

October 9, 2001

Mr. C. Lance Terry  
Senior Vice President  
& Principal Nuclear Officer  
TXU Electric  
Attn: Regulatory Affairs Department  
P. O. Box 1002  
Glen Rose, TX 76043

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES), UNITS 1 AND 2 -  
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: EXTENDED OUTAGE TIME FOR OFF-  
SITE POWER - SINGLE OCCURRENCE (TAC NOS. MB1823 AND MB1824)

Dear Mr. Terry:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 88 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 and Amendment No. 88 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 for CPSES, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated April 25, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 31 and August 23, 2001.

The amendments change the TS to allow a one-time only change to TS 3.8.1, "AC [Alternating Current] Sources - Operating," Action A.3, by extending the required Completion Time for restoration of an inoperable offsite circuit from 72 hours to 21 days.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

David H. Jaffe, Senior Project Manager, Section 1  
Project Directorate IV  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 88 to NPF-87  
2. Amendment No. 88 to NPF-89  
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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The amendments change the TS to allow a one-time only change to TS 3.8.1, "AC [Alternating Current] Sources - Operating," Action A.3, by extending the required Completion Time for restoration of an inoperable offsite circuit from 72 hours to 21 days.

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Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station

cc:

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TXU ELECTRIC

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-445

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 88  
License No. NPF-87

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by TXU Electric dated April 25, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 31 and August 23, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 88, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. TXU Electric shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than February 28, 2002.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1  
Project Directorate IV  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 9, 2001

TXU ELECTRIC

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-446

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 88  
License No. NPF-89

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by TXU Electric dated April 25, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 31 and August 23, 2001, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 88 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. TXU Electric shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented no later than February 28, 2002.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Robert A. Gramm, Chief, Section 1  
Project Directorate IV  
Division of Licensing Project Management  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: October 9, 2001

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 88

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87

AND AMENDMENT NO. 88

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-89

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove

Insert

3.8-2

3.8-2

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 88 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87

AND AMENDMENT NO. 88 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-89

TXU ELECTRIC

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated April 25, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated July 31 and August 23, 2001, TXU Electric (the licensee or TXU) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes would revise TS 3.8.1 for alternating current (AC) Sources, Operating, to extend the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) for restoration of an inoperable offsite circuit from 72 hours to 21 days on a one-time basis. The supplemental letter dated August 23, 2001, provided clarifying information that did not change the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) staff's proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 46482, September 5, 2001).

2.0 BACKGROUND

The CPSES electrical output is connected to the 345 kilovolt (kV) transmission system via the CPSES switchyard. The startup and shutdown power for CPSES, Units 1 and 2, are derived from the 138 kV and 345 kV systems. Separate connections to the 138 kV and 345 kV switchyards provide independent and reliable offsite power sources to the Class 1E systems. The network interconnections are made through five 345 kV and two 138 kV transmission lines to the TXU electric grid.

Two physically independent and redundant sources of offsite power are available on an immediate basis for the shutdown of either unit. The preferred power sources supply power to the Class 1E buses during plant startup, normal operation, emergency shutdown, and upon a unit trip. The preferred source to Unit 1 is the 345 kV offsite supply from the 345 kV switchyard through the Startup Transformer XST2; the preferred source to Unit 2 is the 138 kV offsite supply from the 138 kV switchyard through the Startup Transformer XST1. Each of the Startup Transformers (XST1 and XST2) are normally energized by its related 6.9 kV AC Class 1E

buses. In the event one startup transformer becomes unavailable to its normally fed Class 1E buses, power is made available from the other startup transformer by an automatic transfer.

Each transformer has the capacity to supply the required Class 1E loads of both units during all modes of operation. The design basis load capability of each Startup Transformer includes both of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses in both units, assuming an accident in one unit and the orderly shutdown and cooldown of the second unit. In the event that all offsite power sources become unavailable, redundant emergency diesel generators (EDGs) will power the ESF buses.

