



Entergy Nuclear Northeast
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
James A. Fitzpatrick NPP
P.O. Box 110
Lycoming, NY 13093
Tel 315 349 6024 Fax 315 349 6480

T.A. Sullivan
Vice President, Operations-JAF

September 26, 2001
JAFP-01-0226

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Stop O-P1-17
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: **Docket No. 50-333**
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: LER-00-015-01 (DER-00-05158)

Containment Leakage Rate Exceeds Authorized Limits

Dear Sir:

Revision 0 of this report was submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (ii), "Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded."


Revision 1 of this report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v), "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material," as well as 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii).

Revision 1 of this report revises the status of corrective actions, identifies the cause and corrective actions for Refuel Outage 14 LLRT failures that significantly contributed to Primary Containment leakage, and discusses the potential dose consequences due to this event.

There are no commitments contained in this report.

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. Timothy Page at (315) 349-6209.

Very truly yours,



T. A. SULLIVAN

TAS:TP:las
Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region 1
USNRC, Project Directorate
USNRC Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

IE22

FACILITY NAME (1) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000333 PAGE (3) 1 OF 6

TITLE (4) Containment Leakage Rate Exceeds Authorized Limits

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	18	00	00	015	01	09	26	01	N/A	05000
									N/A	05000

OPERATING	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)				
		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER	0	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: Mr. Timothy Page, Sr. Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code): 315-349-6209

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
X	SB	ISV	E095	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO

EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 18, 2000, following completion of Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) of valves 29AOV-80D (inboard) and 29AOV-86D (outboard) Main Steam System isolation valves (MSIVs), it was determined that the Primary Containment Type B and Type C as-found running total minimum-pathway leakage rate had exceeded the maximum allowable limit of 320 standard liters per minute (SLM) specified in Technical Specifications (TS) Section 6.20. When leak tested in combination (applied test pressure between the inboard and outboard MSIV), test results demonstrated seat leakage in excess of 320 SLM. At the time of the testing, the mode switch was in the REFUEL position while the plant was conducting Refuel Outage 14.

The excessive leakage rate of inboard MSIV 29AOV-80D was attributed to valve disc to seat misalignment. The excessive leakage rate of outboard MSIV 29AOV-86D was attributed to seat scoring in the valve seat area caused by debris travelling across the seating surfaces, driven either by fluid motion over the seat or by valve disc motion.

The failed valves were repaired and retested satisfactorily prior to plant startup. An equipment failure evaluation was performed for the valves that failed testing. An operability review was performed to support operation through the remainder of the operating cycle. Additional outage controls and modifications are being planned to enhance MSIV performance and test accuracy.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2	OF 6
		00	015	01		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EIIS Codes in []

Event Description

The plant entered Refuel Outage 14 on October 6, 2000. Type C Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) activities on the Primary Containment [NH] penetrations and isolation valves commenced shortly after plant cooldown in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Section 6.20, "Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program". On October 18, 2000, following completion of LLRTs of the Main Steam System [SB] Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 29AOV-80D (inboard) and 29AOV-86D (outboard), it was determined that the Primary Containment Type B and Type C as-found running total minimum pathway leakage rate had exceeded the maximum allowable limit of 320 standard liters per minute (SLM) specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). When leak tested, test results demonstrated gross seat leakage.

TS Section 6.20.A requires that peak Primary Containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident (Pa) is 45 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). The maximum allowable Primary Containment leakage rate (La) at Pa shall be 1.5 percent of Primary Containment air weight per day. The maximum TS allowable leakage per day equates to 320 standard liters per minute (SLM).

Test methods for the combined test of the MSIVs requires that pressure be applied between the inboard MSIV and the outboard MSIV. For the individual test of outboard valve 29AOV-86D, the Main Steam Line upstream of inboard MSIV is filled with water. During the fill evolution, excessive water leakage occurred past the valve seat of 29AOV-80D. Due to this excessive leakage through inboard MSIV, the "D" inboard MSIV was classified as having gross leakage. Inboard valve leakage was due to the inboard valve disc assembly not being properly aligned with the valve seat.

