January 3, 1989

Docket No. 50-336

Mr. Edward J. Mroczka
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Engineering and Operations
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
P. O. Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Dear Mr. Mroczka:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NOS. 69401 AND 69557)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 138 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your applications dated September 13 and September 30, 1988.

The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) 4.4.5.1.4.a.8 to allow the inspection of steam generator tubes by insertion of the probe from the cold leg side of the steam generator tube. In addition, the amendment revises TS 3.4.6.1, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage," to decrease the allowable primary-to-secondary leakage (through any one steam generator) from 0.15 to 0.10 gpm.

One proposed TS change, contained in the September 30, 1988 application, was reviewed and found to be unacceptable. The proposed change addresses the surveillance program to be undertaken following a plant shutdown resulting from high primary-to-secondary leakage per TS 4.4.5.1.3. The proposed TS change would delete the requirement for a general steam generator tube inspection, per TS Table 4.4-6, and institute an inspection aimed specifically at detecting and repairing the source of the leakage. It is our position that the existence of a leaking steam generator tube may suggest a more widespread problem that can only be investigated via the normal sample inspection specified in TS Table 4.4-6.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's bi-weekly Federal Register notice. A copy of the Notice of Denial, concerning the proposed change to TS 4.4.5.1.3 is also enclosed.

Sincerely,

/s/
David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 138 to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Denial

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

LA:PDI-4	PM:PDI-4	PD:PDI-4	OGC	BC:EMTB
SNorris	DJaffe:lm	JStolz		CY Cheng
12/8/88	12/8/88	12/8/88	12/ /88	12/9/88

AMENDMENT NO. 138 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 MILLSTONE UNIT 2
DATED: January 3, 1989

Docket File
NRC PDR
Local PDR
Gray File
S. Varga (14E4)
B. Boger (14A2)
J. Stolz
S. Norris
D. Jaffe
OGC
D. Hagan (MNBB 3302)
E. Jordan (MNBB 3302)
B. Grimes (9A2)
T. Barnhart (4) (P1-137)
W. Jones (P-130A)
E. Butcher (11F23)
ACRS (10)
GPA/PA
ARM/LFMB

cc:

Gerald Garfield, Esquire
Day, Berry and Howard
Counselors at Law
City Place
Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499

W. D. Romberg, Vice President
Nuclear Operations
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Kevin McCarthy, Director
Radiation Control Unit
Department of Environmental Protection
State Office Building
Hartford, Connecticut 06106

Bradford S. Chase, Under Secretary
Energy Division
Office of Policy and Management
80 Washington Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06106

S. E. Scace, Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

J. S. Keenan, Unit Superintendent
Millstone Unit No. 2
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 128
Waterford. Connecticut 06385

R. M. Kacich, Manager
Generation Facilities Licensing
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

D. O. Nordquist
Manager of Quality Assurance
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Regional Administrator
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

First Selectmen
Town of Waterford
Hall of Records
200 Boston Post Road
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

W. J. Raymond, Resident Inspector
Millstone Nuclear Power Station
c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Post Office Box 811
Niantic, Connecticut 06357

Charles Brinkman, Manager
Washington Nuclear Operations
C-E Power Systems
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
7910 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 138
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The applications for amendments by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated September 13 and September 30, 1988, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 138, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 3, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 138

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove	Insert
3/4 4-7a	3/4 4-7a
3/4 4-9	3/4 4-9
B 3/4 4-2a	B 3/4 4-2a
B 3/4 4-3	B 3/4 4-3

4.4.5.1.3 Inspection Frequencies - The above required inservice inspections of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the following frequencies:

a. The first inservice inspection shall be performed after 6 Effective Full Power Months but within 24 calendar months of initial criticality. Subsequent inservice inspections shall be performed at intervals of not less than 12 nor more than 24 calendar months after the previous inspection. If two consecutive inspections following service under AVT conditions, not including the preservice inspection, result in all inspection results falling into the C-1 category or if two consecutive inspections demonstrate that previously observed degradation has not continued and no additional degradation has occurred, the inspection interval may be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months.

b. If the results of the inservice inspection of a steam generator conducted in accordance with Table 4.4-6 at 40 month intervals fall into Category C-3, the inspection frequency shall be increased to at least once per 20 months. The increase in inspection frequency shall apply until the subsequent inspections satisfy the criteria of Specification 4.4.5.1.3.a; the interval may then be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months.

c. Additional, unscheduled inservice inspections shall be performed on each steam generator in accordance with the first sample inspection specified in Table 4.4-6 during the shutdown subsequent to any of the following conditions:

1. Priamry-to-secondary tubes leaks (not including leaks originating from tube-to-tube sheet welds) in excess of the limits of,Specification 3.4.6.2.

2. A seismic occurrence greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake.

3. A loss-of-coolant accident requiring actuation of the engineered safeguards.

4. A main steam line or feedwater line break.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (Continued)

4.4.5.1.4 Acceptance Criteria

a. As used in this Specification

1. Imperfection means an exception to the dimensions, finish or contour of a tube or sleeve from that required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy-current testing indications below 20% of the nominal tube or sleeve wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections.

