1	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
2	(1:30 p.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll, you need a
4	new watch.
5	MS. CARROLL: I apologize.
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Would you address
7	Contention 5, please.
8	MS. CARROLL: Well, would you prefer that
9	or would you like to go back to 3 and then continue?
10	I'm prepared to
11	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Fine, go back to 3 then.
12	MS. CARROLL: Contention 3 deals with
13	inadequate seismic design. We have 12 minutes and
14	I'll try to take less to make up for the lateness.
15	This contention is supported by the expert opinion of
16	Peter Burkholder.
17	The NRC staff does not oppose the
18	admission of this contention, which challenges the
19	adequacy of DCS' seismic analysis. DCS opposes the
20	contention on a number of grounds.
21	First, DCS argues that the scenario
22	addressed in the CAR is bounding because it was an
23	earthquake of magnitude 6.9 at Charleston, which
24	occurred less than 100 miles from SRS.

GANE's response to that is this argument

misses the point of our argument. The Talwani study shows that the region of seismicity may be larger than originally though, based on the Charleston earthquake.

Also, that the frequency of earthquakes may be higher.

The second point of DCS' argument disputed GANE's assertion that it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of Section 1.3.6.2 of the CAR because of lack of references and because it references Westinghouse SRS documents that are not publicly available. But DCS does not show that the references are either complete or accessible. In fact, GANE's expert, Peter Burkholder, called Westinghouse this week. Catherine Whitker of the Records Office confirmed that Report Number 2000-0454 is not publicly available. This is one of the reports cited in the CAR.

DCS then argues that even if GANE is correct that the information is not available, GANE has not shown that it is material information. But as GANE states in the contention, this data is used by DCS to describe site geology for purposes of evaluating the relationship between geologic structure and seismic sources within the general site region. This assertion by DCS establishes the materiality of the data.

Third, DCS takes issue with an assertion

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by GANE that the USGS has identified a larger magnitude for a seismic event on August 2, 1974 than was reported in the CAR. USGS reports a magnitude of 4.9, whereas the CAR reports a magnitude of 4.3. DCS argues that there are different methods for calculating the magnitude of a seismic event and that the magnitude of an event can vary, depending upon the method selected.

The problem with this is that DCS has not provided any references or other information to allow an independent reviewer to evaluate how it came up with the 4.3 figure or whether the estimate is reliable.

GANE contention also faults the CAR for failing to include 10 other seismic events listed by USGS that have occurred since 1974 within 200 miles of the SRS and that have a magnitude greater than 3.0. DCS says that three are actually included in the CAR. DCS also says that four occurred after the 1993 cutoff date for Table 1.3.6-1. GANE questions why a cutoff date that was eight years ago. Finally, DCS says that the remaining three events range in magnitude from 3.0 to 3.7 and add nothing of any significance to the CAR table. But we wonder why are they left out? The accumulation of errors raise significant questions

about DCS' methodology.

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Number 4, DCS also takes issue with GANE's assertion that although the CAR cites several site response studies within the SRS regarding the shaking of earth during an earthquake, there is not indication that DCS has performed a quantitative site response study for the MOX facility. DCS refers to Figure 1.3.5-22 for CAR Section 1.3.5.2 and exploration borings and cone penetrometer tests that were taken in 2000 to define site-specific subsurface conditions at the MOX facility site.

According to DCS at page 24 of their response, "The exploration borings and CPT holes indicate that subsurface conditions encountered at the MFFF site are consistent with all previous investigations performed at SRS in F area and near the site."

If one looks at page 29 of the geotechnical study that the NRC staff put on MOX website September 5, the statement appears to be false. Location of the building on the MOX facility site has been changed precisely because geologic conditions are not uniform. I'm quoting from page 29 of the geotechnical report. "The original exploration program consisted of 13 exploration borings and 37 CPT

1	soundings. The CPT program was extended to 63
2	soundings after thick soft zones were encountered in
3	the eastern portion of the MFFF site at the original
4	building location."
5	And I would point you to a diagram that
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Excuse me, Ms. Carroll,
7	would you give me the full name of that document you
8	just quoted from? You gave us the page number.
9	MS. CARROLL: Yes, sir, I apologize. MOX
10	Fuel Fabrication Facility Site Geotechnical Report and
11	it has a series of numbers. Would you like them?
12	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Please.
13	MS. CARROLL: DCS01-WRS-DS-NTE-G-00005-C.
14	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And whose document is
15	that?
16	MS. CARROLL: It is DCS' document and I
17	believe is in response to an RAI.
18	I refer you and I'll finish reading the
19	quote, but there's a map that's included in the CAR
20	and it's Figure 1.3.5-22, and this shows the location
21	of the bore holes and CPTs that I'm reading about from
22	DCS' geotechnical report.
23	"The critical structures" okay, so I
24	just said that they had 13 borings, 37 soundings, it
25	was extended to 63 soundings after thick soft zones

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were encountered in the eastern portion -- I like to 1 it the MFFF site, at the original building 2 "The critical structures had to 3 locations. relocated to avoid thick soft zones. The original 4 soil boring locations were also adjusted to provide 5 coverage of the present MOX and EDG building location 6 and remained at a total of 13. Five dialotometer test 7 holes, DMT holes were performed at representative 8 locations near CPT soundings and exploration borings, 9 to evaluate in situ stress conditions and to collect 10 in situ data for correlation with the CPT, exploration 11 boring and laboratory test results." 12

that the probabilistic seismic hazard assessment is incomplete. DCS incorrectly asserts that this contention is based only on an RAI from the staff. The contention is based on our expert's agreement with the reasoning provided in the RAI, which you can see on page 17 of our contentions. GANE concurs with the need for clarification -- I'm quoting -- on all points mentioned in the RAI, end quote.

Our expert, Peter Burkholder, agrees with the reasons for requesting additional information that are provided in the RAI at pages 439. Some of the vital issues that are requested in there -- some of

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280 them are so technical, I don't even know what part to 1 spout to you, but they also deal with ground motion 2 modeling, slope instability hazards, liquification 3 liquefaction susceptibility, excuse 4 liquefaction susceptibility, soft zones -- and my 5 personal favorite -- a request for a copy of a 6 7 Westinghouse SRC report. Number 6. The contention -- this is DCS' 8 response to GANE -- the contention asserts that DCS 9 has not complied with NRC staff guidance that a site-10 should 11 specific spectrum of seismic events developed. DCS argues that the standard review plan 12 is not binding. GANE agrees that the staff guidance 13 documents are not binding, but they do represent 14 quidance for complying with the regulations. 15 If the applicant doesn't comply with NRC 16 must provide some alternative and 17 guidance, it

If the applicant doesn't comply with NRC guidance, it must provide some alternative and equivalent means of complying with NRC regulations. Here, the fact that seismic conditions appear to vary within the space of a few hundred feet on the MOX site is an especially compelling reason to do a site-specific spectrum of seismic events.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll, your time is up.

MS. CARROLL: And I'm finished.

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CHAIRMAN MOORE: I have a couple of 1 2 questions. MS. CARROLL: Yes. 3 CHAIRMAN MOORE: How do you respond to the 4 applicant's argument that even if GANE's assertions 5 set forth in Contention 3 are accepted as true, none 6 of these matters demonstrate that the design basis of 7 the MOX fuel facility is erroneous? 8 The Talwani study that we MS. CARROLL: 9 submitted supports our contention that the scenario 10 that DCS analyzed is probably not the bounding 11 incident that needs to be adhered to. 12 CHAIRMAN MOORE: So on page 22 of its 13 answer, DCS addresses that and my question is, is DCS 14 correct on page 22 that the events in the Talwani and 15 Schaeffer study are bounded by the events considered 16 in the CAR. 17 So then it's your position that their 18 statement that they are so bounded is incorrect. 19 MS. CARROLL: It's too dated. 20 ample relevant information out that needs to be 21 Talwani shows that the applied to the design. 22 scenarios they looked at are not necessarily bounding. 23 CHAIRMAN MOORE: And on page 23 of their 24 answer to your Contention 3, they say much the same 25

thing, they say "The value cited by GANE is bounded by 1 the magnitude of the Charleston earthquake as provided 2 in Table 1.3.6-1 of the CAR." 3 MS. CARROLL: But they're relying on data 4 5

that's dated back to 1974 and we have a study by the authority in the U.S. -- we called to ask for experts and all roads lead to this Talwani guy who is up there in Columbia, South Carolina. He is the authority on seismology and particularly for this zone and he is saying there have been bigger earthquakes, frequently. And in fact, this liquefaction thing tends to erase the geologic record and that is part of why it's so difficult.

But this is abundant, it's a prominent study. Our quy in Colorado went right to it. He had never heard of -- well, he had heard of Talwani and it was just a confirmation, but he is a prominent, prominent man. His study is out there, it's been out there for awhile -- well, it's been out there since April, so I'll concede that maybe they didn't know about this, but it's time to get on board with it.

The question that Talwani raises is that the size of the region affected by the Charleston earthquake is greater than was thought.

JUDGE KELBER: Well, I'm trying to narrow

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the issues, if I can, and I'm not sure how that 1 particular claim enters in, but let me ask you, from 2 an engineering point of view, what I'm interested in 3 is the ground acceleration, the frequency and from a 4 probabilistic point of view, the return frequency. 5 Now which of these are at issue? There are three 6 parameters there, which of these are at issue, in your 7 view? 8 Well, although I was going MS. CARROLL: 9 to answer that, my lawyer tells me I can't and I 10 believe her. 11 JUDGE KELBER: Okay. 12 MS. CARROLL: I don't have the expertise. 13 I would really have hoped JUDGE KELBER: 14 that we would be able to narrow the issues as much as 15 possible here. 16 MS. CARROLL: We would be happy to provide 17 an answer when we consult with our expert. 18 As you're probably aware, the staff and 19 DCS spent a day and a half just two days ago going 20 over some of this and would you like to see the six 21 inch geotechnical document that DCS just submitted? 22 It's obviously an open-ended issue and, Judge, I could 23 make this process work and be clear and we could be 24 sitting here without this open-ended issue -- well, 25

2 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, on page 26, following up Judge Kelber's question, 3 again asserts that even if your allegations 4 regarding return interval are accepted, you have 5 provided no basis for questioning either the design 6 earthquake or that return interval, because your 7 are all the applicant's bounded by 8 assertions earthquake analysis. You just say that this is a 9 1.0 disagreement among experts so that there is a fight here. 11 MS. CARROLL: There's a fight. 12 Applicant. CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay. 13 MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you. 14 I'd like to just make a couple of general 15 points and then I'm going to pause for a minute to 16 consult with my client and certainly if you have 17 questions, we can answer those. 18 Just to briefly reiterate, what we're 19 asking the Board to do is to recognize that there are 20 -- the fact that there may be disparities 21 individual data points and in particular aspects of 22 the seismic analysis doesn't necessarily mean there's 23 genuine issue of material fact and does not 24 necessarily mean that they call into question the 25

we'll talk about the motion to dismiss later.

design bases. So one of the things we would ask the Board to do is look very carefully at the contention and look at each part of the contention as a separate issue and make its decisions accordingly.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Mr. Silverman, help me

Out, on page 21 of your response, you speak of a -under number 1, a magnitude 7 earthquake at Charleston
with a 600-year recurrence interval -- you identify
that as one of GANE's points. And then on the next
page you say, "The CAR addresses an earthquake of
magnitude 6.9 at Charleston" --

MR. SILVERMAN: Right.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: -- "which occurred less than 100 miles from the Savannah River Site." And then you go on to say in the next sentence that the magnitude 7 event at Charleston is bounded, if I'm reading this correctly, by the events that you consider. How does a magnitude 6.9 earthquake bound a 7 earthquake at the same location?

MR. SILVERMAN: I'll admit that we weren't as clear as we should have been here, Your Honor. In two ways, it does. My understand -- and I'm not a seismic expert -- is that there are different scales used for determining the magnitude of an earthquake. The scale we used came up with a value of 6.9 and that

is -- for those of you who may understand the term -the body wave magnitude. The scale that I understand
was used by Talwani and Schaeffer is called the moment
magnitude methodology. My understanding is that if
you apply that methodology, our 6.9 earthquake is in
fact a 7.3 earthquake. That's number one.

Number two, when we talk about the earthquake occurring at Charleston, what we're talking about is not in the City of Charleston but at the closest point of the Charleston seismic zone, which is a geographic area close to the facility, so it's actually, as I understand it, about 75 miles away from the facility. So that's actually closer than the City of Charleston. Also, my understanding is that we have in fact designed the facility and the intent is to design it to withstand an event of that magnitude.

With respect to the second portion of the contention where we talk about the August 2, 1974 event, and we have two different magnitudes alleged, again, we believe that the 4.9 magnitude value is bounded by the Charleston earthquake with the 6.9 and we have identified that in the CAR table. So we don't think that part of the contention raises a material issue.

With respect to the 10 events that we were

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alleged to have omitted -- and in this regard, GANE 1 says that there is an accumulation of errors, there 2 really isn't an accumulation of errors. There are 3 three of those events that are in fact right there in 4 the table. There are four of them that did occur 5 after the 1993 cutoff date of the table, and that's 6 why they were not included. And with respect to both 7 those events that were not included and the three 8 remaining events that GANE cites, they all have 9 magnitudes in a range which are encompassed by the 10 data that we have presented. There are 250 events in 11 that table and I wouldn't be surprised at all that 12 some individuals could find some events that we did 13 not include. 14 We ask you to consider what impact that 15 has on the seismic design basis. 16

> CHAIRMAN MOORE: On page 22, in response to GANE's assertion that you did not essentially provide references to any of the studies and/or -must have been the studies that -- that you didn't references for your statements provide You indicate on page 22 that Section conclusions. seismic provides other references for 1.3.8 information in the CAR.

> > My question is simply is all of the

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1	information set forth in the CAR referenced?
2	MR. SILVERMAN: In the entire CAR?
3	CHAIRMAN MOORE: With regard to seismic.
4	And the reason I ask that is they claim that it is not
5	and give a laundry list of all the things that have
6	not been referenced, they give examples. And you
7	don't answer each one of those but you merely point
8	out that Section 1.3 provides other references. And
9	I just want to know is their laundry list correct.
10	MR. SILVERMAN: I'm sorry, this is a list
11	of statements where they allege we have not provided
12	references?
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Their contention on page
14	15.
15	MR. SILVERMAN: What does the paragraph
16	begin with? We may have different page numbering.
17	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Starting with "DCS
18	claims"
19	MR. SILVERMAN: Yeah, okay.
20	CHAIRMAN MOORE: "to evaluate the
21	relationship between geologic structure and seismic
22	sources within the general site region."
23	MR. SILVERMAN: Uh-huh.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And they say two
25	sentences later "For those figures that do indicate
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the source of the information, no citation to a 1 provided in the list of 2 reference document is references, and they cite Section 1.3.8. 3 instance figures," and they give a bunch of them. 4 So they're pointing out MR. SILVERMAN: 5 areas where allegedly we have provided --6 Well, the problem is CHAIRMAN MOORE: 7 their concern as expressed in the contention is 8 clearly that they can't independently verify what 9 you've done because you haven't provided them a road 10 map that can be followed --11 I understand. MR. SILVERMAN: 12 CHAIRMAN MOORE: -- to provide independent 13 14 verification. (Brief pause.) 15 MR. SILVERMAN: There are -- it appears 16 there are statements that are not referenced to any 17 particular published work -- some references where the 18 intervenors would not have access to the references. 19 Let me just say and I'll be happy to respond to any 2.0 other questions you have, that let's go back and look 21 at what the contention is. The contention isn't there 22 an omission or error or safety issue. The contention 23 is they couldn't verify our information. And that is 24

not an admissible contention, in our view.

Well, if the applicant CHAIRMAN MOORE: 1 can't follow your road map, how can the staff follow 2 3 your road map to ensure you're correct? MR. SILVERMAN: Well, the staff, if they 4 need additional references have asked for them and we 5 have since provided them. My point is only --6 MOORE: So doesn't that 7 CHAIRMAN definitionally say that your road map is not able to -8 - does not demonstrate that your analysis is accurate? 9 MR. SILVERMAN: There is no requirement to 10 have a reference for every statement in the CAR. 11 don't know the specific statements we're dealing with, 12 but there's certainly no requirement that every 13 factual statement or technical analysis have 14 published work as a referenced basis. And even if 15 there were, the point is that that is not a statement 16 17 of any deficiency in the design bases of the principal It's not even a statement of really any error SSCs. 18 or omission. It's not a valid contention. 19 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, I guess I'm stuck 20 21 on circularity again. JUDGE KELBER: Let me ask, what in your 22 view is actually being challenged -- I like to think 23 in engineering terms -- as an engineer, I'm worried 24 Frequency I have to deal with, the 25 about them.

amplitude I have to deal with and how often, I have to 1 deal with. 2 Which of those are being challenged? 3 MR. SILVERMAN: Well, I think in reference 4 to the Talwani and Schaeffer study, it appears there's 5 an assertion about frequency. I'm not an engineer, so 6 I don't know that there's any challenge here to 7 amplitude. There does appear to be a challenge to the 8 return interval. 9 JUDGE KELBER: The return frequency. 10 MR. SILVERMAN: They say return interval, 11 12 perhaps that's the same. Again, in this particular portion, and I 13 really would urge the Board as they review this 14 contention, once again to break it down and look at 15 the individual bases. The simple allegation is that 16 there is a lack of references, that references are not 17 publicly available and that they could not verify our 18 analysis. 19 The whole thrust of the CHAIRMAN MOORE: 20 contention is that because you have not provided 21 sufficient information, it's impossible to determine 22 whether your analysis is correct. And then they break 23 that down into A, B, C of why they can't independently 24 verify, all shooting to the fact that the CAR is --25

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And I

don't understand if the information to determine the 2 sufficiency is not present on the face of the CAR why 3 that's not a valid contention. 4 Well, we believe -- I MR. SILVERMAN: 5 think we believe the information is there in the CAR 6 and there's ample technical information to formulate 7 identify specific reasonable contentions and to 8 alleged errors or omission in the analysis. 9 say that gee, we couldn't do that because we don't 10 have all the references is a different matter. 11 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Let me give you another 12 example. 13 MR. SILVERMAN: Sure. 14 15 CHAIRMAN MOORE: On page 25 of your response, you state in your paragraph number 5, item 16 number 5, probabilistic seismic hazardous assessment, 17 "GANE states that the probabilistic seismic hazard for 18 the MOX facility is incomplete. GANE's only basis for 19 this claim is a reference to an RAI issued by the 20 staff." 21 and 17 of their 16 you look at 22 Ιf contention, under the heading at the bottom of page 23 16, Site Response, isn't that whole first paragraph 24 not a basis for the claim and isn't the reference to 25

the CAR's seismic analysis is insufficient.

the RAI just additional support?

