

Mr. Raymond P. Necci - Vice President
 Nuclear Oversight and Regulatory Affairs
 c/o Mr. David A. Smith
 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
 P.O. Box 128
 Waterford, CT 06385

August 12, 1999

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT - MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION,
 UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. MA5026)

Dear Mr. Necci:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 238 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated March 17, 1999.

The amendment changes Technical Specifications 3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems - ECCS Subsystems - Tavg ≥ 300 °F;" 3.7.1.7, "Plant Systems - Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves;" and 3.7.6.1, "Plant Systems - Control Room Emergency Ventilation System." The changes will revise: 1) surveillance requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling System valves, 2) the atmospheric steam dump valve requirements to focus on the steam release path instead of the individual valves, and 3) the allowed outage time for the atmospheric steam valves and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System. The licensee made changes to the Bases pages, consistent with the proposed changes to the TSs, which will be issued with the amendment to keep the authority file current.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Ronald B. Eaton, Sr. Project Manager, Section 2
 Project Directorate I
 Division of Licensing Project Management
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 238 to DPR-65
 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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Nuclear Oversight and Regulatory Affairs
c/o Mr. David A. Smith
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
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2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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Unit 2

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 2

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 238
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee) dated March 17, 1999, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 238, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 12, 1999

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 238

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

<u>Remove</u>	<u>Insert</u>
VIII	VIII
3/4 5-5	3/4 5-5
3/4 5-6	3/4 5-6
3/4 5-6a	3/4 5-6a
3/4 7-9c	3/4 7-9c
3/4 7-16	3/4 7-16
B 3/4 7-3a	B 3/4 7-3a
B 3/4 6-3b	B 3/4 6-3b
B 3/4 6-3c	B 3/4 6-3c

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

10. Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated position with power to the valve operator removed:

<u>Valve Number</u>	<u>Valve Function</u>	<u>Valve Position</u>
2-SI-306	Shutdown Cooling Flow Control	Open**
2-SI-659	SRAS Recirc.	Open*
2-SI-660	SRAS Recirc.	Open*

b. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

c. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system by ensuring that with a simulated reactor coolant system pressure signal greater than or equal to 300 psia the interlock prevents the shutdown cooling system suction valves from being opened.
2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3. DELETED
4. DELETED

*To be closed prior to recirculation following LOCA.

**Pinned and locked at preset throttle open position.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by cycling each power operated valve in the subsystem flow path not testable during plant operation through one complete cycle of full travel.
- e. By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for each of the injection valves in Table 4.5-1. This verification shall be performed:
1. Within 4 hours following the completion of each valve stroking operation,
 2. Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator or its control circuit, or
 3. At least once per 18 months.
- f. By conducting a flow balance verification immediately prior to returning to service any portion of a subsystem after the completion of a modification that could alter system flow characteristics. The injection leg flow rate shall be as follows:
1. HPSI Headers - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be ≥ 471 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be ≤ 675 gpm.
 2. LPSI Header - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be ≥ 2850 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be $\leq 4500 + \left[\frac{RWST \text{ level } (\%) - 10 (\%)}{90\%} \times 200 \right]$
- g. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:
1. The valves in the boron injection flow path from the boric acid storage tank via the boric acid pump and charging pump actuate to their required positions, and
 2. The charging pump and boric acid pump start automatically.

Table 4.5-1

ECCS INJECTION VALVES

1. 2-SI-617 "A" HPSI Header - Loop 1A Injection
2. 2-SI-627 "A" HPSI Header - Loop 1B Injection
3. 2-SI-637 "A" HPSI Header - Loop 2A Injection
4. 2-SI-647 "A" HPSI Header - Loop 2B Injection
5. 2-SI-616 "B" HPSI Header - Loop 1A Injection
6. 2-SI-626 "B" HPSI Header - Loop 1B Injection
7. 2-SI-636 "B" HPSI Header - Loop 2A Injection
8. 2-SI-646 "B" HPSI Header - Loop 2B Injection
9. 2-SI-615 LPSI Header - Loop 1A Injection
10. 2-SI-625 LPSI Header - Loop 1B Injection
11. 2-SI-635 LPSI Header - Loop 2A Injection
12. 2-SI-645 LPSI Header - Loop 2B Injection