2. Degradation means a service-induced cracking, wastage, wear or general corrosion occurring on either inside or outside of a tube or sleeve.

3. Degraded Tube or sleeve means a tube or sleeve containing imperfections $\geq$ 20% of the nominal wall thickness caused by degradation.

4. % Degradation means the percentage of the tube wall or sleeve thickness affected or removed by degradation.

5. Defect means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the plugging limit. A tube containing a defect is defective.

6. Plugging Limit means the imperfection depth at or beyond which the tube shall be repaired because it may become unserviceable prior to the next inspection and is equal to 40% of the nominal wall thickness for tubes or sleeves.

7. Unserviceable describes the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line or feedwater line break as specified in 4.4.5.1.3.c, above.

8. Tube Inspection means an inspection of the steam generator tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely around the U-bend to the top support of the cold leg or an inspection from the point of entry (hot leg or cold leg side) completely around the U-bend to the opposite tube end.

b. The steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE after completing the corresponding actions (plug or sleeve all tubes exceeding the plugging limit and plug all defecting sleeves) required by Table 4.4-6.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 1 GPM total primary-to-secondary leakage through both steam generators and 0.10 GPM through any one steam generator, and

d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours.

b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity at least once per 12 hours.

b. Monitoring the containment sump inventory at least once per 12 hours,

c. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours during steady state operation except when operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

CHEMISTRY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be maintained within the limits specified in Table 3.4-1.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

a. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Steady State Limit but within its Transient Limit, restore the parameter to within its Steady State Limit within 24 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.

b. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Transient Limit, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours.

MODES 5 and 6

With the concentration of either chloride or fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System in excess of its Steady State Limit for more than 24 hours or in excess of its Transient Limit, reduce the pressurizer pressure to $\leq$ 500 psia, if applicable, and perform an analysis to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 500 psia or prior to proceeding to MODE 4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be determined to be within the limits by analysis of those parameters at the frequencies specified in Table 4.4-1.

evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking.

The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the primary coolant system and the secondary coolant system (primary-to-secondary leakage = 0.10 GPM, per steam generator). Cracks having a primary-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that primary-to-secondary leakage of 0.10 gallon per minute can readily be detected by radiation monitors of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with proper chemistry treatment of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Plugging or sleeving will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit of 40% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Sleeving repair will be limited to those steam generator tubes with a defect between the tube sheet and the first eggcrate support. Tubes containing sleeves with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit will be plugged. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness.

Whenever the results of any steam generator tubing inservice inspection fall into Category C-3, these results will be immediately reported to the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. Such cases will be considered by the Commission on a case-by-case basis and may result in a requirement for analysis, laboratory examinations, tests, additional eddy-current inspection, and revision of the Technical Specifications, if necessary.

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems."

3/4.4.6.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 GPM. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the leakage detection systems.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 GPM for all steam generators ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of Part 100 limits in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 GPM limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Therefore, the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

The 0.10 GPM Primary to Secondary leakage limitation assures structural integrity. A tube with a through-wall circumferential crack which leaks at 0.10 GPM under normal operating conditions retains the structural margins recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.121. In addition, the total leakage under accident conditions would remain below the 1 GPM limit.

3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System contaminants ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduce the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the concentrations of the contaminants within the Steady State Limits shown on Table 3.4-1 provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the resulting 2 hour doses at the site boundary will not exceed an appropriately small fraction of Part 100 limits following a steam generator tube rupture accident in conjunction with an assumed steady state primary-to-secondary steam generator leakage rate of 1.0 GPM and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the primary coolant's specific activity > 1.0 μCi/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but within the allowable limit shown on Figure 3.4-1, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.138

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

INTRODUCTION

By applications for license amendments dated September 13 and September 30, 1988, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), requested a change to Technical Specification (TS) 4.4.5.1.4.a.8 to allow the inspection of steam generator tubes by insertion of the probe from the cold leg side of the steam generator tube. In addition, the proposed amendment would revise TS 3.4.6.1, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage", to decrease the allowable primary-to-secondary leakage (through any one steam generator) from 0.15 to 0.10 gpm.

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

Millstone Unit 2 utilizes a steam generator tube design shaped as an inverted "U". These steam generator tubes traverse the steam generator from the hot leg to the cold leg side of steam generator tube sheet. Steam generator tubes are periodically subjected to eddy current testing (ECT) to detect flaws in the tubes. The testing is accomplished by inserting a probe into the tube. At the present time, TS 4.4.5.1.4.a.8 defines a steam generator "tube inspection" as, "...an inspection of the steam generator tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely around the U - Bend to the top support of the cold leg." The licensee has proposed that the definition of "tube inspection" be expanded to also include: "from the point of entry (hot leg or cold leg side) completely around the U-bend to the opposite tube end." The purpose of steam generator tube inspections is to locate flaws that could potentially result in a steam generator tube rupture. The proposed change to the TS would maintain the ability of the licensee to identify steam generator tube flaws and take preventive measures to limit the probability of a steam generator tube rupture. Moreover, the proposed change to TS 4.4.5.1.4.a.8 has the potential to expose more steam generator tube area to ECT inspection thus detecting flaws more effectively. Accordingly, the proposed change to TS 4.4.5.1.4.a.8 is acceptable.

