August 21, 1998

Mr. Martin L. Bowling, Jr
Recovery Officer - Technical Services
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
c/o Ms. Patricia A. Loftus
Director - Regulatory Affairs
P. O. Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT - MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. MA1462)

Dear Mr. Bowling:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 219 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated April 6,1998.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications (TSs) by: (1) adding a surveillance requirement to verify pressurizer heater capacity to TS 3.4.4, "Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer," (2) moving the identification of the location of the containment air temperature detectors from the surveillance requirements portion of TS 3.6.1.5, "Containment Systems - Air Temperature," to the TS Bases for Containment Systems, Section 3/4.4.6.1.5, "Air Temperature," and (3) modifying the action statements and surveillance requirements of TS 3.7.1.5, "Plant Systems - Main Steam Isolation Valves." The TS Bases are updated to include the list of containment air temperature detectors and reflect the proposed changes.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Daniel G. McDonald, Jr., Senior Project Manager
Special Projects Office - Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 219 to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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cc w/encls: See next page

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Unit 2

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 219
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated April 6, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 219, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

for William M. Dean
Deputy Director for Licensing
Special Projects Office
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 21, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 219

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
3/4 4-4	3/4 4-4
3/4 6-9	3/4 6-9
3/4 7-9	3/4 7-9
B 3/4 6-2	B 3/4 6-2
B 3/4 7-3	B 3/4 7-3
------	B 3/4 7-3a

PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A water volume greater than or equal to 525 cubic feed (35%) but less than or equal to 1050 cubic feet (70%), and

b. At least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 130 kW capable of being supplied by emergency power.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With only one group of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours.

b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limits at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.4.2 Verify at least two groups of pressurizer heaters, which are supplied by emergency power, each have a capacity of at least 130 kW at least once per 92 days.

AIR TEMPERATURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment average air temperature > 120°F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shall be determined to be ≤ 120°F at least once per 24 hours.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

MODE 1	-	With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours; otherwise, be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours.
MODES 2 and 3	-	With one or more main steam line isolation valves inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2 or 3 may continue provided the inoperable valve(s) is(are) restored to OPERABLE status or the isolation valve(s) is(are) closed* within 1 hour and verified closed at least once per 7 days; otherwise, be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 6 seconds on any closure actuation signal while in HOT STANDBY, with $T_{avg} \geq 515°F$ during each plant startup except that verification of full closure within 6 seconds need not be determined more often than once per 92 days. The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.4 do not apply for entry into MODE 3.

*The main steam line isolation valves may be opened to perform Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.5.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 54 psig during MSLB or LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure is obtained from a MSLB event. The limit of 1.0 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to less than the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitation on containment air temperature ensures that the containment air temperature does not exceed the worst case combined LOCA/MSLB air temperature profile and the liner temperature of 289°F. The containment air and liner temperature limits are consistent with the accident analyses.

The temperature detectors used to monitor primary containment air temperature are located on the 38 ft. 6 in. floor elevation in containment. The detectors are located approximately 6 feet above the floor, on the southeast and southwest containment walls.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the design pressure of 54 psig in the event of a LOCA or MSLB. The measurement of containment tendon lift off force, the visual and metallurgical examination of tendons, anchorages and liner and the Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 "Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures."

3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY (Continued)

of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. The dose calculations for an assumed steam line rupture include the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The ability of the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) to close is verified after the plant has been heated up. Since it is necessary to establish a high Reactor Coolant System temperature before the surveillance test can be performed, on exception to Technical Specification 4.0.4 has been added to SR 4.7.1.5 to allow entry into MODE 3. This is necessary to allow plant startup to proceed with equipment that is believed to be OPERABLE, but that cannot be verified by performance of the surveillance test until the appropriate plant conditions have been established. After entering MODE 3 and establishing the necessary plant conditions ($T_{avg} \geq 515°F$), the MSIVs will be declared inoperable if SR 4.7.1.5 has not been performed within the required frequency, plus 25%, in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.2 and 4.0.3. The action statement for MODES 2 and 3 would then be entered. However, the required actions can be deferred for up to 24 hours (Technical Specification 4.0.3) to allow performance of SR 4.7.1.5. If the surveillance test is not performed within this 24 hour time period, the requirements of the action statement for MODES 2 and 3 apply, and the MSIV(s) must be either restored to OPERABLE status or closed. Closing the MSIV(s) put the valve(s) in the required accident condition. However, the MSIV(s) may be opened to perform SR 4.7.1.5. If the MSIV(s) cannot be closed, the plant must be shut down to MODE 4.

