

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

- a. A boric acid storage system with:
 1. A minimum contained volume of 5000 gallons,
 2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and
 3. A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.
- b. The refueling water storage tank with:
 1. A minimum contained volume of 175,000 gallons,
 2. A minimum boron concentration of 2400 ppm, and
 3. A minimum solution temperature of 45°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.7 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
 1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,
 2. Verifying the water level of the tank, and
 3. Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside ambient air temperature is <45°F.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.8 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2.

- a. A boric acid storage system with:
 1. A minimum contained volume of 11,336 gallons,
 2. Between 7000 and 7700 ppm of boron, and
 3. A minimum solution temperature of 65°F.
- b. The refueling water storage tank with:
 1. A contained volume between 439,050 gallons and 441,100 gallons of borated water,
 2. A boron concentration between 2400 and 2600 ppm, and
 3. A solution temperature of $\geq 45^{\circ}\text{F}$ and $\leq 55^{\circ}\text{F}$.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 & 4.

ACTION:

- a. With the boric acid storage system inoperable, restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore the boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.
- b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.8 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

- 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. The isolation valve open,
 - b. Between 7664 and 7816 gallons of borated water,
 - c. Between 2300 and 2600 ppm of boron, and
 - d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 605 and 661 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.*

ACTION:

- a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.5.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 12 hours by:
 1. Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
 2. Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

* Pressurizer Pressure above 1000 psig.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM - BORON INJECTION TANK \geq 350°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4.1.1 The boron injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

- * a. A minimum contained volume of 900 gallons of borated water,
- +* b. Between 2400 and 2600 ppm of boron.
 - * 1 hour deviation is permitted to correct the out of specification condition.
 - + To permit adequate recirculation and sampling following actions taken to correct the boron concentration, 4 hours is allowed for verification of the sample results providing corrective action was taken within the first hour.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3.

ACTION:

With the boron injection tank inoperable, be in HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore the tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4.1.1 The boron injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Verifying the water level in the surge tank at least once per 7 days.
- b. Verifying the boron concentration of the water in the surge tank at least once per 7 days.

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 With the reactor vessel head unbolted or removed, the boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met:

- a. Either a K_{eff} of 0.95 or less, which includes a 1% $\Delta k/k$ conservative allowance for uncertainties, or
- b. A boron concentration of ≥ 2400 ppm, which includes a 50 ppm conservative allowance for uncertainties.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6*.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at ≥ 30 gpm of 7000 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until K_{eff} is reduced to ≤ 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to ≥ 2400 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

- a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and
- b. Withdrawal of any full length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the reactor coolant system and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least 3 times per 7 days with a maximum time interval between samples of 72 hours.

* The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum boration capability requirements occur at BOL from full power peak xenon conditions and requires 11,336 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 65,000 gallons of 2400 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

With the RCS temperature below 200°F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boration capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% $\Delta k/k$ after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either 5000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 175,000 gallons of 2400 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the movable control assemblies is established by observing rod motion and determining that rods are positioned within ± 12 steps (indicated position), of the respective group demand counter position. The OPERABILITY of the rod position indication system is established by appropriate periodic CHANNEL CHECKS, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS and CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod position and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. The OPERABLE condition for the analog rod position indicators is defined as being capable of indicating rod position within ± 12 steps of the associated group demand indicator. For power levels below 50 percent, the specifications of this section permit a one hour stabilization period to permit stabilization of known thermal drift in the analog rod position indicator channels. During this stabilization period, greater reliance is placed upon the group demand position indicators to determine rod position. Above 50 percent power, rod motion is not expected to induce thermal transients of sufficient magnitude to exceed the rod position indicator instrument accuracy of ± 12 steps. Limited use of rod position indication primary detector voltages is allowed as a backup method of determining control rod positions. Comparison of the group demand indicator to the calibration curve is sufficient to allow determination that a control rod is indeed misaligned from its bank when primary voltage measurements are used. Comparison of the group demand counters to the bank insertion limits with verification of rod position with the analog rod

BASES

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to limit any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The boron injection tank is required to be isolated when RCS temperature is \leq the enable temperature set forth in Specification 3.4.9.3 to prevent a potential overpressurization due to an inadvertent safety injection signal.

The analysis of a main steam pipe rupture is performed to demonstrate that the following criteria are satisfied:

1. Assuming a stuck rod cluster control assembly, with or without offsite power, and assuming a single failure in the engineered safeguards, there is no consequential damage to the primary system and the core remains in place and intact.
2. Energy release to containment from the worst steam pipe break does not cause failure of the containment structure.
3. Radiation doses are not expected to exceed the guidelines of the 10 CFR 100.

The limits on injection tank minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met.

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2400 ppm) ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The Limitation of K_{eff} of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for uncertainties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core when performing those evolutions with the potential to initiate criticality. Suitable detectors used in place of primary source range neutron flux monitors N-31 and N-32 are recognized as alternate detectors. Alternate detectors may be used in place of primary source range neutron flux monitors as long as the required indication is provided. Since installation of the upper internals does not involve movement of fuel or a significant positive reactivity addition to the core, one primary or alternate source range neutron flux monitor with continuous visual indication in the control room provides adequate neutron flux monitoring capability during this evolution.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The LCO is applicable during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies and during movement of fuel assemblies over recently irradiated fuel assemblies because there is a potential for the limiting fuel handling accident (FHA) to occur. Therefore, the requirements of this Specification may be required to limit leakage of radioactive material within the containment to the environment. A FHA which does not involve recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 100 hours) will result in radiation exposures that are within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 50.67 without any reliance on