NOV 18 1987

Docket No. 50-336

Mr. Edward J. Mroczka
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Engineering and Operations
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
P. O. Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Dear Mr. Mroczka:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC #66056)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.122 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated August 28, 1987.

The change modifies the Technical Specifications (TS) as follows: (1) the maximum linear heat rate shown in TS Figure 3.2.1 would be reduced from 15.6 to 14.0 kw/ft, and a factor of 1.115 would be applied to the planar peaking for reactor operation during Cycle 8 beyond a core average burnup of 9500 MWD/MTU, and (2) the equations of TS Figure 3.2.-3b would be deleted.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

"ORIGINAL SIGNED BY"

David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 122to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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PDI-4 Reading
D. Jaffe
E. Jordan
T. Barnhart (4)
E. Butcher
GPA/PA
J. Partlow
NRC & Local PDRs
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JStolz
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11/17/87

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MWHodges
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11/17/87

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PDR ADOCK 05000336
P PDR

Mr. Edward J. Mroczka
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit No. 2

cc:
Gerald Garfield, Esq.
Day, Berry & Howard
Counselors at Law
City Place
Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499

Mr. Wayne D. Romberg
Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station
P. O. Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Executive Director for
Operations
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Mr. Charles Brinkman, Manager
Washington Nuclear Operations
C-E Power Systems
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
7910 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Mr. Lawrence Bettencourt, First Selectman
Town of Waterford
Hall of Records - 200 Boston Post Road
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

Northeast Utilities Service Company
ATTN: Mr. Richard R. Laudenat, Manager
Generation Facilities Licensing
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Kevin McCarthy, Director
Radiation Control Unit
Department of Environmental
Protection
State Office Building
Hartford, Connecticut 06106

Mr. Theodore Rebelowski
U.S. NRC
P. O. Box 615
Waterford, Connecticut 06385-0615

Office of Policy & Management
ATTN: Under Secretary Energy
Division
80 Washington Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06106

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 122
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated August 28, 1987 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 122, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective upon issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: NOV 18 1987

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 122

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove	Insert
3/4 2-3	3/5 2-3
3/4 2-5	3/4 2-5
3/4 2-6	3/4 2-6
3/4 2-8(a)	3/4 2-8(a)
B 3/4 2-1	B 3/4 2-1
B 3/4 2-2	B 3/4 2-2



Figure 3.2-1 Allowable Peak Linear Heat Rate vs Burnup

* A limit of 14.0 KW/FT is required for Cycle 8 only whenever the core average burnup is $\geq$ 9500 MWD/MTU.



FIGURE 4.2-1 Augmentation Factors vs Distance From Bottom of Core

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR - F^T_{xy}

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2 Meet either of 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.2.2.

3.2.2.1 The calculated value of F^T_{xy}, defined as F^T_{xy}** = F_{xy} (1+Tq), shall be limited to $\leq$ 1.62 with the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX alarm setpoints adjusted consistent with the limits shown on Figure 3.2-2a, or

3.2.2.2 The calculated value of F^T_{xy}, defined as F^T_{xy}** = F_{xy} (1+Tq), shall be limited to $\leq$ 1.719 with the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX alarm setpoints adjusted consistent with the limits shown on Figure 3.2-2b.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.*

ACTION:

a. With F^T_{xy} > 1.62 and the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX alarm setpoints adjusted consistent with the limits shown on Figure 3.2-2a, within 6 hours either:

   1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to bring the combination of THERMAL POWER and F^T_{xy} to within the limits of Figure 3.2-3a and withdraw the full length CEAs to or beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit of Specification 3.1.3.6, or

   2) Apply the limits of Specification 3.2.2.2 and Figure 3.2-3b and within 72 hours adjust the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX alarm setpoints consistent with the limits shown on Figure 3.2-2b, or

   3) Be in at least HOT STANDBY.

b. With F^T_{xy} > 1.719 and the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX alarm setpoints adjusted consistent with the limits shown on Figure 3.2-2b, within 6 hours either:

   1) Reduce THERMAL POWER to bring the combination of THERMAL POWER and F^T_{xy} to within the limits of Figure 3.2-3b and withdraw the full length CEAs to or beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit of Specification 3.1.3.6, or

   2) Be in at least HOT STANDBY.

---

* See Special Test Exception 3.10.2

** For Cycle 8 only, whenever the core average burn-up is $\geq$ 9500 MWD/MTU, an additional multiplier of 1.115 shall be used in the calculation. Therefore, for these conditions, F^T_{xy} = 1.115 F_{xy} (1+T_q).

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 F^T_{xy} shall be calculated by the expression F^T_{xy}* = F_{xy} (1+Tq) and F^T_{xy} shall be determined to be within its limit at the following intervals:

a. Prior to operation above 70 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading,

b. At least once per 31 days of accumulated operation in MODE 1, and

c. Within four hours if the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T_q) is $>$ 0.02.

4.2.2.3 F_{xy} shall be determined each time a calculation of F^T_{xy} is required by using the incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map with all full length CEAs at or above the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit for the existing Reactor Coolant Pump combination. This determination shall be limited to core planes between 15% and 85% of full core height inclusive and shall exclude regions influenced by grid effects.

