

Mr. Martin L. Bowling, Jr.  
 Recovery Officer - Technical Services  
 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
 c/o Ms. Patricia A. Loftus  
 Director - Regulatory Affairs  
 P. O. Box 128  
 Waterford, Connecticut 06385

January 27, 1999

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT - MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION,  
 UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. MA4150)

Dear Mr. Bowling:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 225 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated November 10, 1998.

The amendment changes Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protective Instrumentation," and 3.3.2.1, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," to restrict the time a reactor protection or engineered safety feature actuation channel can be in the bypass position for 48 hours, from an indefinite period of time.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

original signed by:  
 Stephen Dembek, Project Manager  
 Project Directorate I-2  
 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 225 to DPR-65  
 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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\*see previous concurrence

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

January 27, 1999

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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stephen Dembek".

Stephen Dembek, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 225 to DPR-65  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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Unit 2

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Unit 2

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY  
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 225  
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated November 10, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.225 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



William M. Dean, Director  
Project Directorate I-2  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 27, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 225

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
2-4	2-4
3/4 3-2	3/4 3-2
3/4 3-4	3/4 3-4
3/4 3-5	3/4 3-5
3/4 3-7	3/4 3-7
3/4 3-8	3/4 3-8
3/4 3-9	3/4 3-9
3/4 3-16	3/4 3-16
3/4 3-17	3/4 3-17
3/4 3-41	3/4 3-41
B 3/4 3-1	B 3/4 3-1
--	B 3/4 3-1a

**TABLE 2.2-1**  
**REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINT LIMITS**

	<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
1.	Manual Reactor Trip	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
2.	Power Level-High Four Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating	$\leq 9.6\%$ above THERMAL POWER, with a minimum setpoint of $\leq 14.6\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER, and a maximum of $\leq 106.6\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER.	$\leq 9.7\%$ Above THERMAL POWER, with a minimum of $\leq 14.7\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER, and a maximum of $\leq 106.7\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER.
3.	Reactor Coolant Flow - Low (1)	$\geq 91.7\%$ of reactor coolant flow with 4 pumps operating*.	$\geq 90.9\%$ of reactor coolant flow with 4 pumps operating.
4.	Reactor Coolant Pump Speed - Low (1)	$\geq 830$ rpm	$\geq 823$ rpm
5.	Pressurizer Pressure - High	$\leq 2400$ psia	$\leq 2408$ psia
6.	Containment Pressure - High	$\leq 4.75$ psig	$\leq 5.24$ psig
7.	Steam Generator Pressure - Low (2) (5)	$\geq 680$ psia	$\geq 672$ psia
8.	Steam Generator Water Level - Low (5)	$\geq 36.0\%$ Water Level - each steam generator	$\geq 35.2\%$ Water Level - each steam generator
9.	Local Power Density - High (3)	Trip setpoint adjusted to not exceed the limit lines of Figures 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 (4).	Trip setpoint adjusted to not exceed the limit lines of Figures 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 (4).

\*Design Reactor Coolant flow with 4 pumps operating is the lesser of either:  
a. The reactor coolant flow rate measured per Specification 4.2.6.1, or  
b. The minimum value specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

TABLE 3.3-1  
REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Manual Reactor Trip	2	1	2	1, 2 and *	1
2. Power Level - High	4	2(f)	3	1, 2, 3(d)	2
3. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low	4	2(a)	3	1, 2 (e)	2
4. Pressurizer Pressure - High	4	2	3	1, 2	2
5. Containment Pressure - High	4	2	3	1, 2	2
6. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	4	2(b)	3	1, 2	2
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Low	4	2	3	1, 2	2
8. Local Power Density - High	4	2(c)	3	1	2
9. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure	4	2(a)	3	1,2(e)	2
10. Loss of Turbine - Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - Low	4	2(c)	3	1	2

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

\*With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

- (a) Trip may be bypassed below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is  $\geq$  5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- (b) Trip may be manually bypassed below 780 psia when all CEAs are fully inserted; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 780 psia.
- (c) Trip may be bypassed below 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is  $\geq$  15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- (d) Trip does not need to be operable if all the control rod drive mechanisms are de-energized or if the RCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to the refueling concentration of Specification 3.9.1.
- (e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.
- (f)  $\Delta T$  Power input to trip may be bypassed below 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL POWER is  $\geq$  5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 4 hours and/or open the protective system trip breakers.
- ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:
  - a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour. The inoperable channel shall either be restored to OPERABLE status, or placed in the tripped condition, within 48 hours.
  - b. Within 1 hour, all functional units receiving an input from the inoperable channel are also declared inoperable, and the appropriate actions are taken for the affected functional units.
  - c. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 48 hours, provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 3 - NOT USED

ACTION 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, and at least once per 4 hours thereafter.

