



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

October 15, 2001

Tennessee Valley Authority
ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice
Chief Nuclear Officer and
Executive Vice President
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
NO. 50-390/01-03 AND 50-391/01-03

Dear Mr. Scalice:

On September 15, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on September 14, 2001, with Mr. L. Bryant and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified.

Since September 11, 2001, your staff has assumed a heightened level of security based on a series of threat advisories issued by the NRC. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the heightened level of security was recommended for all nuclear power plants and is being maintained due to the uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist attacks. The steps recommended by the NRC include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with local law enforcement and military authorities, and limited access of personnel and vehicles to the site.

The NRC continues to interact with the Intelligence Community and to communicate information to you and your staff. In addition, the NRC has monitored maintenance and other activities which could relate to the site's security posture.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible for the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

//RA//

Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-390, 50-391
License No. NPF-90 and Construction Permit No. CPPR-92

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report 50-390/01-03, 50-391/01-03
w/Attachment

cc w/encl:

Karl W. Singer
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Operations
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

Jon R. Rupert, Vice President (Acting)
Engineering and Technical Services
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

Ashok S. Bhatnagar
Site Vice President
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

General Counsel
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert J. Adney, General Manager
Nuclear Assurance
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert G. Jones, Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

Mark J. Burzynski, Manager

Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

Timothy E. Abney, Manager
Licensing and Industry Affairs
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution

State Health Officer
Alabama Dept. of Public Health
RSA Tower - Administration
Suite 1552
P. O. Box 303017
Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

Chairman
Limestone County Commission
310 West Washington Street
Athens, AL 35611

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-390, 50-391
License Nos: NPF-90 and Construction Permit CPPR-92

Report No: 50-390/01-03, 50-391/01-03

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 1260 Nuclear Plant Road
Spring City TN 37381

Dates: June 17 through September 15, 2001

Inspectors: J. Bartley, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Rich, Resident Inspector
W. Bearden, Regional Inspector
R. Carrion, Project Engineer
R. Schin, Regional Inspector
P. Taylor, Senior Project Engineer

Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000390-01-03, 05000391-01-03, on 06/17 - 09/15/2001, Tennessee Valley Authority, Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2, resident inspector report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, regional project engineers, and regional reactor inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. This violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period except for two reactor trips. On June 29, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to lowering main condenser vacuum caused by a collapse of cooling tower fill material which partially blocked the suction of the condenser circulating water pumps. The condition was corrected and Unit 1 was restarted and reached 100% RTP on July 11. On September 4, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to the failure of a vital inverter which caused a loss of feedwater to the #1 steam generator. The vital inverter was repaired and Unit 1 was restarted and reached 100% RTP on September 7. Unit 2 remained in a suspended construction status.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted equipment alignment partial walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional system descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

- B train auxiliary building gas treatment system
- C-S component cooling water system (CCS) pump and A train CCS pumps and heat exchanger
- A train safety injection (SI) pump

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of areas important to reactor safety, listed below, to verify the licensee's implementation of fire protection requirements as described in the Fire Protection Program, Standard Programs and Processes (SPP) 10.9 Control of Fire Protection Impairments, SPP-10.10 Control of Transient Combustibles, SPP-10.11 Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work). The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to: (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection

systems, equipment, and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation.

- Auxiliary instrument room
- A and B train transformer rooms
- Vital DC boardrooms I, II, III, and IV
- Intake pumping structure A and B train pump and strainer rooms

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed programs, tests, inspection activities, held discussions with system engineers, and conducted field observations to determine that the integrity and operability of the CCS, emergency diesel generator (EDG) jacket water heat exchangers, and the essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system were being maintained. The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions for recent problems experienced with the presence of asiatic clams in the raw water cooling systems at the site, which included increased monitoring of ERCW and CCS system performance and the need for improved performance of the raw water chemical treatment system. The inspector reviewed documentation to verify that initial baseline heat exchanger performance testing criteria and tube plugging guidance was consistent with design basis values for the EDG jacket water heat exchangers and the CCS. The inspector also reviewed documentation to verify that ongoing frequent heat exchanger inspection/maintenance activities, test methodology, system performance monitoring, operational guidance, and system chemical treatments, consistent with accepted industry practices were being conducted for the EDG jacket water heat exchanger, CCS, and the ERCW system heat exchangers. In addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's use of eddy current examination to monitor for degradation of tubes in risk-significant heat exchangers. The following documents were reviewed to support the inspector's evaluation of heat exchanger integrity and operability and to verify that the licensee had continued to meet commitments for Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment:

