

7/30/76

Docket No. 50-336

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company  
ATTN: Mr. D. C. Switzer, President  
P. O. Box 270  
Hartford, Connecticut 06101

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 16 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated July 29, 1976.

The amendment consists of changes in the Technical Specifications that will increase the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Value - Loss of Power, from  $\geq 2912$  volts to  $\geq 3700$  volts.

In your July 29, 1976 letter, you proposed changes to the facility to assure a reliable source of power to safety related equipment. We have reviewed these proposed changes and have commented on them in our Safety Evaluation. In this regard, we require submittal of design details, test programs and related information to the Commission in accordance with your commitments set forth in your July 29, 1976 letter.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 16
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page

\*For concurrence chain see previous yellow.

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Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

George Lear, Chief  
 Operating Reactors Branch #3  
 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 16
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc w/encs:  
 See next page

*no legal objection*

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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company - -

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY,  
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY,  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY, AND  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-336

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2


AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 16  
License No. DPR-65

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Connecticut Light and Power Company, The Hartford Electric Light Company, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensees), dated July 29, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.
3. The license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George Lear, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:  
Changes to the  
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 30, 1976

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 16

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65

DOCKET NO. 50-336

Replace the following page of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by Amendment number and contains vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf page 3/4 3-19 is also provided to maintain document completeness. No changes were made on 3/4 3-19.

Page

3/4 3-20

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP VALUE</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
5. ENCLOSURE BUILDING FILTRATION (EBFAS)		
a. Manual EBFAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
c. Containment Pressure - High	$\leq 5$ psig	$\leq 5$ psig
d. Pressurizer Pressure - Low	$\geq 1600$ psia	$\geq 1600$ psia
6. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (SRAS)		
a. Manual SRAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low	30 inches above tank bottom	30 inches above tank bottom
7. CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES ISOLATION		
a. Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons)	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
c. Automatic CIAS Actuation Logic	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
d. Containment Radiation - High		
Gaseous Activity	9100 cpm	9100 cpm
Particulate Activity	$1.0 \times 10^6$ cpm/hr	$1.0 \times 10^6$ cpm/hr

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES

<u>FUNCTIONAL UNIT</u>	<u>TRIP VALUE</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUES</u>
8. LOSS OF POWER		
4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays)	$\geq 3700$ volts	$\geq 3700$ volts
9. TURBINE RUNBACK		
a. CEA Insertion Limits Switches	0 steps	+3 steps
b. Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation	$> 2\%$ power decrease in $\leq 2$ seconds	$> 2\%$ power decrease in $\leq 2$ seconds

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2

3/4 3-20

Amendment No. 16



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 16 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-65  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY  
MILLSTONE UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-336

## Introduction

By application for license amendment dated July 29, 1976, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) requested a change to the Technical Specifications for Millstone Unit No. 2. The requested change would increase the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Trip Value - Loss of Power (undervoltage trip or UV trip), from  $\geq 2912$  volts to  $\geq 3700$  volts.

## Discussion

### A. Discussion of Events:

On July 5, 1976, while decreasing unit load to permit repairs to a leaking feedwater regulating valve, Millstone Unit No. 2 experienced a reactor trip due to a steam generator level transient. The in-plant electrical loads had been transferred to the reserve station service transformer (RSST), prior to the trip, so that plant systems could receive power from the offsite source.

In accordance with normal post-trip procedures, plant personnel started various auxiliary equipment; however, certain 480 volt (v) equipment failed to start. Investigation revealed that each of the motor controllers for the motors that failed to start had blown control power fuses. Control power for the 480v equipment is provided by a 480/120v transformer within each equipment controller which derives its power from between the load circuit breaker and controller main line contacts. The control power fuses were replaced and the equipment was started.

As a result of a subsequent investigation, it was determined that the control power fuses had been blown as a consequence of the sustained low grid voltage condition experienced following the July 5, 1976 trip of Millstone Unit No. 2. The grid voltage drop, combined with the additional voltage drops associated with the loads on the intervening transformers, reduced the voltage at the output of the 480/120v control transformers enough to prevent pull-in (i.e., actuation) of the motor main line contactors. This resulted in overcurrent being drawn by the contactor coil and consequent blowing of the control circuit fuses.