PLANT SYSTEMS

ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.7 Each atmospheric dump valve line shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With one atmospheric dump valve line inoperable, restore the inoperable line to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours.
- b. With more than one atmospheric dump valve line inoperable, restore one inoperable line to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.7 Verify the OPERABILITY of each atmospheric dump valve line by local manual operation of each valve in the flowpath through one complete cycle of operation at least once per 18 months.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.6.1 Two independent Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES

ACTION:

Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4:

- a. With one Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With both Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains inoperable, restore at least one inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

MODES 5 and 6*

- a. With one Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train in the recirculation mode.
- b. With both Control Room Emergency Ventilation Trains inoperable, or with the OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train required to be in the recirculation mode by ACTION (a.) not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE normal and emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

* In Modes 5 and 6, when a Control Room Emergency Ventilation Train is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of 3.7.6.1 Limiting Condition for Operation, provided: (1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system (s), subsystem (s), train (s), component (s) and device(s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of the specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied within 2 hours, then Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.6.1.a or 3.7.6.1.b shall be invoked as applicable.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI signal.

3/4.7.1.7 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES

The atmospheric dump valve (ADV) lines provide a method to maintain the unit in HOT STANDBY, and to replace or supplement the condenser steam dump valves to cool the unit to Shutdown Cooling (SDC) entry conditions. Each ADV line contains an air operated ADV, and an upstream manual isolation valve. The manual isolation valves are normally open, and the ADVs closed. The ADVs, which are normally operated from the main control room, can be operated locally using a manual handwheel.

An ADV line is OPERABLE if local manual operation of the associated valves can be used to perform a controlled release of steam to the atmosphere. This is consistent with the LOCA analysis which credits local manual operation of the ADV lines for accident mitigation.

3/4.7.1.8 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION VALVES

The steam generator blowdown isolation valves will isolate steam generator blowdown on low steam generator water level. An auxiliary feedwater actuation signal will also be generated at this steam generator water level. Isolation of steam generator blowdown will conserve steam generator water inventory following a loss of main feedwater. The steam generator blowdown isolation valves will also close automatically upon receipt of a containment isolation signal or a high radiation signal (steam generator blowdown or condenser air ejector discharge).

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RT_{NDT} of 50°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

The appropriate administrative controls, based on the above considerations, to allow locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves to be opened are contained in the procedures that will be used to operate the valves. Entries should be placed in the Shift Manager Log when these valves are opened and closed. However, it is not necessary to log into any Technical Specification Action Statement for these valves, provided the appropriate administrative controls have been established.

If a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve is opened while operating in accordance with Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedures (AOPs and EOPs), it is not necessary to establish a dedicated operator. The AOPs and EOPs provide sufficient procedural control over the operation of the containment isolation valves.

Opening a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve bypasses a plant design feature that prevents the release of radioactivity outside the containment. Therefore, this should not be done frequently, and the time the valve is opened should be minimized. As a general guideline, a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve should not be opened longer than the time allowed to restore the valve to OPERABLE status, as stated in the action statement for LCO 3.6.3.1 "Containment Isolation Valves."

A discussion of the appropriate administrative controls for the containment isolation valves, that are expected to be opened during operation in MODES 1 through 4, is presented below.

Manual containment isolation valve 2-SI-463, safety injection tank (SIT) recirculation header stop valve, is opened to fill or drain the SITs and for Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) boron equalization. While 2-SI-463 is open, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.

When SDC is initiated, SDC suction isolation remotely operated valves 2-SI-652 and 2-SI-651 (inside containment isolation valve) and manual valve 2-SI-709 (outside containment isolation valve) are opened. 2-SI-651 is normally operated from the control room. While in Modes 1, 2 or 3, 2-SI-651 is closed with the closing and opening coils removed and stored to satisfy Appendix R requirements. It does not receive an automatic containment isolation closure signal, but is interlocked to prevent opening if Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure is greater than approximately 275 psia. When 2-SI-651 is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.