After draining the inboard Main Steam Line, combined testing of the inboard and outboard MSIVs indicated leakage exceeding the ability of the test equipment to achieve test pressure. The test volume could not be pressurized by the leak rate monitor, which has a 400 SLM maximum flow rate. Leakage observed at vents located upstream of the inboard valve and downstream of the outboard valve indicated excess leakage through both valves. This resulted in declaring the outboard valve as having gross seat leakage. Combined leakage of the inboard and outboard MSIVs was in excess of 400 SLM.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3	OF 6
		00	015	01		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Cause of Event

The excessive leakage rate of inboard MSIV 29AOV-80D was attributed to valve disc to seat misalignment. The excessive leakage rate of outboard MSIV 29AOV-86D was attributed to seat scoring in the valve seat area caused by debris travelling across the seating surfaces, driven either by fluid motion over the seat or by valve disc motion. When the valve was opened, no foreign material was found, therefore, the specific time of occurrence and mechanism could not be verified.

Previous valve failure evaluations identified the need for valve modifications/enhancements, due in part to LLRT methodology and valve orientation. Improvements to valves 29AOV-80D and 29AOV-86D are identified in the corrective actions. The cause and corrective actions for LLRT failures that significantly contributed to Primary Containment leakage during Refuel Outage 14 are identified in Table 1 of this report.

Analysis of the Event

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), "Any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded," and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v), "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material."

The Primary Containment System has the capability to limit leakage during any of the postulated design basis accidents for which it is assumed to be functional such that offsite doses do not exceed the guideline values set forth in 10 CFR 100. Compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J provides assurance that the Primary Containment including those systems which penetrate the Primary Containment do not exceed the allowable leakage rate specified in the TS.

Immediate actions were not required as the plant was in a shutdown condition and Work Orders were already in place to repair the valves. All MSIVs that exceeded the TS leak rate limit were rebuilt and successfully tested prior to startup from the Refuel Outage.

An upper bound on the leak rate through 29AOV-80D and 29AOV-86D could not be determined since the leakage was beyond the capacity of the test equipment; therefore the potential dose consequences of this event could not be precisely quantified. A level 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment was conducted to quantify/evaluate the safety significance of this event. This analysis determined that the change to Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) relative to the base case was 9.82 E-8 per reactor year. Therefore, this event is considered to have a low safety significance.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	4	OF 6
		00	015	01		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Extent of Condition

At the conclusion of LLRTs, it was identified that as-found leakage rates for MSIVs 29AOV-80B, 29AOV-86B and 29AOV-86C had exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS Section 4.7.A.2.b, Surveillance Requirements, "Primary Containment") leakage rate acceptance criteria of ≤ 11.5 scfh (5.422 SLM) per valve when tested at ≥ 25 psig. Therefore, valves 29AOV-80B and 29AOV-86B were also considered significant contributors to exceeding the maximum allowable Primary Containment leakage rate (La) of 320 SLM.

Other LLRT failures were evaluated. No additional penetration failures were identified during Refuel Outage 14 that significantly contributed to Primary Containment leakage.