The standby onsite AC power systems at CPSES are designed to provide reliable and adequate power for Class 1E loads to ensure safe plant shutdown in the event that preferred and alternate power sources are not available. Four independent EDG sets, two per unit, are provided at CPSES. The EDGs are physically and electrically independent. With this arrangement, no single failure can jeopardize the proper functioning of redundant ESF loads. EDGs are automatically started by a safety injection signal or an under-voltage signal on the 6.9 kV ESF bus served by the EDG. Sequential loading of the EDG is automatically performed.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

In reviewing the licensee's proposed change to TS 3.8.1, the NRC staff has reviewed the proposed changes from a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), as well as a deterministic perspective. Section 3.1 of this evaluation addresses the deterministic aspects of the proposed changes. The probabilistic aspects of the amendment are addressed in Section 3.2.

#### 3.1 Deterministic Evaluation

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1, Action 'A' currently requires, in part, that if one required offsite power circuit (in this case, a transformer) is inoperable, that the required offsite circuit be restored to Operable status within 72 hours. A plant shutdown, to cold shutdown conditions, is required if the transformer is not restored to operable status within 72 hours. The licensee has proposed to extend the AOT for restoration of an inoperable offsite circuit from 72 hours to 21 days on a one-time basis. This change would allow for a one-time preventive maintenance outage on Startup Transformer XST2 to be completed by February 28, 2002. This change is needed to ensure the continued long term reliability of Startup Transformer XST2.

Under the current TS requirements, both CPSES units would need to be in a cold shutdown state simultaneously for an extended period of time in order to perform maintenance on Startup Transformer XST2. This is because Startup Transformer XST2 provides one of the two TS-required offsite power sources to Units 1 and 2, and both units are required to maintain two offsite power sources when above cold shutdown. Based on the licensee's experience with similar transformers, the proposed preventive maintenance could not be completed within the current outage time limit of 72 hours. The licensee intends to use the proposed completion time to perform the planned maintenance of Startup Transformer XST2. The licensee states that the proposed outage time of 21 days is adequate to perform disassembly of the transformer and to perform post-maintenance and operability tests required to return the offsite circuit to operable status. The transformer will be returned to service and declared operable following completion of the transformer maintenance.

In the supplemental letter dated August 23, 2001, the licensee stated that regular inspections of site transformers by CPSES Electrical Maintenance personnel have identified several current oil leaks, though minor, from Startup Transformer XST2, and suspect that the Startup Transformer XST2 low side bushings are the likely source of the oil leakage. Startup Transformer XST1 has a different manufacturer and type and is not exhibiting similar leakage.

The refueling outages for CPSES are planned for either the spring or fall of next year during lower power periods. The licensee stated that reduced atmospheric stability during spring weather conditions contributes to decreased grid stability and increased risk of LOOP. This would suggest waiting for the fall outage as the single available work window, which would defer the maintenance another year. The proposed November 2001 outage schedule anticipates the most favorable weather conditions for the duration of the work, conducive to the performance of the mostly outdoor transformer maintenance tasks. Also, this time window is well past the summer peak and prior to winter weather ice storms (providing the optimum grid conditions).

The licensee has experience with similar type transformers installed in the TXU transmission system. Based on this experience, the licensee has determined that all bushing presently in service on Startup Transformer XST2 should be replaced to ensure the long term reliability of the transformer. The licensee has successfully performed the recommended maintenance on similar transformers in the TXU transmission system.

In addition, the licensee stated that Startup Transformer XST2 will be returned to service and declared operable as soon as possible following completion of the transformer maintenance, which is expected to be completed in 14 days; however, the proposed extension should provide sufficient margin to ensure the required AOT is not challenged due to unforeseen or unpredictable circumstances that may arise during the course of the maintenance. Also, the licensee stated that, during the most limiting state of maintenance, it has estimated that the transformer could be reassembled and placed in service within a maximum of five days, should the need arise.