With regard to primary-to-secondary leakage, the second proposed change to the TS involves the limit for leakage through a single steam generator. At the present time, TS 3.4.6.2 limits the primary-to-secondary leakage, in a single steam generator, to 0.15 gpm. The proposed change to TS 3.4.6.2, which would decrease the allowed leakage from 0.15 to 0.10 gpm, resulted from the licensee's January 1987 shutdown of Millstone Unit 2 for high primary-to-secondary leakage. Following the plant shutdown, the licensee identified a steam generator tube with a circumferential crack which was through-wall over at least a portion of the 220° circumferential extent.

Assessments of the safety significance of the leaking tube were performed. From the assessments, it was concluded that operation of the steam generator continued to be safe provided that structural limits could be met for a circumferentially oriented crack. Based on calculations which concluded that a circumferential crack of the size which would allow 0.15 gpm primary-to-secondary leakage was structurally acceptable, an administrative reduction of the allowable leakage from 0.5 gpm to 0.15 gpm per steam generator was adopted for subsequent reactor operation. The 0.15 gpm leakage rate was incorporated in the TS with issuance of Amendment No. 121 on November 13, 1987.

Based upon further examination of the circumferential crack, the licensee now concludes that a further reduction in allowable primary-to-secondary leak rate, from 0.15 gpm to 0.10 gpm per TS 3.4.6.2 is desirable.

The proposed change to TS 3.4.6.2 is conservative in that it requires the licensee to correct steam generator tube flaws at a lower indicated leakage rate. Operational experience at Millstone Unit 2 has shown that a leakage limit of .1 gpm is practical and is not expected to result in unnecessary reactor shutdowns. Accordingly, the proposed change to TS 3.4.6.2 is acceptable.

One proposed TS change, contained in the September 30, 1988 application, was reviewed and found to be unacceptable. The proposed change addresses the surveillance program to be undertaken following a plant shutdown resulting from high primary-to-secondary leakage per TS 4.4.5.1.3. The proposed TS change would delete the requirement for a general steam generator tube inspection, per TS Table 4.4-6, and institute an inspection aimed specifically at detecting and repairing the source of the leakage. The proposed change to TS 4.4.5.1.3 would require the following elements in the event that the facility is shutdown due to high primary-to-secondary leakage:

1. Identify the location of the leakage,

2. Investigate the cause,

3. Identify appropriate corrective measures,

4. Verify that structural integrity is adequate.

While the above program is necessary to identify and repair local leakage, it does not address the potential for more wide-spread problems in the steam generators.

It is our position that the existence of a leaking steam generator tube may suggest a more widespread problem that can only be investigated via the normal sample inspection specified in TS Table 4.4-6.

Accordingly, the proposed change to TS 4.4.5.1.3 is unacceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR §51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: January 3, 1989

Principal Contributor: D. H. Jaffe

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

NOTICE OF PARTIAL DENIAL OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has denied, in part, a request by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO/licensee), an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65, issued to the licensee for operation of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, located in the Town of Waterford, Connecticut.

One proposed change to the Technical Specification (TS) contained in NNECO's September 30, 1988 application for licensee amendment, was found to be unacceptable. The proposed change addresses the surveillance program to be undertaken following a plant shutdown resulting from high primary-to-secondary leakage per TS 4.4.5.1.3. The proposed TS change would delete the requirement for a general steam generator tube inspection, per TS Table 4.4-6, and institute an inspection aimed specifically at detecting and repairing the source of the leakage. It is our position that the existence of a leaking steam generator tube may suggest a more widespread problem that can only be investigated via the normal sample inspection specified in TS Table 4.4-6.

Accordingly, the NRC staff has denied NNECO's proposed change to TS 4.4.5.1.3.

The other provision of the amendment relating to TS 4.4.5.1.4.a.8 request has been approved by Amendment No. 138 dated January 3, 1989. Notice of Issuance of that amendment will be published in the Commission's biweekly FEDERAL REGISTER notice.

The licensee was notified of the Commission's denial of the proposed TS change by the letter transmitting Amendment No. 138.

By February 13, 1989 , the licensee may demand a hearing with respect to the denial described above and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding may file a written petition for leave to intervene.

A request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must filed with the Secretary of the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., by the above date.

A copy of any petitions should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel-Rockville, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, and to Gerald Garfield, Esq., Day, Berry and Howard, One Constitution Plaza, Hartford, Connecticut 06103, attorney for the licensee.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated September 30, 1988, and (2) the letter to the licensee with the Commission's Safety Evaluation dated January 3, 1989 , issued with Amendment No. 138 to DPR-65.

These documents are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20555 and Waterford Public Library, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut 06385. A copy of item (2) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Document Control Desk.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of January 1989

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



David H. Jaffe, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation