

October 7, 1994

Mr. John F. Opeka
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, CT 06141-0270

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M89804)

Dear Mr. Opeka:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 179 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated July 1, 1994.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TS) associated with the sump recirculation actuation signal. The changes will be implemented after the installation of four auctioneered power supplies in the Engineering Safety Feature Actuation System sensor cabinets.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by Phillip F. McKee

for: Guy S. Vissing, Senior Project Manager Project
Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 179 to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File PUBLIC
PDI-4 Plant SVarga
CMiller (A) SNorris
GVissing GHill (2)
CGrimes
SMazumdar
ACRS (10)
OPA
OC/LFDCB
LNicholson, RGI

110048

NRC FILE CENTER COPY

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\VISSING\M89804.AMD

OFFICE	LA:PDI-4	PM:PDI-4	D:PDI-4	OGC	
NAME	SNorris	G Vissing:bf	PF McKee	R Bachmann	
DATE	09/ 94 9/15/94	09/ 94 9/15	09/ 94	09/ 94	09/ 94

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

9410120177 941007
PDR ADOCK 05000336
P PDR

DF011



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 7, 1994

Mr. John F. Opeka
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, CT 06141-0270

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. M89804)

Dear Mr. Opeka:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.179 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, in response to your application dated July 1, 1994.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications (TS) associated with the sump recirculation actuation signal. The changes will be implemented after the installation of four auctioneered power supplies in the Engineering Safety Feature Actuation System sensor cabinets.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The notice of issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Guy S. Vissing".

Guy S. Vissing, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No.179 to DPR-65
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. John F. Opeka
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 2

cc:

Ms. L. M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Post Office Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270

Regional Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

J. J. LaPlatney
Haddam Neck Unit Director
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
362 Injun Hollow Road
East Hampton, Connecticut 06424-3099

First Selectmen
Town of Waterford
Hall of Records
200 Boston Post Road
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

Kevin T. A. McCarthy, Director
Monitoring and Radiation Division
Department of Environmental Protection
79 Elm Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06106-5127

P. D. Swetland, Resident Inspector
Millstone Nuclear Power Station
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Post Office Box 513
Niantic, Connecticut 06357

Allan Johanson, Assistant Director
Office of Policy and Management
Policy Development and Planning Division
80 Washington Street
Hartford, Connecticut 06106

Donald B. Miller, Jr.
Senior Vice President
Millstone Station
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

S. E. Scace, Vice President
Nuclear Operations Services
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Post Office Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

G. H. Bouchard, Nuclear Unit Director
Millstone Unit No. 2
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Post Office Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

Nicholas S. Reynolds
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005-3502

Charles Brinkman, Manager
Washington Nuclear Operations
ABB Combustion Engineering
Nuclear Power
12300 Twinbrook Pkwy, Suite 330
Rockville, Maryland 20852

R. M. Kacich, Director
Nuclear Planning, Licensing & Budgeting
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Post Office Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

J. M. Solymossy, Director
Nuclear Quality and Assessment Services
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Post Office Box 128
Waterford, Connecticut 06385



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 179
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated July 1, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 179, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Phillip F. McKee, Director
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 7, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 179

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

3/4 3-13
3/4 3-16
3/4 3-17
3/4 3-18
3/4 3-23
--
B 3/4 3-2
--

Insert

3/4 3-13
3/4 3-16
3/4 3-17
3/4 3-18
3/4 3-23
3/4 3-25a
B 3/4 3-2
B 3/4 3-2a

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2
0128

3/4 3-13

Amendment 197, 198, 179

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>CHANNELS TO TRIP</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>	<u>APPLICABLE MODES</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION					
a. Manual MSI (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	1
b. Containment Pressure - High	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	2
c. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3(c)	2
5. ENCLOSURE BUILDING FILTRATION (EBFAS)					
a. Manual EBFAS (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	1
b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	1
c. Containment Pressure-High	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	2
d. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3(a)	2
6. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (SRAS)					
a. Manual SRAS (Trip Buttons)	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	1
b. Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	4

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

- (a) Trip function may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < 1750 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is ≥ 1750 psia.
- (b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.
- (c) Trip function may be bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 600 psia.
- (d) Each channel has two sensors, high radiation level on either sensor will initiate containment purge valve isolation.
- (e) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

ACTION STATEMENTS

- ACTION 1 -** With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.
- ACTION 2 -** With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:
- a. < 1750 psia; immediately place the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 1750 psia.
 - b. ≥ 1750 psia, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following conditions are satisfied:
 - 1. All functional units receiving an input from the bypassed channel are also placed in the bypassed condition.
 - 2. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided one of the inoperable channels is placed in the tripped condition.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

- ACTION 3 - With one or more channels inoperable, operation may continue provided the containment purge valves are maintained closed.
- ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:
- a. < 1750 psia: immediately place the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 1750 psia.
 - b. \geq 1750 psia, operation may continue with the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following condition is satisfied:
 1. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided BOTH of the inoperable channels are placed in the bypassed condition.