TABLE 4.3-1

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u>
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	S/U(1)	N.A.
2. Power Level - High				
a. Nuclear Power	S	D(2), M(3), Q(5)	M	1, 2, 3*
b. ΔT Power	S	D(4), Q	M	1
3. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low	S	R	M	1, 2
4. Pressurizer Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2
5. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2
6. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	S	R	M	1, 2
7. Steam Generator Water Level - Low	S	R	M	1, 2
8. Local Power Density - High	S	R	M	1
9. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure	S	R	M	1, 2
10. Loss of Turbine--Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - Low	N.A.	R	S/U(1)	N.A.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2  
0302

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Amendment No. 116, 225

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u>
11. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor	S	R(5)	S/U(1)	3, 4, 5 and *
12. Underspeed - Reactor Coolant Pumps	S	R	M	1, 2
13. Reactor Protection System Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M and S/U(1)	1, 2
14. Reactor Trip Breakers	N.A.	N.A.	M	1, 2 and *

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2  
0302

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Amendment No. 38, 52, 225

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- \* - With reactor trip breaker closed.
- (1) - If not performed in previous 7 days.
- (2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; adjust "Nuclear Power Calibrate" potentiometers to make nuclear power signals agree with calorimetric calculation. During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations of nuclear power and  $\Delta T$  power may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.
- (3) - Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, recalibrate the excore detectors which monitor the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX by using the incore detectors or restrict THERMAL POWER during subsequent operations to  $\leq 90\%$  of the maximum allowed THERMAL POWER level with the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination.
- (4) - Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, adjust " $\Delta T$  Pwr Calibrate" potentiometers to null "Nuclear Pwr -  $\Delta T$  Pwr". During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations of nuclear power and  $\Delta T$  power may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.
- (5) Neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. |

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- (a) Trip function may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is  $< 1750$  psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is  $\geq 1750$  psia.
- (b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.
- (c) Trip function may be bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 600 psia.
- (d) Deleted
- (e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.
- ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour. The inoperable channel shall either be restored to OPERABLE status, or placed in the tripped condition, within 48 hours.
  - b. Within 1 hour, all functional units receiving an input from the inoperable channel are also declared inoperable, and the appropriate actions are taken for the affected functional units.
  - c. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 48 hours, provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

- ACTION 3 - With less than the minimum channels OPERABLE the containment purge valves are to be maintained closed.
- ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:
- a.  $< 1750$  psia: immediately place the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 1750 psia.
  - b.  $\geq 1750$  psia, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following condition is satisfied:
    1. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1 provided BOTH of the inoperable channels are placed in the bypassed condition.

TABLE 4.3-6

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux	M	R*
2. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication	M	N.A.
3. Reactor Cold Leg Temperature	M	R
4. Pressurizer Pressure		
a. Low Range	M	R
b. High Range	M	R
5. Pressurizer Level	M	R
6. Steam Generator Level	M	R
7. Steam Generator Pressure	M	R

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\*Neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### BASES

#### 3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

Action Statement 2 of Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-3 requires an inoperable Reactor Protection System (RPS) or Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) channel to be placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour. The inoperable channel may remain in the bypassed condition for a maximum of 48 hours. While in the bypassed condition, the affected functional unit trip coincidence will be 2 out of 3. After 48 hours, the channel must either be declared OPERABLE, or placed in the tripped condition. If the channel is placed in the tripped condition, the affected functional unit trip coincidence will become 1 out of 3. One additional channel may be removed from service for up to 48 hours, provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.

Plant operation with an inoperable pressurizer high pressure reactor protection channel in the tripped condition is restricted because of the potential inadvertent opening of both pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) if a second pressurizer high pressure reactor protection channel failed while the first channel was in the tripped condition. This plant operating restriction is contained in the Technical Requirements Manual.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance testing verifies OPERABILITY of the RPS by overlap testing of the four interconnected modules: measurement channels, bistable trip units, RPS logic, and reactor trip circuit breakers. When testing the measurement channels or bistable trip units that provide an automatic reactor trip function, the associated RPS channel will be removed from service, declared inoperable, and Action Statement 2 of Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 entered. When testing the RPS logic (matrix testing), the individual RPS channels will not be affected. Each parameter within each RPS channel supplies three contacts to make up the 6 different logic ladders/ matrices (AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and CD). During matrix testing, only one logic matrix is tested at a time. Since each RPS channel supplies 3 different logic

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### BASES

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#### 3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

ladders, testing one ladder matrix at a time will not remove an RPS channel from the overall logic matrix. Therefore, matrix testing will not remove an RPS channel from service or make the RPS channel inoperable. It is not necessary to enter an action statement while performing matrix testing. This also applies when testing the reactor trip circuit breakers since this test will not remove an RPS channel from service or make the RPS channel inoperable.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. The Reactor Protective and Engineered Safety Feature response times are contained in the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Requirements Manual. Changes to the Technical Requirements Manual require a 10CFR50.59 review as well as a review by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

The containment airborne radioactivity monitors (gaseous and particulate) are provided to initiate closure of the containment purge valves upon detection of high radioactivity levels in the containment. Closure of these valves prevents excessive amounts of radioactivity from being released to the environs in the event of an accident. The actuation logic for this function is 1 out of 4. Action Statement 3 of Table 3.3-3 addresses inoperable containment purge channels.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 225

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 10, 1998, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested amendment would change TSs 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protective Instrumentation," and 3.3.2.1, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," to restrict the time a reactor protection or engineered safety feature actuation channel can be in the bypass position for 48 hours, from an indefinite period of time.