Procedures

- Technical Instruction (TI)-27, Part III, Cleaning and Cleanness of Fluid Systems and Components
- TI-79.000, Generic Letter 89-13, Heat Exchanger Test Program
- TI-79.703, CCS Heat Exchanger Performance Test
- Preventive Maintenance (PM) 0256W, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Cooler Coil Internal Inspection
- PM 2679F, Shutdown Board Room Chiller Annual Inspection
- PM 4492F, Inspection of ESF General Area and Pump Room Coolers
- Maintenance Instruction (MI)-0.026, Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Inspection

Problem Evaluation Reports

- 99-003426-000, Live asiatic clams found in CCS heat exchanger A
- 00-006894-000, Low ERCW flow to 1B RHR pump and 1B containment spray pump room coolers due to presence of clams in ERCW headers
- 00-008250-000, Partial blockage of ERCW supply piping for auxiliary feed water (AFW) pumps due to silt and clams was identified during ultrasonic examination
- 00-011470-000, Microbiological induced corrosion found in raw cooling water supply piping to oil coolers for 1A and 1B number 7 heater drain tank pumps
- 01-003712-000, Heat exchanger performance test instruction not revised to reflect new design calculations
- 01-007617-000, Need for periodic training on corrosion control program for system engineering personnel

Work Orders

- 00-0000321-00, SI pump 1A-A room cooler inspection
- 00-0000321-00, Shutdown board room chiller B-B annual inspection
- 00-0000808-00, CCS heat exchanger C performance test
- 01-0002945-00, CCS/AFW pump space 1A-A cooler coil inspection

Other Documents

- Maintenance Rule Performance improvement plan for raw water chemical treatment system

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator retraining to verify operator performance was adequate and that training was being conducted in accordance with Procedures TRN-1, Administering Training, and TRN-11.4, Continuing Training for Licensed Personnel. In addition, the inspectors verified that the training program included risk-significant operator actions, emergency plan implementation, and lessons learned from previous plant experiences.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled portions of selected structures, systems and components (SSCs), listed below, as a result of performance-based problems, to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to scoped SSCs and to verify that the licensee was following the requirements of TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting, 10 CFR 50.65, and SPP-6.6, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting 10 CFR 50.65. Reviews focused, as appropriate, on: (1) maintenance rule scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2) classifications; and (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).

- 1-FCV-63-96 Failed stroke time during TI-50.028
- 1-PNL-099-R10, Reactor protection set III channel failure
- 0-CHR-031-0129, Electric boardroom chiller B-B failure
- 1 BKR-211-1912/6-A, EDG 1A output breaker, closing spring charging motor failure
- Failure of cooling tower fill resulting in reactor trip

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate for the selected SSCs listed below: (1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) the management of risk; (3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and (4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the requirements of: 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4); SPP-7.0, Work Control and Outage Management; SPP-7.1, Work Control Process; and TI-124, Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix.

- B train motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump level control valve troubleshooting
- 2B EDG troubleshooting for false start
- A train safety injection pump inoperable with 1A EDG exhaust fan inoperable

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee's response to a Unit 1 reactor trip on June 29 and the subsequent startup on July 10 and a Unit 1 reactor trip on September 4 and the subsequent startup on September 6. The inspectors observed main control room command and control, procedure usage, event notification, reactor trip data gathering, root cause team investigation, and portions of the startup. The inspectors reviewed the post-trip data and interviewed operators to verify that the plant and systems responded as designed. The inspectors verified that the licensee completed these activities in accordance with the following procedures: Business Practice (BP)-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis; SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program; Plant Administrative Instruction (PAI) 2.04, Reactor/Turbine Trip Report; E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection; ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response; Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) 11, Loss of Condenser Vacuum; General Operating Instruction (GO) 1, Unit Startup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby; GO-2, Reactor Startup; GO-3, Unit Startup From Less Than 4% Reactor Power to 30% Reactor Power; and AOI-25.01, Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected operability evaluations affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, listed below, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and the risk significance in accordance with the SDP. The inspectors verified that the operability evaluations were performed in accordance with SPP-3.1, Corrective Action Program, and SPP-10.6, Engineering Evaluations for Operability Determinations.