Corrective Actions

1. Work Requests (WRs) were generated and repair activities were completed on MSIVs 29AOV-80B, 29AOV-80D, 29AOV-86B, 29AOV-86C and 29AOV-86D. Additionally, modification work, consisting of MSIV improvements/enhancements, based on previous valve failure evaluations and valve vendor recommendations, were completed on the following MSIVs:
 - 29AOV-80D - Installation of guide pads to the valve body to control valve disc to valve body clearance and improve valve disc to seat alignment, and installation of a new ring/spacer configuration to aid in improving stem alignment and reduce stem galling.
 - 29AOV-86D - Installation of hardened washers on valve bonnet to reduce torque transfer losses and eliminate bonnet leakage, installation of hardened washers on both ends of the live load spring to reduce torque losses for added packing pressure for better control of packing leakage, and installation of a new ring/spacer configuration to reduce stem galling. Additionally, a rebuilt/certified actuator was installed and the spring pack between the actuator and valve was replaced with new yoke guides and bronze bushings to reduce closing friction loads. The valve seat was refurbished.
2. An operability review was performed to support operation through the remainder of the operating cycle, given the previous MSIV performance history and repair activities. This conclusion was supported by an independent evaluation performed by the NSSS vendor.
3. Outage controls will be implemented to assure that the shutdown and as-found LLRT plan are followed. This will minimize the probability of failures, such as that for 29AOV-80B, which resulted from water being washed over the valve seat. **(Scheduled to be Completed Prior to Shutdown for RO15)**
4. Additional modifications are planned for specific MSIVs to enhance performance (29AOV-80A, 29AOV-80C, 29AOV-86A, 29AOV-86B, 29AOV-86C). These modifications will be performed during RO15. **(Scheduled to be Completed Before Startup from RO15)**

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	5	OF 6
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	00	015	01		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Additional Information (cont'd)

A. Previous Similar Events:

LER 98-013 and LER 96-012 reported Primary Containment accumulated leakage in excess of maximum allowed by the TS.

B. Failed Components:

Component: 29AOV-80B, 80D, 86B, 86C, and 86D
Main Steam Line Inboard and Outboard
Main Steam Isolation Valves
Manufacturer: Edward Valves, Inc.
Model: 1612 JMMNY
Type: 1250 psi, 24 inch, Globe (flite-flow)

C. Applicability to NEI 99-02, Rev. 0, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline."

This event is considered a safety system functional failure in the context of NEI 99-02, Rev. 0.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	05000333	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	6 OF 6
		00	015	01	

Table 1 - Corrective Actions Scheduled for Future Refuel Outage

Component	Effect	Failure Mode	Failure Mechanism (see notes below)	Additional Corrective Action
29AOV-80B	Internal Leakage	Loss of Sealing Integrity	Improper Operation, Particle Accumulation	No further action required (RO 14 corrective action is considered effective)
29AOV-80D	Internal Leakage	Loss of Sealing Integrity	Out of Alignment	
29AOV-86D	Internal Leakage	Loss of Sealing Integrity	Scored Seat	No RO 15 actions needed (failure mechanism not previously observed); also see RO 14 corrective actions taken
29AOV-86B	External Leakage	Loss of Pre-load (Packing)	Improper Design, Improper Assembly, Mechanical Cycling	Replace disc stem, disc as needed, and change stellite junk ring to carbon steel junk ring spacer (RO 15)
29AOV-86C	External Leakage	Loss of Pre-load (Packing)	Improper Design, Improper Assembly, Mechanical Cycling	

Notes:

Improper Operation: Valve was cycled open prior to completing LLRT, causing particulate laden water to wash over the valve seat due to the abnormal system line-up.

Particle Accumulation: Particles on the seating surfaces prevented full metal to metal contact, thereby causing an air test failure.

Out of Alignment: Caused by valve being in a 30 degree off vertical position in conjunction with original hardware; actuator and spring force insufficient to ensure full metal to metal contact in seating surfaces without additional guiding.

Scored Seat: Caused by debris travelling across seating surfaces, driven either by fluid motion over seat or by valve disc motion. Further analysis was not performed, as the material that scored the seat was not found when the valve was disassembled. This type of failure has not been previously observed.

Improper Design: Stem is guided at packing gland junk ring (stellite interface with 17-4 pH stainless steel stem); cycling the valve over time causes scoring, which removes packing material and reduces packing preload; the increased scoring can lead to galling.

Improper Assembly: Involved the sequencing of the packing replacement. An upgraded sequence has been developed.

Mechanical Cycling: With stem scoring and low packing pre-load, mechanical cycling provided the sliding force needed to degrade the packing pre-load to a failure condition.