4.2.2.4 T_q shall be determined each time a calculation of F^T_{xy} is required and the value of T_q used to determine F^T_{xy} shall be measured value of T_q.

* For Cycle 8 only, whenever the core average burn-up is 9500 MWD/MTU, an additional multiplier of 1.115 shall be used in the calculation. Therefore, for these conditions, $F_{xy}{}^T$ = 1.115 F_{xy} (1 + T_q).

FIGURE 3.2-3a Total Radial Peaking Factor vs Allowable Fraction of Rated Thermal Power





FIGURE 3.2-3b Total Radial Peaking Factor vs. Allowable Fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

3/4.2.1 LINEAR HEAT RATE

The limitation on linear heat rate ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200°F.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Excore Detector Monitoring System and the Incore Detector Monitoring System, provide adequate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the linear heat rate does not exceed its limits. The Excore Detector Monitoring System performs this function by continuously monitoring the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX with two OPERABLE excore neutron flux detectors and verifying that the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-2. In conjunction with the use of the excore monitoring system and in establishing the AXIAL SHAPE INDEX limits, the following assumptions are made: 1) the CEA insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.2, 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are satisfied, 2) the flux peaking augmentation factors are as shown in Figure 4.2-1, 3) the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT restrictions of Specification 3.2.4 are satisfied, and 4) the TOTAL PLANAR RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR does not exceed the limits of Specification 3.2.2.

The Incore Detector Monitoring System continuously provides a direct measure of the peaking factors and the alarms which have been established for the individual incore detector segments ensure that the peak linear heat rates will be maintained within the allowable limits of Figure 3.2-1. The setpoints for these alarms include allowances, set in the conservative directions, for 1) flux peaking augmentation factors as shown in Figure 4.2-1, 2) a measurement-calculational uncertainty factor of 1.07, 3) an engineering uncertainty factor of 1.03, 4) an allowance of 1.01 for axial fuel densification and thermal expansion, and 5) a THERMAL POWER measurement uncertainty factor of 1.02.

A reduced linear heat rate limit of 14.0 kW/ft for Cycle 8 operation beyond a core average burn-up of 9500 MWD/MTU ensures that the 2200°F peak fuel cladding temperature limit will not be exceeded in the event of a LOCA. The value of 9500 MWD/MTU is the predicted end-of-cycle for Cycle 8. Operation beyond the predicted end-of-cycle may require reductions in the reactor coolant temperatures which can increase the calculated peak clad temperatures. The reduction in the linear heat rate limit will more than compensate for the effect of the reduction in the reactor coolant temperatures on the LOCA analysis.

3/4.2.2, 3/4.2.3 and 3/4.2.4 TOTAL PLANAR AND INTEGRATED RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS - F^T_{xy} AND F^I_r AND AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T_q

The limitations on F^T_{xy} and T_q are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the analysis for establishing the Linear Heat Rate and Local power Density - High LCOs and LSSS setpoints remain valid during operation at the various allowable CEA group insertion limits.

BASES

The limitations on F^t_r and T_q are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the analysis establishing the DNB Margin LCO, and Thermal Margin/Low Pressure LSSS setpoints remain valid during operation at the various allowable CEA group insertion limits. If F^T_{xy}, F^T_r or T_q exceed their basic limitations, operation may continue under the additional restrictions imposed by the ACTION statements since these additional restrictions provide adequate provisions to assure that the assumptions used in establishing the Linear Heat Rate, Thermal Margin/Low Pressure and Local Power Density - High LCOs and LSSS setpoints remain valid. An AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT$>$0.10 is not expected and if it should occur, subsequent operation would be restricted to only those operations required to identify the cause of this unexpected tilt.

The value of T_q that must be used in the equation $F^T_{xy} = F_{xy} (1 + T_q)$ and $F^T_r = F_r (1 + T_q)$ is the measured tilt.

The surveillance requirements for verifying that F^T_{xy}, F^T_r and T_q are within their limits provide assurance that the actual values of F^T_{xy}, F^T_r and T_q do not exceed the assumed values. Verifying F^T_{xy} and F^T_r after each fuel loading prior to exceeding 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides additional assurance that the core was properly loaded.

For Cycle 8 operation beyond a core average burn-up of 9500 MWD/MTU, an additional multiplier of 1.115 is used in the calculation of $F_{xy}{}^T$. This value is proportional to the reduction in the maximum linear heat rate. The value of 9500 MWD/MTU is the predicted end-of-cycle for Cycle 8.

3/4.2.6 DNB MARGIN

The limitations provided in this specification ensure that the assumed margins to DNB are maintained. The limiting values of the parameters in this specification are those assumed as the initial conditions in the accident and transient analyses; therefore, operation must be maintained within the specified limits for the accident and transient analyses to remain valid.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 122 TO DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated August 28, 1987 (Ref. 1), the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNEC) requested changes to Technical Specifications (TS) for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2. The TS are proposed for modification in such a way as to allow operation with a minimum reactor coolant system (RCS) flow rate of 340,000 gpm during extended operation (coastdown) for Cycle 8.

