." Therefore, the staff finds it acceptable.

3.3 Proposed TS Surveillance Requirement Section 4.7.1.6 and TS Bases Section 3/4.7.1.6

The licensee proposed a new TS Surveillance Requirement, Section, 4.7.1.6, with an associated TS Bases, Section 3/4.7.1.6, to require each feedwater isolation valve/feedwater pump trip circuitry be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months. Proposed TS Bases Section 3/4.7.1.6 provides bases for this surveillance requirement.

This proposed TS surveillance requirement will impose additional limitations, restrictions, and controls not currently in place in the Millstone Unit 2 TS, and is consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants." Therefore, the staff finds it acceptable.

3.4 Proposed Modification to TS Bases Sections 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2

The licensee proposed to modify TS Bases, Sections 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2, by denoting that the feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately upon receipt of a MSI signal.

This proposed modification to the TS Bases will provide personnel with additional information and does not alter the manner in which equipment is operated, nor does it affect equipment availability. Therefore, the staff finds it acceptable.

3.5 Proposed Miscellaneous Editorial Changes

The licensee proposed several editorial modification (e.g., modifying the Index to reflect the new TS sections).

This proposed modification to the TS will provide personnel with information concerning the additional TS section requirement and does not alter the manner in which equipment is operated, nor does it affect equipment availability. Therefore, the staff finds it acceptable.

3.6 Proposed TS Section 3.8.2.1A

The licensee has proposed to add Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.2.1A and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.2.1A to the Millstone Unit 2 TS.

Proposed LCO 3.8.2.1A, and SR 4.8.2.1A titled "Onsite Power Distribution Systems - A.C. Distribution - Operating" contain the operability and surveillance requirements for inverters 5 and 6. These new proposed sections to the Millstone Unit 2 TS require that "inverters 5 and 6 shall be OPERABLE and available for automatic transfer via static switches VS1 and VS2 to power buses VIAC-1 and VIAC-2, respectively," while the plant is in Mode 1, 2, & 3.

This proposed LCO to be added to the licensee's TS will control the operability of inverters 5 and 6 to ensure it is consistent with assumptions in the Millstone Unit 2 accident analyses, and with the design basis of the plant. Since inverters 5 and 6 provide an alternate source of 120-V ac power for the control circuits of the feedwater regulating valves and the probability of the primary source of 120-V ac power failing coincident with an MSLB inside containment is low, the period of inoperability or unavailability allowed for in the LCO is acceptable. For inverters 5 and 6 to be operable, they must receive 125-V dc power from bus 201D and be available and able to supply power of the correct voltage and frequency to vital buses VIAC-1 and VIAC-2, respectively. The proposed surveillance requirements are to check these parameters on a frequency that is consistent with related information provided in the Standard Technical Specifications and current regulatory practice. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed TS 3/4.8.2.1A to Millstone Unit 2 TS to be acceptable. The staff also finds acceptable the licensee's proposed change to Bases 3/4.8, "Electrical Power Systems," which provides additional information concerning TS 3/4.8.2.1A,

3.7 Proposed TS Section 3/4 8.2.5

The licensee has also proposed to add TS Section 3/4.8.2.5, titled "D.C. Distribution Systems (Turbine Battery) - Operating" to the Millstone Unit 2 Technical Specifications as follows.

Proposed TS 3/4.8.2.5, titled "D.C. Distribution Systems (Turbine Battery) - Operating" contains the operability and surveillance requirements for 125-V bus 201D and 125-V battery bank 201D. This new proposed TS requires that the dc electrical power subsystem which supplies dc power to inverters 5 and 6 shall be operable and energized.

In order for inverters 5 and 6 to perform their safety function as alternate sources of 120-V ac power for the control circuits of the feedwater regulating valves, they must be provided with 125-V dc power. The source of this power is the turbine battery dc electrical power subsystem, which consists of 125-V dc bus 201D and 125-V battery bank 201D. This proposed TS is to control the operability of 125-V dc bus 201D and 125-V battery bank 201D to ensure it is consistent with assumptions in the Millstone Unit 2 accident analyses and is consistent with the design basis of the plant. Since the safety function of this dc electrical power subsystem is to provide power to inverters 5 and 6, the period of inoperability allowed in the LCO is consistent with the LCO for inverters 5 and 6 and is acceptable. The SRs for this TS are similar to those for the unit's station batteries and are also acceptable. Therefore, the staff finds proposed TS 3/4.8.2.5 to be acceptable.

4.0 TECHNICAL CONCLUSION

On the basis of its review of the information in the licensee's submittals of May 6, 1994, and March 27, 1995, and the Millstone Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report, the NRC staff has determined the proposed changes to the Millstone Unit 2 TS described above to be acceptable.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 32232). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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