3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICs)

Feedwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isolation of feed flow to the steam generators via the feedwater regulating valves, feedwater bypass valves, and as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The response time includes signal generation time and valve stroke. Feed line block valves also receive

a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Since the block valves are not credited with isolation, they are not required to operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all valves are specified. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI signal.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RT_{NDT} of 50°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 219

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 6, 1998, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would modify the TSs by: (1) adding a surveillance requirement to verify pressurizer heater capacity to TS 3.4.4, "Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer," (2) moving the identification of the location of the containment air temperature detectors from the surveillance requirements portion of TS 3.6.1.5, "Containment Systems - Air Temperature," to the TS Bases for Containment Systems, Section 3/4.4.6.1.5, "Air Temperature," and (3) modifying the action statements and surveillance requirements of TS 3.7.1.5, "Plant Systems - Main Steam Isolation Valves." The TS Bases would also be updated to include the list of containment air temperature detectors and reflect the proposed changes.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 TS 3.4.4, "Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer"

The limiting condition for operation (LCO) of TS 3.4.4 specifies a specific amount of water volume and two groups of pressurizer heaters each with a capacity of at least 130 kW and capable of being supplied by emergency power. The current TS 3.4.4 has a surveillance requirement (SR 4.4.4), to verify the water volume. However, there is no SR to verify the pressurizer heater requirements specified in the TS LCO. The licensee proposes to add an SR to verify at least once per 92 days that: (1) there are at least two groups of pressurizer heaters, (2) they are supplied by emergency power, and (3) each of the groups have a capacity of 130 kW. The existing SR will be renumbered as 4.4.4.1 and the new SR requirement will be 4.4.4.2.

The addition of the SR to verify that all the LCO requirements of TS 3.4.4, including the heaters, are maintained will provide reasonable assurance that the safety-related function of the pressurizer to maintain the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure will be available and operable.

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The proposed frequency of the SR to verify the pressurizer heater requirements, at least once per 92 days, is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG - 1432, Rev. 1, "Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Plants," dated April 1995 (STS-CE).

The staff has determined that the addition of the SR, as detailed above, is consistent with the current guidance provided in the STS-CE and will provide reasonable assurance that the pressurizer will be capable of performing its safety-related function and is, therefore, acceptable.

2.2 TS 3.6.1.5, "Containment Systems - Air Temperature"

The licensee proposes to change the current SR 4.6.1.5 by removing the details relating to the location of the containment temperature monitors and relocating them in the associated TS Bases. In addition, the details of the location of the temperature detectors will be expanded and corrected to be consistent with the plant terminology relating to locations within the containment. The wording of SR 4.6.1.5 will also be changed to clarify the SR and eliminate redundant wording.

Although the licensee indicated that it was relocating the list of containment temperature detectors from the SR to the TS Bases, the SR only identifies the location of the temperature detectors and does not list the detectors. The physical location of components or other items that are identified in the SR sections of the TSs are normally not included in the TSs. Moving the identification of the location to the associated TS Bases is appropriate. The location of the temperature detectors is identified as the 38 foot elevation of the southeast and southwest walls. The correct containment floor elevation is 38 feet 6 inches, which will be the location included in the associated TS Bases The TS Bases will also indicate that the detectors are located approximately 6 feet above the floor at that containment elevation.

The inclusion of the containment temperature limit of equal to or less than 120 degrees Fahrenheit and the deletion of arithmetic average, which is redundant to the already stated average temperature in the LCO and SR, provides needed clarification.

The staff has determined that removing the location details from the TSs and including the corrected location details in the associated TS Bases is consistent with the guidance in the STS-CE and are, therefore, acceptable. The staff has also determined that providing the needed clarification is also acceptable.

2.3 TS 3.7.1.5, "Plant Systems - Main Steam Isolation Valves"

The primary purpose of the main steamline isolation valves (MSIVs) is to protect the RCS from an overcooling event on excess steam demand. They are designed to automatically isolate the steam generators in the event of a rupture of the downstream piping. The MSIVs also ensure that at least one steam generator will be available as a heat sink to remove decay and sensible heat from the RCS on an upstream rupture of a steam line. The licensee proposes several changes to TS 3.7.1.5 relating to the MISVs. The changes include: (1) modifying the action statement for Mode 1 to require the plant be placed in Mode 2 within 6 hours instead of Mode 4 (hot shutdown) within 8 hours, (2) modifying the action statement for Modes 2 and 3 to address more than one inoperable MSIV with an action time of 1 hour to either restore the valve(s) to an operable status or close the valve(s) and verify their closure at least once per 7 days; and modifying the requirement from being in Mode 4 within the next 8 hours to being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours and in Mode 4 in the following 6 hours, (3) deleting the words "that is open" in

SR 4.7.1.5, (4) deleting the requirement for MSIV partial stroke testing, (5) changing the requirement to perform testing of the MSIVs from "during each reactor shutdown" to "during each plant startup," and (6) adding an exception to TS 4.0.4 to allow entry into Mode 3 in order to establish plant conditions that are necessary to perform MSIV testing.