Bear with me one minute while I read that paragraph again.

MR. SILVERMAN: What that paragraph says to me is essentially -- we've obviously abbreviated our description of what the contention is, but the notion is -- what we said is that the contention is that the PSHA is incomplete, and this paragraph indicates that the reason it's incomplete is that it does not indicate that a quantitative site response study for the MOX facility site has been done and that we haven't established -- the potential for intense shaking or soil liquefaction at the site has not been established. We -- our response is that this is (1) based upon the RAI and (2) we say as described in answers to RAIs, detailed site investigations were performed.

My point is that our response doesn't just rise or fall on the statement that this is based upon an RAI, we also explain that their statement incorrect and the analysis has been performed. don't think we're mischaracterizing their position.

Where in the CAR can I CHAIRMAN MOORE: find that analysis?

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1	MR. SILVERMAN: Without spending a lot
2	more time on this, Your Honor, there is a section
3	1.3.6 which is seismology, and I am advised that in
4	that section, we do discuss the probabilistic seismic
5	hazard analysis. It's a pretty long section, I think,
6	and I haven't focused on the specific language.
7	Perhaps we can get you a better answer before the
8	session is over.
9	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, we'll have to take
10	a look at that in our further study of all of this.
11	Do you have anything further?
12	MR. SILVERMAN: I may.
13	(Brief pause.)
14	MR. SILVERMAN: I guess the only other
15	point I would add is that GANE has made reference to
16	the geotechnical report that was submitted in August
17	to the NRC. That is something that I don't believe
18	was identified in the contention, so it would be an
19	additional basis, but it's my understanding that if
20	you review that report, it does in fact confirm that
ŀ	
21	the SRS site information is applicable to the specific
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	the SRS site information is applicable to the specific

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I understood you.

MR. SILVERMAN: The geotech report that 1 was submitted, which GANE alludes to --2 3 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Correct. MR. SILVERMAN: -- for the first time I 4 think here today, does in fact confirm that the SRS 5 site data is applicable to the MOX facility site and 6 7 we just wanted to make that point. CHAIRMAN MOORE: If I understood what Ms. 8 Carroll was stating about that report, it indicates 9 that the location identified in the CAR is no longer 10 the subject of the location -- the actual physical 11 location of the facility? 12 I didn't make that clear. MS. CARROLL: 13 The map that's in the CAR does show the current 14 location, proposed location, but the geotechnical 15 report reveals that they moved it, which had not been 16 known before, and we think that the data that caused 17 them to move it is actually completely inconsistent 18 uniform that there's a with their statements 19 20 seismology. CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay. 21 MR. SILVERMAN: So the point is the 22 geotech report does analyze our site today. 23 Mr. Hull, does staff CHAIRMAN MOORE: 24 the applicability -- I'm sorry -the concede 25

1	admissibility of GANE Contention 3? I just can't
2	remember if it had a qualification.
3	MR. HULL: No, Your Honor, we had no
4	qualifications on number 3.
5	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Do you have anything
6	you'd like to add?
7	MR. HULL: No, staff has nothing to add at
8	this time.
9	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay.
10	JUDGE KELBER: There is nothing I'm
11	trying to narrow the issues here because seismic
12	issues tend to get very unwieldy. Is there any
13	particular aspect of this that is of greater concern
14	than any other?
15	MR. HULL: Right now, the staff is
16	reviewing the geotechnical report and I believe I made
17	reference in my September 12 filing to the fact that
18	the staff was going to be having meetings in Aiken
19	which occurred just this week, on Wednesday and
20	Thursday. The geotechnical report was discussed in
21	those meetings, it's still under evaluation, so at
22	this point, I'm not in a position to say whether one
23	technical issue might be more important than another.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll, Contention
25	5.

	MS. CARROLL. TOUT HOROT, I'd TIRE to
2	point out very briefly, and this isn't rebuttal, but
3	this just might be helpful. Don Moniak attended the
4	meeting yesterday morning and thought it was
5	significant to point out, and we agree, that the
6	development of SRS seismic criteria is still an
7	objective that has not been met, and more
8	specifically, site-specific probabilistic seismic
9	hazard assessment is still in process and isn't
10	expected to be completed until December or January.
11	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Fine. Would you address
12	Contention 5?
13	MS. CARROLL: Yes, sir.
14	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And you'll be addressing
15	Contention 8 with 5.
16	MS. CARROLL: That is correct.
17	Contention 5 and Contention 8 deal with
18	incorrect designation of controlled area and
19	Contention 8 impacts minimized through incorrect
20	designation of controlled area. We have ten minutes.
21	These contentions are supported by the
22	expert of Dr. Edwin S. Lyman.
23	Well, we have the map. Everybody's gotten
24	to see the map of Savannah River Site. Let's put it
25	where we can great. So what we understand is that

1	one area is defined by the boundary of Savannah River
2	Site and within that which is a 300 square mile
3	area. Within that, we have a 45 acre area which is
4	proposed for the MOX facility, which will have a fence
5	around it. DCS puts the boundary of the controlled
6	area at the SRS boundary site and we disagree that and
7	think it should be at the MOX facility boundary site.
8	We say that as a legal matter, the boundary of the
9	controlled area must be at the edge of the area that
10	DCS controls; that is, the edge of the restricted area
11	which contains the MOX factory. The DCS' illegal
12	designation of controlled area boundary is significant
13	for three important reasons:
14	1. People who work in other areas of

- 1. People who work in other areas of Savannah River Site should not be exposed to higher doses than allowable doses for members of the public, unless they get paid by DCS to do so.
- 2. If the boundary of the controlled area is closer to the plant, then DCS must have more rigorous means of keeping doses within regulatory limits, than if the boundary of the controlled area is further from the plant, because radiation levels will be measured at the boundary of the controlled area.

And I'm going to go ahead and say this editorial comment that this smacks of dilution is the

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solution to pollution.

3. The third reason that this is illegal is described in 10 CFR 70.61(b) and (c) and would result in stricter security.

DCS argues that it will have a protocol with DOE that limits site access in the event of an emergency. GANE's response to that is we haven't seen this protocol, so we don't know if DCS has the authority to limit access to the entire Savannah River Site and we really appreciate Don's discussion this morning of the many activities that the public may partake upon on the Savannah River Site.

It seems doubtful that DOE would give DCS that much authority. It would also be difficult to carry out as a practical matter due to the sheer size of Savannah River Site at 300 square miles. How will DCS physically control access? Are they going to post employees at every ingress and egress point on the Savannah River Site? And are they going to stop every car that comes on and every train? It's an awesome responsibility for a subcontractor.

DCS argues that its approach of including DOE facilities within the site and boundaries was sanctioned by NRC in promulgating amendments to Part 70 in 2000. Our response is that it is not clear from

the rulemaking document cited by DCS that that is the case. The portion of the statement of consideration cited by DCS relates to comments about doses to "collocated workers," that is workers at nearby DOE facilities who may have occasion to go onto the MOX facility site in the course of their jobs.

In responding to the comments, the Commission emphasized that the licensee must establish the controlled area over which it has authority to exclude personnel or property. This gets back to the unanswered question of how DCS could have control over the entire Savannah River Site.

Also, DCS has conceded that it now intends to treat non-DCS workers in the controlled area as members of the public during normal operation. If DCS accepts the principle for normal operation, then it should also accept it for accidents.

I have a couple more comments.

In response to DCS' contention that this issue is outside the scope of the proceeding, GANE contents that it affects the design, where is the fence for the controlled area. What design features are necessary to minimize accident doses to a person at the boundary of the controlled area? The answer to that question depends a lot on whether the distance to

the boundary is measured in feet or in miles. 1 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Anything further? 2 3 MS. CARROLL: No. Applicant? 4 CHAIRMAN MOORE: MR. SILVERMAN: One of the assertions that 5 GANE makes is that Savannah River Site workers should 6 not be exposed to higher doses than members of the 7 public unless they're paid by DCS. And we don't agree 8 with that at all. There's obviously no requirement 9 10 for such. What there is is a requirement collocated workers, Savannah River Site workers, may, 11 for accident purposes, accident analysis purposes, be 12 analyzed against the performance objectives applicable 13 to workers rather than the performance objectives 14 applicable to members of the public, so long as they 15 are properly trained in accordance with 10 CFR Part 16 17 19. We have committed to do that and that is consistent with the regulations. 18 CHAIRMAN MOORE: I asked you several 19 questions this morning when this subject came up with 20 Mr. Moniak. 21 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes. 22 CHAIRMAN MOORE: And I was wondering -- if 23 I remember correctly, you didn't have an answer but 24 you were going to see if you could get one. 25

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that

Yeah, MR. SILVERMAN: Ι have 1 2 information for you, Your Honor. My understanding, first of all, is that 3 one of the issues that you asked about is the language 4 in the regulation that says the licensee has the 5 ability to control access for any reason. 6 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Uh-huh. 7 MR. SILVERMAN: We appreciate 8 language is in the regulation, we think that has to be 9 read in the context of Part 20, the rationale for Part 10 20 and the context of the rationale for having a 11 controlled area boundary designated. Part 20 is a 12 radiation protection regulation and that language has 13

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And so we think that it is -- even though the language says "for any reason," we think that it is reason and appropriate under the regulation to conclude that so long as that ability exists to limit access to the area in the event of emergency or other radiological incident, that that meets the regulation.

to be construed in the context of that regulation. The

primary purpose of the controlled area boundary, as we

understand it, is to establish a location at which one

calculates doses, radiological doses, to a member of

CHAIRMAN MOORE: So the plain meaning rule

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

the public.

1	of interpreting regulations, construing regulations,
2	is inapplicable to the definition of controlled area?
3	MR. SILVERMAN: We don't understand why it
4	would be relevant or important at all for the
5	applicant to be able to control access entirely at its
6	own whim, unrelated to radiological health and safety
7	considerations, simply because it seems like a nice
8	idea to do it.
9	We also understand that DOE has the
10	ability in its emergency plan
11	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, assume for the
12	moment that we're stuck with the regulation. Aren't
13	the answers either comply or get the regulation
14	changed?
15	MR. SILVERMAN: We have to comply or get
16	the regulation changed, that's correct, or get an
17	exemption from the regulation.
18	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Or seek an exemption from
19	the regulation.
20	MR. SILVERMAN: Right.
21	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Have you sought such an
22	exemption?
23	MR. SILVERMAN: No, because we didn't
24	believe one was necessary.
25	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, under my view of

1	the case from the CADC, where much like this, it had
2	to do with using simulators and I'm sorry, I can't
3	remember the precise language of the regulation but
4	the gist of it was something to the effect that you
5	either could or you couldn't use a simulator for some
6	purpose and even though it was very clear, it wasn't
7	convenient to read it that way and so the agency read
8	it in the convenient way and the Court of Appeals
9	indicated that that was not appropriate conduct on the
10	part of an agency, that it must follow its regulations
11	or change them.
12	So I'm troubled here because unless you
13	produce a protocol that DOE gives you the authority to
14	do this, I can't see how you could comply.
15	MR. SILVERMAN: Well again, we think that
16	we are developing a protocol, we think it will be
17	appropriate and provide the necessary responsibilities
18	and functions. It's an issue that is unrelated to the
19	design basis of the principal SSE, so if it's an issue
20	at all, it is an issue
21	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay, but
22	MR. SILVERMAN: at the possession and
23	use stage.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll just
25	directly addressed that. How is she wrong?

MR. SILVERMAN: I don't recollect how she 1 2 addressed that, Your Honor. MS. CARROLL: Where is the fence? Excuse 3 4 me, I'm sorry. CHAIRMAN MOORE: That the controlled area 5 deals, as you readily concede, with doses and how you 6 7 design a facility to ensure that the doses that are received under all the various scenarios are different 8 if you measure it in feet than they are with miles. 9 I think that's a fair paraphrase of what she just 10 said. How do you respond that that makes it a design 11 issue? 12 MR. SILVERMAN: There are design issues 13 14 that are not appropriate for this proceeding. This is an issue about the design bases, the fundamental 15 design parameters of the facility. We have in the CAR 16 specifically identified exactly which items we believe 17 are principal structures, systems and components. 18 there's a list. 19 And for each of those we've specified here 20 are the design bases we used. There's nothing in this 21 contention that says your selection was wrong or you 22 design bases 23 something out oryour inadequate. That information is there in the CAR to 24 be addressed. 25

1	CHAIRMAN MOORE: But you addressed each
2	and every one of those using this controlled area.
3	Now assume you can't use this controlled area, how do
4	those change?
5	MR. SILVERMAN: I don't know the answer to
6	that.
7	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, that's what their
8	contention that's what's behind this very
9	contention, that's what this contention is all about -
10	- you've used the wrong control area.
11	MR. SILVERMAN: Well, again, we believe
12	that this type of arrangement that we contemplate is
13	both was both contemplated by the rule changes in
14	the year 2000 and has been applied in other
15	situations.
16	JUDGE LAM: Mr. Silverman, would you
17	elaborate on that? I'm thinking about that you're
18	referring to the gaseous diffusion plant.
19	MR. SILVERMAN: Yes.
20	JUDGE LAM: Would you elaborate on how
21	that facility is compared to this current design?
22	MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, based upon my
23	understanding, which I think is accurate, the gaseous
24	diffusion plants are large Department of Energy
25	reservations operated by the Department of Energy,

1	virtually the whole facility. Within the site region,
2	within the overall site is a gaseous diffusion
3	operating gaseous diffusion plant operated by, in
4	effect, an NRC licensee. They hold certificates
5	that's the United States Enrichment Corporation
6	doesn't hold a license, it holds a certificate of
7	compliance.
8	That facility is regulated by the NRC.
9	The rest of the Portsmouth and Paducah reservation is
10	not. We have a situation where the MOX facility will
11	be regulated by the NRC, the rest of the Savannah
12	River Site reservation will not be.
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: I think you'll find, Mr.
14	Silverman, that not only is it just the site, the
15	actual physical plant itself, portions of it, are
16	regulated by DOE and portions of it are not.
17	MR. SILVERMAN: That's absolutely right.
18	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Within side the walls.
19	MR. SILVERMAN: That's right. They even
20	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Doesn't that make it a
21	considerably different situation?
22	MR. SILVERMAN: I don't see how that does
23	in this case. The controlled area boundary in that
24	case is at the boundary of the Paducah and Portsmouth
25	sites, just like we're proposing to do here. That is

where the public dose is calculated.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, if you live in a duplex, which is essentially the situation at the gaseous diffusion plants because part of the plant is DOE and part of the plant is United States Enrichment Corporation, how do you differentiate the common area, essentially, in that situation? I would suggest to you it's impossible.

MR. SILVERMAN: Well, I don't know the answer to that in that case. They have obviously addressed those issues, those plants are operating and they're operating under NRC oversight and to the best of my knowledge, they're operating safely.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: But that, in no way, shape or form, even indicates that this issue has ever even been addressed in that facility, does it? The fact that it exists doesn't mean that it was addressed.

MR. SILVERMAN: No, the certificate applications for those facilities specify where the controlled area boundary is and I think do indicate that there are arrangements with the Department of Energy to exert control over those facilities in the event of an emergency.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay. Anything else?

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No, nothing else. MR. SILVERMAN:

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CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff.

MR. HULL: Your Honor, the staff continues to come to the position that -- I mean, there's no question that the definition of controlled area states what it states, but GANE has not -- in proffering this contention, GANE has not identified any evidence which supports its position that the DCS assumption about the appropriate controlled area boundary advversely affects the adequacy of its physical security measures and that as a result the design basis of the MOX facility does not adequately support approval of They provide no evidence to support construction. that assertion, so the staff continues to view this as an inadmissible contention.

