

March 8, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager
Project Directorate 2
Division of Licensing and Project Management


FROM: F. Mark Reinhart, Section Chief */RA/*
Licensing Section
Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch
Division of Systems Safety and Analysis

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST, "STEAM
GENERATOR REPLACEMENT," AND "POWER UPRATE" FOR
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
(TAC NOS. MB0199 AND MB0782)

The Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch (SPSB) has determined that it needs additional information to the above subject technical specification change request. The request for additional information is attached. The SPSB reviewers are Jay Lee and Leta Brown.

CONTACTS: Leta Brown, SPSB/DSSA
415-1232

Jay Lee, SPSB/DSSA
415-1080



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**REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FOR
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT**

- References: (1) Carolina Power and Light Company letter to the NRC dated December 14, 2000, titled "Power Uprate."
- (2) Carolina Power and Light Company letter to the NRC dated October 4, 2000, titled "Steam Generator Replacement."
- (3) Carolina Power and Light Company, Harris Nuclear Plant Calculation Sheet, HNP-F/NFSA-0072, titled "SGRP/POWER UPRATE PROJECT," dated August 28, 2000.

1 Large-Break Loss-Of-Coolant (LOCA)

In Table 2.22-10 of Appendix A to Reference 1, you have provided the major assumptions and parameters used for the radiological consequence analysis for the large-break LOCA. Provide the following additional information:

- Termination time of containment spray injection.
- Beginning time of containment spray recirculation phase.
- Termination time of containment spray recirculation phase.
- Time to reach elemental iodine decontamination factor of 100.
- Time to reach particulate iodine decontamination factor of 50.
- Explain how you obtained a containment atmosphere mixing rate of 1.60 between the sprayed and unsprayed regions.
- Provide technical basis for assuming flashing fraction of 2 percent for the emergency core coolant system (ECCS) leakage. A constant enthalpy method should be used to determine the flashing fractions.

2 Steamline Break Accident

- In Table 2.22-1 of Attachment A Reference 1, you have provided an iodine protection factor of 51.1 using 45 cfm unfiltered air inleakage rate into the control room while reference 3 showed the iodine protection factor of 81.8. State the unfiltered air inleakage rate used in Reference 3 and explain the discrepancy.
- Provide delay times (if applicable) in control room isolation after an isolation signal is generated. Explain how you obtained the control room operator thyroid doses in reference 3 for (1) initial blowdown of secondary coolant, (2) pre-existing iodine spike

case, and (3) accident initiated iodine spike case. Did you use the ratios of the atmospheric dispersion factors between exclusion area boundary (EAB) and control room adjusting with the EAB dose and the iodine protection factor?

3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident

In Section 6.3.2 Reference 2, you have provided the major assumptions and parameters used for the radiological consequence analysis for the steam generator tube rupture accident. Provide the following additional information.

For pre-existing iodine spike

- Iodine activity released (Ci) to the environment through flashed break flow from ruptured steam generator with iodine partition factor of 1.0.
- Iodine activity released (Ci) to the atmosphere from ruptured steam generator and intact steam generators over 0 to 2 hours and 2 to 8 hours with iodine partition factor of 100.

For accident-initiated iodine spike

- Iodine activity released (Ci) to the environment through flashed break flow from ruptured steam generator with iodine partition factor of 1.0.
- Iodine activity released (Ci) to the atmosphere from ruptured steam generator and intact steam generators over 0 to 2 hours and 2 to 8 hours with iodine partition factor of 100.
- Post-trip average primary coolant iodine concentrations for 0 to 2 hour and 2 to 8 hour durations.

4 Control Rod Ejection Accident

In Table 2.22-7 of Appendix A to Reference 1, you have provided the major assumptions and parameters used for the radiological consequence analyses for the control rod ejection accident. In the table, you stated that you assumed a credit for fission product removal by the containment spray. State what initiated the containment spray and describe its operation.

5 Meteorology

As a result of the February 22, 2001, meeting on the Harris alternate source term analysis, it is the staff's understanding that either 1) one set of relative concentration (X/Q) values for control room dose calculations is considered to be the design basis input for all of the Harris design basis accident dose assessments or 2) because this set is associated with the design basis accident currently resulting in the highest estimated dose, other X/Q values do not need to be considered. If this is correct, confirm and discuss why this single set of X/Q values is adequate (e.g., they bound the X/Q values for all of the other accidents). If the set of X/Q values is not bounding for all accidents, then for all sets not bounded, provide the X/Q values, and the methodology, inputs, and assumptions used to calculate the other X/Q values. In addition, list the accidents for which each set applies, as well as the postulated release location/receptor pairs. A figure would be helpful in understanding the physical relationship of the release locations and receptor pairs with

respect to heights, distances, directions, and plant structures.

During the meeting, two relatively recent license amendments were discussed. Both Amendment 88 and 97 relate to fuel-handling dose assessments. In both safety evaluations, the staff agreed with the licensee's finding that the fuel-handling dose to control room personnel was bounded by the dose for the LOCA. In the case of Amendment 97, staff concluded that the acceptability applied for Outage 9 and Operating Cycle 10. Other design-basis accidents were not considered and acceptability was discussed in terms of dose. X/Q values are a function of release location/receptor pairing that may be a function of accident. The highest X/Q values are not necessarily associated with the highest dose since dose is also a function of other inputs that may vary as a function of accident and, for a given accident, change over time with changes in assumptions related to plant design and/or operation. While Amendments 88 and 97 may provide some useful information, additional justification is needed for X/Q values for other release location/receptor pairings and other accidents.