In order to protect the control power fuses from future degradation of off-site power, plant personnel raised the UV trip setpoint to 3782v\* corresponding to a minimum 480v bus voltage of 425v. Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 requires the Loss of Power setpoint (i.e., UV trip) to be set at a voltage greater than or equal to 2912v.

On July 21, 1976, with Millstone Unit No. 2 operating at full power, a 1500 HP recirculating water pump was started. The resulting voltage drop, due to the motor inrush current, actuated the ESFAS - Loss of Power logic. The following sequence of events occurred:

1. A reactor trip occurred due to the load shed de-energization of the control element drive MG sets from the emergency buses.
2. Both emergency diesels started and properly picked up the emergency buses and the required safety related loads were commanded to start in sequence. The only significant loads required to be sequenced onto the diesels under the existing conditions were service water and reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) pumps.
3. The service water and RBCCW pumps inrush current caused the bus voltage to drop below the undervoltage setting which caused an undervoltage trip and consequent shedding of these loads.
4. Thus, on completion of the ESFAS sequencing, the emergency buses were energized, but the service water and RBCCW pumps were not operating due to the additional load shed signals.

Event number 3, described above, was not expected by NNECO but is explainable. The ESFAS - Loss of Power logic which causes the emergency bus to load shed prior to diesel operation senses voltage

\*Whenever low voltage was sensed with the new voltage setpoint, NNECO expected the following sequence of events to occur at a sufficiently high voltage to protect control power fuses:

1. A plant trip or other condition causing a voltage dip below 3782v on the 4160v emergency buses would cause the undervoltage relays to sense a loss of normal power (LNP) condition and generate a UV trip signal.
2. This would cause both diesel generators to start, load shedding to occur on the emergency buses, and the diesel generators to be connected to the emergency buses after attaining rated speed and voltage.
3. The ESFAS sequencers would then sequence start the required loads at rated voltage.

on the emergency bus. Thus, the emergency bus will shed loads under a low voltage condition whether energized by off-site power or a diesel generator. Recognizing this situation, plant personnel reset the UV trip setpoint to the previous value of 2912v. Then, the RSST was reconnected to the emergency buses to supply power from the off-site source. The service water and RBCCW pumps were started and the plant commenced an orderly cool-down. The total time the emergency buses were incapable of accepting loads was approximately five minutes.

B. Proposed Changes

In their letter and application for license amendment dated July 29, 1976, NNECO has proposed the following changes which would assure a reliable source of power to safety related equipment:

1. The voltage "taps" on the RSST (345KV/6.9KV/4.16KV transformer) and the 4.16KV/480v transformer will be raised. This change will serve to optimize the in-plant voltage levels at the emergency buses.
2. The under voltage trip logic will be modified to prevent load shedding of the emergency buses once the diesel generators are supplying the emergency buses.
3. The UV setpoint will be maintained at greater than or equal to 3700v (88% of nominal voltage). This will prevent emergency bus control power circuit fuses from blowing due to variations in line voltage.
4. The licensee has revised the calibration procedures for the undervoltage setpoint adjustments.
5. The licensee has documented a test program to verify the design changes and to provide assurance that no undesirable systems interactions occur as a result of the design changes.
6. The licensee will provide the details of a design change which will include the installation of additional UV monitors to eliminate short duration grid transients which have the potential of decreasing the availability of the offsite power system. The details of the design change and test program will be provided to the Commission within fifteen days.
7. The licensee will also provide revised control power scheme for the 480 volt safety related equipment to provide assurance of operability over a wide range of voltage variations on the emergency buses. The details of design modification will be provided to the Commission for approval within a time frame to allow implementation during the facility shutdown for the next refueling.

## Evaluation

Our evaluation of the licensee's proposed changes are contained in the following sections:

1. The tap settings on the RSST (345KV/6.9KV/4.16KV) and the 4.160v/480v transformer will be changed to improve the voltage level at the 480 volt emergency buses with respect to the 345KV grid system voltage. The licensee has provided a detailed description of the change in the transformer tap settings and an analysis to provide assurance that the change will not create an unacceptable over voltage condition. The selection of the taps will optimize the voltage profiles on both the 4160 volt and 480 volt emergency buses. Computer studies were utilized in the selection of the tap settings. The results of the computer studies for the full load and no load conditions have been documented as the basis for the tap settings. The studies indicate that a slight over voltage could occur at a complete no load condition, however, the licensee has indicated that the minimum load on the RSST will always be at or above 5 MVA which is within the operating voltage range of the safety related components at the 480 volt emergency bus level.