GANE is obligated to provide some evidence which merits further inquiry and if you compare this contention to Contention 3, you'll -- the staff urges you should find that Contention 5 is adequate. They really rely only on the fact that the staff has issued requests for additional information to DCS on this topic, but they don't provide any other independent evidence that there's a problem.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, if the applicant has applied a wrong definition, isn't that, in and of

1	itself, indicative that the analysis is highly
2	questionable?
3	MR. HULL: I don't think it's been
4	established that they apply wrong definition.
5	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, assume for the
6	moment that you have to comply with the definition
7	contained in 10 CFR Section 20.1003, controlled area.
8	And assume for the moment that they cannot comply with
9	the "for any reason" provision of that definition.
10	Now if you accept that as the definition
11	of controlled area in the regulations and that it has
12	been inappropriately applied by the applicant, then
13	doesn't that, on its face, raise the question as to
14	the propriety of their analysis?
15	MR. HULL: Well, but it hasn't been
16	established that the either DOE or DCS would not have
17	the authority to limit access to that area for any
18	reason.
19	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, it has to be the
20	licensee, Mr. Hull.
21	MR. HULL: Excuse me?
22	CHAIRMAN MOORE: The regulation says
23	licensee.
24	MR. HULL: And it's my understanding that
25	there is some agreement or protocol that's trying to
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be worked out between DOE and DCS on this point. CHAIRMAN MOORE: And I believe it's 2 accurate that Mr. Silverman has not been willing to 3 indicate that DOE will cede the authority for them at 4 any time for any reason to exclude persons from the 5 entire controlled area, including State Route 25 and 6 7 the CSX Railroad. But I still don't see any MR. HULL: 8 evidence of how this affects the adequacy of the 9 proposed physical security measures. 10 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Fine. 11 And how it would adversely MR. HULL: 12 affect the design basis of the MOX facility. I don't 13 see any evidence submitted by GANE which goes to those 14 questions. 15 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay, fine. 16 May I clarify --MR. SILVERMAN: 17 JUDGE KELBER: Let me ask one question. 18 Suppose I take a very simple illustration that I have 19 a plant which emits some stray radiation and I measure 20 the dose received by a member of the public at 100 21 yards and 1000 yards. Clearly it's going to be 22 If I designed the plant to make the dose different. 23 fall within Part 20 limits at 1000 yards, it is very 24 likely to exceed that by a considerable measure at 100 25

	yalds, is that not correct:
2	MR. HULL: Let me make sure I understand.
3	You're saying that let's say they put a fence 1000
4	yards away versus a fence 100 yards away and would
5	there be differences between those two scenarios?
6	JUDGE KELBER: Yes, in the design of the
7	plant, if I designed it for 1000 yards and then I find
8	that I have to work at 100 yards, don't I have to do
9	something to meet Part 20? I meet Part 20 at 1000, I
10	don't meet it at 100.
11	MR. HULL: Just a moment, Your Honor.
12	(Brief pause.)
13	MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, could I
14	attempt to answer the question while the staff is
15	discussing it?
16	MR. HULL: Your Honor, I'm going to have
17	the project manager, Drew Persinko, address your
18	question.
19	MR. PERSINKO: My name is Drew Persinko,
20	I'm the project manager NRC's project manager on
21	MOX. Responding to the Board, it's conceivable that
22	if you do change the boundary of where the public dose
23	starts, that that could affect your design. You might
24	have to change some of the principal SSEs you could
25	conceivably. But that assumes that the establishment

of the controlled area boundary is incorrect at the 1 outset, which I don't know that's been established 2 3 yet. JUDGE KELBER: Thank you. 4 May I elaborate? MR. SILVERMAN: 5 Mr. Hull, one final CHAIRMAN MOORE: 6 thing, look at page 20 of the contention, and it cites 7 apparently one of your RAIs. 8 MR. HULL: You're talking about the final 9 paragraph on page 20, Your Honor? 10 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Correct, over onto page 11 And if the staff agrees with the applicant's 21. 12 interpretation of 10 CFR 21003, and you bring up 13 70.61(f). If you agree with that, then why did the 14 staff issue this RAI that is cited here stating a 15 different interpretation of the rule? 16 MR. HULL: Well, again, Your Honor, I have 17 to go back to the fact that an admissible contention 18 cannot be based solely on the fact that an RAI was 19 issued and I don't see any other evidence that GANE 20 has given us which supports this contention. 21 Well, I would suggest CHAIRMAN MOORE: 22 that looking at the contention, that they have applied 23 the wrong definition and haven't met the definition in 24 the regulation, but you don't find that sufficient? 25

MR. HULL: I don't see any evidence of how 1 it affects, adversely affects, health and safety 2 3 interests. Carroll. GANE CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. 4 Contention 6, please. 5 MS. CARROLL: We have eight minutes. The 6 contention that's being referred to is inadequate 7 safety analysis and our expert opinion for this 8 contention is provided by Dr. Edwin S. Lyman. This 9 contention challenges the adequacy of DCS' safety 10 analysis. It is supported by the expert declaration 11 of Dr. Edwin Lyman. 12 The NRC staff does not approve -- by the 13 way, Dr. Lyman was planning to come today and declined 1.4 because of the events last week. There were family 15 pressures not to fly. The NRC staff does not oppose 16 the contention with the exception of language relating 17 to the boundary of the controlled area. DCS first 18 criticizes GANE's reliance on an RAI as "insufficient" 19 by itself to support the contention, but GANE's 20 discussion of the RAI reflects the fact that GANE's 21 expert agrees with the RAI. The contention also gives 22 the reasons for his agreement. 23 DCS also claims that GANE does not provide 24 sufficient detail in support of its argument that the 25

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CAR does not analyze a boundary case with respect to the source term for a fire involving the plutonium oxide buffer storage unit. The the contrary, at page 23 and 24, GANE gives specific examples of its reason for questioning the accuracy and the conservatism at DCS' analysis.

GANE DCS also arques that has not adequately supported its challenge to DCS' assumption that two banks of hepa filters will continue to operate in an accident. DCS says that it does not rely on hepa filters to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, but it does admit that hepa filters are relied on for defense in-depth which is required by 10 CFR 70.64(b). DCS also claims that hepa filters will have an efficiency of 99.95 percent and that it was conservative in assuming that they would be only 99 percent effective.

This argument ignores the report in RAI cited on page 25 of GANE's contentions, indicating that hepa filter performance is uncertain and might be nil.

The following is an additional quote from the abstract of the Bergman DOE report that is cited at note 19 on page 26 of GANE's contentions: "The deterioration of the filter efficiency depends on the

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exposure parameters. In severe exposure conditions, 1 the filters would be structurally damaged and have a 2 residual efficiency of zero percent." 3 Finally, DCS claims --4 JUDGE KELBER: Excuse me. Where did that 5 quote come from? 6 It's from -- I'm sorry --MS. CARROLL: 7 it's from a report that's cited, the Bergman DOE 8 9 report --JUDGE KELBER: Thank you. 10 MS. CARROLL: -- that's cited at note 19. 11 JUDGE KELBER: At footnote 19, thank you. 12 Finally, DCS claims that MS. CARROLL: 13 GANE has not raised a viable dispute with DCS over 14 instrumentation and control system 15 whether DCS' satisfies the defense in-depth principle. According 16 to DCS, there is redundancy within the instrumentation 17 and control system, but the system lacks one feature 18 necessary to defense in-depth -- a balance between 19 prevention and mitigation. Given -- and I shouldn't 20 say one because I'm not sure that it's limited to 21 Given that mitigation by hepa filters is 22 uncertain, DCS' MOX factory design lacks a mitigation 23 feature. 24

And I'm finished.

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CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant.

MR. SILVERMAN: Yeah, there are three components to this contention, three elements. The first is the allegation that we didn't analyze the bounding case for a fire in the plutonium oxide buffer storage unit. Essentially the allegation is that more justification is required for our position and that our assumptions should be further examined. That is language from the GANE contention.

Essentially also, they appear to call into question the assumptions we've made about the fraction of plutonium that could become airborne and respirable. We took those values that we selected for those factors from the NRC staff's own accident analysis guidelines.

In fact, we took the most conservative airborne fraction assumption and also the most conservative assumptions regarding the portion of the plutonium that could become respirable from three studies, even with those different and conservative values, the result of our accident analysis shows that we are well, well below the requirements which is performance regulatory objectives in the event of an accident both for doses to members of the public and to workers. So we don't

1	think that raises a material issue.
2	With respect to the centering furnace, the
3	hydrogen explosion in the centering furnace, GANE
4	alleges that we provided inadequate analysis and
5	challenges our hepa filter efficiency. We in fact
6	analyzed in the CAR an explosion event in the aqueous
7	polishing process as well as in the centering furnace,
8	and the aqueous polishing process explosion event that
9	was considered had a larger source terms and bounds
10	the centering furnace event. We don't describe the
11	centering furnace explosion in detail because it's not
12	the bounding case, the bounding case is the aqueous
13	polishing process explosion.
14	Finally, with respect to our GANE's
15	concerns about
16	JUDGE KELBER: Excuse me. Aqueous
17	polishing process explosion, that's a hydrogen
18	explosion?
19	MR. SILVERMAN: Apparently it could be any
20	kind of explosion including a hydrogen explosion.
21	JUDGE KELBER: But one doesn't know what
22	size explosion it is, does one? It can be anything.
23	MR. SILVERMAN: It's a deterministic
24	accident based upon the largest all of the material
25	in the largest tank in a cell and a cell is a

1	segmented portion of the facility that's segmented
2	from the rest of the facility. It's all the tanks in
3	the cell and the cell is protected from the rest of
4	the facility.
5	JUDGE KELBER: But the cell is in effect
6	not in line in that process, it's in a separate
7	process?
8	MR. SILVERMAN: This is Gary Kaplan from
9	DCS.
10	MR. KAPLAN: All the AP process is
11	contained in many cells which are segmented from each
12	other and the bounding explosion involves all of the
13	material within one of those cells.
14	JUDGE KELBER: In one cell.
15	MR. KAPLAN: That's correct. There's more
16	material involved than that, more radiological
17	material involved than that, in the centering furnace.
18	JUDGE LAM: And in the bounding analysis,
19	the hepa filter does not suffer any structural damage,
20	is that correct?
21	MR. KAPLAN: For the safety stragety
22	for explosions is to prevent them. Basically 10 CFR
23	70.61 we're going to preent all the explosions in the
24	facility. As defense in-depth, we will show that the
25	hepa filters survive the explosion, provide mitigation

1	if that explosion were to occur.
2	JUDGE KELBER: Wait a minute, wait a
3	minute. If the explosion were to occur, you maintain
4	the hepa filters will maintain most of their
5	capability?
6	MR. KAPLAN: Yes, we'll demonstrate that,
7	that's correct.
8	JUDGE KELBER: You intend to demonstrate
9	that?
10	MR. KAPLAN: Yes, but to meet 70.61, we're
11	going to demonstrate that the explosions are
12	prevented, they're made highly unlikely.
13	JUDGE LAM: May I ask you, how could that
14	be feasible? We're dealing with a great deal of
15	distance from the site of the explosion to where the
16	hepa filters are located?
17	MR. KAPLAN: Right. It's distance and
18	these are relatively small tanks, relatively small
19	explosions, that's correct.
20	JUDGE LAM: So the source terms are small
21	and the distance is great.
22	MR. KAPLAN: That's correct.
23	JUDGE KELBER: I'm familiar with some of
24	these plants since I gave a talk at the Second
25	International Conference on Plutonium way back on a
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1	pilot plant. And the explosion, if one should occur,
2	would propogate down what is essentially a long pipe.
3	Where is the attenuation?
4	MR. KAPLAN: Well, there will be features
5	as necessary to protect the hepa filters, if
6	necessary.
7	JUDGE KELBER: Ah-ha! These features are
8	described somewhere?
9	MR. KAPLAN: They will be described in the
10	ISA, correct.
11	JUDGE KELBER: In the what?
12	MR. KAPLAN: In the license application.
13	MR. SILVERMAN: In the integrated safety
14	analysis.
15	JUDGE KELBER: Features which are being
16	designed now and are necessary to protect the hepa
17	filters, but they are not a part of the CAR?
18	MR. KAPLAN: At the current time, the
19	design, basically the piping system, is very small and
20	we think the analysis will show that the explosion
21	won't propogate down where we'll need any additional
22	features.
23	JUDGE KELBER: Wait a minute. The shock
24	wave is going to go down this tube and it's not going
25	to need any additional features, it's going to

Ι attenuate naturally to a few inches of water? 1 somehow doubt that. 2 MR. SILVERMAN: Again, what we're talking 3 about here is providing at this stage of the process 4 the design bases, not the detailed design. 5 JUDGE KELBER: Well, but the design basis 6 certainly has to include some feature to deal with 7 hydrogen explosions and such other explosions as you 8 And we're being told that some magical 9 may want. feature which attenuates a shock wave passing through 10 a long tube is going to be introduced. It's surely 11 vital when you have hepa filters which are unsupported 12 by anything other than their will to live. 13 MR. SAINT LOUIS: I'm Tom Saint Louis with 14 DCS. 15 The network of piping that connects to the 16 hepa filters starts out small at the source of the 17 explosion, but expands because it serves many parts of 18 the facility. So that will attenuate the shock wave. 19 In addition, there are features inside the filter 20 housings that are described in the CAR that protect 21 22 the filters. JUDGE KELBER: I read those features and 23 they're pretty standard. 24 MR. SAINT LOUIS: Yes. 25

JUDGE KELBER: And I agree with them, of 1 course, but that's beside the point. Are there 2 calculations to support this assertion that the shock 3 wave will be so attenuated down to a few inches of 4 5 water pressure? The calculations are MR. SAINT LOUIS: 6 being performed and will be submitted in the ISA. 7 MR. SILVERMAN: Which will be part of the 8 license application. 9 I wish I had their JUDGE KELBER: 10 confidence. Regardless of the fact that you decide 11 that the hydrogen explosion would not be bounding --12 and I'm not sure why -- you feel that you do not have 13 to adhere to any of the OSHA regulations regarding the 14 use of safety devices or the NASA standard for 15 hydrogen and hydrogen systems? I don't see any 16 reference -- there's also an ASME standard. I didn't 17 see any reference to any of these standards in the 18 CAR. 19 Well, if there are OSHA MR. SILVERMAN: 20 requirements that apply, Your Honor, we will obviously 21 have to adhere to them and would intend to adhere to 22 them, but they're not part of the construction 23 authorization request and they're not issues to the 24

NRC.

1	JUDGE KELBER: Well, certainly ASME
2	standards and NASA standards are.
3	MR. SILVERMAN: Well, ASME standards may
4	be selected and used as part of the design basis and
5	we have committed to certain ASME standards.
6	JUDGE KELBER: But not the ones dealing
7	with hydrogen.
8	MR. SILVERMAN: I'm not sure about that,
9	we could check on that.
10	MR. SAINT LOUIS: We are following both
11	the Compressed Gas Association and the NFPA standards
12	for hydrogen distribution and storage on the site.
13	JUDGE KELBER: What is the target
14	reliability for the ISC system that's going to prevent
15	these explosions? When you say prevent, you really
16	mean you have a target reliability.
17	MR. SILVERMAN: Judge Kelber, we'd like a
18	couple of minutes to answer that and pick it up after
19	we take an afternoon break.
20	JUDGE KELBER: Sure.
21	MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you.
22	CHAIRMAN MOORE: So that I can understand
23	some of what was just done between you and Dr. Kelber,
24	are the cells dependent or independent of one another?
25	MR. SAINT LOUIS: The cells are connected

1	with an exhaust ventilation system, so they're
2	structurally separate from each other.
3	CHAIRMAN MOORE: But they are connected
4	through a ventilation system?
5	MR. SAINT LOUIS: That's correct.
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay. Are there any
7	other connections?
8	MR. SAINT LOUIS: There's process piping
9	that passes material from one operation to the next
10	operation.
11	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And these are sequential?
12	MR. SAINT LOUIS: That's correct.
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And all of the process
14	piping and all of the ventilation system follows the
15	sequence of the cells?
16	MR. SAINT LOUIS: That's correct.
17	JUDGE KELBER: I do have one final
18	question. People speak of bounding accidents here, do
19	you mean the highest consequence or the highest risk
20	to individuals? And I guess I sort of ask that of
21	GANE as well.
22	MR. KAPLAN: What's proposed there is the
23	bounding consequence analysis.
24	JUDGE KELBER: Pardon?
25	MR. KAPLAN: Bounding consequences.

1	JUDGE KELBER: Thank you.
2	MR. KAPLAN: Assuming the event occurs.
3	So it would also be the highest risk.
4	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Mr. Silverman, did you
5	have anything further?
6	MR. SILVERMAN: No, sir.
7	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Mr. Hull.
8	MR. HULL: Staff has nothing at this time.
9	JUDGE KELBER: Mr. Hull, in replying to
10	the contention, you wrote in part, "For example, GANE
11	contends that a hydrogen explosion in the centering
12	furnace of the proposed MOX facility is not adequately
13	analyzed in the CAR and that a previous safety study,
14	excepts of which are attached to GANE's contentions as
15	Exhibit 6, of MOX fuel fabrication plants identify
16	this scenario as one of the common risk contributors."
17	In the scoping summary report you
18	distributed on August 28, I find no mention of
19	hydrogen explosions. Do you believe the scope of the
20	EIS will be extended to include the effects of such
21	explosions?
22	MR. HULL: Haven't considered that
23	question, Your Honor, but if we in reviewing the EPRI
24	interim report that is referenced in footnote 23 on
25	that page that you were just reading from and just

1	for the record, this is the staff's September 12, 2001
2	response to the contentions it's certainly possible
3	that if we reviewed that report and conclude that it
4	does need to be discussed in the EIS, we'll discuss it
5	in the EIS.
6	JUDGE KELBER: Thank you.
7	MS. CARROLL: I'm a little bothered by
8	their willingness to discuss this outside of the
9	public.
10	CHAIRMAN MOORE: I'm sorry, I
11	MS. CARROLL: I'm a little bothered by the
12	applicant and the NRC staff's willingness to discuss
13	various and sundry issues, as long as the public is
14	not involved.
15	CHAIRMAN MOORE: That's not directly
16	relevant to what we have in front of us today.
17	If you would address, Ms. Carroll, your
18	Contention 7.
19	MS. CARROLL: Contention 7, GANE contends
20	that the ER is inadequate to address the environmental
21	impacts of using MOX fuel in the Catawba and McGuire
22	reactors. We have five minutes. We rely on Dr. Edwin
23	S. Lyman's expert opinion for this contention.
24	This contention challenges the failure of
25	the ER to address the environmental impacts of

irradiating MOX fuel in the McGuire and Catawba 1 It is supported by the expert declaration 2 of Dr. Edwin Lyman. 3 As the contention sets forth, there is 4 significant new information not considered in DOE's 5 SPB EIS that the likelihood and consequences of an 6 fuel a reactor that burns MOX 7 accident at substantially greater than previously thought. 8 has an indirect impact that must be considered in the 9

ER and the EIS. 10

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that this NRC both arque DCS and contention is not admissible because it was not embraced in the Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing. But the Notice stated that the issues to be heard include whether the action called for under NEPA is We cannot imagine how it issuance of the license. could be irrelevant to that determination to inquire whether the product that is being licensed can be used That question cannot be answered adequately safely. by reference to DOE's generic EIS because DOE did not address the additional risks of burning MOX in ice condenser containments.

That's all I've got.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant.

MR. POLONSKY: Everything I've heard today

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on this contention is the same that we read in the 1 written contention and we have the same response. 2 It's outside the scope of the proceeding. 3 with the Catawba reactors and specific technical 4 information regarding those reactors. It doesn't have 5 anything to do directly with the MOX facility license. 6 CHAIRMAN MOORE: In -- and I can't lay my 7 hands on it -- your CAR -- I'm sorry, in the 8 environmental report -- in Section 5.6.4, last 9 sentence, you state "Safety and environmental impacts 10 of design basis and beyond design basis accidents will 11 be analyzed by the mission reactor licensee as part of 12 the 10 CFR Part 50 reactor license amendment process." 13 What's your basis for stating that? 14 MR. POLONSKY: Our basis is that in order 15 for -- we assume that in order for Duke to accept MOX 16 fuel for irradiation in their reactors which are 17 licensed under Part 50, that they will likely undergo 18 a separate licensing proceeding to amend their 19 licenses to irradiate that fuel. 20 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, we know that much. 21 in Kor But as part of any either environmental assessment 22 and/or an environmental impact statement, that's where 23 this would come in in part? 24 MR. POLONSKY: I'm not sure I understand

1	your question, Judge.
2	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, what we're reading
3	from is from your environmental report.
4	MR. POLONSKY: Yes.
5	CHAIRMAN MOORE: So I'm assuming that if -
6	- clearly there will have to be safety analysis done,
7	but in addition, the consequences of design basis and
8	beyond design basis accidents would be done as part of
9	the under NEPA for the target reactors or the
10	reactors that are going to burn the fuel.
11	MR. POLONSKY: I hope this answers your
12	question. What NEPA would require is any significant
13	change to the facility that was not incorporated in
14	their initial NEPA analysis, assuming those plants
15	were, you know, authorized to operate after 1970.
16	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And you seem to indicate
17	that there would be such.
18	MR. POLONSKY: We assume so, but
19	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff.
20	MR. HULL: Yeah, the well, I'll be
21	happy to answer any questions, I don't have anything
22	to state at this point.
23	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Do you agree with the
24	statement I read from the applicant's environmental
25	report, Section 5.6.4, the last sentence?

MR. HULL: I'm sorry, Your Honor, you'll 1 need to repeat it. I was looking at something else 2 3 while you were --CHAIRMAN MOORE: "Safety and environmental 4 impacts of design basis and beyond design basis 5 accidents will be analyzed by the mission reactor 6 licensee as part of the 10 CFR Part 50 reactor license 7 amendment process." 8 MR. HULL: Yes, that's correct. 9 So if this contention CHAIRMAN MOORE: 10 were submitted at the appropriate time and by an 11 appropriate petitioner, would it be admissible in a 12 reactor amendment licensing proceeding on one of these 13 four mission reactors? 1.4 MR. HULL: Well, you know, assuming the 15 requirements of the contention rule were met and the 16 contention was specific enough. 17 CHAIRMAN MOORE: But the subject is one 18 that clearly will be open during the mission reactor 19 \_amendment process? 20 Yes, it'll be considered as 21 MR. HULL: part of the staff's NEPA review. And I think as you 22 stated earlier today, Judge Moore, it will probably be 23 more beneficial to do the specific analyses at the 24 four reactors at that time, if and when it becomes 25

1	necessary rather than do some sort of generic
2	environmental analysis right now.
3	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay, we're going to take
4	a brief and I mean brief five minute recess.
5	It's now 3:09. We will be back in session at 3:14.
6	(A short recess was taken.)
7	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll.
8	MS. CARROLL: Yes, sir.
9	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Contention 9.
10	MS. CARROLL: Contention 9, we're styling
11	as inadequate cost comparison, and we have three
12	minutes.
13	This contention challenges the failure of
14	the environmental report to consider the economic
15	costs of the MOX facility. The NRC staff does not
16	oppose admission of the contention.
17	DCS argues that 10 CFR 51.45(c) does not
18	require putting emphasis on the word require
19	economic analysis because the regulation uses the word
20	"should" instead of "must," but "should" is not a
21	command that can be ignored like "may." "Should"
22	means you ought to do it unless you have a good reason
23	not to. And DCS has not provided a reason.
24	DCS also argues that GANE cannot ask for
25	a discussion of costs because the DOE generic EIS

already made a decision that the costs are acceptable. That decision was based on information that has become outdated. The DOE EIS cannot be frozen in time, the government has to keep updating its environmental analysis as the decision-making process progresses and becomes more specific.

The decision to license the MOX facility must be based on accurate information about its costs. Even if the NRC cannot revisit the balance of MOX production versus the immobilization that was struck in the generic EIS, -- I'm having trouble reading my notes, excuse me -- the heart of the cost/benefit analysis required here is located on the base of plutonium disposition. Whether or not to dispose of plutonium and then weighing out immobilization versus MOX as the proposed disposition paths under this NEPA process.

The public deserves this analysis. We have these new reports showing phenomenally escalated costs, almost 50 percent more than they were two years ago, to produce MOX. So that even if the NRC can't revisit the immobilization versus MOX production question, they do have authority to see that this information is gathered and available to the public, so the public knows what it's getting into.

1 So, the ER must discuss the economic costs associated with the choice. This type of disclosure to 2 decision-makers and the public is one of the most 3 4 important and valuable features of NEPA. 5 Thank you. CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant. 6 I'm 7 MR. POLONSKY: Ι hope not mischaracterizing what Ms. Carroll said, but I thought 8 I heard that she said that there has not been a 9 violation of an NRC regulation and that the regulation 10 says "should" and that we were supposed to have 11 provided a rationale for why we did not put in 12 something that a regulation says -- uses the word 13 "should" but in fact, we don't view that as 14 violation of the regulation on its face, and if you 15 look at the plain meaning, it says "should" and we are 16 not required to do so, and we did not. 17 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Turn to the last sentence 18 of Section 51.45, please -- 51.45(c), last sentence. 19 20 What verb does it use? Should contain. MR. POLONSKY: 21 Now would you contend 22 CHAIRMAN MOORE: that your environmental report does not need to 23 contain data sufficient to aid the Commission in 24 development of an independent analysis? 25

So what that

But even this sentence,

"must."

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay. 2 means, in effect, is that the -- I assume that even 3

MR. POLONSKY:

MR. POLONSKY:

No.

though "should" in some circumstances can be read as

Judge Moore, if there was a deficiency in the ER,

additional information would have needed to be

provided for it to have been accepted and used by the

NRC. We are not aware of a reason for the NRC to seek

with your interpretation, as I see it, is in the

sentence that you're relying on as saying "should" and

hence not being mandatory, the preposition "also" was

definition for the following discussions, if I can

move ahead and give an example of why I think that

context, if it is permissive, as you contend?

POLONSKY:

And what does the word "also" mean in that

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will

accept

your

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, one of the problems

non-mandatory language, in other circumstances, it can 5 be read as mandatory in the same sense as "shall" or

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even though the word "should" doesn't require us to, that there are reasons why an economic cost/benefit analysis is not necessary in all situations, and if

MR.

economic information.

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the word "should" is used, it may indicate that there are circumstances where an economic cost benefit analysis is not required. Such a situation would be where a programmatic EIS has already been conducted or where, in this case, the DOE's record of decision, which incorporated two specific and detailed cost analyses, already made the decision that the costs were acceptable.

financial Now they proffer that new information has been released in, from what understand, a draft report that was recently issued. But the question is whether NEPA requires an economic cost/benefit analysis. And to the extent that they state -- that GANE states that DOE must update its analysis, that is on the onus of DOE to conduct.

example, within а for And NEPA, supplemental EIS scope, would only require that if that were a material or significant change that the definition of material decided was a DOE significant. There's been no indication that the type of cost changes are material or significant and there's no indication that the underlying need for this program, which is the U.S./Russial agreement, would be changed in any way by an increase in costs.

In addition, this is not an economic cost

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1	comparison of the MOX facility in a vacuum. It's in
2	comparison to MOX versus immobilization and the
3	decision of whether to pursue a hybrid or a single MOX
4	fabrication or a single immobilization is a DOE policy
5	decision that was made by DOE, supported by the
6	U.S./Russian agreement, which requires a hibrid
7	approach of both immobilization and MOX fabrication.
8	And that decision that policy decision is DOE's
9	and we believe outside the scope of this proceeding.
10	So even if the word "should" does require
11	it under normal circumstances, we believe the
12	circumstances of this case provide an exception.
13	JUDGE KELBER: Strictly from the point of
14	view of English grammar, should and shall are
15	indistinguishable in this case. After all, we don't
16	have a command that you should not commit adultery,
17	but we could have.
18	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff, do you have
19	anything?
20	MR. HULL: No, Your Honor.
21	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll, Contention
22	Number 10.
23	MS. CARROLL: Contention Number 10,
24	inadequate discussion of transportation impacts.
25	Comments were made by these comments

were made by a respected entity with substantial expertise. They relate to inadequacies of DOE's generic EIS to address environmental impacts of transportation of plutonium through Georgia to the MOX facility. These comments were not addressed or resolved in the final generic EIS, they are not addressed or resolved in the environmental report.

all the new analysis that has been referred to in DCS's argument, and I don't recall if NRC referred to them, they were for transport of newly manufactured fuel to the reactors. Our concern is with plutonium coming through the state of Georgia from the western states to the facility.

It's okay for the government to do tiered EISs, but if NRC and DCS are going to rely on a DOE EIS, it has to be adequate to address the general dose -- sorry, can't read the writing here -- but if the NRC and DCS are going to rely on a DOE EIS, it has to be adequate to address the general case and it also has to be adequate to embrace the specifics of the individual case.

GANE's contention shows that DCS' environmental report and the generic EIS are inadequate to address transportation impacts. It is important to note that NRC and DCS to not identify

passages in the generic EIS where the state of Georgia's comments were addressed or resolved. And it was the state of Georgia's comments on the record that provided most of the basis of our contention -- the material basis of our contention.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant.

MR. POLONSKY: The contention is basically a regurgitation of State of Georgia comments on the draft SPD EIS. There were, I believe, hundreds of comments submitted by different people on the SPD draft EIS, which as part of the NEPA process were considered and either rejected or incorporated as appropriate, as any NEPA process would be, into the final SPD EIS.

The fact that GANE believes that the State of Georgia's comments should have been incorporated and believes that they were not incorporated by DOE into the SPD EIS has little or no bearing on the adequacy of the ER. It would merely be stating that they had commented themselves on the SPD EIS and their own comments had not been incorporated into the final. We believe this contention is outside the scope of this proceeding and would also like to point out that the contention itself is specific to plutonium

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1	transport into SRS, the Savannah River Site, not to
2	the MOX facility for, at least as is currently
3	proposed, we believe the shipments are going to APDCF,
4	the PDCF will, as its name implies, disassemble the
5	pits. That material will then be fed to the MOX
6	facility itself and DOE will have jurisdiction and
7	control and will actually conduct that transportation.
8	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff.
9	JUDGE LAM: Before you do that, do we know
10	if the State of Georgia's comments have been resolved
11	to the satisfaction to the State of Georgia?
12	MR. POLONSKY: I do not know.
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff.
14	MR. HULL: I don't have anything to add to
15	the staff's response, Your Honor.
16	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll.
17	MS. CARROLL: Yes, sir.
18	CHAIRMAN MOORE: GANE Contention 11.
19	MS. CARROLL: Contention 11, we have five
20	minutes oh, wait oh, I see, item 9 is Contention
21	10, that threw me off a little bit item 10 is
22	Contention 11. Okay, we have five minutes.
23	The contention is that the environmental
24	report fails to address the waste stream from aqueous
25	polishing. Relevance of Cogema's experience I'm

sorry, we're in a different mode. We had fuller answers worked out and as we got deeper into the contention, we got a little sketchier here. Okay.

DCS and NRC, I believe, also challenge GANE's assertion that Cogema's experience -- the Cogema experience with MOX manufacture is relevant to this proceeding. However, the environmental report acknowledges that the same process used in French plants is intended to be used in the U.S. plant so the experience is indeed relevant.

NEPA requires a hard look -- this is in at environmental impacts. It is not propose a known and potentially reasonable to hazardous process and not discuss what is known about We have a really huge problem at Savannah River Site and it's been acknowledged for the last 20 years and it's called the Tank Closure Program. We have the highest curie inventory in the nation -- and you saw how watery it is. You couldn't even see through the fog this morning hardly when you were coming here. Look at the map, it's just covered with creeks and stuff, it's a really watery area.

Okay, in the press of war, we built this vast facility here. We have been dealing with plutonium and tritium at the Savannah River Site and

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342 as such, we have now 35 million gallons of high level 1 liquid waste in 50-year old tanks sitting above the 2 largest freshwater recharge aquifer in North America. 3 And this is a problem. It's acknowledged and we're 4 trying to deal with it. 5 We've had a failure of a fundamental 6 7 8

process, an interim process, that was supposed to get that liquid ready to go into a glassification factory. The qlassification technology is pretty darned good but we're missing a step. We wasted nearly 20 years on it. Last year, we abandoned it, we have nothing -right now, we have nothing. Meanwhile, we've got one tank we've managed to empty but last year, two tanks sprang leaks. So the inventory has been lowered below the leaks and put in the empty tank.

Now this tank closure program is really important to a lot of pps, it took a lot of pressure to get instituted, it is an ongoing program.

The MOX process and the aqueous process which they came to late in the game, they said they were going to do a dry process, they can't do it --It counter-productive isn't a strong enough word. counteracts any efforts in the tank closure program.

Be that as it may, I want to make sure you understand this problem and I know that you do because

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_	you mentioned it filst thing this morning. Right now,
2	the current plan is, well, you know, they've got a
3	waste management this is what DCS said they've
4	got a waste management program. Yeah, they're kind of
5	stalled out right now, but we aren't going to produce
6	any waste until 2007, so surely they'll have it
7	together by then. I mean, we're talking about DOE and
8	I don't want to insult anybody, but they start and
9	abandon stuff all the time and it isn't reasonable to
10	assume that by 2007, they're going to be going.
11	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll
12	MS. CARROLL: So it's not smart to count
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: your time is up, five
14	minutes has expired.
15	MS. CARROLL: I just have one more
16	thought. And haven't I been light on the other ones?
17	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Pardon?
18	MS. CARROLL: I have one more thought and
19	I have really been
20	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Please just give me your
21	thought, please.
22	MS. CARROLL: Okay. In Contention 1,
23	there is a reference to scrap generation and a
24	reference in Contention 1 to the Melox plant in France
25	and how they have dealt with an unanticipated amount

of scrap which has amounted to eight percent and which is jamming up the system. It's sitting around undealt with but the deal is it's going to go through a similar process, an aqueous processing, it's going to produce a waste stream and this is not dealt with. Applicant.

CHAIRMAN MOORE:

The contention as stated MR. POLONSKY: says that we failed -- quote-unquote, failed -- to address aqueous polishing waste stream. On its face, it's a misreading of the ER. We clearly reference in Section 5.2.12, the transfer of high alpha liquid waste to SRS and we don't think the contention raises a material fact when it states that we failed to address the waste stream.

On the issue about Cogema, the allegation is that GANE can't verify Cogema's performance in facilities in France and that that info should have been made available to the public. The requirement in identify -- base those 2.714 under NEPA is to contentions on the ER -- a deficiency in the ER, the case law says, or an omission.