The current TS 3.7.1.5 action statement for Mode 1 allows 4 hours to restore an inoperable MSIV to operable status or to close the valve, otherwise the plant is required to be in hot shutdown, Mode 4, within 8 hours. The licensee proposes to modify the action statement for Mode 1 to require the plant to be placed in Mode 2 within 6 hours, instead of Mode 4 within 8 hours. This change would match the appropriate mode and action requirement. The proposed change to 6 hours is consistent with the time allowed by TS 3.0.3, which allows 6 hours to reach Mode 3, and it would also allow sufficient time to shut down the plant from 100 percent power. Once the plant is in Mode 2, then the action statement requirements for Modes 2 and 3 would apply.

The licensee also proposes to expand the scope of the action statement for Modes 2 and 3 to address more than one inoperable MSIV, which would eliminate the need to enter TS 3.0.3 if both MSIVs are inoperable. The reference to continued operation in Mode 1 would be removed since the action statement does not apply in Mode 1. An action time of 1 hour would be added to restore the inoperable valve(s) to operable status or to close the affected valve(s). The licensee chose 1 hour since it was a reasonable time to allow the valve(s) to be repaired, or to establish the plant conditions to close the valve(s). The requirement to be in Mode 4 within the next 8 hours would be modified to require that the plant be in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours and Mode 4 in the following 6 hours. The licensee proposes to increase the mode transition time from 8 hours to 13 hours in the action statement for Modes 2 and 3. This increase is reasonable for the plant operators to accomplish a controlled transition to a lower mode and is consistent with the time allowed by TS 3.0.3. In addition, the phrase in the action statement for Modes 2 and 3, "maintained closed," would be modified to "maintained," and the phrase "and verified closed at least once per 7 days," would be added to provide additional assurance that the inoperable MSIVs are closed. In addition, a note (*) would be added to state that the MSIVs may be opened to perform SR 4.7.1.5 to allow MSIVs that are in the closed position to comply with the action statement.

The licensee proposes to remove the words "that is open" in SR 4.7.1.5 to expand the scope of the SR to each MSIV regardless of its valve position. If the valves are not operable, the proposed changes to the Modes 2 and 3 action statement would allow continued plant operation if the valves are closed since it is the accident position of the MSIVs. The licensee also proposes to delete SR 4.7.1.5.a, which is the MSIV partial stroke test. Partial stroke testing would still be required by TS 4.0.5, which invokes the Millstone Unit 2 In-service Testing Program. In proposed SR 4.7.1.5.b, MSIV full stroke testing would become SR 4.7.1.5. The requirement to perform this test would be changed from "during each reactor shutdown" to "during each plant startup" since it is more important to verify equipment operability prior to plant operation instead of after plant operation. Also, it could be difficult to perform this test at the conditions specified if a rapid shutdown of the unit is required.

An exception to TS 4.0.4 would be added to SR 4.7.1.5 to allow entry into Mode 3. This is necessary to allow plant startup to proceed with equipment that cannot be verified to be operable until the appropriate plant conditions for performing the test have been established. After entering Mode 3, and establishing the necessary plant conditions, as defined in the proposed surveillance, the MSIVs would be declared inoperable if SR 4.7.1.5 has not been performed

within the required frequency and the proposed action statement for Modes 2 and 3 would be entered.

The staff has determined that the proposed TS changes provide needed clarification and are consistent with the guidance provided in the STS-CE. The staff also has determined that the proposed changes would not adversely affect the operability requirements of the MSIVs, the MSIVs would still function as designed to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents, there would be no adverse effects on how the associated systems or components function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents, and there would be no adverse effects on any design basis accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the staff has determined that the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

3.0 SUMMARY

The staff has determined that the proposed changes to TS 3.4.4, "Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer," TS 3.6.1.5, "Containment Systems - Air Temperature," and TS 3.7.1.5, "Plant Systems - Main Steam Isolation Valves," are acceptable. The staff has also determined that the proposed update of the TS Bases to include the location of the containment air temperature detectors and to reflect the proposed changes is also acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 25113 dated May 6, 1998). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: V. Ordaz
D. McDonald

Date: August 21, 1998