We have reviewed the information provided by the licensee, including the results of the computer studies, and have concluded that the change in the transformer tap settings will improve the voltage level at the 4160 volt and 480 volt emergency buses and will not create an overvoltage condition for full load or minimum load conditions and is therefore acceptable.

2. The licensee has also proposed a design change which will inhibit the undervoltage shed feature once the onsite power sources (diesel generators) have been started and have energized their respective 4160 volt emergency buses.

The functional requirement for the undervoltage monitors on the 4160 volt emergency buses is to detect loss of the offsite (preferred) power system voltage and initiate the necessary actions required to transfer the emergency buses to the onsite power system. The original trip setpoint of 2912 volts (70% of nominal voltage) provided adequate protection for the loss of offsite power and did not interact with the operability of the onsite power system (diesel generators) when the voltages dip to approximately 83% of the normal bus voltage for short durations during the loading sequences on the 4160 volt emergency buses.

As a result of the July 5, 1976 event, the licensee readjusted the trip set point of the undervoltage monitor, two out-of-four coincidence logic, to ensure the availability of the safety related 480 volt equipment. The licensee did not verify the accuracy of the trip set point by performing a system voltage test. The effect of the set point change was not adequately analyzed nor were functional verification tests performed to determine any undesirable systems interactions. The results of the July 21, 1976, event indicate that the undervoltage trip set point was incorrectly set higher than intended. In addition, the change in the trip set point caused interaction with the onsite power system which resulted in load shedding due to the short duration voltage dips during the load sequencing onto the diesel generator supplied 4160v emergency buses. As indicated above, the function of the undervoltage monitor is to effect an orderly transfer to onsite emergency power in event of the loss of offsite power. To accomplish this function the undervoltage monitor senses the voltage level at the 4160 volt emergency bus in a two out-of-four coincidence logic configuration. On undervoltage trip, the logic initiates the following actions: (1) the offsite power source is disconnected from the emergency power system, (2) the existing loads are shed from the emergency buses, (3) the onsite emergency power sources (diesel generators) are started; and (4) load sequencing of the emergency loads is initiated when the diesel generators have attained rated speed and voltage.

We have concluded, on the basis of our evaluation of the information provided, that the bypassing of the undervoltage monitor once it has completed its function of detecting the loss of offsite power and initiated the required actions to transfer from the offsite power system to the onsite power system meets the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 "Electrical Power Systems" and IEEE Std. 308-1971 "Criteria for Class IE Power Systems for Nuclear Generating Stations" and is, therefore, acceptable. Moreover, each piece of equipment taking power from the emergency buses is individually protected from undervoltage and thus removal of the undervoltage load shed feature following starting of the diesel will not affect equipment operational reliability.

3. The licensee proposes to raise the undervoltage trip set point, which is monitored at the 4160 volt emergency bus, from the present value of 2912 volts (70% of nominal voltage) to 3700 volts (88% of nominal voltage). This set point change will assure that an unacceptably degraded grid system voltage will be detected prior to the voltage reaching a level that could potentially render the ac control circuits for the 480 volt safety related equipment inoperable. The offsite power source will be disconnected from the emergency buses, when the 88% undervoltage trip point is reached, and the safety related loads will be transferred to the onsite power system. The set point change to 3700 volts at the 4160 volt emergency bus level corresponds

to a voltage of 440 volts (92%) at the 480 volt emergency buses during full load conditions. This is within the design limits for operation of the safety related control equipment and is acceptable providing the licensee verifies the trip set point level and that no undesirable systems interactions occur as a result of the trip set point change.

4. The licensee has revised the calibration procedure for the under voltage monitors (revision 3 to procedure 2676) which changes the method of calibration and eliminates the error caused by using the test circuitry. The under voltage monitors are to be calibrated utilizing a source voltage. The licensee has indicated that the new set points will be verified by actually varying the bus voltage and observing proper bistable operation. The test circuit is being modified to eliminate the existing design error.