This does not identify a deficiency in the ER simply because that information is not made available to the public. In addition, DCS is not relying on any Cogema operating parameters for its

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1	design and there's no requirement to incorporate
2	information from other facilities. The fact that the
3	facility is going to be of a type that is similar
4	doesn't require them to incorporate specific operating
5	parameters from that facility.
6	Finally, DCS
7	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Outside the Melox plant,
8	are there any other plants that are using any process
9	that you're copying?
10	MR. POLONSKY: Outside of Cogema's
11	facilities?
12	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Outside the Melox plant,
13	yeah.
14	MR. POLONSKY: Outside of Melox, I don't
15	know, but it's all Cogema facilities.
16	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay, one of your the
17	process which you're using, I take it, is derived from
18	·
19	MR. POLONSKY: A number of different
20	Cogema facilities.
21	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And I just did a little -
22	- I'm very curious as to why those similar processes
23	are not need not be looked at as part of the hard
24	look under NEPA, because that is the experience.
25	MR. POLONSKY: DCS

1	CHAIRMAN MOORE: You're not doing this in
2	a vacuum.
3	MR. POLONSKY: DCS is the applicant.
4	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Correct.
5	MR. POLONSKY: Not any of its
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: I understand that.
7	MR. POLONSKY: consortium companies.
8	CHAIRMAN MOORE: But
9	MR. POLONSKY: The designs are not the
10	same.
11	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Are they similar? Does
12	not your environmental report, Section 3.2, indicate
13	that they are?
14	MR. POLONSKY: It mentions yes, but
15	that does not impact anything about the hard look
16	analysis under NEPA. The hard look analysis under
17	NEPA is whether or not specific aspects of the
18	environment have been analyzed. If, for example,
19	archaeological impacts were not analyzed, that would
20	be a deficiency in hard look. But there is no
21	requirement and no case law that I'm aware of under
22	NEPA that requires an environmental impact statement
23	CHAIRMAN MOORE: But the impacts that have
24	been created by the similar processes in other
25	facilities, are they not relevant to this inquiry?

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, it's also my understanding, just for example, if we take your argument to a little bit more of extreme, that the aqueous polishing process that we use is very similar to a process called Purex that's used around the country in government facilities. And I don't think there's a requirement that we evaluate the impacts and effluents, for example, from unrelated government facilities.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Just assume for the moment, and I have no idea whether this assumption has any basis, but assume for the basis of answering the question that there are very significant environmental impacts flowing from those processes. You would not need to look at those same impacts here? You could just ignore them, even though your process is similar?

MR. POLONSKY: As long as the environmental report takes into account what the environmental impacts are expected to be, reasonably expected or reasonably foreseeable impacts, that's what NEPA requires. And we have done so and there's no indication here of how we haven't done that. And as the Commission has been very clear about, a contention is not a platform for a fishing expedition in discovery.

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We're very aware that the petitioners would like to see information about Cogema's operations and facilities, or at least we've heard that from Mr. Moniak, that he would like to see information about Cogema. But Cogema is not the applicant here and we don't believe this contention proposes anything other than a deficiency in the ER which factually is incorrect.

They say we failed to do it, we did do it and there is no deficiency in the ER, which is something they were required to do under 2.714.

JUDGE LAM: That point is well taken. However, why didn't you take advantage of the benefit of experience on similar facility elsewhere?

MR. POLONSKY: All of the environmental impacts that are expected from this process, whether it's taken from the Purex process or whether it's taken from a Cogema in general process or whether it's a low level waste generation process that's taken from any commercial process throughout the country is incorporated in the environmental report as a potential environmental impact in Section 5 and how the affected environment -- how the environment will be affected by operations.

Specifically, there are different

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349 capacities, the grades of the material are different, 1 there are going to be two separate facilities from 2 and technology have extracted 3 which we processing, the regimes are not identical and there is 4 no, again, requirement for us to do that. 5 Judge Lam, you may be right, there may 6 may have been nice to - it 7 been incorporated that for the benefit of the doubt, but 8 that's not the basis of a valid contention. 9 10

Thank you. JUDGE LAM:

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff.

I would add, Your Honor, that MR. HULL: you've got a whole different set of regulations that are applicable in France. Now I have no idea what the details of any French laws or regulations that are out there that apply to these French facilities, but you know, it would be very difficult to make any reasonable comparison for NEPA purposes when -- I mean, for instance, let's say you've got a waste stream, a liquid waste stream, that's flowing into a river in France that runs by one of these facilities.

Well, you have a -- since you have an entirely different set of regulations and rules in this country, I mean who is to say that that same

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waste stream would be prohibited under law in this 1 2 country. And the other thing that I just need to 3 add is that you have to look at the specific 4 contention here, Contention 11 provides no evidence of 5 what these alleged problems in Europe are. 6 be just gross speculation to assume that there are 7 some problems. It was up to GANE to identify such 8 problems, and they did not. They have the burden on 9 submitting a valid contention and this is a very bare 10 bones contention that leaves the parties guessing as 11 to well, you know, what are these problems in Europe 12 that they reference. 13 So the staff would continue to maintain 14 that Contention 11 is not admissible. 15 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Contention 12, please. 16 17 Ms. Carroll, if you would address that. Contention 12 deals with MS. CARROLL: 18 malovolent acts, terrorism and insider sabotage. 19 have five minutes. 20 The question posed by Contention 12 is 21 address the environmental report must 22 whether consequences of terrorism and insider sabotage. The 23 NRC staff and DCS argued on the day after what 24 happened in New York and Washington that this isn't 25

required under NEPA.

We believe this is an irrational position. As discussed in the contention, there are examples all around us of terrorism and insider sabotage. If there was a doubt whether these threats must be considered, it was eliminated by the events of last week. GANE requests leave to amend the factual basis for this contention. We're asking the Licensing Board to take official notice of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon last week.

To continue to ignore this issue is not only irrational, but it's immoral.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant.

MR. POLONSKY: We are acutely aware of last week's events and as required by regulations, DCS will be submitting security and safeguards plans with its license application. These plans will address threats, thefts and radiological sabotage. However, the case law on NEPA does not require an assessment of intentional acts in an environmental review and therefore, the ER itself is not deficient and that's why we believe --

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Do you disagree with the staff's analysis that the rule of reason applies here?

MR. POLONSKY: I'm sorry?

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CHAIRMAN MOORE: Do you disagree with the 1 staff's analysis that under NEPA the rule of reason 2 3 applies? MR. POLONSKY: To the extent that this is 4 echoing the basis of why NEPA does not require an 5 environmental analysis of intentional acts, yes. 6 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well, my question goes to 7 under the applicable NEPA case law, do you agree with 8 the staff's position that the rule of reason is the 9 test that is applied, that you only address reasonably 10 foreseeable events? 11 Yes, I was just going to MR. POLONSKY: 12 echo those key words -- yes, reasonably foreseeable. 13 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Sadly, here at 3:47 on 14 September 21, 2001, are you still going to contend 15 it's not reasonably foreseeable that these kinds of 16 catastrophic events can occur? 17 There is a difference POLONSKY: MR. 18 between the statement you've made, Judge Moore -- can 19 occur, reasonably foreseeable and whether or not they 20 are reasonably foreseeable and can occur at this 21 22 facility. If we were about to license a 200 story 23 tower building in Chicago, I might agree that it might 24 be reasonably foreseeable under NEPA to make an 25

1	analysis of intentional threats on that licensing
2	proposed action. However, there is no indication,
3	based on last week's events or for that matter a
4	change in NEPA case law after the other domestic act
5	of terrorism in this country
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: On September 10, was
7	there any indication that any such event was
8	reasonably foreseeable?
9	MR. POLONSKY: I'm not sure of your
LO	question, Your Honor.
L1	CHAIRMAN MOORE: On September 10, would
L2	you agree that it would have been remote and
L3	speculative under NEPA to contend the events that
L4	occurred would occur?
15	MR. POLONSKY: Under NEPA, yes, but that
16	doesn't stop the applicant
17	CHAIRMAN MOORE: So you didn't need to
18	look at the consequences.
19	MR. POLONSKY: Under NEPA, but those
20	sabotage and terrorist events are incorporated in
21	safety and security plans.
22	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay, how? Because each
23	one of your analyses as I read your ER and CAR say
24	that your hepa filters will remain intact and working.
25	MR. POLONSKY: I'm not sure I'm following

your analogy.

unfortunately it's terribly easy to imagine that an attack that would remove the hepa filters from service as well as doing other collateral damage and at the present time that has become far less remote and speculative than it was last September 10. Now do you still intend to state that your publication of plans which are essentially aimed at keeping the hepa filters working under your various accident scenarios is sufficient to account for the environmental impact of these acts?

MR. POLONSKY: The regulations require us to submit security and safeguard plants that will meet threats, thefts and radiological sabotage. Now whether or not the definition of a threat, theft or radiological sabotage changes as a result of events of last week, that has no -- we believe it has no change to the environmental NEPA responsibility.

And again, I would point out, for example, the attack on the Edward R. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, a devastating domestic terrorist act unforeseeable prior. But it did not change NEPA case law. It may change the way agencies protect their facilities against threats and sabotage, but it

doesn't effect the NEPA analysis. 1 If one is applying the CHAIRMAN MOORE: 2 rule of reason and you only look at reasonably 3 foreseeable events, and those that are reasonably 4 foreseeable, you must then analyze to consequences of 5 such events because they are no longer remote and 6 7 Then why isn't this contention speculative. admissible, because under the rule of reason one can 8 reasonably conclude it is no longer remote and 9 speculative, it is foreseeable, and the consequences 10 of such an act have not been -- the environmental 11 consequences of such an act have not been analyzed in 12 the environmental report? 13 MR. POLONSKY: Because it's DCS' position 14 that the rule of reason is for a specific facility and 15 there's no indication that it's any more reasonably 16 foreseeable that a MOX facility would be the target of 17 terrorism than prior to September 11th than today, or 18 any other nuclear facility for that matter. 19 there have been other incidents --20 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Excuse me. 21 MR. POLONSKY: Yeah. 22 CHAIRMAN MOORE: I could be mistaken but -23 - and the staff can certainly correct the record --24

but are not all facilities today on a high state --

the highest level of security alert? 1 If you say so. MR. POLONSKY: 2 If so, why is that? CHAIRMAN MOORE: 3 MR. POLONSKY: Because there is a threat 4 to -- there's a threat to domestic terrorism. There's 5 a threat of domestic terrorism. 6 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well if it's not --7 But there's no change --MR. POLONSKY: 8 any of corresponding change to 9 there's no regulations. 10 CHAIRMAN MOORE: The rule of reason is not 11 It's supposed to be a rule of reason, 12 a regulation. and reason, in light of circumstances, often is 13 changed. And if environmental consequences are not 14 15 looked at because they were previously viewed as being only consequences of remote and speculative actions 16 and changes occur that they're no longer remote and 17 speculative, why does not that same rule of reason 18 require under NEPA that they're looked at? 19 MR. POLONSKY: I agree with the principal. 20 I just believe that there are other incidents that 21 have happened in this country that in the past should 22 have, if this rule applies, this rule of reason, that 23 would have changed NEPA case law, and they did not. 24 And so, I take from that and analogize and say if they

didn't change NEPA case law -- again, 1 environmental review, then -- CHAIRMAN MOORE: Was the 2 issue ever raised? And please tell me where and when. 3 Any licensing proceeding MR. POLONSKY: 4 that would have occurred after the Edward R. Murrah 5 Building, for example, would be an example. 6 7 licensing that would have happened after a plane -- a propeller plane flew into the Empire State Building I 8 There's historical 9 believe 40 or 50 years ago. evidence for these things, and we can agree to 10 disagree on the application of your rule of reason. 11 CHAIRMAN MOORE: No, it's not my rule of 12 I would like that the be very clear 13 For your information, the JUDGE LAM: 14 Commission has spoken on how one may assess what is 15 the meaning of remote and speculative. 16 Staff. CHAIRMAN MOORE: 17 MR. HULL: Your Honor, the staff -- if the 18 the staff on any questions of 19 has contention, Mr. Fernandez will respond. 20 CHAIRMAN MOORE: You, Mr. Fernandez, say 21 the rule of reason is the applicable principle that 22 should be applied, that only reasonable -- reasonably 23 foreseeable events; hence, those that are non-remote 24 and speculative need be analyzed under NEPA --25

MR FERNANDEZ: That's correct. 1 CHAIRMAN MOORE: -- and the consequences 2 of such events? 3 MR FERNANDEZ: That's correct. 4 the staff's CHAIRMAN MOORE: Is it 5 position today, September 21, 2001, that the events 6 postulated in contention 13, filed a month before the 7 remote and events of September 11th are still 8 speculative and don't fall within a common sense 9 application of the rule of reason? 10 MR. FERNANDEZ: That's correct, and let me 11 explain why. I think we need to look at the text of 12 The text of the contention really the contention. 13 doesn't raise any of the issues that we've been 14 The text of the contention talks 15 discussing so far. about what the Department of Energy does in their SPD 16 EIS, something that is clearly beyond the scope of 17 Then they go on to challenge what 18 this proceeding. DCS does with regard to their environmental report and 19 what they regard as many credible scenarios. 20 Your Honor, September 11th -- the events 21 in September -- on September 11th are relevant, and 22 the Commission is considering how to address those in 23 regards to its -- to the safeguards to all 24

facilities that licenses there; however, as

the

Part 51 and what it requires. 2 The requirements on the Part 51, as guided 3 by the rule of reason that you said with regards to 4 NEPA, don't mandate that we consider terrorism acts, 5 their terrorism acts are bv 6 unforeseeable and are by their nature intentionally 7 performed in the devious manner -- a manner that can 8 be easily predictable. 9 That's why we don't do, for example, 10 probabilistic risk assessment for terrorism, because 11 it's not easy to predict who, what, when, where and 12 You can remedy these things. All you can do is 13 have good intelligence and try to prevent and minimize 14 15 the effects --The contention CHAIRMAN MOORE: 16 analyze the need to 17 savs that you environmental consequences of essentially something 18 that's equivalent to a severe accident. 19 MR. FERNANDEZ: And -- and I mean we --20 . . and the staff's position is that the applicant has 21 submitted information as to what the -- for example, 22 off-site releases from the maximum credible accident 23 and the --24 And each one of those CHAIRMAN MOORE: 25

applicant stated, this does not change the nature of

1	accidents that has been analyzed in the CAR, as well
2	as the for the ER
3	MR. FERNANDEZ: Right.
4	CHAIRMAN MOORE: postulate that the
5	filters of the facility remain intact and working and
6	contain the accident.
7	MR. FERNANDEZ: Correct.
8	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Now the contention says
9	that it's no longer remote and speculative that such
10	accidents can occur.
11	MR. FERNANDEZ: Well I think you're
12	talking about two different things.
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And if one occurred that
14	it would not be bounded by the bounding conditions
15	that the applicant has analyzed and it needs to be
16	looked at under NEPA as
17	MR. FERNANDEZ: I think you may be
18	reformulating the contentions because as I read it, it
19	doesn't talk about the hepa filters, it just talks
20	about terrorists attacks and how they're not analyzed,
21	and our understanding is that they are analyzed.
22	They're bounded by the maximum
23	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Fine. Tell me how if
24	events like occurred on September 11th were to occur
25	at this facility, how they would be bounded by that

accident analysis in the ER and the CAR.

MR. FERNANDEZ: Well, Your Honor, I think this is also another part where the rule of reason would need to apply. The reason why is, we need to ask ourselves, these are -- there's a comparable situation with nuclear power plants. This is not the first time that an airplane crashing into licensee facilities has been considered. This is not a novel issue.

Other licensing boards and appellate boards have faced the same issue. In the Shoreham case, for example, and in Turkey Point they have considered these issues. And in those cases we've considered that we don't expect private individuals and these companies have to carry the burden of defending the nation. That burden is left to the government. The government has the responsibility of protecting Americans from attacks from terrorists.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Excuse me. This has nothing to do with burden. This has to do with an analysis under NEPA that if this horrible event happened, what would the consequences be. It doesn't say they have to protect against it, pay the freight for protecting against it, or any other such thing, merely what are the environmental consequences and can

1	those environmental consequences be mitigated.
2	MR. FERNANDEZ: I think you're correct in
3	that assessment. The problem is that it's not
4	reasonable to foresee the postulations made by the
5	by GANE in this case. I mean if from now I guess
6	the Board would have to take the position that from
7	now in every licensing action, we need to consider a
8	large aircraft crashing into our facilities. If that
9	is the position that the Board is willing to take from
10	now on, then I guess this staff has nothing else to
11	say.
12	JUDGE KELBER: Have there been licensing
13	proceedings in which the possibility of aircraft
14	crashes of various types have been considered?
15	MR. FERNANDEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
16	JUDGE KELBER: Where it was appropriate,
17	where it was foreseeable?
18	MR. FERNANDEZ: Yes, Your Honor. If there
19	for example
20	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Now why were those
21	considered?
22	MR. FERNANDEZ: If I remember correctly
23	JUDGE KELBER: Let me help you out. TMI
24	1 and 2
25	MR. FERNANDEZ: Yeah, TMI.
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1	JUDGE KELBER: Turkey Point and
2	MR. FERNANDEZ: I think TMI is a good
3	example because of the proximity to the aircraft paths
4	with regard to LaGuardia and JFK. And in that case,
5	it was reasonably for sale because it was so close to
6	where these planes were flying that they needed to
7	consider what the impacts would be, and a factual
8	determination as part of its safety analysis. The
9	Board looked at those facts, but not as far as NEPA.
10	Never has a board required of an applicant to look at
11	these types of scenarios with regards to its NEPA
12	obligations.
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: But in all of the
14	instances that you've just referenced, the bounding
15	accident already considered what the same
16	consequences of the airplane crash. With a reactor,
17	you would lose containment. Well here there is no
18	containment.
19	JUDGE KELBER: Not at Turkey Point.
20	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Pardon?
21	JUDGE KELBER: Not at Turkey Point.
22	MR. FERNANDEZ: It depended on the
23	hearing. You're right with regards to one of the
24	hearings. The other hearing did not consider
25	CHAIRMAN MOORE: So I'm just having

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trouble saying that it's already being considered and never under NEPA. Well it never needed to be because it was already a bounded accident. What's being postulated here by malevolent acts of terrorism are something that go beyond what up to this point was the bounding accident that the HEPA filters stay intact and function.