When valve 2-SI-709 is opened locally, a separate dedicated operator is not required to remain at the valve. 2-SI-709 is opened before 2-SI-651. Therefore, opening 2-SI-709 will not establish a connection between the RCS and the SDC System. Opening 2-SI-651 will connect the RCS and SDC System. If a problem then develops, 2-SI-651 can be closed from the control room.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

The administrative controls for valves 2-SI-651 and 2-SI-709 only apply during SDC operation. They are acceptable because RCS pressure and temperature are significantly below normal operating pressure and temperature (the RCS is administratively required to be < 300 °F and < 265 psia before shutdown cooling flow is initiated), the penetration flowpath can be isolated from the control room by closing either 2-SI-652 or 2-SI-651, and the manipulation of these valves, during this evolution, is controlled by plant procedures.

The pressurizer auxiliary spray valve, 2-CH-517, can be used as an alternate method to decrease pressurizer pressure, or for boron precipitation control following a loss of coolant accident. When this valve is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.

The exception for 2-CH-517 is acceptable because the fluid that passes through this valve will be collected in the Pressurizer (reverse flow from the Pressurizer to the charging system is prevented by check valve 2-CH-431), and the penetration associated with 2-CH-517 is open during accident conditions to allow flow from the charging pumps. Also, this valve is normally operated from the control room, under the supervision of the licensed control room operators, in accordance with plant procedures.

A dedicated operator is not required when opening remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations (Criterion 57 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). Operating these valves from the control room is sufficient. The main steam isolation valves (2-MS-64A and 64B), atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 190B), and the containment air recirculation cooler RBCCW discharge valves (2-RB-28.2A-D) are examples of remotely operated containment isolation valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations.

Local operation of the atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 190B), or other remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations, will require a dedicated operator in constant communication with the control room, except when operating in accordance with AOPs or EOPs. Even though these valves can not be classified as locked or sealed closed, the use of a dedicated operator will satisfy administrative control requirements. Local operation of these valves with a dedicated operator is equivalent to the operation of other manual (locked or sealed closed) containment isolation valves with a dedicated operator.

The main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202) are remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations. These valves are maintained open during power operation. 2-MS-201 is maintained energized, so it can be closed from the control room, if necessary, for containment isolation. However, 2-MS-202 is deenergized



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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 238

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated March 17, 1999, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested amendment would change TS 3.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems - ECCS Subsystems - Tavg \geq 300 °F;" TS 3.7.1.7, "Plant Systems - Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves;" and 3.7.6.1, "Plant Systems - Control Room Emergency Ventilation System." The changes will revise: 1) surveillance requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling System valves, 2) the atmospheric steam dump valve requirements to focus on the steam release path instead of the individual valves, and 3) the allowed outage time for the atmospheric steam valves and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System. The licensee made changes to the Bases pages consistent with the proposed changes to the TSs. The Bases page changes will be issued with the amendment to the TS to keep the authority file current.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Technical Specification 3.5.2

- a. The licensee is proposing to revise surveillance requirement 4.5.2.a.10 to remove valve 2-CH-434, and its associated footnote, from the list of valves to be checked in demonstrating operability of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Valve 2-CH-434 functions as a containment isolation valve. It is a 2" manually operated gate valve that is required to be in the locked close position per Table 5.2-11, "Containment Structure Isolation Valve Information" in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). As such, it is subject to surveillance requirement (SR) 4.6.1.1.a to ensure that primary containment integrity is demonstrated. The position of this valve in both SRs is locked close. It is not necessary to include verification of the valve in the locked shut position in

two SRs and the appropriate SR is 4.6.1.1.a, Containment Integrity, as that is the valve's function. While this represents a decrease in number of times the valve is verified to be in the assigned position and condition, the staff finds it acceptable as 1) the valve is subject to the same requirements as like valves of the same safety significance, 2) it is governed by the appropriate SR, and 3) it is located inside containment which provides the additional benefit of reduced personnel exposure.