We have concluded that the use of a source voltage, required by the modified calibration procedure, supplemented by a verification test is an acceptable method of setting and verifying the set point of the undervoltage monitors. We will require that the details of the modifications to the test circuit be documented for our evaluation prior to use of this method for set point adjustments and calibrations.

5. The licensee has provided details of the tests that will be performed to verify the changes that will be implemented as described above. The tests will:
  - a) Verify that the addition of large loads on the power distribution system will not cause inadvertent trips as a result of the under voltage setpoint change.
  - b) Verify the accuracy of the setpoint adjustments by utilizing the new procedures and varying bus voltage to confirm proper actuation.
  - c) Verify that the undervoltage load shed feature is bypassed once the diesel sequencer starts by simulating a bus undervoltage signal verifying correct operation. The diesel voltage will be lowered to verify no shedding and the reset function will be verified by tripping the diesel circuit breaker and verifying correct operation.
  - d) Prior to startup, the licensee will verify the operability of both diesel generators.
6. The licensee will implement an additional design change, including verification testing, within 15 days of issuance of the license amendment. This change will provide a second set of undervoltage sensors at the 4160v emergency buses. These sensors will be arranged in a two-out-of-

four logic configuration and will initiate a time delay trip of the RSST (offsite power) supply breaker to the 4160 volt emergency buses, thus deenergizing these buses in event of a sustained undervoltage condition. The setpoint will be adjusted to recognize a degraded voltage that could potentially render 480 volt safety related equipment inoperable. This monitor will also have a time delay of several seconds duration to eliminate spurious trips due to short duration voltage transients on the grid. The licensee has indicated that the time delay setting will be within the bounds of the times assumed in the design basis accidents as documented in the Millstone Unit No. 2 Final Safety Analysis Report.

In addition, the original undervoltage sensors will be reset to trip at the 70% level but will retain their functions of initiating transfer of the emergency loads to the onsite emergency power system as described above (including trip of the offsite power supply breaker), initial load shedding, and diesel generator start. The time delay associated with initiation of these functions is 0.5 seconds. Thus, the second set of undervoltage sensors will assure the operability of safety related systems and equipment in event of a sustained low grid voltage condition and the original undervoltage sensors will assure transfer to onsite emergency power for the rapid grid voltage decay associated with loss of offsite power.

This design change will provide an additional means of monitoring the condition of the offsite power system to detect not only loss of offsite power, but an unacceptable sustained degradation of the voltage level that could potentially effect safety related equipment. The proposed design, with the time delay, will not degrade the availability of the offsite power system below an acceptable level and will increase the capability of the offsite power system to provide power to safety related equipment when required.

The licensee will provide the details of the final design implementation and the test program for our evaluation and final design approval within fifteen days of this license amendment. The test program will verify the functional operability and confirm that no undesirable systems interactions occur as a result of the design change.

The design change will be implemented in accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971 "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations". We have concluded that the design also meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 17 "Electric Power Systems" and IEEE Std. 308 and is therefore acceptable.

7. During the next refueling outage, the licensee will modify his control power design for the 480v safety related equipment to provide added margin for operability with respect to voltage variations at the 480v level. We have concluded that this is a desirable modification. We will require that the details of this design modification be submitted for our evaluation and final design approval prior to implementation.

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In reviewing the above described design changes and Technical Specification change, we have concluded that sufficient testing will be performed to assure that no additional failure modes will be introduced into safety related systems and thus the consequences of accidents previously considered will not be more severe. Since the above changes will increase the reliability of safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of previously considered accidents, no safety margin will be decreased nor will the probability of such accidents be increased.

#### Environmental Considerations

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: July 30, 1976

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-336

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY,  
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY,  
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, AND  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSE

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 16 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, The Connecticut Light and Power Company, The Hartford Electric Light Company, and Western Massachusetts Electric Company, which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, located in the Town of Waterford, Connecticut. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment modifies the Technical Specifications to increase the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Value - Loss of Power, from  $\geq 2912$  volts to  $\geq 3700$  volts.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.


The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated July 29, 1976, (2) Amendment No. 16 to License No. DPR-65, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Waterford Public Library, Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut 06385.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 30th day of July, 1976.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



George Lear, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
Division of Operating Reactors