MR. FERNANDEZ: I think you're correct with regard to everything you've said so far. The only thing is, I don't see that represented in the contention filed by GANE. As the Board has currently explained it, that's a different argument. That's not what's before us right now, I don't think. I don't think that's what GANE argued of their contention. I mean, I don't see anything with regards to that in the text of their contention.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll, your last contention, contention 13.

MS. CARROLL: Contention 13 contends that lacks probability environmental report the This calculations and we have five minutes. based requirement contention is on a regulations that to the extent practical NEPA analysis must quantify the factors -- I'm sorry, must quantify the factors considered. DCS concedes that it hasn't

fully quantified environmental impacts of accidents.

DCS argues that it isn't practical to do a fully quantitative analysis because uncertainties are too great.

This argument establishes the existence of a material factual dispute between the parties. On the one hand, GANE has demonstrated that probabilistic risk assessment is a commonly used tool and is looked to by the NRC commissioners as a valid way to measure environmental impacts.

On the other hand, DCS argues that in this quantitative analysis is not sufficiently case reliable to be useful; thus, DCS offers a kind of hybrid analysis that can combines quantitative and In GANE's view this is the qualitative analysis. worst of both worlds, in which qualitative analysis is significance of quantitative the mask uncertainties. GANE has raised an admissible issue as to whether the environmental impacts of accident risks at the MOX facility are quantifiable. The contention should be admitted.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant, one moment.

Backing up to the previous contention. Staff, the middle sentence of the contention says lack of

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of design safeguards. That is precisely the point I 2 was making, that's it beyond the accidents they viewed 3 or design -- within design safeguards. 4 MR. FERNANDEZ: Can you -- can you tell me 5 which sentence that is, Your Honor? 6 CHAIRMAN MOORE: That's the contention, 7 the 12th line. 8 Well, Your Honor, Ι MR. FERNANDEZ: 9 believe that that last -- the line that you're reading 10 from -- I mean, again, the applicant was clear in that 11 now is not the appropriate time to challenge the 12 safequards design and the emergency plans that the 13 licensee needs to submit during the operations, 14 special nuclear material used in possession license 15 stage of the proceeding. Now we're dealing about what 16 the contents of the ERR and what the required contents 17 of that ER should be and these are not that. 18 Where are the -- such 19 CHAIRMAN MOORE: consequences from an environmental standpoint going to 20 be looked at in the next stage -- in the possession 21 and use? 22 The environmental impact MR. FERNANDEZ: 23 statement is being drafted by the staff currently to 24 address both stages, construction and use -- I mean 25

analysis of monovalent act scenario leads to failure

construction and operation. 1 CHAIRMAN MOORE: And it's going to include 2 such matters? 3 MR. FERNANDEZ: It would more than likely 4 include them. If it doesn't to the satisfaction of 5 the staff, it will be supplemented at a later date if 6 it receives new and significant information from the 7 applicant with regards to those matters. And at that 8 point, the public would have the opportunity to 9 participate through the scoping process once again. 10 why CHAIRMAN MOORE: But isn't 11 appropriate for a contention to say the environmental 12 report is faulty for not including such -- the same 13 matters you say are going to be looked at in the EIS. 14 MR. FERNANDEZ: Well as I understand it, 15 what you're asking is whether they're required to 16 submit something to analyze impacts of -- that would 17 look out -- something like what happened on September 18 19 11th, is that correct? 20 CHAIRMAN MERRY: Well in your terms, currently design basis beyond design basis --21 accidents. 22 MR. FERNANDEZ: And it is the position of 23 the staff that NEPA does not currently require that. 24 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant. 25

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MR. SILVERMAN: We're on contention 13.

I'll be brief, Your Honor. GANE argues that Part 51 regulations require that the environmental report quantify the probability of accidents and that we failed to explain why it's not practical to do that. Again, as GANE has correctly stated, the regulation states that generally that environmental impact should be quantified to the fullest extent practicable. have, in fact, in Section 5.5 of the Environmental Report an accident analysis discussion, which does include upper bound probabilities for some accidents and does include and discuss other accidents in a There's nothing inappropriate qualitative manner. about that. It's consistent with the regulation and the contention should be rejected in our view.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff.

MR. HULL: Yeah, I'll supplement Mr. Silverman's remarks in that respect. Section 5.5 in Appendix F of the Environmental Report total over 25 pages of material and it was GANE's responsibility -- rather than just making some blanket assertion about the Environmental Report not being adequate, it was GANE's responsibility to indicate or specify what portions of the Environmental Report are inadequate. Contention cannot be admissible when it just makes

blanket statements like this without giving 1 parties any specifics as to what are the issues that 2 GANE seeks to litigate. 3 In addition to that, GANE did not identify 4 any specific accident scenarios, and their citations 5 I won't go into to NRC case law are not relevant. 6 that because that's fully explained in the staff's 7 Thank you. response. 8 If I want to evaluate a JUDGE KELBER: 9 safety assessment sometime in the future, I'm faced 10 with the assertion that an explosion in an aqueous 11 processing cell is -- poses -- I believe it's probably 12 greater consequences than an explosion in a centering 13 But how am I to judge without a good 14 furnace. probabilistic analysis which poses the greater risk? 15 Well, Your Honor, focusing on MR. HULL: 16 contention 13, that was my point. They don't specify 17 what accident analysis are we supposed to be talking 18 about. 19 Well there are many KELBER: JUDGE 20 Do they have to do an analysis all on 21 accidents. 22 their own --MR. HULL: In submitting contentions, Your 23 Honor, they're required to specify, in this regard, 24 what is the accident analysis that was not adequately 25

1	evaluated. They can't just make broad statements like
2	they do here in contention 13. They have to give the
3	parties specific information to put the parties on
4	notice as to what issues they seek to litigate, and
5	contention 13 does not do that.
6	JUDGE KELBER: Do you think we'll ever
7	have a PRA for this plant? Does the staff intend to
8	make one?
9	MR. HULL: One moment, Your Honor.
10	(Brief pause.)
11	MR. HULL: I'm advised that the staff does
12	not intend to do a probabilistic risk assessment here.
13	JUDGE KELBER: Oh, God help us all.
14	CHAIRMAN MOORE: We'll turn now to the
15	GANE motion to dismiss. You have 15 minutes.
16	MS. CURRAN: I would like to take ten
17	minutes and reserve five for rebuttal.
18	CHAIRMAN MOORE: We'll consider feel
19	free to take all of your time and we'll consider
20	whether rebuttal is necessary at the end. But I would
21	request that you move the graphic from in front of you
22	
23	MS. CURRAN: Okay.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: so that I can throw
25	things directly at you.
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MR. HULL: Your Honor, Ι hate 1 Mr. Persinko wanted to add a statement 2 interrupt. regarding the previous contention-13 discussion. 3 MR. PERSINKO: I just want to say that the 4 staff intends to incorporate risk concepts in risk but 5 complete intend do not to 6 does probabilistic risk assessment as one would normally 7 think with false reason of entries. 8 MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, if --9 JUDGE KELBER: Don't go to Las Vegas. 10 Your Honor, if I may MR. SILVERMAN: 11 In light of the fact that GANE has been briefly? 12 given the opportunity to file the motion, we filed a 13 response and they had an additional pleading admitted 14 and we did not have the opportunity to respond. We 15 would object to a rebuttal argument in this case. 16 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay. Well let's take it 17 and see where it leads and whether rebuttal and 18 surrebuttal might be necessary. Please proceed. 19 MS. CURRAN: I'm mindful that the Board 20 has instructed us all that it has read the pleadings 21 and that we shouldn't repeat what's on paper. So what 22 I would like to focus on today is an argument made by 23 DCS that there's no specific provision of the Atomic 24 Energy Act that prohibits system two-step process 25

established by the NRC and that the AEA does not require the submittal and NRC review of a license application or any other information prior to commencement of construction of a plutonium fuel fabrication facility. The applicant cited the <u>Power Reactor Development</u> case and its response to the contentions. I went back and looked at that and found that it's helpful in looking at this motion to dismiss.

this in What's happened it seems proceeding is that the NRC staff has created kind of a hybrid proceeding that takes a little bit from Part 70 and takes a little bit from Part 50 and creates a separate construction permit application which they call the CAR, which is less complete than an operation license application, much less complete. And separates the review process into very distinct steps that are separated not only in the sense that there's two separated in time, which required but distinctly different amounts of information to be This is something that is -- I find no submitted. authorization for in the statute. There is a real difference between the statutory provisions for twostep licensing of nuclear power plants and the onestep licensing of other kinds of facilities.

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looks Ιf one at the Power Reactor Development case, that case discusses how there is in Section 182 -- 182 of the Act, which is 42 USC 2232(a), the Congress sets out a standard for the issuance of an operating license. And in Section 185, which is 42 USC 2235, there's a separate standard set out for the issuance of the construction permit. question -- the Power Reactor Development case, which is 367 US 346, the year was 1961 -- was whether the standard at the construction permit stage is different than the standard would be at the operating license stage, whether it's a lesser standard. The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative and said that the construction permit is kind of provisional thing and that later on when an operating license is issued, then the Commission will make the required are safety findings that compete operation under the Act.

There's a case where Congress has set up a statutory process for dividing the licensing of a nuclear facility into two parts. The Supreme Court talked about the rationale for allowing this lesser safety finding in the construction permit stage and the tension that existed between wanting to encourage licensees to go through construction by guaranteeing

that a favorable safety finding would be made at operation, and on the other hand wanting to be able to make that safety finding at the operating stage independently. The court resolved that tension in favor of the lesser finding at the construction permit stage, but guaranteeing that there would be a stringent safety finding at the operating license stage.

That two-step process does not apply to a plutonium processing facility. It's not a production and utilization facility as the Commission has defined those facilities in its regulations. So there's essentially no statutory authority for such a two-step license and review process. I think we have gone over the fact that in the regulations themselves there also is no two-step process for the submittal of construction permit application for a plutonium There is a separate step for processing plant. consideration of whether construction should allowed to go ahead, but it's very clear from the rule making history that the Commission did not contemplate making that determination until it had received a complete license application and even had completed its safety and environmental review. And, of course, exactly the opposite is being planned here.

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Another issue that I just wanted to bring to your attention here, and I'm sure you're aware of is, there have been many, many examples raised here today of the practical effect that has on the ability of this agency to make adequate findings regarding the design of this facility and whether it's going to be adequate in the long run to support the operation of I think there's been many instances the facility. today where the Licensing Board was frustrated in its attempts to determine what information had been submitted, or was considered necessary. that's no accident, because, in fact, the NRC has no regulations that separately set out in detail what would be required for a construction permit versus an operating license.

In fact, this is -- something has been flipped here, that a regulation that was initially intended to make the review of plutonium processing plants more stringent by adding the requirement that the design of the facility be included in the body of the license application has been twisted in the sense to allow an incomplete construction permit application that doesn't allow a comprehensive review of what the facility is going to do. The result is -- the effect is exactly the opposite of what the Commission

intended when it promulgated these regulations.

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really -- I feel that we've been thorough in our attempt to respond to the arguments made by DCS and the staff, and if you have any questions about our arguments, we would be really glad to respond.

JUDGE KELBER: You mentioned rule making history and similar considerations. Do you have any specific references that could help us?

They are cited in our MS. CURRAN: Yes. motion to dismiss. Let me give you the page number. I believe it's on page 16 of our motion to dismiss. This -- the rule making in 1971, I believe, was made immediately effective. There was concern expressed in the rule making itself for the special hazards posed by plutonium processing facilities. If you look in the Notice of Rulemaking, it says we are dispensing with the period that usually is given before the rule making this immediately qoes into effect and It's an unusual action for the Commission effective. to take.

If we -- if one were to JUDGE KELBER: adopt your view as to the nature of the licensing process here, would that make this 70. -- what is it, 22(f) and 23(b) 12 consistent?

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I'm sorry, 70.23(b)? 1 MS. CURRAN: JUDGE KELBER: Yeah. The key words -- we 2 discussed this earlier today. It says the Commission 3 will approve construction on the basis of information 4 5 filed pursuant to the 70.22(f). MS. CURRAN: Right. In other words, the 6 entire application must be submitted before the 7 Commission makes that determination on the adequacy of 8 the design. In fact, the regulations require that a 9 completed license application must be submitted at 10 least nine months before commencement of construction. 11 Under the schedule proposed by the staff here, which 12 is attached as an exhibit to our motion, that isn't 13 even possible here. And I think -- as you've heard a 14 little bit today, the terminology is a little loose. 15 This is an application but it's not being called an 16 application for a license. It's being called an 17 application for something else, or a permit, 18 authorization request. There's no such animal in the 19 NRC regulations. 20 But their position --CHAIRMAN MOORE: 21 they being the staff and the applicant, since it's not 22 23 prohibited, it's permitted. MS. CURRAN: From the perspective --24 How do you respond to CHAIRMAN MOORE: 25

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MS. CURRAN: That's not a valid argument. The NRC -- for one thing, we started out with the question of how an application gets docketed for a hearing, and there's only one kind of application that can be docketed for a hearing under Part 70 and that From the application for license. а perspective of a citizen intervenor, the idea that the staff could simply make up a category application and call a public hearing on it, which is what's happened here, is an extraordinary waste of time, mention an citizen intervenor's not to the citizen experience for incredibly confusing intervenor who looks to the regulations to try to figure out what is going on. What do I as intervenor have to evaluate in order to assess the adequacy of this application? And when you go through the application -- the regulations and look to see what kind of an application am I looking at here, the regulations don't help you.

In comparison, if this were a construction permit proceeding for a nuclear power plant, one could go to Section -- Part 50 and see specific requirements for the contents of a construction permit application and compare those requirements to the contents of the

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application. There's no such thing here. There's only what the staff arbitrarily announces to us it considers relevant. And that is not responsible agency process. It prejudices the ability of any member of the public to understand and participate in the decision making process. Also, it's clear to us, especially from what's been said today, results in a decision making process that does not -- is not rigorous with respect to protecting public health and safety.

Curran, after listening to what the staff has said and what the applicant has said today, which were the staff would not hesitate to exercise its oversight responsibility to impose requirements if and when necessary after the facility is constructed, and the applicant was willing and able to bear that risk. Would that mitigate some of the concern about the protection of public health and safety?

MS. CURRAN: Well in the real world, if you have built a facility and spent a lot of money on it, and after you have finished it, you find that you create your plans for carrying out the operation, the activities that are going to go on in this building, and you find that there's some very expensive changes

that you really ought to make to make it safe, in the 1 real world one thinks twice about tearing down a 2 building that one has finished. Certainly I would 3 think DOE would think twice about tearing down a 4 building at the taxpayers expense, which is when DCS 5 says it's going to bear the cost, it's passing the 6 7 It's not the stockholders who are paying, cost on. it's mostly the taxpayers who are paying. So this is 8 -- it's also common sense that when you're going to 9 build something, a building that would house a 10 potentially dangerous activity, to plan for what's --11 to plan for a relationship between the physical design 12 of the facility and what's going to take place there. 13 And if the NRC wanted to have a separate process for 14 review of construction and operation that is similar 15 to a nuclear power plant, first it needs authorization 16 in the statute for that. And second, it needs -- it 17 needs some kind of regulations to support such a 18 19 process.

We've heard a lot of confusing statements here today about how much material -- how much information is to be required, for instance, with respect to material control and accounting in order to support the design of the facility. The original intent of these regulations was to set up a rigorous

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process where the design of the facility would be 1 added to the operational requirements, and instead, 2 they've been -- they've been divorced. 3 Ms. Curran, I believe CHAIRMAN MOORE: 4 that in the Commission's referral order they indicated 5 Unfortunately I it was to be a two-part process. 6 can't put my finger on that to find where that 7 8 appears. MS. CURRAN: I recognize that. We are not 9 arguing to you that there's no ambiguity here. 10 came to the Licensing Board in the first instance 11 because it was not clear to us that the Commission was 12 aware of the problems that we --13 CHAIRMAN MOORE: But can't the Commission 14 change the rules by order, and haven't they done that 15 in this case? 16 I don't -- I don't believe MR. CURRAN: 17 that the Commission can make -- first of all, if the 18 Commission is going to make changes to a regulation --19 to a set of regulations, it needs to do so knowingly 20 at the very least. It's not clear to me at all that 21 the Commission understood that the two-step licensing 22 process that is normal for a nuclear power plant does 23 not necessarily apply in a Part 70 licensing case. 24 at the very least, if the rules are going to be 25

changed, then that has to be acknowledged and explained. In our view, when the agency promulgates regulations for the consistency of its decision making process, it should abide by those regulations unless it goes through an orderly process for changing them, and that has not happened here. What we've got is defacto licensing based on whatever the circumstances happen to be and without regard to the regulations.

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CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant.