- PER 01-012017-000, Ice condenser temperature excursion due to lower doors opening
- PER 01-011978-000, 1-FCV-1-4 did not fully close
- PER 01-012186-000, Containment divider barrier seal bypass area
- PER 01-012637-000, Safety injection pump relief valve diverting 30 gpm
- PER 01-012757-000, One-quarter inch hole in ERCW pipe

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of operator workarounds to assess: (1) the effect on the reliability, availability, and, potential for misoperation of a system; (2) the potential for increasing an initiating event frequency or affecting multiple mitigating systems; and (3) the cumulative effects on the ability of the operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and accidents. The inspectors reviewed the current operator workarounds as defined by Operations Department Procedure (OPDP)-1, Conduct of Operations, and interviewed operators to determine if there were other conditions which would require actions to compensate for equipment problems or deficiencies.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the 12 modifications listed below to verify that the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of risk-significant SSCs had not been degraded and that the modifications had not left the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors reviewed the related design adequacy, implementation, post-modification testing, and updating of design and licensing documents and plant procedures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a related licensee self-assessment report to confirm that the licensee was identifying issues and initiating actions to resolve problems.

- Design Change Notice (DCN) 39767-A, Replace Electronic Governor Control for All Four Emergency Diesel Generators
- DCN 50165-A, Containment Venting Is Now Through Normally Open FCV-30-40 and -37
- DCN 50494-A, Power Increase Obtained by Use of Leading Edge Flow Monitor System for Feedwater
- Engineering Design Change (EDC) E-50120-A, Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber Fuel Rods
- EDC E-50397-A, Ice Condenser Replacement Baskets
- Temporary Alteration Control Form (TACF) 1-98-18-61, R0; Change Equipment Which Actuates a Main Control Room Alarm for an Open Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door
- TACF 1-00-11-244, R0; Reduce Potential for Unit Trip by Inadvertent Action of Main Generator Ground Fault Relay
- TACF 1-00-3-246, R1; Generator/Turbine Trip Protection
- UFSAR Change Package 1650, Deletion of Zero Leakage to Atmosphere from Emergency Core Cooling System Pump Seals
- UFSAR Change Package 1654, Application of Heavy Ice Condenser Baskets
- Procedure GO-6, Additional Condenser Dump Valves to Maintain Cooldown
- TI 100.006, Relief Requests PV-10, PV-13, and PV-17 for Check Valve Testing

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance test (PMT) procedures and/or test activities listed below to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors verified that these activities were performed in accordance with SPP-8.0, Testing Programs; SPP-6.3, Pre-/Post-Maintenance Testing; and SPP-7.1, Work Control Process.

- WO 01-000711-003, Repair ERCW pump C-A air vent isolation valve
- WO 01-008855-000, Solid state protection system train B 15 volt power supply action plan
- WO 01-011941-000, Valve 1-FCV-001-0004 failed to fully shut
- 1B SI pump component outage, WO's 01-008808-000, 01-003759-000, 01-013643-000 and 01-008823-000
- WO 01-014060-000, Vital Inverter 1-I failure

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

On September 4, Watts Bar Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power due to loss of the 1-I Vital AC Inverter which caused a feedwater regulating valve to close. The reactor was maintained in mode 3 during the outage and was restarted on September 6. The inspectors observed outage activities including risk management, safety system availability, decay heat removal, and configuration control and verified that TS requirements were met. The inspectors monitored reactivity control in accordance with instruction GO-5, Unit Shutdown From 30% Reactor Power to Hot Standby. The inspectors observed mode change prerequisites and observed portions of power ascension to 100 percent power in accordance with GO-2, Reactor Startup, GO-3, Unit Startup From Less Than 4% Reactor Power to 30% Reactor Power, and GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs, listed below, to assess, as appropriate, whether the surveillances met the requirements of: TS; the UFSAR; SPP-8.0, Testing Programs; SPP-8.2, Surveillance Test Program; and, SPP-9.1, ASME Section XI. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

- 1-SI-1-904, Full Stroke Exercising of MSIVS
- 1-SI-74-901-B, Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B-B Quarterly Performance Test
- 1-SI-3-902, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Quarterly Performance Test
- 1-SI-68-46, 92-Day RCP 1 UV/UF Trip Actuating Device Operational Test
- 1-SI-3-903-A, Valve Full Stroke Exercising During Plant Operation - Auxiliary Feedwater (Train A)
- Chemistry Manual; Chapter 6.24, Sampling CVCS Mixed Bed Demineralizers; Chapter 7.17, Preparation of Samples for Degassed Liquid Activity Determination; and Chapter 7.10, Degassing Operations

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary plant modifications against the requirements of SPP-9.5, Temporary Alterations, and SPP-9.4, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments, and verified that the modifications did not affect system operability or availability as described by the TS and UFSAR. In addition, the inspectors verified that the installation of the temporary modification was in accordance with the work package, that adequate configuration control was in place, procedures and drawings were updated, and post-installation tests verified operability of the affected systems.