- b. The licensee proposes adding the footnote, "Pinned and locked at preset throttle open position." to valve 2-SI-306 in SR 4.5.2.a.10. The shutdown cooling (SDC) pumps also function as the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps at Millstone, Unit 2. The valve, 2-SI-306, is a throttle valve in the discharge piping from the SDC pumps. When not used for SDC (plant is shutdown), the pumps provide LPSI in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The FSAR states, "Should the inadvertent closure of valve 2-SI-306 in the L.P. Injection System occur, it would result in the inability of that system to perform its function following a LOCA." Additionally, the FSAR states, "To provide additional assurance that the valve will not close, the manual operator on the opposite side of the shaft is pinned and locked to the handwheel to prevent movement of the valve plug due to the mechanical advantage of the handwheel drive nut. Also the handwheel is locked in position to prevent inadvertent operation. Thus, multiple means are provided to assure that valve 2-SI-306 will remain in an open position during all operations except shutdown cooling and that it will allow the system to perform its function following a LOCA." For the above reasons the staff finds the footnote acceptable and appropriate.
- c. The licensee proposes changing the nomenclature in SR 4.5.2.e and Table 4.5-1 from "throttle" to "injection" when referring to the listed ECCS valves. This change is non-technical and better describes the valves' function and is acceptable.
- d. With respect to page 3/4 5-6a a reference to the previous amendment that affected that page, Amendment No. 45, will be added to the bottom. The reference had been inadvertently omitted. This is a non-technical change and is acceptable.

2.2 Technical Specification 3.7.1.7

- a. The Index page VIII will be modified to delete the word "steam" from the entry for TS 3.7.1.7. This is a non-technical change and is acceptable.
- b. The terminology used in TS 3.7.1.7 and SR 4.7.1.7 is being changed from "Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve" to "Atmospheric Dump Valve Line." The licensee believes that this change will focus attention on the release paths rather than the individual component. This is a non-technical change and is acceptable.
- c. The licensee proposed changing the time clock in action Statement a, to restore a single inoperable atmospheric dump line (ADL) from 7 days to 48 hours due to the adverse impact an inoperable ADL has on the ability to accomplish a plant cooldown with loss of the main condenser as the preferred heat sink. Such an event has a relatively high frequency and therefore, the licensee's proposed change in allowed outage time from 7 days to 48 hours is prudent and acceptable.

- d. The licensee proposed changing the time clock in action Statement b, to restore operability with more than one ADL inoperable from 24 hours to 1 hour due to the severe impact two inoperable ADLs would have on the ability to accomplish a plant cooldown following a small break LOCA with a loss of offsite power. This is significantly more conservative than the existing TS and is acceptable.
- e. The licensee proposed changing the SR for operability of the ADVs to specify local manual operation of each valve through one complete cycle. Chapter 14 of the FSAR, Section 14.6.5.3.2, elaborates on the equipment and operator actions that support the long term cooling plan for a post LOCA condition. Operator action outside the control room may be necessary to manually open the ADVs. Staff has reviewed this change in wording and finds it consistent with the discussion and assumptions for the post LOCA long term cooling equipment and operator actions in the FSAR and, therefore, acceptable.
- f. The licensee made changes to the Bases pages consistent with the proposed changes to the TSs. The Bases page changes will be issued with the amendment to keep the authority file current.

2.3 Technical Specification 3.7.6.1

- a. An "a." will be added to the current action statement to allow for the addition of an action statement. This is a non-technical change and is acceptable.
- b. The licensee has proposed adding an action statement to TS 3.7.6.1, to account for a situation reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) 98-014-00, where both control room emergency ventilation trains are inoperable during normal plant operations. This is an expected condition when cleaning or replacing the air filters in the common supply header. It is appropriate to place this action statement in this TS rather than rely on the use of the generic TS 3.0.3 as was the case before this proposed TS change. The change is, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 19559). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR

51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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