Thank you. I would like MR. SILVERMAN: to first respond to a couple of Ms. Curran's points. The first point she makes is, she alludes to the Atomic Energy Act and the provisions which specify that you must have a construction permit approved and an operating license approved for a reactor. Congress up that specific statutory scheme reactors. Her position is because they did not send up a similar specific statutory scheme for MOX fuel fabrication facilities; therefore, the agency is without power to establish such a procedure. We don't agree with that. There is no provision in the Atomic Energy Act that prohibits this procedure. The only thing the Atomic Energy Act requires for a facility like this is that we not possess special nuclear material without a license. As a result of that, the

1	staff is free and the Commission is free to establish
2	appropriate licensing procedures just so long as it
3	assures that no special nuclear material is possessed
4	without a license. Section 161 of the Atomic Energy
5	Act gives very broad powers in establishing licensing
6	procedures.
7	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well but wait a
8	minute. Are the provisions of Part 70 substantive
9	regulations or procedural regulations?
10	MR. SILVERMAN: They contain both
11	procedural and substantive requirements.
12	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well is it generally
13	acknowledged that Part 2 contains the procedural
14	regulations?
15	MR. SILVERMAN: Generally for hearings and
16	enforcement
17	CHAIRMAN MOORE: And what is required in
18	an application? Would it be your contention that that
19	is a procedural rule, not a substantive rule?
20	MR. SILVERMAN: I'm not sure I would make
21	the distinction one way or the other, but I believe
22	Part 70 speaks to that, what's required for various
23	types of applications.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: May the Commission change
25	by rule I'm sorry, by order substantive rules?

1	MR. SILVERMAN: I don't believe they're
2	changing the rules. What they're doing is
3	establishing additional procedures not called by the -
4	- not specifically required by the statute.
5	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well forget the statute.
6	How about the regulations?
7	MR. SILVERMAN: If you're referring to the
8	Part 70 regulations
9	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Yes.
10	MR. SILVERMAN: 7022(f) and 23 that we
11	discussed earlier
12	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Yes.
13	MR. SILVERMAN: we have stated our
14	position on that. We believe that those regulations
15	authorize this procedure, that the Commission
16	recognized that. CHAIRMAN MOORE: Where did they
17	recognize it? I'm having trouble putting my finger on
18	that.
19	MR. SILVERMAN: Well the referral order
20	clearly discusses the fact that there'll be a separate
21	construction authorization request. It discusses the
22	fact that the issues were to be admitted as
23	contentions must relate and this is page 7 under
24	Commission guidance to whether the principal
25	structure systems and components and the quality

1	assurance program together provide reasonable
2	assurance. And they add in the finding about NEPA.
3	I also believe in the April 18th if
4	you'll bear with me just one second.
5	MR. FERNANDEZ: Your Honor, if I may?
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: No.
7	MR. SILVERMAN: Let me finish. The very
8	first paragraph in the summary of the April 18th
9	Notice of Acceptance for Docketing and Notice of
10	Opportunity for Hearing says the NRC has accepted to
11	construction authorization request, CAR, for
12	docketing.
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Is that is that a
14	staff notice or a Commission notice?
15	MR. SILVERMAN: This is signed by the
16	secretary of the Commission.
17	•
18	CHAIRMAN MOORE: All right.
19	MR. SILVERMAN: I believe there are other
20	places in here where this recognizes that there will
21	be a construction authorization request and that that
22	is separate from the license application to come
23	later.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Which goes back the
25	Atomic Energy Act clearly permits the Commission to
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act in two ways, by order and by rule. 1 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes. 2 Then the notice of CHAIRMAN MOORE: 3 docketing would be in order, so that --4 MR. SILVERMAN: I think effectively it is, 5 but we rely on both that and on the regulations. 6 CHAIRMAN MOORE: I'm having some trouble 7 putting this in context because if the regulations are 8 read in a fashion as suggested by the petitioners, 9 then that would seem to be contradictory of Commission 10 -- at least implied, if not explicit statements of the 11 But if they are not in -- if the 12 Commission. Commission has not done this by order, then it can 13 only do this by a rule change. So the question then 14 becomes, in these documents in which they've done it, 15 does a notice amount to an order by the Commission 16 changing the substantive rules? 17 MR. SILVERMAN: Again, I do -- I do think 18 in essence -- and would probably want to research the 19 point -- that this notice is in effect an order of the 20 it's not a change. It 21 Commission, but clarification of the scope of this proceeding. 22 think this regulation calls for certain specific 23 findings to be made and it is appropriate and 24 reasonable under the regulation for the applicant to 25

submit the information necessary for the staff to make those findings. And it is illogical for the applicant to be required to submit information that is beyond the scope of those findings at this stage and is redundant in many ways.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Your interpretation is in the teeth of 7023(b), which incorporates 7023(f). I mean that is the crux of the matter. You're essentially asking us to read the provision of 7023(b) that says information on the basis of information filed pursuant to Section 7022(f) out of the regulations. I would agree with you, if it didn't say that, that your argument is highly persuasive.

We don't think it says MR. SILVERMAN: see if I can explain, put these that. Let me regulations in context. I'm going to borrow statement from Mr. Hull, I believe, who said that Section 7022(f) was adopted in the 1950s. So we have a -- if you look at that regulation, it talks about an application -- the information that an application has At that time, I don't think anyone to contain. contemplated or specifically considered a separate construction authorization request. I'm sorry, not F. 7022 -- I apologize -- was adopted in the 19503 in general. F was added later.

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When F was added, it says, in addition to all this other information that we've already asked for from an applicant, we want certain additional specific information. That is, a description of the plant site, a description of the design basis of principal SSCs, et cetera. That's the additional kernel of information that was added and required.

We now go to the regulation in 7023 where it says the Commission will approve construction of the principal SSCs based upon -- on the basis of information filed pursuant to 7022(f) when it's determined that the design basis of the principal SSCs in the QA program are adequate. We think what they're referring to there is that additional information related to the design basis of principal SSCs that was added as an additional requirement to strengthen the regulations, and that it does not intend to require the submittal of a large amount of additional information that would not normally be submitted at this stage.

It's also the logical result in the following sense. We're talking about highly -- if you applied the interpretation of the intervenors, you're going to be submitting general design information on the plant. At the same time, you're going to have to

submit detailed design information of the plant of the type you would have to submit at the possession and use license stage. There's a redundancy and an illogic there that doesn't hold for us. There would be no reason to ask for the general information at this time if the Commission contemplated all of the detailed specific information at this time. What the staff and the Commission have done here is read some regulations that are admittedly not as clear as they should be, but they have read them in a reasonable way, in a logical way, in a way that's authorized by the statute and in a way that ensures that the staff gets the requisite information they need.

Ms. Curran also says -- and they've made this comment in their --

interpretation, how do you respond to Mr. Curran's argument that you will be the -- the staff will be doing an EIS before they ever see a safety analysis.

Now in every other instance where you have a two-part licensing proceeding, you have -- at a CP for a reactor, for example, the EIS, as does the CP license application, has all of the detailed design.

MR. SILVERMAN: No.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Certainly the vast, vast

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majority of the detailed design material in it. they're done on parallel tracks. Indeed, in a recent case in which several members of this Board sat in Turkey Point, the staff's answer to a charge that you must complete the safety analysis before you do the IS is no, no, no, they can be done in parallel because when they're done in parallel, you necessarily in doing your NEPA analysis are using and incorporating the analysis from the safety side -- from the safety track. Here, Ms. Curran points out that what's going to happen is, the EIS will be done two years before the safety analysis, and all of the things that you've told us today that will be done later, will be done later, will be done later, that go to whether or not your accident analysis are going to be properly assessed and are correct, will not be looked at until two years after the environmental impact statement is issued. That seems to me to strike a discordant note, and not, as you would contend, bring an illogic to the regulations, rather Ms. Curran's interpretation of these regulations would clearly avoid that situation and fit in the traditional mold of having the EIS and the safety analysis done on parallel tracks, not perpendicular tracks, one done two years in front of the -- I'm sorry, the NEPA analysis, and EIS done two

1 | years in advance of the safety analysis.

MR. SILVERMAN: First of all, what we have here is a parallel track and that is consistent with other NRC procedures. We have the SER being prepared at the same time the environmental impact statement is being prepared by the staff and parallel tracks. Furthermore, we pointed out two examples where this type of procedure is specifically authorized by the regulations. We've referred to the Part 52 relief site permit application procedure. That's a procedure where an application can apply for an early site permit for a nuclear power plant. Before they have filed a construction permit, before they have filed a combined license, and in order to --

CHAIRMAN MOORE: What does the NEPA -- what NEPA requirements attach at that point and what does the NEPA analysis include at that point?

MR. SILVERMAN: I will quote the regulation -- well a portion of the regulation. A full environmental review will be prepared covering, quote, the environmental effects of construction and operation, unquote. That's constructed, even though a construction permit hasn't even been filed or a combined license application hasn't been filed. There is an environmental review of construction and

operation in that procedure. That's in the regulations in Part 52.

In part 50, we have the limited work authorization procedure where an LWA may be issued after an environmental impact statement is issued on the construction permit, but before the SCR under construction permit is issued. If an applicant had to wait, even for that SCR to come out before it could proceed to work there wouldn't be any reason to get There are at least two the LWA in the first place. very provisions in the regulations where this procedure is called for. It is not necessary under NEPA to have the entire safety analysis and all of the safety considerations and a final application prepared in order to do an adequate environmental impact statement.

The thing that bothers me JUDGE KELBER: is one of the first things I learned when coming on The Commission follows the Humpty Dumpty the panel. Our rules and regulations say what they mean rule. It's otherwise known as the and mean what they say. Ms. Curran's interpretation plain speaking rule. seems to satisfy that point of view. If you follow her interpretation the rules mean what they say and You're offering a perfectly say what they mean.

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1	reasonable interpretation by analogy, but it doesn't
2	mean the Humpty Dumpty rule. You're putting us in a
3	great dilemma that way. We're faced with two rational
4	interpretations. One which meets the plain speaking
5	rule, but which is not analogous to procedures worked
6	with power plants nuclear power plants. You're
7	saying this is something analogous to what's done with
8	nuclear power plants in their early site permits and
9	limited work authorizations, and we should follow that
LO	interpretation. How do we choose put yourself in
11	a neutral position. How does one choose? On what
12	basis is there to make a choice?
13	MR. SILVERMAN: Judge Kelber, I think my
14	response to that is that the Commission is aware of,
15	and has sanctioned the procedure and the
16	interpretation that we proffered.
17	JUDGE KELBER: In other words, you're
18	saying the Commission said do it. Okay.
19	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Do you have anything
20	else?
21	MR. SILVERMAN: Well I just want to
22	respond real briefly to one of the arguments that the
23	intervenors have made because I think it's very
24	misleading, and then I will close my remarks.
,	They continually say that our

interpretation weakens rather than strengthens the 1 safety regime. That's absolutely false. What we've 2 done here is what -- what the Commission has done is 3 added an another entire level of review here. 4 special nuclear material licensees once again simply 5 have to file a possession and use license application. 6 What they've done here is establish a requirement that 7 we come forward with a discussion of the general 8 design basis of this plant so that they can make a 9 finding that if we built it in accordance with those 10 basic parameters there will be reasonable assurance of 11 And we can't build until those findings are 12 That is added on. That's the strengthening of 13 the regulations. 14

We have no other comments on this at this time.

CHAIRMAN MOORE: The trouble with that argument though is, it's almost a nonsecular because the information that you supply is so skeletal that once you get the -- something that I can find no -- I don't know what you will get when you -- from your CAR. I guess you'll get an authorization. You won't get a license, as I understand it. But it's very skeletal and you get that authorization, then you provide all of the detailed information during

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possession and use. And yet, because you've got this authorization on the basis of skeletal information, it is now locked in, because you did all that you said you were going to do, even if subsequently with the detailed information, it proves that perhaps that wasn't prudent. But you have met the authorization of this -- what you were saying, this benefit of a two-step process. And so, I think that it's a two-edged sword that you're pointing out. It has great advantages to you, whether it has great advantages for safety, I don't know.

MR. SILVERMAN: Well, I believe it does.

have to object would Ι characterization of the CAR as skeletal. I mean this is three volumes of documentation here with very specific commitments to codes and standards that are to be applied to design basis events, to descriptions of how we do our accident analysis and the results of accidents analysis. There is а lot It is by definition three information in there. volumes more than one would get for any other special

CHAIRMAN MOORE: Now what happens once you get whatever comes out of this process, an authorization, whether it's a license, whatever we're

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calling it? You then are entitled -- having fulfilled 1 that requirement, you then are entitled to the 2 possession and use license, are you not? 3 No, not at all. MR. SILVERMAN: 4 entitled to begin --5 CHAIRMAN MOORE: If you build it the way 6 you say you were going to build it in your initial 7 license, aren't you then entitled --8 No, that's only part of MR. SILVERMAN: 9 Obviously the staff has to verify 10 the calculation. that we built it in accordance with the commitments 11 that we've made. 12 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay, assume you do that. 13 In addition to that, the MR. SILVERMAN: 14 staff has to obviously approve all of the other 15 commitments, obligations and specifications that we 16 provide in our license application, which is going to 17 be, I understand, considerably more detailed in many 18 including containing a large number of 19 programs like material control and accountability, et 20 cetera, that we haven't provided at this point in 21 Plus an integrated safety analysis, which has 22 time. to be provided under the new NRC regulations, and a 23 demonstration that, you know, certain events are 24 highly unlikely or certain events are unlikely based 25

1	upon our application. There's a lot more to be done
2	here. It's not just okay, you built it in accordance
3	with those design basis.
4	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Then we what, supplement
5	the IS if necessary?
6	MR. SILVERMAN: If there's substantial
7	significant new information, then the NRC has an
8	obligation to examine that information and make a
9	determination whether they need to supplement it. If
10	there's significant changes to the design of the
11	facility that the NRC believes warrants a supplement
12	they're obligated to do that.
13	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Where does the backfit
14	rule fit in?
15	MR. SILVERMAN: There is a backfit rule.
16	It's a new rule in 10 CFR Part 70. I'm not sure I
17	understand your question, but it does give the staff -
18	- that's interesting. It's a good point. It does
19	give the staff the ability to make determinations that
20	backfits are required with certain determinations,
21	and, you know, without a cost benefit analysis if it's
22	necessary if the backfit is necessary to meet
23	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Doesn't the backfit rule
24	require a cost benefit analysis?
25	MR. SILVERMAN: No. The way the backfit

1	rule works in both the Part 50 regime and the Part 70
2	regime is if the staff determines that there's a
3	change that's required in order to meet the adequate
4	protection standard. There is no cost benefit
5	analysis. It is imposed upon the licensee. If the
6	staff I can cite you to the regulation using the
7	language. If the staff believes it's simply a safety
8	improvement and it's not necessary to meet adequate
9	protection standard, but would be a safety
10	improvement, then there is a cost benefit analysis
11	done.
12	JUDGE LAM: So in this case the backfit
13	rule may or may not apply?
14	MR. SILVERMAN: There is a backfit rule
15	no, it applies in the sense that it gives the staff
16	the ability to say regardless of the requirements that
17	we have imposed before, in order to protect public
18	safety, we must impose a new requirement, and they may
19	do that
20	JUDGE LAM: The backfit rule would apply
21	and cost benefit analysis may or may not be required?
22	MR. SILVERMAN: Yes.
23	CHAIRMAN MOORE: But under Ms. Curran's
24	reading of these regulations, if this were done as a
25	one-step process, the backfit rule would never come

1	into play.
2	MR. SILVERMAN: I'm not sure about that.
3	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well how would it come
4	into play?
5	MR. SILVERMAN: I think that any time,
6	even an operating plant, the staff can impose a
7	backfit.
8	CHAIRMAN MOORE: No, they just wouldn't
9	give you the license until you did what they wanted
10	you to do. You could contest that, but it would not
11	be anything to do with the requirements of the
12	backfit.
13	MR. SILVERMAN: Perhaps.
14	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Staff, do you have
15	anything to add?
16	MR. FERNANDEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
17	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay.
18	MR. FERNANDEZ: The first thing we would
19	like to add the first think we would like to
20	address is that even though Ms. Curran's argument is
21	an attractive one, it's just one of two arguments
22	before you that are reasonable. We believe the more
23	reasonable, and in fact, the one endorsed by the
24	Commission is the one advanced by the applicant and
25	the staff.

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I would like to address some things raised by the Board and Ms. Curran in her presentation. First, I would like to begin with what Judge Kelber said with regards to putting the Board in a difficult The Board is in no difficult position at position. I believe that the orders issued by the that this is a two-step Commission are clear, licensing proceeding, there's no question about what of how this Commission's expectations are Commission should -- of how this proceeding should proceed. And if there's any question as to what the Commission meant, then the Commission itself should

answer that question and not to Board.

Second, I would like to address something that Judge Moore addressed with regards to what applicant will get a the end of this process. Something that I don't think anybody has mentioned yet is the Administrative Procedures Act. The APA defines what a license is with regards to what administrative In it's definition of licenses, there's agencies do. It's a very broad permits and authorizations. So reading the APA in conjunction with definition. the Atomic Energy Act, as the Atomic Energy Act license from the commands, they would have a Commission at the end of this proceeding.

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With regards to the Commission notice, I think, Judge Moore, you were looking for where in the Commission notice the Commission specified as far as the bifurcated proceeding. If you go to page 19,995, If you have a copy from the the second column. Federal Register, it will be bolded where it says Federal Register. And there it reads, the results of the NRC's reviews of the DCS filings will documented in a safety evaluation report and environmental impact statement. As stated in the March 7, 2001 Federal Register notice, in the summer of 2002 DCS plans to submit a request for authority to operate the MOX facility, and that request would be the subject of the separate notice of opportunity for That is volume 66 of the Federal Register. hearing. We would like to point out that ordinarily these notice of acceptance for docketing are filed by the In this case, it was the secretary of the staff. Commission that issued the notice.