- TACF 1-01-007-043, reactor coolant system Loop #1 hot leg sample line isolated
- WO 01-013078-000, Recorder installed on 2B EDG start circuit

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a licensee-evaluated emergency preparedness drill to verify that the emergency response organization was properly classifying the event in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart, and making accurate and timely notifications and protective action recommendations in accordance with: EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event; EPIP-3, Alert; EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency; EPIP-5, General Emergency; and the Radiological Emergency Plan. In addition, the inspectors verified that licensee evaluators were identifying deficiencies and properly dispositioning performance against the performance indicator criteria in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. **SAFEGUARDS**

3PP2 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's resolution of PER 01-013594-000 against the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 and Watts Bar's Physical Security/Contingency Plan. In addition, the inspectors interviewed security officers, reviewed access control logs, and observed operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) to verify licensee implementation of the security plan.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. **OTHER ACTIVITIES**

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Licensee records were reviewed to determine whether the submitted performance indicator (PI) statistics were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 0.

.1 Safety System Functional Failures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs), maintenance rule records, and maintenance work orders for the period from October 2000 through June 2001 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the PI data for Safety System Functional

Failures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program to determine if any problems with the collection of PI data had occurred and if resolution was satisfactory.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed daily reactor coolant system (RCS) chemistry sample analyses for maximum dose equivalent Iodine-131 for the period from January through June 2001 to verify that the percent of TS limit was the same or lower than the maximum value reported by the licensee for the applicable month. In addition to record reviews, inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze an RCS sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operating logs of daily measurements of RCS identified leakage for the period from October 2000 through June 2001 and compared the data reported by the performance indicator.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) LER 50-390/2001-001: Manual Reactor Trip Due to Reduced Circulating Water Flow

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the LER to determine if the cause of the June 29, 2001, reactor trip event was identified and that corrective actions were reasonable. The inspectors also reviewed the event using Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111, Attachment 14, Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions (refer to Section 1R14).

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Manual Reactor Trip Due to the Loss of Vital Inverter 1-I

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors responded to the control room for a manual reactor trip on September 4, 2001. The reactor was tripped due to a loss of feedwater to the #1 steam generator which was caused by a loss of a vital inverter. The inspectors observed plant parameters, performance of mitigating systems, and operator performance. The inspectors verified that timely notifications were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, and that licensee staff properly implemented the appropriate plant procedures (refer to Section 1R14). In addition, the inspectors coordinated with NRC staff to determine the risk significance of the event based on the failure of a motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump to automatically start.

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Bryant and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 14, 2001. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations. The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV).

The licensee was informed that if this NCV is denied, a response, with the basis for denial, should be provided, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

50-390/01-03-01

Contrary to TS 5.7.1, on July 13, 2001, Surveillance Instruction 0-SI-67-901-A, Essential Raw Cooling Water Pump A-A Performance Test, was inadequately implemented, rendering the 2A-A ERCW header inoperable. This is in the licensee's corrective action program as PER 01-012550-000. (Green)

ATTACHMENT

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

K. Parker, Maintenance and Modifications Manager
D. Boone, Radiological Control Manager
L. Bryant, Plant Manager
S. Casteel, Radiological and Chemistry Control Manager
J. Cox, Training Manager
L. Hartley, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
M. King, Acting Chemistry Manager
D. Kulisek, Assistant Plant Manager
W. Lagergren, Site Vice President
D. Nelson, Business and Work Performance Manager
P. Pace, Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager
J. Roden, Operations Superintendent
T. Wallace, Operations Manager
J. West, Site Quality Manager

NRC

J. Bartley, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Rich, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Closed

50-390/2001-01	LER	Manual Reactor Trip Due to Reduced Circulating Water Flow (Section 4OA3.1).
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