The licensee will be implementing the following compensatory measures during the extended outage of Startup Transformer XST2:

1. The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) will be applied throughout the duration of the extended outage. This will ensure that equipment identified as important to LOOP and Station Blackout considerations will be administratively controlled and protected to insure that the equipment, including the EDGs, the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Systems, Station Service Water Systems, and Blackout Sequencers, assuming both units are at-power, remain operable for the duration of the planned XST2 Startup Transformer maintenance outage.
2. Switchyard access will be controlled. All activity in the switchyard will be closely monitored and controlled. No activity in the switchyard will be allowed that could challenge the operability of the remaining offsite power circuit.
3. To minimize risk during the planned outage of Startup Transformer XST2, maintenance and testing of the EDGs or the 6.9 kV safety buses will not be conducted.

4. Surveillance testing of key equipment will be performed prior to removing Startup Transformer XST2 from service.
5. Controls will be in place to limit maintenance and testing on equipment important to mitigating risks.
6. Necessary personnel will be pre-assigned and verified available.

In view of the current condition of Startup Transformer XST2, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's proposal to perform maintenance on the transformer in the November 2001 time frame, rather than waiting until the next refueling, is appropriate. The NRC staff believes that precluding testing and maintenance of other electrical systems during the extended outage will reduce the probability of station blackout at CPSES during the extended outage.

### 3.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Evaluation

The NRC staff reviewed the use of the PRA model that the licensee utilized to evaluate the proposed extension of the AOT for Startup Transformer XST2. The Safety Monitor computer program was used for easier quantification of various configurations required to support this submittal. Baseline comparisons of the Safety Monitor model results and the CPSES PRA model evaluated using the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)-CAFTA code baseline results were completed, with good correlation being indicated between the two quantification methods. Additionally, the Safety Monitor program has an extremely large breadth of industry use and acceptance, and the CPSES PRA model has had NRC staff review as noted in Appendix A of the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation (SE) related to the CPSES Risk-Informed Inservice Testing Program dated August 14, 1998.

The CPSES PRA internal events model does not include contributions from internal fires, internal floods, seismic events, and other external events. Due to the common cause nature of these events and the fact that the increased Completion Time (CT) or AOT impacts only risk contributions of independent component unavailabilities, inclusion of floods, fires, and external events would not impact the conclusions of this evaluation. While such contributions, if added, would make small contributions to the baseline Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release (LERF), the changes in CDF and LERF due to the increased CT would be very small.

Regarding the extension of the AOT for Startup Transformer XST2, if the XST2 Startup Transformer is taken out of service for maintenance, both units are affected since Startup Transformer XST2 also functions as a backup to Startup Transformer XST1. The increase in risk results in an additional CDF contribution of  $1.90\text{E-}6/\text{year}$  for Unit 1 and  $1.93\text{E-}6/\text{year}$  for Unit 2.

Corresponding additional LERF contributions are  $4.20\text{E-}8/\text{year}$  for Unit 1 and  $3.60\text{E-}8/\text{year}$  for Unit 2. The nominal at-power incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) values are  $1.09\text{E-}7$  and  $2.42\text{E-}9$ , both below the guideline values of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications," August 1998. The increased CDF and LERF contributions are small, based upon risk graphs contained in

RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," July 1998.

The results of the licensee's analyses indicate that the net change in core damage probability is reduced when Startup Transformer XST2 maintenance is completed at-power, rather than a planned shutdown, and thus presents a lower overall risk. It should be noted that the conditional core damage probability from Mode 1 to Mode 4 and return (the transition risk), corresponding to a shutdown of the facility and subsequent return to power, is of the same magnitude as performing the maintenance at-power. The results are based on single unit risk, i.e., Unit 1 being forced to shut down to perform this planned preventive maintenance. When dual unit risk is considered, assuming both units transition to shutdown to perform this maintenance, the risk is essentially doubled.