We would also like to address the statements that GANE made with regards to the Atomic Energy Act. The Atomic Energy Act is very specific with regards to nuclear power plants, and that is correct. However, as the <u>Seagal</u> case recognized in the D.C. circuit, it also is very unlike any other act

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in the authority of delegates to the agency, which it created. In this case, the Commission. It gave the Commission powers unlike other agencies have in determining the way it would issue licenses and it would organize itself. So we believe that relying on the Atomic Energy Act -- we have the discretion of setting up and establishing the practices as we deem necessary to license facilities that are not specifically set out in the Atomic Energy Act.

Also another comment raised by Ms. Curran with regards to the immediate effectiveness of the rule when it was promulgated. I don't think the Board should read anything into making the rule immediately effective when it was published. We need to remember that at the time there were several people -- several industry groups that were interested in engaging in So it's obvious that the this type of facility. Commission would issue a rule immediately because the interest was there. So they wanted to make sure that if anybody came in, they came in under the particular rule that they wanted to promulgate. It doesn't specifically reflect that they were any particular inordinate concerns with regards to the safety of these facilities that they allude to.

Now I would like to go into the merits of

the motion, if you don't have any questions.

(No response.)

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MR. FERNANDEZ: First, as we mentioned, we contend that the Board lacks authority to review the motion. As we argued before, the authority of the Board and the scope of this proceeding is clearly delineated and the notice of hearing and in the referral order. We believe if there are any issues that the Board deems that deal with this particular issue it should be referred to the Commission.

Second, even though GANE offhandedly it's discards the argument that because not specifically prohibited, we shouldn't be authorized to We believe that it's a engage in this activity. strong argument. I mean the -- we'll be the first to admit that Part 70, when you read it in its totality, at some point it doesn't seem to really make sense. It has been something that the staff has dealt with, the applicant has dealt with it and we understand when GANE says it's difficult to deal with the regulations, These are the regulations we know what they mean. that we have and these are the regulations that we need to deal with.

We believe that you can read everything that's in the regulations to support a bifurcated

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licensing approach. There's nothing that prohibited 1 it and it establishes clearly as a standard for 2 approving construction and a standard for approving 3 operations. True, in --4 Don't get carried away 5 CHAIRMAN MOORE: You used the word clearly. with you advocacy now. 6 Now this morning we were told they're ambiguous. 7 you guys have got to get together over there. 8 MR. FERNANDEZ: Well, Your Honor, I would 9 point to 723(b) and it does set out what we need to 10 I know you're going to refer me back to 11 7222(f) and I'm about to address that. But 7023(b) 12 does set out what the Commission needs to look at when 13 it's approving construction. 14 7022(f) is a roadblock. We recognize that 15 say you need to provide all 16 to We would -- I agree with the information up front. 17 this was amended that 18 applicant that when Commission intended for those particular requirements 19 to apply solely for the purpose of special nuclear 20 materials used in possessed licenses. And that is not 21 what we're litigating today. I mean, the fact that 22 23 the DCS -- go ahead.

> JUDGE KELBER: You believe something is the Commission's intent?

the

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Yes, Your Honor. MR. FERNANDEZ:

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And what is the basis of JUDGE KELBER:

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that belief?

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MR. FERNANDEZ: Well, Your Honor, there is -- unlike GANE, I don't believe that the statements of considerations for the rule are that clear. I believe that just reading the regulations on their face, in tandem, the whole of Part 70, you come out with the having separate Commission's intent of two considerations of operations and licensing. In fact, why would they have two separate standards for considering construction and operations? Well because you would consider them separately. They didn't clearly outline there was going to be a separate licensing proceeding, and we are all wrestling with that issue. But it is clear that they established two separate standards for the two separate issues.

What's clear? Where are JUDGE KELBER: the two separate standards?

MR. FERNANDEZ: Your Honor, if you go to Commission will it approve 723(b). says the Once they have analyzed construction of et cetera. what it says there, then if you go to A-8, it says when the proposed activity is operation of facility, as would happen in the second part of the hearing process, then you have the delineated requirements of what they need to approve.

I mean it's even clear that if they came in with just one application, we may even had to have had a second hearing after that to make sure that they had constructed the facility to the specifications their one license in had set out they So when faced with both of these application. regulatory interpretations, we would urge the Board to go with the interpretation that the staff has done and that the Commission has approved.

Now moving on to some of the other arguments raised by GANE regarding Part 51, the NEPA requirements and the staff. Your Honor, the NEPA requirements and the staff are basically that. National that come from the requirements Those obligations are Environmental Policy Act. separate from the obligations that the agency has with the Atomic Energy Act. Basically we're talking about two documents that are drafted in response to two obligations that the agency has. What GANE is trying to say is that oh, when NEPA was drafted, it basically reinforced or enhanced the Atomic Energy Act to require that you draft a safety evaluation report with the environmental impact statement, and that is not

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correct.

We all know through the NEPA case law that NEPA is a procedural statute, that it has no substantive requirements on the agencies that are implementing that statute, and that when the agency meets the hard look requirement, and it publishes sufficient EIS, it has met its obligations on the National Environmental Policy Act. We would argue that the Board should not allow GANE to piggyback on the Atomic Energy Act to increase the responsibilities that the NRC has under NEPA.

I think we're running out of time and we want to be fair to all the other parties -- the point regarding the unavailability of the hearing file. The regulations are clear that the hearing file should be produced when a hearing is established. That has not happened yet. We believe it may be premature to address that issue.

Even in fact if a hearing were found -- if we found that the petitioners can become parties to a hearing, if there is a hearing, the hearing file only contains the documents that are available at that point, and the rules specifically provide for the staff to supplement the hearing file as new documents

1 become available and do not require any particular documents are available at a particular 2 time. 3 If you don't have any questions, the staff 4 will rest. 5 JUDGE LAM: I have a question for you, Mr. 6 7 Fernandez. Yes, Your Honor. MR. FERNANDEZ: 8 think in the JUDGE LAM: Do you 9 Commission's referral order to us it gave implicit 10 approval to this two-step licensing process, or did it 11 give explicit approval? 12 MR. FERNANDEZ: Your Honor, I think that 13 the Board in it's referral order -- hold on a second. 14 15 I believe they explicitly adopt the statements that they made with regards to the notice of hearing, 16 particularly in pages 7 through 8. They ask -- they 17 direct the presiding offer -- officer to issue an 18 initial decision specifically, quote, on the CAR 19 within approximately two years. 20 The decision is not on whether DCS should 21 have a special nuclear materials license, the decision 22 basically the construction CAR, 23 the authorization, the construction portion of 24 Right now, I cannot -- and also on page 25 proceeding.

1	8, it also delineates the hearing's goal as issuance
2	of an initial decision on the CAR. So it's clear the
3	Commission is aware that there's a two-part proceeding
4	and that it wants to Board to merely stick to the
5	issues raised by the CAR in this proceeding and not
6	issues with regards to the bifurcation of the process.
7	JUDGE LAM: If that being the case, if
8	your interpretation is correct, do you think it would
9	be better for the Commission to decide this motion by
10	GANE?
11	MR. FERNANDEZ: I don't know if it would
12	be better or worse. I know it would be appropriate
13	for the Commission to be the one to decide the issue.
14	JUDGE KELBER: You used the fact that they
15	requested an initial decision, but there have been a
16	number of cases complex cases in which there have
17	been initial decisions given. They don't the ones
18	I'm thinking of do not have about private fuel storage
19	is the case in point. Do not have a bifurcated
20	proceeding.
21	MR. FERNANDEZ: I didn't mean to over
22	emphasize the portion that referred to it being an
23	initial decision. I'm sorry.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Did it ever occur to the
25	staff in looking at this problem in advance, if it was

1 looked at at all, to use the procedure and get a binding interpretation from the general counsel on 2 what this regulation means, and if you didn't consider 3 it, why didn't you consider it? 4 MR. FERNANDEZ: As far as I -- my own 5 personal knowledge is concerned, I'm not aware that 6 staff formally requested an opinion on 7 interpretation of the Part 70 requirements from the 8 general --9 Before you embarked on CHAIRMAN MOORE: 10 this incredibly ambitious approach, why was that not 11 considered when your co-counsel has indicated the 12 regulations are in ambiguous and not clear? 13 MR. FERNANDEZ: Again, Your Honor, I don't 14 I've only been with the agency for a year. I 15 think those decisions were made prior to my arrival. 16 Well unlike you, I've CHAIRMAN MOORE: 17 been here a long time and I've never seen that 18 approach used, and yet I've seen the staff run into a 19 lot of walls in the years I've been here with this 20 very reason, and I just cannot fathom why when this 21 procedure is available, before you embark on something 22 that is inevitably going to cause this kind of a 23 problem, you do not get at the earliest stages such an 24

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interpretation.

1	And I would hope I don't expect, but I
2	would hope that that message will get through, because
3	I frankly find that it is beyond the pale in this day
4	and age that we should be having to wrestle with a
5	problem like this when before you ever embarked on
6	this path it should have been resolved definitively.
7	There being nothing further, the Board
8	will take all of these matters under consideration.
9	MR. MONIAK: Your Honor.
10	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Yes, Mr. Moniak.
11	MR. MONIAK: I was wondering if I could
12	have 30 seconds to offer a comment on the motion. We
13	never submitted any written comments.
14	CHAIRMAN MOORE: I recognize that. The
15	Board what I would like to do though is to hear
16	from you on this morning we left open a couple of
17	matters and you were going to enlighten us on where
18	and you'll have to forgive me for forgetting precisely
19	what we were dealing with can be found.
20	MR. MONIAK: It was the crane the crane
21	issue that was cited in number 10.
22	CHAIRMAN MOORE: That's GANE contention
23	10?
24	MR. MONIAK: Yes. Would you like me to do
25	that first?
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1	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Yes.
2	MR. MONIAK: Okay.
3	MS. CARROLL: Did hear him right? He said
4	GANE's contention 10. This is yours.
5	CHAIRMAN MOORE: I'm sorry. Ten, yeah.
6	MR. MONIAK: Heavy lift cranes, I have a
7	copy of this.
8	CHAIRMAN MOORE: You can do this
9	MR. MONIAK: Yes, I know I can do this
10	sitting down, but it's been a long day. I think
11	better on my feet.
12	Contention 10 regarding heavy lift cranes.
13	I want to cite the citation. It's Section 1110 of the
14	Construction Authorization Request, page 11.101. The
15	heavy lift crane it states the heavy lift cranes
16	that handle critical loads must retain their load
17	during normal operation design basis accidents and
18	design basis natural phenomenon events. The paragraph
19	above it says heavy lift cranes in the MOX facility
20	designed to safely and reliably hoist critical or non-
21	critical loads that weigh in excess of 1,800 pounds
22	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Is that an exhibit to
23	your contentions?
24	MR. MONIAK: Well it's in the CAR.
25	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Okay.

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1	MR. MONIAK: I just didn't have this in
2	front of me.
3	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Fine.
4	MR. MONIAK: Critical loads are defined as
5	those
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: It's in the CAR and we'll
7	be able
8	MR. MONIAK: Oh, okay, okay.
9	CHAIRMAN MOORE: I just wanted the
10	citation.
11	MR. MONIAK: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Now what's the second
13	matter you have?
14	MR. MONIAK: Under on the second page
15	of this it just says there are no principal SSCs
16	associated with the system, in spite of the fact that
17	
18	JUDGE KELBER: Are you still talking about
19	the crane?
20	MR. MONIAK: The crane, yes.
21	JUDGE KELBER: No, we'll read that
22	ourselves. You gave us the reference and that's fine.
23	MR. MONIAK: Okay, great.
24	The other issue I wanted to address, it
25	was not really in our contentions, is relating to the

1	contract. There was a when earlier about what was in
2	it. I have it here
3	CHAIRMAN MOORE: It wasn't submitted as an
4	exhibit to any of
5	MR. MONIAK: No.
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Then it is not before us
7	for consideration as part of the contention.
8	MR. MONIAK: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN MOORE: So that
10	MR. MONIAK: I was wondering if I could
11	have 30 seconds to address this?
12	CHAIRMAN MOORE: No.
13	MR. MONIAK: Okay, thanks.
14	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Now we have a couple of
15	housekeeping matters. Ms. Carroll, you have one.
16	MS. CARROLL: Well something kind of weird
17	happened last week. I came back from being out of
18	town and I had an order from DCS or whatever, their
19	response to our contention, and a PDF file. I sent
20	the PDF file to Diane and it was so big her computer
21	couldn't open it and I asked for a copy of it in Word
22	and they said no, we're not going to serve in Word
23	anymore. It just seems petty and weird to me. The
24	PDF files are bigger and harder to open. I actually
25	haven't done the work to look at your order. I

1	thought you specified Word Perfect.
2	CHAIRMAN MOORE: In a word, you're being
3	served by electronic mail with PDF files as opposed to
4	something
5	MS. CARROLL: A word processing document.
6	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Word or Word Perfect that
7	you were previously getting, is that correct?
8	MS. CARROLL: That's true.
9	CHAIRMAN MOORE: By whom?
10	MS. CARROLL: By the applicant.
11	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Applicant, is that the
12	case, and if so, why can't you use Word or something
13	else that they can handle?
14	MR. POLONSKY: That is the case. We have
15	decided and initially had made a decision to file by
16	PDF files. The order requires electronic filing.
17	GANE clearly can open it themselves as she's
18	indicated.
19	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Do you have the
20	capability of sending it in Word or Word Perfect?
21	MR. POLONSKY: We do, but for security
22	reasons we discontinued that practice of filing.
23	MS. CARROLL: These are public documents.
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Ms. Carroll, I've heard
25	your argument.

2 MR. POLONSKY: Yes, we are now, and we had There was a lapse. I can explain in the beginning. 3 if it will make more sense. A PDF file is in essence 4 5 an image of the document. CHAIRMAN MOORE: I recognize that. 6 MR. POLONSKY: A Word document has many 7 hidden characteristics that can be tweaked from the 8 background of a document and there are various 9 functions that we don't want anyone to be able to 10 identify that could be identified if the document were 11 accessible via Word or Word Perfect. So we're no 12 longer serving documents in Word or Word Perfect. 13 would be happy to fax it or -- I mean clearly Glenn 14 Carroll is capable of printing it herself and faxing 15 it to her legal counsel. We have, we think, met our 16 obligation to file it electronically and in a timely 17 manner and GANE has indicated they can access that 18 19 document. And you're treating CHAIRMAN MOORE: 20 everyone the same way? 21 Yes, everyone is being MR. POLONSKY: 22 served identically except for EI, of course. 23 CHAIRMAN MOORE: Well since there'll be no 24 more filings necessary until the Board has spoken on 25

Are you filing things PDF with us?

1	the matters before us, there's nothing in that regard
2	that needs to be decided today.
3	Are there any other housekeeping matters?
4	MS. CARROLL: I'd like to point out one
5	thing in case it's not obvious to you. A PDF file,
6	you cannot copy and paste any of the words. Anything
7	you want to recite you'll have to retype. So I would
8	say that's our main objection, besides it being large,
9	and I'll have to have another computer, you know.
10	CHAIRMAN MOORE: We need not decide that
11	at this moment.
12	MR. POLONSKY: That's not a factual
13	statement either. You can cut and paste.
14	MR. MONIAK: It depends. Actually it
15	depends on how it was
16	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Hearing no other matters
17	to be brought before us
18	MR. MONIAK: I have one point that I would
19	like to make regarding timeliness. We were like two
20	or three hours late in submitting our contentions. I
21	didn't anticipate anybody would be waiting on the
22	other end at two in the morning timing us. I want to
23	point out that we never
24	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Mr. Moniak
25	MR. MONIAK: received copies of the DCS

2	CHAIRMAN MOORE: there's an old adage
3	MR. MONIAK: Yes.
4	CHAIRMAN MOORE: that if you haven't
5	stepped in a bear trap, don't go looking for it.
6	MR. MONIAK: Okay. I want to point out
7	though that DCS has not provided
8	CHAIRMAN MOORE: Excuse me. The applicant
9	did not raise the issue and object to your filing.
10	MR. MONIAK: Okay, you're right. I'll
11	pass.
12	CHAIRMAN MOORE: So they have essentially
13	waived their objection for this round.
14	MR. MONIAK: Okay.
15	CHAIRMAN MOORE: I would caution you in
16	the future
17	MR. MONIAK: I will take that caution
18	CHAIRMAN MOORE: that they may no
19	longer be willing to do that.
20	MR. MONIAK: Okay.
21	MR. SILVERMAN: I would just like in
22	response to a question by Judge Kelber regarding
23	target reliability for INC systems refer you to an RAI
24	answer, if I may.

JUDGE KELBER: Sure.

MR. SILVERMAN: CAR RAI number 39. 1 CHAIRMAN MOORE: There being no other 2 3 matters before us at this time, we'll take all of this under advisement in determining the standing and the 4 admissibility of the contentions. 5 Once the Board rules there will be an immediate telephone conference 6 to deal with discovery and lay down the procedures for 7 If there's nothing further, we're 8 doing that. adjourned. 9 (Whereupon, the above matter was concluded 10 11 at 5:23 p.m.) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

#### **CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Duke Cogema Stone & Webster

Docket Number:

70-3098-ML

ASLBP Number:

01-790-01-ML

Location:

North Augusta, Georgia

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

William L. Warren

Official Reporter
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