TABLE 3.3-4

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)		
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Containment Pressure - High	4.75 psig	≤ 5.20 psig
c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	≥ 1600 psia	≥ 1592.5 psia
2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)		
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Containment Pressure -- High-High	≤ 9.48 psig	≤ 10.11 psig
3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)		
a. Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
c. Containment Pressure - High	≤ 4.75 psig	≤ 5.20 psig
d. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	≥ 1600 psia	≥ 1592.5 psia
4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION		
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Containment Pressure - High	≤ 4.75 psig	≤ 5.20 psig
c. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	≥ 500 psia	≥ 492.5 psia

TABLE 4.3-2

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST</u>	<u>MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED</u>
1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)				
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N. A.
b. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
d. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)				
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Containment Pressure-- High - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
c. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)				
a. Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
d. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
e. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION				
a. Manual (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
c. Steam Generator Pressure - Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
d. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3
5. ENCLOSURE BUILDING FILTRATION (EBFAS)				
a. Manual EBFAS (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
d. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
e. Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	1, 2, 3

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2
0130

3/4 3-23

Amendment No. 197.179

INSTRUMENTATION

**ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM SENSOR CABINET
POWER SUPPLY DRAWERS**

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2.2 The engineered safety feature actuation system Sensor Cabinets (RC02A1, RC02B2, RC02C3 & RC02D4) Power Supply Drawers shall be OPERABLE and energized from the normal power source with the backup power source available. The normal and backup power sources for each sensor cabinet is detailed in Table 3.3-5a:

CABINET	NORMAL POWER	BACKUP POWER
RC02A1	VA-10	VA-40
RC02B2	VA-20	VA-30
RC02C3	VA-30	VA-20
RC02D4	VA-40	VA-10

Table 3.3-5a

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

ACTION:

With any of the Sensor Cabinet Power Supply Drawers inoperable, or either the normal or backup power source not available as delineated in Table 3.3-5a, restore the inoperable Sensor Cabinet Power Supply Drawer to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.2.1 The engineered safety feature actuation system Sensor Cabinet Power Supply Drawers shall be determined OPERABLE once per shift by visual inspection of the power supply drawer indicating lamps.

4.3.2.2.2 Verify the operability of the Sensor Cabinet Power Supply auctioneering circuit at least one per 18 months.

INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The maximum allowable trip value for these monitors corresponds to calculated concentrations at the site boundary which would not exceed the concentrations listed in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II. Exposure for a year to the concentrations in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table corresponds to a total body dose to an individual of 500 mrem which is well below the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 for an individual at any point on the exclusion area boundary for two hours.

Determination of the monitor's trip value in counts per minute, which is the actual instrument response, involves several factors including: 1) the atmospheric dispersion (x/Q), 2) isotopic composition of the sample, 3) sample flow rate, 4) sample collection efficiency, 5) counting efficiency, and 6) the background radiation level at the detector. The x/Q of 5.8×10^{-6} sec/m³ is the highest annual average x/Q estimated for the site boundary (0.48 miles in the NE sector) for vent releases from the containment and 7.5×10^{-8} sec/m³ is the highest annual average x/Q estimated for an off-site location (3 miles in the NNE sector) for releases from the Unit I stack. This calculation also assumes that the isotopic composition is xenon-133 for gaseous radioactivity and cesium-137 for particulate radioactivity (Half Lives greater than 8 days). The upper limit of 5×10^5 cpm is approximately 90 percent of full instrument scale.

SRAS Logic Modification

Action Statement 4 of Table 3.3-3, which applies only to the SRAS logic, specifies that during surveillance testing the second inoperable channel must also be placed in the bypassed condition. For the SRAS logic, placing the second inoperable channel in the tripped condition (as in Action Statement 2) could result in the false generation of a SRAS signal due to an additional failure which causes a trip signal in either of the remaining channels at the onset of a LOCA. The false generation of the SRAS signal leads to unacceptable consequences for LOCA mitigation.

With Action Statement 4, during the two-hour period when two channels are bypassed, no additional failure can result in the false generation of the SRAS signal. However, an additional failure that prevents a trip of either of the two remaining channels may prevent the generation of a true SRAS signal while in this Action Statement. If no SRAS is generated at the appropriate time, operating procedures instruct the operator to ensure that the SRAS actuation occurs when the refueling water storage tank level decreases. Due to the limited period of vulnerability, and the existence of operator requirements to manually initiate an SRAS if an automatic initiation does not occur, this risk is considered acceptable.

Sensor Cabinet Power Supply Auctioneering

The auctioneering circuit of the ESFAS sensor cabinets ensures that two sensor cabinets do not de-energize upon loss of a D.C. bus, thereby resulting in the false generation of an SRAS. Power source VA-10 provides normal power to sensor cabinet A and backup power to sensor cabinet D. VA-40 provides normal power to sensor cabinet D and backup power to cabinet A. Power sources VA-20 and VA-30 and sensor cabinets B and C are similarly arranged.