2.0 EVALUATION

As part of the initial review for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, the licensee proposed to operate the four-channel plant protection system instrumentation in a two-out-of-three logic with the fourth channel placed in an indefinite by-pass. The NRC staff, however, required that the inoperable fourth channel be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour, and at a later time approved a 48-hour bypass of the inoperable channel before it is placed in the tripped condition. The staff subsequently required all Combustion Engineering (CE) plant licensees to either limit the bypass of an inoperable channel to 48 hours or perform a specific review and analysis to justify a less stringent TS requirement. This staff requirement was transmitted to the licensee by letter dated March 31, 1982.

In a letter dated June 25, 1984, Millstone Unit No. 2 provided justification for continued operation with the ability to bypass a reactor protection system (RPS) or engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) channel for an indefinite period of time. However, the licensee subsequently determined that it did not provide adequate justification to allow continued use of indefinite bypass operation for an RPS or ESFAS channel. Therefore, the licensee proposes to

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modify Millstone Unit No. 2 TSs 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 by restricting the time a reactor protection or engineered safety feature actuation channel can be in the bypass position to 48 hours, from an indefinite period of time (except containment purge valve isolation and containment sump recirculation). In addition, the licensee is proposing to modify the TS action requirement for the loss of turbine load reactor trip function, the channel calibration requirements for the loss of turbine load reactor trip function and the wide range logarithmic neutron flux monitors, add a note to exclude neutron detectors from channel calibration requirements, add license amendment numbers to TS page 3/4 3-9, correct a reference to a surveillance requirement, and correct errors contained on TS page 2-4. The staff's evaluation is provided herein.

All CE plants with analog or digital plant protection system instrumentation have four separate trip channels for each trip parameter configured into a random two-out-of-four coincident logic. This design allows for bypassing one channel of a trip parameter while continuing to meet the single failure criterion with the remaining two-out-of-three coincident logic.

Although the two-out-of-three plant protection system coincident logic meets the single failure criterion, the fourth channel was not previously accepted by the staff as an installed spare, because of concerns with common mode failures. The staff was concerned that a single failure may affect more than one channel if adequate separation is not maintained between the channels. Walkdowns at some CE plants confirmed that adequate separation between channels was not maintained. Thus, the TS requirement of 48 hours permitted in bypass was established because of the low likelihood of a fault affecting more than one channel during the short 48-hour period. However, an indefinite bypass was determined to be acceptable by the staff for those plants that could demonstrate adequate independence between channels on a plant-specific basis.

The licensee has determined that it cannot demonstrate adequate independence between channels for Millstone Unit No. 2 because there is a remote possibility that a failure in one RPS or ESFAS channel can propagate to a second channel. With two channels inoperable due to this one failure, and a third channel bypassed, there would only be one operable RPS or ESFAS channel. The one operable channel would not be able to initiate a protective action, if required, since at least two trip signals are needed. Therefore, the licensee proposes to modify the Millstone Unit No. 2 TSs 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protective Instrumentation," and 3.3.2.1, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," to restrict the time an RPS or ESFAS channel can be in the bypass position to 48 hours, from an indefinite period of time (except containment purge valve isolation and containment sump recirculation). Specifically, the proposed changes modify the action statements for TSs 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 to require a failed RPS or ESFAS actuation channel to be placed in the tripped condition within 48 hours of the failure, instead of allowing the failed channel to remain in the bypass position for an indefinite period of time. This change will also allow a second channel to be removed from service for up to 48 hours, instead of 2 hours, provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.

The proposed changes are consistent with the Calvert Cliffs model RPS and ESFAS TSs provided in Enclosure 3 of the NRC correspondence dated April 16, 1981, and the new improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for Combustion Engineering plants (NUREG-

1432). The use of the Calvert Cliffs RPS and ESFAS TSs as a model for changes to the Millstone Unit No. 2 TSs (Option 1) is acceptable as stated in the NRC correspondence dated March 31, 1982.

The current action statement for the failure of a containment purge channel (Table 3.3-3 Action 3) will not be changed because this engineered safety features function is not susceptible to the potential failure mechanisms addressed by this change. Furthermore, the current action statement for the failure of a containment sump recirculation channel (Table 3.3-3 Action 4) was approved by TS Amendment 179 and will also not be changed.

Finally, the proposed changes to modify the TS action requirement for the loss of turbine load reactor trip function, the channel calibration requirements for the loss of turbine load reactor trip function, and the wide range logarithmic neutron flux monitors; add a note to exclude neutron detectors from channel calibration requirements; add license amendment numbers to TS page 3/4 3-9; correct a reference to a surveillance requirement; and correct errors contained on TS page 2-4 are all consistent with NUREG-1432.

Based on the preceding review and justifications for the TS changes, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed TS changes are acceptable.

### 3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

### 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 69343, December 16, 1998). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by

operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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