Reload analyses performed for Cycle 8 (Ref. 4 and 5) were approved by the Staff (Ref. 3) for a minimum RCS flow rate of 340,000 gpm during the predicted end of core life for Cycle 8. However, Ref. 3 states:

> "Extended cycle operation beyond the projected end of cycle (EOC) 8 is, however, based on a previous assumption of 350,000 gpm RCS flow rate. Accordingly, should you desire to operate Millstone Unit 2 beyond the projected EOC 8 please provide a supplemental evaluation and proposed TS, as needed, at least 90 days prior to the projected EOC 8."

This safety evaluation addresses the above referenced "supplemental evaluation and proposed TS" submitted by the licensee (Ref. 1) for extended operation.

2.0 EVALUATION

Analyses of Cycle 8 operation was approved for a minimum RCS flow of 340,000 gpm; but extended operation for Cycle 8 was not presented at the reduced flow rate. Extended operation is now scheduled for Millstone 2 in the form of a coastdown which is characterized by a decrease in core average coolant temperature and power decrease. The previously predicted assembly average burnup of 9500 MWD/MTU has extended to 10,500 MWD/MTU, with the coastdown in temperature to begin at 9500 MWD/MTU and the corresponding power decrease to begin at about 9760 MWD/MTU.

The 1000 MWD/MTU duration of extended operation for coastdown involves operation at the same conditions as in Cycle 8 or of less severity than Cycle 8. The bounding core parameters for all non-LOCA (loss of coolant accident)

transients are the same Cycle 8 conditions that exist at the beginning of the coastdown. This includes transients of concern due to departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) effects which are bounded by the existing analyses due to the lower temperature, pressure, and power conditions during extended operation. Also, fuel rod internal gas pressure in the Westinghouse fuel will not exceed RCS system pressure during Cycle 8 extended operation (Ref. 6).

Availability of equipment and operability requirements remain the same during extended operation. The reduction in power is expected to go from 100% to about 85%, thereby remaining in the same operational mode as before. Therefore, system availability and operability requirements reflected in TS are unchanged for the coastdown condition.

Evaluations of the current transient analyses by Westinghouse, the vendor, shows that accidents for the extended operation condition are bounded by the existing Cycle 8 analyses, except for the LOCA analyses. For a LOCA, the peak clad temperature (PCT) increases as a result of the initial decrease in RCS temperature while average power is held constant . Once average power begins its descent, the PCT no longer increases. Therefore the limiting condition, for both the small and large break LOCA is the point in the extended burnup when core average power begins to decrease which is about 260 MWD/MTU after EOL. For the large break LOCA case, the Westinghouse evaluation (Refs. 2) shows a small PCT increase above the Cycle 8 PCT value of 2142° F, but remains within the 2200°F PCT limit. For the small break LOCA case, however, the PCT increase above the Cycle 8 PCT value of 2135° F could exceed 2200° F unless compensatory measures are taken as described below.

The licensee has proposed to reduce the allowable a maximum linear heat rate (LHR) and total planar radial peaking factor ($F_{xy}T$) by 11.5% for extended operation, as reflected in proposed TS Figure 3.2.1, "Allowable Peak Linear Heat Rate vs. Burnup." These reductions allow the average LHR to remain unchanged while increasing restrictions on boundary conditions during extended operation. Using known sensitivities of the LHR that have been used in previous Millstone 2 operating cycles, the proposed maximum allowable values for LHR and $F_{xy}T$ would compensate for the effect of extended operation on the bounding LOCA transients. These sensitivities were determined using NRC staff-approved, ECCS evaluation models. Additional conservativeness is assumed in the evaluation. Steam generator tube plugging is assumed at 23.4% when the actual value is about 17.6%. Beginning-of-life fuel temperatures were used in the evaluation without taking credit for the lower end-of-life temperatures. Therefore, the results of the evaluation ensure a PCT, local cladding oxidation rate, and whole-core hydrogen generation level that remain within the values for Cycle 8, which satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 50.46.

The final change to the TS addressed herein involves the proposed deletion of the equations for total planer and integrated radial peaking factors from TS Figure 3.2-3b; these equations already appear in TS 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.3, respectively. The proposed deletion of the subject equation would have no effect on the TS other than to delete an unnecessary repetition of the equations. Accordingly, the proposed deletion of the equations in TS Figure 3.2-3b is acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or a change in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR §51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNEC) to USNRC Document Control Desk, August 28, 1987.

2. Letter from E. J. Mroczka (NNEC) to USNRC Document Control Desk, November 6, 1987.

3. Letter from D. H. Jaffe (NRC) to J. F. Opeka (NNEC), December 8, 1986.

4. Letter from J. F. Opeka (NNEC) to USNRC Document Control Desk, October 27, 1986.

5. Letter J. F. Opeka (NNEC) to USNRC Document Control Desk, August 29, 1986.

6. "Millstone Unit 2 Basic Safety Report", Docket No. 50-335, March 6, 1980.

Dated: NOV 18 1987

Principal Contributor: A. Gilbert, D. Jaffe