If the normal or backup power source for an ESFAS Sensor Cabinet is lost, two sensor cabinets would be supplied from the same power source, but would still be operating with no subsequent trip signals present. However, any additional failure associated with this power source would result in the loss of the two sensor cabinets, consequently generating a false SRAS. The 48-hour Action Statement ensures that the probability of a Action Statement and an additional failure of the remaining power source, while in this Action Statement is sufficiently small.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that 1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and 2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded.

The spent fuel storage area monitors provide a signal to direct the ventilation exhaust from the spent fuel storage area through a filter train when the dose rate exceeds the setpoint. The filter train is provided to reduce the particulate and iodine radioactivity released to the atmosphere. Should an accident involving spent fuel occur, the 100 mR/hr actuation setpoint would be sufficient to limit any consequences at the exclusion area boundary to those evaluated in the NRC Safety Evaluation, Section 15 (May 1974).



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 179

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY

THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-336

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 1, 1994, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would change the TS associated with the sump recirculation actuation signal instrumentation. The licensee will implement these changes after the installation of four auctioneered power supplies in the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) sensor cabinets during the forthcoming refuelling outage (Cycle 12).

2.0 BACKGROUND

On July 6, 1992, while the Millstone Unit 2 was in a refueling outage, a loss of normal power occurred when two ESFAS sensor cabinets were de-energized during a simultaneous replacement of two 120 volt Class IE inverters supplying ac power to the ESFAS cabinets. A subsequent review of the ESFAS circuitry by the licensee indicated that a Sump Recirculation Actuation System (SRAS) signal would be generated if control power was lost to two specific combinations of two-out-of-four ESFAS sensor cabinets.

The present SRAS instrumentation used four channels (A, B, C, and D), each powered from one instrument panel VA 10, VA 20, VA 30, and VA 40. The two-out-of-four SRAS logic permits six channel combinations, namely AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and CD. Loss of combination AC and BD could occur in the event of loss of a single 125 volt dc power source. Such a loss of power would result in a spurious SRAS actuation. If this were to occur during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), a low pressure safety injection pump required for LOCA mitigation would be stopped by the SRAS signal. In addition, in the event of an LOCA or main steamline break, such an SRAS actuation could open the containment sump recirculation motor operated valve before the refueling water

storage tank inventory is injected into thereactor coolant system. Therefore, for the short-term, the licensee modified the SRAS logic to eliminate the two undesired permissives and by letter dated October 28, 1992, the licensee proposed the necessary TS changes to implement the hardware changes. On December 23, 1992, the NRC approved those TS changes as Amendment No. 168.

For the long-term, the licensee proposes to use auctioneered power supplies to the ESFAS sensor cabinets. This modification will restore the SRAS logic to its original state.

In addition to the auctioneered power supplies, the licensee in 1992 installed manual main steamline isolation (MSI) trip buttons.

3.0 EVALUATION

The proposed changes involve the auctioneering ESFAS sensor cabinet power supplies, SRAS logic circuit modifications, and MSI manual trip button addition.

TS changes associated with the incorporation of the auctioneering ESFAS sensor cabinet power supplies are specified in a new TS page 3/4 3-25a. This page specifies:

- a. The normal and backup power supplies for different cabinets will be as specified in Table 3.3-5a.
- b. In the event any of the ESFAS sensor cabinet power supply(ies) is inoperable, or either the normal or backup power source is not available, the inoperable power supply(ies) must be restored to operable status within 48 hours or the plant will be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours. This requirement conforms with the standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering plants, NUREG-1432, and on December 23, 1992, NRC approved similar changes for the temporary TS of Millstone Unit 2 (Amendment 168).
- c. Make visual inspection of the power supplies of the ESFAS cabinets once per shift.
- d. Verify the operability of the auctioneering circuit at least once per 18 months. This requirement conforms with similar requirements for comparable ESFAS instrumentation of NUREG-1432.

The TS changes associated with the SRAS logic modifications are marked on pages 3/4 3-13, 16, and 17 (Table 3.3-3). On page 3/4 3-13, minimum number of operable channels will be changed from 4 to 3 as a result of installation of the auctioneering power supplies which will permit operation with 2-out-of-3 logic. On page 3/4 3-16, Note (f) has been deleted as this note is not applicable after installation of the auctioneering circuit. On page 3/4-17, Action 4 will be revised to permit 2 hours for surveillance testing of an additional channel when the minimum operable channel requirement is met.

The TS changes associated with the main steamline isolation are marked on pages 3/4 3-13, 18, and 23. These changes are consistent with existing manual trip buttons for other ESFAS logics and the Standard Technical Specifications.

Based on the staff's evaluation, the staff concludes that there is sufficient assurance that the proposed changes do not degrade or adversely affect the plant safety system and are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 42342). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: S. Mazumdar

Date: October 7, 1994