The licensee has a program to evaluate the risk associated with the combined outage of various combinations of equipment. The licensee has put in place a set of administrative guidelines that go beyond the limitations set forth in the plant TSs to avoid or reduce the likelihood of risk-significant configurations from either emergent or planned work. These guidelines control configuration risk of equipment out-of-service during all modes of operation to assure that the plant is always being operated within acceptable risk guidelines.

The licensee employs a conservative approach to at-power maintenance. The weekly schedules are train/channel based, prohibiting the scheduling of opposite train activities without additional review, approval, and/or compensatory actions. The assessment process further minimizes risk by restricting the number and combination of systems/trains allowed to be simultaneously unavailable for scheduled work. Unplanned or emergent work activities are factored into the plant's projected condition, and the risk level is evaluated. Based on the results of this evaluation, decisions pertaining to what, if any, actions are required to achieve an acceptable level of risk (component restoration/invoking compensatory measures) are made. The unplanned or emergent work activities are also evaluated to determine impact on planned activities and the impact that system/train outage combinations would have on risk.

The licensee has evaluated the risk-significant components when Startup Transformer XST2 is out-of-service. The licensee provided the following list of risk-significant components and/or systems whose simultaneous unavailability would likely place the plant in a high-risk configuration:

- Electric Power-AC and direct current power distribution, both trains
- The redundant Startup Transformer
- Service Water-Both Trains
- EDGs

The PRA included consideration of external events, of which the two important classes are fire and tornado. The following events appear in the majority of the dominant fire scenarios:

- Reactor Coolant Pump seal failure with resulting small Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), following loss of Component Cooling Water.

- Small LOCA due to a stuck-open Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) or safety relief valve.
- Operator error in controlling the PORVs.
- Operator failure to isolate shutdown equipment from the effects of a fire.
- Operator failure to properly align or restore core-cooling systems.

No improvements were determined in the licensee's fire Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), as documented in the NRC staff SE dated July 8, 1999, as being necessary to further reduce the fire risk at CPSES. Additionally, no vulnerabilities associated with tornado events were identified in the licensee's IPEEE. Hence, no plant improvements or commitments related to tornado events are planned by the licensee.

For the following reasons, prior probabilistic evaluations support, in the NRC staff's judgment, the licensee's 21-day CT request for Startup Transformer XST2. Taking a startup transformer out-of-service for maintenance affects both units, since Startup Transformer XST1 functions as a back-up to Startup Transformer XST2. The increase in CDF is approximately  $1.9E-06$ /year, while the increase in LERF is approximately  $4.2E-08$ /year. These risk increases associated with the proposed 21-day Startup Transformer XST2 CT are considered small (RG 1.174). Additionally, the ICCDP and ICLERP are within the guideline values of RG 1.177.

Additionally, the licensee's instantaneous CDF and LERF values are both within the ranges normally seen during routine planned test and maintenance activities. The licensee further controls risk by measures taken as part of the CRMP, that is, by restricting the number and combinations of systems/trains allowed to be simultaneously unavailable for scheduled work.

### 3.3 Conclusions Regarding the Evaluation of Deterministic and PRA Aspects

The NRC staff has not deterministically established an independent basis to judge whether the the proposed Startup Transformer XST2 AOT has a lower risk when it is conducted during a forced or planned shutdown compared with the proposed maintenance with both CPSES units remaining at-power. The proposed increase in the AOT, from 72 hours to 21 days, is supported by the licensee's specific PRA. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's risk analysis demonstrates that whether the Startup Transformer XST2 maintenance is conducted during a forced or planned shutdown, the risk for these conditions is higher than that of the at-power risk. Accordingly, the proposed extension of the AOT for Startup Transformer XST2 is acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (66 FR 46482, dated September 5, 2001). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors:       O. Chopra  
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Date: October 9, 2001