

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DO NOT REMOVE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

June 29, 1989

Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

Mr. W. R. Cartwright
Vice President - Nuclear
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen. Virginia 23060

Dear Mr. Cartwright:

SUBJECT: SURRY UNITS 1 AND 2 - CORRECTIONS TO AMENDMENT NOS. 128 AND 128 AND AMENDMENT NOS. 130 AND 130 (TAC NOS. 56910, 56911, 72811 AND 72812)

On May 24, 1989, the Commission issued Amendment Nos. 128 and 128 for the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. These amendments removed obsolete inservice inspection and testing requirements and replaced them with more up-to-date NRC-approved requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.55a(g). Also, Amendment Nos. 130 and 130 were issued for the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 on June 9, 1989. These amendments revised the Technical Specifications (TS) relating to the canal level, canal safety-related actuation instrumentation and the emergency service water pumps. Recently you informed us of administrative errors in these amendments.

In Amendment Nos. 128 and 128, page TS 4.5-1 contained a footnote which required that the inside containment recirculation spray pump be dry tested at least once a month. However, this footnote should have been deleted. Also, the attachment to the amendments which provided the instructions for removing and inserting the new TS pages should have noted that pages TS 4.2-8 through TS 4.2-35 should have been removed from the Surry TS as well as pages TS 4.11-3 and TS 4.11-4. The corrected page TS 4.5-1 and the attachment page are enclosed.

In addition, Amendment Nos. 130 and 130 contained an administrative error on page TS 3.7-9b. The paragraph concerning the Control Room Chlorine Detection System was previously deleted in Amendment Nos. 124 and 124, and therefore should not have been included. Table 4.1-1 also contained a reference to the Control Room Chlorine Detection System which should have been deleted.

Finally, the attachment to the amendments incorrectly instructed you to remove page TS 4.1-8aa. However, since TS 4.1-8aa was a new page to be added, there was no page to remove. The corrected page TS 3.7-9b, Table 4.1-1 and the attachment page are also enclosed.

We apologize for any inconvenience these errors may have caused.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Bart C. Buckley, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects-I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures: As stated

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 128 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32 AMENDMENT NO. 128 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37

DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
TS 111	TS 11
TS 3.1-4	TS 3.1-4
TS 3.6-1	TS 3.6-1
TS 3.6-2	TS 3.6-2
•••	TS 3.6-7
TS 4.0-1	TS 4.0-1
	TS 4.0-2
	TS 4.0-3
	TS 4.0-4
TS 4.1-9b	TS 4.1-9b
TS 4.1-11	TS 4.1-11 TS 4.1-12
TS 4.1-12 TS 4.2-1	TS 4.2-1
TS 4.2-2	TS 4.2-2
TS 4.2-3	TS 4.2-3
TS 4.2-4	TS 4.2-4
TS 4.2-5	TS 4.2-5
TS 4.2-6	TS 4.2-6
TŞ 4.2-7	TS 4.2-7
TS 4.2-8 through TS 4.2-3	
TS 4.3-1	TS 4.3-1
TS 4.3-2	TS 4.3-2
TS 4.3-3	TS 4.3-3
TS 4.3-4	70 A E 1
TS 4.5-1 TS 4.5-2	TS 4.5-1 TS 4.5-2
TS 4.5-3	TS 4.5-3
TS 4.5-4	TS 4.5-4
TS 4.5-5	
TS 4.5-6	
TS 4.11-1	TS 4.11-1
TS 4.11-2	TS 4.11-2
TS 4.11-3	
TS 4.11-4	

4.5 SPRAY SYSTEMS TESTS

<u>Applicability</u>

Applies to the testing of the Spray Systems.

Objective

To verify that the Spray Systems will respond promptly and perform their design function, if required.

Specification

- A. Each containment spray subsystem shall be demonstrated operable:
 - 1. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each containment spray pump performs satisfactorily when tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.3.
 - 2. By verifying that each motor-operated valve in the containment spray flow path performs satisfactorily when tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.3.
 - 3. At least once per 5 years, coincident with the closest refueling outage, by performing an air or smoke flow test and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.
 - 4. Coincident with the containment spray pump test described in Specification 4.5.A.1, by verifying that no particulate material clogs the test spray nozzles in the refueling water storage tank.
- B. Each recirculation spray subsystem shall be demonstrated operable:
 - 1. By verifying each recirculation spray pump performs satisfactorily when tested in accordance with Specification 4.0.3.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 130 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32

AMENDMENT NO. 130 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37

DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Page	<u>es</u> /	<u>Insert Pages</u>
TS 3.7-9b TS 3.7-16 TS 3.7-19 TS 3.14-1 TS 3.14-2 TS 3.14-3 TS 3.14-4 TS 4.1-8a TS 4.1-8a TS 4.1-9c		TS 3.7-9b TS 3.7-16 TS 3.7-19 TS 3.14-1 TS 3.14-2 TS 3.14-3 TS 3.14-4 TS 4.1-8a TS 4.1-8a TS 4.1-9c
		15 4.1-36

control room.

The supply lines installed from the containment penetrations to the hydrogen analyzers have Category I Class IE heat tracing applied. The heat tracing system receives the same transferable emergency power as is provided to the containment hydrogen analyzers. The heat trace system is de-energized during normal system operation. Upon receipt of a safety injection signal (Train A or Train B), the system is automatically started, after a preset time delay, to bring the piping process temperature to $250\,^{\circ}\text{F} \pm 10\,^{\circ}\text{F}$ within 20 minutes. Each heat trace circuit is equipped with an RTD to provide individual circuit readout, over temperature alarm and cycles the circuit to maintain the process temperatures via the solid state control modules.

The hydrogen analyzer heat trace system is equipped with high temperature, loss of D.C. power, loss of A.C. power, loss of control power and failure of automatic initiation alarms.

Control Room Chlorine Detection System

The operability of the chlorine detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly detect and automatically initiate protective action in the event of an accidental chlorine release. This capability is required to protect control room personnel, and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.

Non-Essential Service Water Isolation System

The operability of this functional system ensures that adequate intake canal inventory can be maintained by the emergency service water pumps. Adequate intake canal inventory provides design service water flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers and other essential loads (e.g., control room area chillers, charging pump lube oil coolers) following a design basis loss of coolant accident with a coincident loss of offsite power. This system is common to both units in that each of the two trains will actuate equipment on each unit.

TABLE 4.1-1 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECK, CALIBRATIONS, AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHANNELS

	Channel Description	<u>Check</u>	<u>Calibrate</u>	<u>Test</u>	Remarks
33.	Loss of Power				
	a. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under- voltage (Loss of Voltage)	N.A.	R	M	
	b. 4.16 KV Emergency Bus Under- voltage (Degraded Voltage)	N.A.	R	M	
34.	Control Room Chlorine Detectors	s.	R	М	
35.	Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	R	The test shall independently verify the operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments for the manual reactor trip function. The test shall also verify the opera- bility of the bypass breaker trip circuit.
36.	Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker	N.A.	N.A.	M(1), R(2)	 Local manual undervoltage trip prior to placing breaker in service.
					(2) Automatic shunt trip.
37.	Safety Injection Input from ESF	N.A.	N.A.	R	
38.	Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip	N.A.	N.A.	R	